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This thesis argues that early Christians actively engaged rhetoric and symbols
of monotheism in diverse literary strategies as an ideological tool for resisting,
repositioning, and rereading Judaism in order to shape their own collective identity
from 100 to 200 CE (ch. 1). Belief and confession of one God provides an important
basis for social comparison between Jews and Christians because it represents a
fundamental Jewish identity marker also shared by Christians (ch. 2). A survey of
divine unity and uniqueness rhetoric in early Christian literature revealed three broad
trajectories in which monotheistic motifs assumed significance in shaping Christian
literature and thereby the production of "Christianness" itself. This thesis examines
specific moments in each trajectory that highlight particularly well the functionality
of monotheism in the process of forming Christianness relative to Judaism.
Ignatius of Antioch provides the first example (ch. 3). The literary shaping of
Philadelphians and Magnesians reveals that for Ignatius what fundamentally
distinguished "Judaism" and "Christianism" was not monotheism but their respective
response to the revelation of God through Jesus in the gospel. Monotheism was not a
tool for classifying difference but a powerful weapon for resisting threatening Jewish
influence within the Christian church. Only as an element of resistance brought to
bear on an already established "Judaism"-"Christianism" divide did monotheism
represent, reflexively and secondarily, a means of shaping Christian identity.
Another trajectory overtly utilized "knowledge" of the one God as primary
criterion for indexing sameness and difference between Christianity, Judaism, and
other groups (ch. 4). Kerygma Petrou and Aristides' Apology employ such
monotheistic classification strategies to situate Christianity in a global framework
alongside other religious and/or ethnic collectivities. Both texts locate the "newness"
of Christianity alongside the more well-known status of Jews. In so doing, they
effectively reposition Judaism within the global framework of religious and ethnic
groups to clarify and legitimate the meaning of belonging to Christian identity.
Some Christians employed "two powers" hermeneutic strategies to reinterpret
Jewish scriptural traditions of exclusivist monotheism by insinuating into scripture a
second figure, Jesus, alongside the one God (ch. 5). Aristo's Disputation ofJason
and Papiscus and Justin's Dialogue demonstrate awareness that the scriptures are
shared intellectual property and the proper locus for Christian-Jewish debate. "Two
powers" interpretations thus reflect conscious attempts to reread Jewish monotheistic
textual traditions in a new way. Through them an entire reconstruction of the
symbolic universe of monotheism can take place in explicitly Christian terms.
These diverse strategies reveal a complex network of early Christian literary
production that used monotheistic symbols and rhetoric as an implement to resist,
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"God is one, and there are many gods."1 It is not surprising that the man who
articulated this aphorism was himself a popularizer of Platonic philosophy. Maximus
of Tyre's concern to describe the divine nature in terms of unity and plurality reflects
not only that of his contemporary intellectuals but of the common folk as well.
Antique Graeco-Roman religion was permeated with a concern for issues of divine
unity and plurality. Whether an adherent to one of the traditional Roman cults,
flourishing mystery religions, or philosophic schools, or to the historic and time-
honored Jewish faith, it was impossible to escape some conception of the divine
closely linked to cultic worship in terms of "one" or "many," of divine unity and
plurality/exclusivity. If religious or exposed to religion at all, as was everyone in the
ancient Empire, one was in daily contact with certain metaphysical and confessional
commitments related to concepts of divine unity and plurality ("one God," "many
gods," "Great God," "Most High God," etc.).
1. The "Jesus Problem" and Early christian Monotheism
Within this context, early Christian confession of belief in one God who had
revealed himself uniquely through the person of Jesus was something of an oddity. In
particular, the early and popular strain of Christian monotheism2 which worshipped
Jesus alongside the one God did not fit readily into the monotheistic (or
monolatrous) construct of early Judaism, however diverse the latter was in religious
expression and experience.3 Nor did the adamant Christian denial of the efficacy or
reality of all other "gods" but one4 readily lend itself to irenic co-existence alongside
1 Maximus of Tyre, Who is God according to Plato 17.5: 6eo<; ei<; kcci 6eoi noXKox. Unless
otherwise noted, all translations of foreign languages are the author's.
2 The question of what constitutes "monotheism" is addressed in ch. 2 § 1.
3 Both in his Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids;
Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 2003) and in his earlier One God, One Lord: Early Christian
Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), Larry Hurtado called
attention to the very real nature of the historical problem raised by christological monotheism within
an early Jewish religious matrix. None of the categories found in early Judaism for a second divine
figure alongside the one God (hypostatizations, principal angels, exalted patriarchs) seems readily to
fit the pattern of early Christian Jesus-devotion without some significant "mutation."
4
By demoting pagan deities to demonic status or by denying their existence altogether.
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the popular polytheistic cults of its pagan neighbors. Christological monotheistic
practice raised manifold questions which did not go unnoted by Jews or pagans. How
could Christians confess the unique existence of one, and only one, God and yet
simultaneously worship Jesus as divine or venerate him as an exalted figure
alongside the one God? How does the divinity and/or exalted status of Jesus coincide
with God's unity? Quite simply, these are two aspects of a single problem that lay at
the core of many (and, arguably, most) early Christian communities—How does the
person of Jesus relate to early Christian confessions of God's unity and unique
existence as the "only God?"5 The perceived incongruity between early Christian
monotheism (i.e., devotion to one God and Jesus) and more traditional presentations
and practices of Jewish monotheism and pagan polytheism we label the "Jesus
problem."
Cast in this way, the "Jesus problem" appears primarily theological. Yet its
outworking was not the exclusive preserve of Christian intellectuals with their
theoretical propositions. Very early on, the juxtaposition of "one God, one Lord" had
become part of Christian cultic idiom, and devotion to a second, exalted figure
within the context of monotheistic worship somehow enthused and attracted ordinary
people not as philosophical proposition but as religious confession.6 Christians
worshipped one God in a different expression (sc. via Jesus) than previously known
by Jews or pagans. In light of the importance of cultic behavior in antiquity, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that the idea and practice of Christian monotheism touched
the mundane sphere of everyday Christian social intercourse with pagans and Jews.
Christian monotheism, with its inherent conceptual and cultic difficulties regarding
divine unity and uniqueness, must have manifested itself in the most practical of
ways and the most varied of contexts—on the streets, in the marketplace, within
places of worship—as Christians sought to work out their shared cultic confession of
"one God, one Lord" in terms of wider social realities.
How did Christians make use of monotheistic ideas and symbols in mundane
social contexts, and more importantly, for what ends? What political, social,
economic motives were operative in early Christian monotheism? In what ways did
Christians appropriate monotheism as a power system, as an ideology? These are
5 The question, in a different form, was posed by the pagan Celsus (Origen, Cels. 8.12) and
was placed by Justin on the lips of the Jew Trypho {Dial. 55.1).
61 Cor 8:6; 1 Tim 2:5; Eph 4:5-6.
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important questions about the social function of early Christian monotheism, which
have all too often been neglected. Providing satisfactory answers would require a
host of scholarly books, monographs, and articles. The present thesis represents a
single contribution in this regard.
This thesis explores Christian use of monotheism vis-a-vis Jews within the
second century. We argue that during the second century Christians actively engaged
rhetoric and symbols of monotheism in diverse literary strategies as a powerful
ideological tool for resisting, repositioning, and rereading Judaism and Jewish
traditions in order to shape their own peculiar collective identity. The monotheistic
techniques of resisting, repositioning, and rereading Judaism were unearthed first by
examining a generous sampling of second-century Christian literature to excavate
rhetorical and literary practices respecting divine unity and uniqueness language.7
They emerged as the product of a single heuristic question posed to the literature:
How did second-century Christian communities utilize concepts of divine uniqueness
and unity literarily vis-a-vis Judaism and Jewish traditions? Or, reformulated, how
did Christians technically engage the idea of monotheism with respect to Judaism in
their literature? In keeping with the desired social emphasis of this thesis, a second
question was asked of the emergent techniques: For what social ends did Christians
strategically utilize these techniques? What makes them strategies rather than simply
techniques?8 This question is dynamic. There are many ways to approach it. In this
thesis, we offer an interpretation of the rhetorical and conceptual techniques of
Christian monotheism as literary and ideological strategies by which Christian
communities framed a sense of who they were as distinct from other social
groupings. Among the many concepts available for Christians to identify themselves
as similar or dissimilar to Jews, monotheism figured prominently.
The ultimate desideratum of this thesis is then some elucidation of the social
functions which the concepts of divine unity and uniqueness assumed within the
"symbolic universe" of early Christianity as it relates to Jews during the second
7
"Technique" includes the syntactic forms and rhetorical structures of divine unity and
exclusivity language (see Hans Rechenmacher, »Aufier mir gibt es keinen Gott!« Eine sprach-und
literaturwissenschaftliche Studie zur Ausschliefilichkeitsformel [ATSAT 49; St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag,
1997] 161-76) with which Christians express concepts of divine unity and uniqueness. "Technique"
further includes the discursive logic in which this language is used vis-a-vis Judaism, in this case, to
resist, reposition, and reread Judaism.
8 "Strategy" indicates use of a technique(s) for some end. It is vectorial—with direction
(internal logic) and magnitude (intended purpose). In this thesis, we interpret the strategy (i.e.,
intended goal) of the monotheistic techniques in terms of identity construction.
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century. After an overview of various prior approaches to the study of early Christian
monotheism (§2), we summarize the approach (§3) and chapters of this thesis (§4).
2. Approaches to the Study of Early Christian Monotheism
The best way to clarify the methodology and scope of this thesis is to situate
it in the context of the varied heuristic approaches and concerns of prior scholarly
research on early Christian monotheism. The present section does not evaluate all
technical works on early Christian monotheism. The body of literature is simply too
vast. Rather, we uncover heuristic strands within scholarly literature that seeks to
articulate the phenomena of early Christian monotheism. By delineating common
approaches to the analysis of Christian monotheism, the creative and nuanced value
of the present study becomes clear.
Studies of early Christian monotheism have proceeded along five
methodological lines: ideational-theological, social-descriptive, social-explanatory,
social-scientific, and historical-universalizing. The first three may be classified as
"historical-critical" (§2.1), while the latter two have their own respective techniques
(§2.2) and concerns (§2.3). Further delimitation of these methods into five groups
follows their particular emphases and concerns as seen through the kinds of
questions they ask. The particular methodological direction of this thesis is explained
more fully in the conclusion to this section (§2.4). The following studies, though they
do not constitute a comprehensive listing of literature on early Christian monotheism,
are more than mere representative samples. Most are among the more important
works produced on Christian monotheism, and they have all played an important role
in the formation of this thesis.
2.1 Historical-CriticalStudies
Works of the ideational-theological, social-descriptive, and social-
explanatory types are related in prioritizing the classic historical-critical method9
over other competing interpretive techniques. They rely on the same traditional
9 By which a literary work is subjected to philological, textual, literary, form, and/or
compositional investigation. Among works of this type may also be classed the many linguistic and
literary studies that highlight some aspect of monotheism or monotheistic rhetoric. E.g., Catrin H.
Williams, / am He: The Interpretation of'Ant Hu' in Jewish and Early Christian Literature (WUNT
2.113; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 2000) and David Ball, 'I Am' in John's Gospel:
Literary Function, Background, and Theological Implications (JSNTSup 124; Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1996).
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historical-critical analytic technique(s), and every work of this category seeks some
measure of historical and social description related to early Christian monotheism.
Yet there are discernable emphases sufficient to warrant their distinction, particularly
based upon the relative emphasis they place on the "social" side of this equation.
They are separated here for heuristic purposes according to the following criteria. If a
work describes the development or maintenance of early Christian monotheism
almost entirely in terms of an intellectual or theological endeavor, the most accurate
descriptor for it is "ideational-theological." Works of this type often contain in some
measure description of social facts, yet they do not emphasize this element. If the
primary emphasis of a scholarly investigation rests on describing the broader social
environment (cultic, conceptual, economic, political, etc.) within which Christian
monotheism emerged and thrived, the designation "social-descriptive" is apropos.
Insofar as a work extends this concern for social-description to an interpretive
attempt at integrating Christian monotheism with other ancient social-forces, factors,
and structures in cause-and-effect relations, a study is most appropriately labeled
"social-explanatory."
2.1.1 ideational-Theological
With few exceptions the scholarly study of early Christian monotheism has
been one of the production, development, and spread of monotheism as an idea or
concept. Studies of this type may be multiplied indefinitely by reference to any of the
classic works on early Christian theology, particularly sections on the doctrine of
God.10 We content ourselves to a few key investigations which have emphasized the
conceptual side of divine unity and/or exclusivity in particular.
Important among ideational-theological studies is Gerhard Delling's 1952
article "MONOI OEOZ."u Delling evaluates the exclusivity expression "God
alone" (povoq Qeoq=monos theos) in antiquity. Unfortunately, given the brevity of
treatment, his article provides only general highlights of the use of this type of
exclusivity language in antiquity. This seeming weakness, however, also proves to be
a strength. Delling's primary contribution comes in the synthesizing and generalizing
10 E.g., G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (2d ed.; London: SPCK, 1952); J.N.D. Kelly,
Early Christian Doctrines (5th rev. ed.; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1978); and Jaroslav
Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development ofDoctrine. Volume 1: Emergence of
the Catholic Tradition (100-600) (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
11 TLZ 8 (1952): 470-76.
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process, so clearly presented at the beginning of his article, where he categorizes the
antique monos r/zeos-expressions under three viewpoints—the superlative uses of
polytheistic piety, the philosophical clauses (Satze), and the predications of
monotheistic religion. Though he confesses that these categories are not without
exception in every case, Delling nevertheless provides a valuable service in
highlighting basic rubrics. These are, however, just that—basic rubrics, and little
more; the categorization corresponds generally to what one would expect from
ancient religion, that is, paganism, philosophical works, and Jewish and Christian
monotheism. Any attempt, however, to force the data consistently into one of these
categories (e.g., to assume all Jewish usage of this language falls under
"monotheism") only breaks the mold, for the problem comes in the seams of an
historical process that was not nearly so cut and dry as Delling's categories imply.
The ways this language was manifested in Christian monotheism are manifold, and
the general category of "die Pradikationen der monotheistischen Religion," may only
broadly be applied. It does not allow access to historical particulars (which always
provide interesting exceptions!). Further, Delling's curt analysis of the usage of this
language in Christianity is limited to the New Testament, and he does not even
provide an exhaustive list of divine uniqueness rhetoric within that corpus. With
regard to early Christian uses of this language, Delling does helpfully recognize the
special place divine uniqueness language held in first-century Christian worship
contexts.12
A study of lesser importance than Delling's, though generally helpful for
understanding the Jewish background and New Testament uses of divine exclusivity
and unity concepts, is the article composed by E. Stauffer in Gerhard Kittel's
Theologisches Worterbuch}3 True to the theological orientation of the "dictionary,"
the discussion of God's oneness and uniqueness comes not under the entries for etc;
or povoq but under the word 0eoq. Stauffer's article on etq makes only a few
tantalizingly brief comments about the importance of divine unity before redirecting
the reader to the article on 0eo<;.14 No corresponding entry on povoq is to be found,
12
Delling comments, "offenbar hat die MCWO-T-Pradikation ihren besonderen Ort im
christlichen Gottesdienst des I. Jh" (ibid., 476): a brief social-descriptive element in a largely
ideational-theological work!
13 "0eo<;," in Gerhard Kittel, ed., Theologisches Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament (Stuttgart:
W. Kohlhammer, 1950 repr.) 3.65-120.
14 "El?," in Kittel, ibid., 2.432-40.
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though Jesus' oneness with the father is treated briefly elsewhere by H. M. F.
Biichsel.15 Stauffer's treatment (s.v. 0eoq) is relatively extensive and very helpful for
demonstrating many similarities and divergences between Jewish and early Christian
concepts of God, particularly as these relate to divine oneness and exclusivity. His
analysis of these phrases is, of course, subject to all the usual methodological
criticisms leveled against Kittel's Worterbuch,16 but it nevertheless provides valuable
information.
The studies of Delling and Stauffer examine a broad swath of evidence. A
more common approach is reflected in the number of significant studies which
investigate Christian monotheism within a more limited collection of writings. The
works of Joseph Lortz and Eric Osbom take pride of place here. The particular
contribution of the former's article "Das Christentum als Monotheismus in den
Apologien des zweiten Jahrhunderts" was to highlight the singular significance of
monotheism within the theology of the second-century Christian apologists.17 Lortz
observed three characteristics in Christian apologetic literature: (1) The first and
primary issue, viewed as decisive for Christianity's very survival, was whether there
exists one God or many gods; (2) since the essence of Christianity for the apologists
was seen in monotheism, the person of Jesus strongly faded in importance (i.e., was
intentionally suppressed);18 (3) the apologetic literature stresses that the entire
Christian life in its guidelines and various consequences is represented as the fruit of
correct knowledge of and reverence for God, who decisively rules the entire religious
consciousness. Monotheism was the apologetic shibboleth, theologically and
morally.
Eric Osborn's The Emergence ofChristian Theology,19 though not in direct
conversation with Lortz's work, expands upon the latter by demonstrating the
fundamental position that monotheism (in particular the question of divine unity)
obtained in developing a Christian approach to physics, ethics, and logic within the
theologizing of Justin, Irenaeus, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian.
15 "Movoyevty;," in Kittel, ibid., 4.745-50.
16 On methodological criticisms of TWNT, see M. Silva (Biblical Words and Their Meaning:
An Introduction to Lexical Semantics [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994] 24—28).
17 In Albert Michael Koeniger, ed., Beitrage zur Geschichte des christlichen Altertums und
der byzantinischen Literatur: Festgabe Albert Erhard (Bonn; Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder, 1922) 301-27.
18 A point also noted by Kelly (Early Christian Doctrines, 145—47).
19 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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For Osborn the issue of the one God is the central theological problem facing the
enterprise of these early Christian thinkers. From the particular construction of
Christian monotheism shared by these thinkers three significant questions
were—indeed had to be—raised and addressed in rather creative manners: (1) Was
there one God who was both father of Jesus Christ and creator of this world of evil
and chaos; (2) Was Christian faith truly monotheist, seeing that Christians confessed
Jesus as God while maintaining that there was only one God; and (3) What were the
consequences of these affirmations (i.e., how does the one God as first-principle
affect well-known philosophical categories of physics, ethics, and logic?). These
questions provide the structure of earliest Christian theology and of Osborn's work
as a whole.20 According to him, the theological method for answering these issues is
supplied by the philosophy of "metaphysic of mind" (Geistmetaphysik),21 while the
Bible (including NT) offers material for a reasoned account of the one God.22 Osborn
establishes an accurate understanding of Christian theological development as
primarily an academic and ethical exercise in monotheism, and the reader can readily
see the prominent position of divine uniqueness and unity concepts within the
questions that drove second-century theological inquiry.
In one way or another, each of these sources describes the emergence and
spread of early Christian monotheism (in its various forms) primarily in terms of its
significance as a conceptual, intellectual, and theological enterprise. And though
these works frequently reference broader antique conceptions of deity and other
philosophical categories within the Graeco-Roman world, they do not emphasize the
extra-noetic social context as formative in the emergence of early Christian
monotheistic practice or belief. The Christian concepts of divine unity and
exclusivity are (inadvertently?) presented as having sprung—or at least almost
sprung—via the conversations of Christian intellectuals with the theological ideas of
20 Osborn, Emergence, 3. Though, confusingly, in the Preface he states that only the third of
these concerns provides the book's structure. The outworking of Christian monotheism in regard to
three areas of physics, ethics, and logic, however, provides the major rubrics only for chapters four
through eight.
21 In which the multiplicity of Idea-thoughts exists within the mind of the one God. On
Geistmetaphysik see Osborn (ibid., ch. 2) and an unpublished contribution by Will Rutherford
("Middle Platonic Resources for Early Christian Conceptions of Divine Unity" in Graeco-Roman
Philosophy Section of the 2006 International Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature
[Edinburgh]).
22 Osborn, ibid., ch. 3.
8
the ancient world almost entirely without reference to their broader social
significance.
2.1.2 Social-Descriptive
Ideational-theological studies are necessary to demonstrate the intellectual
atmosphere of early Christianity. Yet insofar as they envision the emergence and
perpetuation of Christian monotheism as a primarily noetic endeavor, they fail to
give appropriate weight to other socio-religious, political, or economic factors which
were operative in that process. To focus exclusively or primarily on the theology of
monotheism is to present a portrait of early Christianity which is all head and no
body. Social-descriptive studies help offset this monopodal imbalance by
supplementing conceptual development with description of wider social and societal
factors at work in the rise, spread, and maintenance of Christian monotheism.23
In his Gods and the One God: Christian Theology in the Graeco-Roman
World, Robert Grant provides a prime example of a scholar who focuses on religious
conflict with a view to its consequences for the development of Christian theology
(and of monotheism in particular).24 Though ultimately concerned about
understanding the theological development of monotheism, Grant sets this process
squarely within the broader constraints of the antique socio-religious environment.
Roughly the first third of his book (i.e., parts one and two) is devoted to this subject.
Using the missionary journeys and experiences of the apostle Paul as his staging
point, Grant sets the religious tone of both eastern and western parts of the Roman
empire and uncovers through a variety of primary texts a situation of considerable
diversity in ancient attitudes towards pagan religion (from hostile antagonism to
unquestioning devotion). He adroitly demonstrates the diversity of the ancient
Graeco-Roman religious world—all was not idols, for there were atheists too!
Grant's distinctive contribution comes, however, in setting the emergence of
Christian monotheism within the context of conflict between the one God of
23 Within this category may also be included works that recognize or stress the emergence of
Christian monotheism as one expression within a broader cultural shift towards "monism" or
"monotheism" in the ancient Graeco-Roman world. E.g., Ramsey MacMullen, Paganism in the
Roman Empire (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1981) 83-89; L. Michael White, From
Jesus to Christianity (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2004) 50-52; and W. Schrage, Unterwegs
zur Einzigkeit und Einheit Gottes: Zum "Monotheismus" des Paulus und seiner alttestamentlich-
friihjudischen Tradition (Neukirchen Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2002) 35-43.
24 (London: SPCK, 1986).
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Christian religion and the many gods of Graeco-Roman paganism. His demonstration
from primary texts is forcefully effective in elucidating the importance of religious
struggle within early, first-century Christian missionary activity. However, in our
opinion, Grant has not made the link between Christianity and anti-idolatry
thoroughly enough for subsequent centuries of pre-Nicene Christianity. His analysis
of the impact of belief in one God on not just the theology but on the missionary
movement of the early Church represents one of the more well-balanced approaches
to this issue; it does justice to the importance of exclusivist monotheism in the
ordinary comings and goings of Christianity (at least as represented in missionary
outreach) as well as in the theological arena.
Another characteristic representative of this category is Erik Peterson's 1926
compendious Eig Qsog: Epigraphische, formgeschichtliche, und religions-
geschichtliche Entersuchungen, which without a doubt represents the classic
expression of scholarship on the use of the Christian acclamation "one God" (elq
Qeoq=heis theos) in antiquity.25 Peterson collects and investigates the ninety-three
Syrian and one-hundred and three Egyptian epigraphs discovered by the mid-1920s
which bear the inscription elq Geocg, in an attempt to understand the significance of
the Christian lapidary formula and to piece together its etiology and social function.
The genius of Peterson's analysis lies in his connecting of the heis theos-formula of
Christian epigraphs with the heis //leos-acclamations of the Christian miracle-
narratives and martyrologies. In so doing, he demonstrates that the heis theos
formula did not arise in oriental liturgy but in the popular antique (not only
Christian) practice of collective, enthusiastic, repetitious shouting of a formulaic
utterance (sc. acclamation). The formula did not arise out of confessional concerns
but from practical social situations in which it was perceived as necessary by an
individual or crowd to invoke apotropaically the supremacy and power of the
Christian God. Heis theos thereby becomes frequently a magical formula appearing
on everything from tombstones, household doorways, porticos, and windows, to
smaller personal items—amulets, stamps, seals, rings, dolls, etc. Peterson's socially-
informed etiology of course holds direct implications on the meaning of the phrase
heis theos. The common Christian practice of publicly and privately acclaiming "eiq
25 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1926). The work is scheduled for 2008 reprint by
Echter Verlag with an introduction by Christoph Markschies. Cf. also Erik Peterson, "Eig Oedg als
Zirkusakklamation in Byzanz," ThLZ 52 (1927): 493-95; non vidi.
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0eoq" reaches its Hdhepunkt beyond the second- and third-centuries (outside the
scope of this thesis).
The studies of Grant and Peterson are characterized in their own peculiar
ways by a concern to situate early Christian monotheism within a much wider
antique social context.26 As they emphasize description of the broader socio-religious
context within which Christian monotheism emerged and flourished, these studies
are "social-descriptive." Studies of this type are critical for situating early Christian
monotheism both within the wider thought world and preexisting social structures of
antiquity.
2.1.3 Soci'al-izxplanatorii
Still other historical-critical studies go beyond social-description and attempt
a cause-and-effect linking between preexisting social categories and some aspect(s)
of early Christian monotheism. Studies of the "social-explanatory" type attempt to
explain the occurrence of particular monotheistic phenomena on the basis of socio-
religious influences or other functional social categories from the larger antique
environment. The boundary between social description and explanation is often quite
thin. The latter requires the former. Links of cause-and-effect cannot be made until
ideational-theological and social-descriptive processes have been thoroughly
catalogued. Peterson's explanation of the acclamatory function of the "one God"
formula, for example, stands on the cusp between social description and explanation.
Yet, his work remains typically descriptive, emphasizing, for example, that
Christians used "one God" amulets for theurgic purposes. He does not attempt to
provide a mechanism for understanding why theurgy was sociologically perceived as
necessary or by what mechanism an acclamation of "one God" could emerge into a
theurgic use on magical amulets.27 The social-explanatory strategy attempts such
interpretations.
The concern to elucidate and attribute causation and consequence between
Christian monotheistic symbol systems and broader social phenomena is particularly
strident in the growing body of literature dedicated to explaining the rise of devotion
26 Also Robert L. Wilken "Toward a Social Interpretation of Early Christian Apologetics,"
CH 39 (1970): 437-58, though not explicitly concerned with monotheism.
27 He does, however, intuit that the amulet-wearer subjectively-perceives that evil forces
threaten his or her life in some form and therefore require appropriate (i.e., magical) means of
vitiating those forces.
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to Jesus within the context of early Jewish religion. Works such as Larry Hurtado's
One God, One Lord and more recently his Lord Jesus Christ, Lauren Stuckenbruck's
Angel Veneration and Christology,28 and Richard Bauckham's God Crucified and
"The Throne of God" reflect this category.29 In one way or another each of these
works attempts to situate the religious phenomenon of early Christian devotion to
Jesus firmly within the broader socio-religious thought-world and cultic practice of
early Jewish "monotheism." Yet they go further and offer potential mechanisms for
how the worship of Jesus alongside one God could have arisen from within the
context of early Jewish "monotheism." They point to the emerging importance of
secondary divine agencies for many early Jewish circles. A strong interest in
secondary divine hypostatizations and exalted patriarchs alongside the growing
importance of—and devotion to?—principal angels within early Jewish religion has
certain similarities to early Christian worship of a second divine figure. Hurtado
doubts whether secondary exalted figures were ever publicly and cultically
worshipped by Jews of the second Temple era. He attempts to explain the emergence
of Jesus-devotion in early Christianity in terms of a "genetic mutation," related to
early Judaism yet clearly different in terms of cultic practice. Bauckham, on the other
hand, envisions earliest Christians as actively locating Jesus within the already well-
established Jewish understanding of God in terms of his unique identity vis-a-vis all
other created reality.30
Each of these works is concerned not merely with describing a monotheistic
phenomenon (in this case, Jesus-devotion). Rather they occupy themselves with
expounding an etiology for this phenomenon, with explaining how cultic devotion to
a second exalted figure could have occurred within the context of certain preexisting
religious rites, beliefs, and concepts in early Jewish religion. Inasmuch as they are
concerned with explaining the emergence of the phenomenon of Jesus-devotion in
terms ofa social response (intellectual, cultic, or otherwise) or in terms ofa socio-
historical mechanism framed in reference to wider social realia, they represent
28
Angel Veneration and Christology: A Study in Early Judaism and in the Christology of the
Apocalypse ofJohn (WUNT 2.70; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1995).
29 God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament (Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdmans, 1999); "The Throne of God and the Worship of Jesus," in The Jewish Roots of
Christological Monotheism (JSJSup 63; Leiden: Brill, 1999) 43-69.
30 "In this way they develop a kind of christological monotheism which is fully continuous
with early Jewish monotheism but distinctive in the way it sees Jesus Christ himself as intrinsic to the
identity of the unique God" (Bauckham, God Crucified, 26-27).
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works of a "social-explanatory" type. Such works owe much to ideational-
theological and social-descriptive methods, yet their primary emphasis lies in
bringing explanatory power to bear on monotheistic phenomena.31 Works of this type
are important for the kinds of social questions and concerns they manifest and for the
creative attempts to effect a broader synthesis of data respecting early Christian
monotheism. The success of an author's interpretive proposals, however, rests upon
the relative accuracy of his or her detailed preparatory study of an historical-critical
nature (ideational-theological and social-descriptive).
2.2 Social-Scientific Studies
In the attempt to integrate and explain aspects of early Christian monotheism
with certain social forces and factors (conceptual, cultic, economic, political, or
otherwise) in the ancient world, works of a social-explanatory nature presage yet
another category of investigations, social-scientific studies. This relatively new
methodological approach to the study of early Christianity has developed, though not
as yet matured, among certain scholarly circles in the past several decades.32 Like the
social-explanatory approach, advocates of this technique also proceed from careful
study of the historical data to some social interpretation or explanation of that data
(i.e., an interpretive social-description). And they indulge questions and concerns of
an explicitly social quality: What are the social causes and consequences of this or
that symbol system, cultic activity, relationship, etc.? What broadly differentiates the
two methods, however, is the technique used to answer those questions. The social-
explanatory method is marked by the emphatic use of historical-critical apparatus for
making inferences and drawing deductions of a social nature. Yet for scholars of a
social-scientific persuasion the historical-critical method is generally inadequate—or
at least not well-equipped—to provide the type of methodologically-coherent
solutions (i.e., explanations) required by questions concerned with explicating the
31 Garth Fowden's study (Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences ofMonotheism in Late
Antiquity [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993]), though technically outside the time-frame
covered by this thesis—it examines monotheism in Byzantium and Islam—deserves mention as an
example of this type.
32 The roots of this relatively-recent trend go back to the types of questions and concerns
represented in the German religionsgeschichtliche Schule of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and, more importantly, to the methodological approaches of the "Chicago School" of the
1910s and 1920s, with the work of Shailer Mathews and Shirley Jackson Case. An important impetus
was again provided by E.A. Judge (The Social Pattern ofChristian Groups in the First Century
[London: Tyndale, I960]).
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interaction of inter-subjective and structural-objective aspects of human society.
Building on the results and factual evidence provided by historical-criticism, they opt
rather for a judicious application to the historical data of techniques and theoretical
models developed explicitly within the modern social-sciences (e.g., sociology,
anthropology, social psychology) in order to better make sense of the interaction of
social forces and factors that shaped and were themselves shaped by early
Christianity. Key among this type of investigation of early Christian monotheism are
two works by Wayne Meeks.33
In a brilliant study entitled "The Man from Heaven in Johannine
Sectarianism,"34 Meeks presents an anthropologically- and sociologically-informed
analysis of the social function which the mythic pattern of the descending/ascending
heavenly redeemer played within Johannine community.35 Eschewing scholarly
attempts at understanding this redeemer motif almost exclusively in terms of
conceptual explanation,36 Meeks argues that the solution to explaining this motif and
its importance within Johannine literature must come precisely in understanding its
origin and social function qua myth within the community that formulated it.37 His
concern is to shift the interpretive approach away from viewing Johannine literature
"as a chapter in the history of ideas" and towards "questions in the form, What
functions did this particular system of metaphors have for the group that developed
it?"38 He takes as his point of departure certain anthropological attempts to arrive at
the "function of myths in the societies that create them by means of close analysis of
33 The publications of Gerd Theissen also deserve special attention as well as John Gager's
impressive Kingdom and Community: The Social World ofEarly Christianity (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1975), which explores the constitutive social symbols of early Christianity and
evaluates the emergence of Christianity into the dominant religion of the late empire. For bibliography
see Daniel J. Harrington ("Second Testament Exegesis and the Social Sciences: A Bibliography,"
BTB 18/2 [1988]: 77-85) and David M. May (Social Scientific Criticism of the New Testament: A
Bibliography [NABPR Bibliographic Series 4; Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1991]).
M JBL 91 (1972): 44-72.
35 Meeks frames the investigation within the context of prior scholarly attempts to understand
the relationship between the descending/ascending redeemer motif in Johannine christology and that
of some gnostic circles. Though he ultimately "does not attempt a direct answer to that question," he
shifts the issue in such a way as to provide "clues which may be helpful in pursuing that problem"
(citations from ibid., 46 et 71, respectively).
36 Ibid., 49: "It is astonishing that attempts to solve the Johannine puzzle have almost totally




their structure."39 By analyzing the underlying mythic structure of descent/ascent in
Johannine literature, Meeks believes then that he can project the results by means of
analogy to the social function which the mythical pattern of the descending/
ascending redeemer performed within the Johannine community.40
What Meeks observes literarily is that the motif of descent/ascent in the
gospel of John functions to depict Jesus "as the Stranger par excellence,"41 In a
positive sense, the mythic pattern presents Jesus, and Jesus alone, as the one who
descended and ascended from heaven and ipso facto as the only one capable of
revealing divine truth (i.e., exclusivity concept; cf. John 3:13),42 the revelatory
content of which is his (self-attested) identity as heavenly redeemer/revealer. In
every case the mythic pattern is closely linked with Jesus' identity,43 yet it functions
not to identify him as heroic protagonist—as common in other ancient mythic
narratives^—but as someone utterly alien, whose identity is freighted with potential
for misunderstanding.45 At key points in the story, in his discussion with Nathanael
"the true Israelite" (1:51), with Nicodemus "the teacher of Israel" (3:11-14), the
midrash on the bread from heaven (6:30-31), indeed, wherever the motif of ascent
and/or descent occurs, "it is in a context where the primary point of the story is the
inability of the men of 'this world,' pre-eminently 'the Jews,' to understand and
accept Jesus."46 Meeks's engaging discussion of the literary structure of the
descent/ascent pattern in John's gospel ultimately uncovers the dualistic, tensile
nature of the christological myth. Far from being the symbol of unity, representing
the "union of heaven and earth, the spiritual and the physical, eternity and history,
God and man," as many well-respected commentators have posited, the function of
39 Ibid., 48 et n. 15 (bibliography).
40 Ibid., 46.
41 Ibid., 50.
42 Ibid., 60: "The pattern, descent and ascent, becomes the cipher for Jesus' unique self-
knowledge as well as for his foreignness to the men of this world. His testimony is true because he
alone knows 'where I came from and where I am going' (8:14)."
43 Ibid., 60-61: "The descent and ascent of the Son of Man thus becomes not only the key to
his identity and identification, but the primary content of his esoteric knowledge which distinguishes
him from the men who belong to 'this world.'" Again, "[T]he identity of Jesus here, as in the other
examples of the ascent/descent motif which we have examined, is bound up with the pattern of his





the mythic pattern of descent/ascent within the literary structure of John suggests "an
interpretation diametrically opposed."47 "[I]n every instance," Meeks observes, "the
motif points to contrast, foreignness, division, judgment,"48 and, analogously, to a
tensive, hostile, and alienating social setting.
The gospel of John itself reflects the etiology of the community that created
it. The mythic pattern of the descending/ascending redeemer from heaven
recapitulates the community's own story and establishes a pattern of significance to
help the group deal with that history.49 In the misunderstanding of Jesus' identity and
the progressive rejection and alienation of him by "the world" (i.e., the wider Jewish
community) in the Johannine gospel, we see reflected the story of a collective of
those who have gathered around the figure of Jesus and who were beginning to
understand his identity and identify with him, so as to become themselves alien to
this world.50 In short "their becoming detached from the world is, in the Gospel,
identical with their being detached from Judaism," no doubt an image of their
expulsion from and continued hostility towards the synagogue.51 The descending/
ascending heavenly redeemer figure of John thereby provides a symbolic mechanism
by which the Johannine group was able to interpret their social situation as a
beleaguered sectarian movement in conflict with the larger Jewish community and
by which they could legitimate their own isolated social identity in terms of a cosmic
myth.52
In his explanation of social realities by means of analogy to mythic structure,
one might be tempted to view Meeks as engaged simply in social-explanatory
analysis. Yet he consciously appeals to a method outside the scope of historical-
critical analysis to make this jump. As noted above he takes his starting point from
certain anthropological attempts to understand mythic social function in terms of
mythic structure via recognition of mythic signal redundancy (i.e., frequent repetition
47 Ibid., 66-67. Cf. "Only within that dominant structure of estrangement and difference is
developed the counterpoint of unity—between God and Christ, between God, Christ, and the small
group of the faithful."
48 Ibid., 67.
49 Ibid., 68-69: In sum, John "functions for its readers in precisely the same way that the
epiphany of its hero functions within its narratives and dialogues" (emphasis his).
50 "[W]e have in the Johannine literature," Meeks observes, "a thoroughly dualistic picture: a
small group of believers isolated over against 'the world' that belongs intrinsically to 'the things




of variations of the basic mythic structure as means of communicating in light of "the
overwhelming complexity of the total social matrix"). Neither does he stop with the
conclusions gleaned analogously between mythic structure and social realia, but he
embarks further on a sociologically-informed explanation of his interpretation of the
Jesus-figure in the Johannine community. He grounds his analysis of the sectarian,
myth-making character of the Johannine community by appeal to the "sociology of
knowledge," particularly in the shape advocated by Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann.53 It is his specific application of these types of methods which move
Meeks out of the social-explanatory format and into the social-scientific realm.
In a book entitled The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the
Apostle Paul, Meeks makes a further contribution to the study of an aspect of early
Christian belief in "one God, one Lord."54 He devotes a small section of First Urban
Christians to understanding and interpreting the social force of monotheistic belief
within the Pauline churches,55 pursuing his task by asking whether there exist
correlations between belief and confession of one God and social forms in the
Pauline community. Unfortunately, the brevity with which Meeks treats the subject
of monotheism precludes detailed analysis, yet he does a masterful job of
highlighting, even if only briefly, the use of monotheism by Paul and the Paulinists
as a socially-integrative symbol for their churches.
For our purposes, it suffices to note that Meeks is keen to stress the social-
unifying function which results from Christian rites of initiation (baptism) and
solidarity (eucharist)—in which confession of "one God, one Lord" figure.56 Yet he
locates the distinctively social-integrating character of Pauline monotheism not so
much in these rituals as in the nature of monotheistic belief for the structure of the
community. "The one God for the Paulinists is precisely the God of Jews and
gentiles together in one community."57 It is this distinctive—neither Jew, nor
Greek—quality that supplies the unique socially-unifying character of Pauline
monotheism. The belief in one God was formulated by Paul and the Paulinists as
53 Ibid., 70-71.
54 (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1983).
55 Ibid., 165-70, 190.
56 Ibid., 140-63 (passim). "Paul uses the symbolism of the Supper ritual not only to enhance
the internal coherence, unity, and equality of the Christian group, but also to protect its boundaries
vis-a-vis other kinds of cultic association" (op. cit., 160).
57 Ibid., 167.
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having necessary moral consequences for the Christian community. Regarding the
social and moral correlates of belief in one God and the place of the confession in
one God during ritual, it is best to permit Meeks to speak in his own words:
The Pauline Christians believe in one God, sole creator of the universe
and ultimate judge of all human actions. In most respects their
monotheism is exactly that of Judaism: they worship not the highest
God but the only God and regard the deities of other cults as nonexistent
or as antigods, demons. Yet they also accord to the crucified and
resurrected Messiah, Jesus, some titles and functions that in the Bible
and Jewish tradition were attributed only to God. The social correlate is
a network of local groups that wants to be a single "assembly ofGod" in
the whole world. The connections among the local cells are, relative to
size, much stronger than those among Jewish communities of the
Diaspora. Unity is a powerful and constant concern of the leaders, both
in the life of the local assemblies and in the connections among them.
The local group is intimate and exclusive; it has strong boundaries. At
the same time, its members interact routinely with the larger urban
society, and both the local group and the leadership collective are
vigorously expansive.
The one God of the Christians, as of the Jews, is personal and active. His
spirit or, alternatively, the spirit of his Son, acts in, on, and with
individual believers and the whole community. The social correlate is the
intimacy of the local household assembly. A high level of commitment is
demanded, the degree of direct interpersonal engagement is strong, the
authority structure is fluid and charismatic (though not exclusively), and
internal boundaries are weak (but not untroublesome).58
What places Meeks squarely in the social-scientific category is his use of
methods and ethnographic techniques from the field of the social-sciences applied to
antiquity. And, though he does not consistently make use of any one particular
social-scientific method in his interpretation of the Pauline communities, he is,
nevertheless, methodologically aware, describing his application of social-scientific
methods as "eclectic" and "suggestive, rather than generative in the manner of
experimental sciences."59 His discussion of patterns of monotheistic belief and
practice must be understood as comprising only a small portion of a much broader
sociological interpretation of Pauline communities, and Meeks capably navigates the
web of theory and historical data to demonstrate the socially-integrative function of
monotheism in the Pauline communities.
Before moving to the final heuristic approach we should note that the




somewhat fluid. The two are not mutually-prohibitive. Larry Hurtado, for example,
does use certain anthropological models in his "social explanation" of early Jesus-
devotion. We have not ranged his Lord Jesus Christ or One God, One Lord among
social-scientific studies, however, because proponents of the latter are marked by a
more rigorous and sustained application of social-scientific principles and methods
than were felt to characterize these works of Hurtado's. This does not, however,
preclude Hurtado from assuming a different approach elsewhere. His article entitled
"Religious Experience and Religious Innovation in the New Testament," for
example, fits more readily within the social-scientific approach than the social-
explanatory model because of its more rigorous appeal to theoretical models from
anthropology.60
2.3 Historical-UniversalizingStudies
Works in this category distinguish themselves by an overriding concern to
draw implications of a social (usually political) nature from the historical data for
some wider, more totalizing historical scope (hence "historical-universalizing"). Like
their social-explanatory and social-scientific counterparts, historical-universalizing
works integrate and explain some aspect(s) of early Christian monotheism with the
wider social framework of antiquity. What distinguishes them, however, is the
ultimate goal of inquiry, the capacious scope of application, the broader social
purpose(s) for which the historical data are used. The former techniques are
concerned with understanding and explaining the matrix of human social relations
and social phenomena in antiquity. Historical-universalizing studies, on the other
hand, not only integrate the data with the antique life-world but try to achieve more
totalizing deductions from that data for some larger, more universal (and usually
modem political) context.
In addition to his classic analysis of Christian acclamation Elq Oedq, Erik
Peterson has graced us with another contribution to the study of early Christian belief
and social function in his relatively-brief tractate "Der Monotheismus als politisches
Problem."61 This study, however, reaches beyond the socially-descriptive and mildly
60 JR 80 (2000): 183-205; cf. "Lord Jesus Christ," 64-74.
61 In his Theologische Traktate (Munich: Hochland-Bucherei, 1951): 45-147.
"Monotheismus" is largely adapted from two articles previously published by Peterson: "Gottliche
Monarchie," ThQ 112 (1931): 537-64, and "Kaiser Augustus im Urteil des antiken Christentums: Ein
Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Theologie," in Hochland 30 (1932/33) 289-299. There is,
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explanatory format evident in Elg Qeog to investigate—somewhat ambitiously—a
larger "metaphysical-political problem." Peterson's concern is specifically with
identifying the relationship(s) between theology (sc. metaphysics) and politics in
antiquity and early Christianity. Yet not just any theology. His focus is the antique
concept of divine monarchy—belief in one supreme divine first principle—and how
it was related to political forms in antiquity. To this end Peterson traces the reception
history of the concept povapxta 0eof) in antiquity and Christian history to the
Cappadocians.
He first discerns the concept in book twelve of Aristotle's Metaphysics in
which Aristotle, borrowing a passage from the Iliad (2.204f.: oijk aycc0ov
TroknKOipaviri, elq Koipavoq eccco), utilizes a political concept of unity {politischen
Einheitsbegriff) to conclude his theology. This illustration from the political sphere
for the necessity of metaphysical unity in the single first principle represents a "strict
monarchism" in which the supreme deity is portrayed in terms of a Homeric
warrior.62 Peterson cautiously traces modifications of this traditional teaching into the
Pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo, where God is drafted in terms of the Persian
monarch, and particularly to the thought of Alexandrian hellenistic-Judaism, among
which Philo is most notable. Philo reinterprets Jewish monotheism into a "cosmic
monarchy" by fusing the Jewish God with the monarchic principle of Greek
philosophy.63 His portrait of God bears traces of the Persian monarch and the Roman
emperor, and he finds the concept of divine monarchy useful as "a political-
theological propaganda formula" for pedagogical instruction of Jewish proselytes. It
was for Philo ultimately a politically and religiously legitimating concept for the
Jewish race, who were in essence priests for the entire human race.64 Hence, the
however, a marked contrast in Peterson's resistance to the possibility of Christian political theology in
"Monotheismus" over against his more open stance towards that endeavor in the earlier articles.
Rudolf Hartmann ("Die Entstehung des Monotheismus-Aufsatzes," in Alfred Schindler, ed.,
Monotheismus als politisches Problem? Erik Peterson und die Kritik der politischen Theologie
[Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1978] 14-22) has demonstrated how this shift reflects Peterson's own Sitz im
Leben.
62 The term "monarchy" itself does not appear until Philo.
63 Two modifications were made: God is predicated as Creator and avoidance of polytheistic
concept (i.e., officials of the emperor must not be venerated); cf. Hartmann, "Entstehung," 15.
64 Peterson, "Monotheismus," 54-62. "Der »Monarchie«-Begriff des Alexandrinischen
Judentums war letzthin ein politisch-theologischer Begriff, dazu bestimmt, die religiose Uberlegenheit
des jiidischen Volkes und seine Sendung an das Heidentum zu begrtinden" (ibid., 64).
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concept of divine monarchy developed into a "political problem"65 first in Philo, who
shifted it away from the metaphysical inquiry of Aristotelian tradition. From the
influence of this "politico-theological propaganda formula," peculiar to Alexandrian
hellenistic-Judaism, the concept of divine monarchy took hold in early Christian
apology and heresiology and played an integral role in Christian catechetical
instruction and propaganda literature.66
From further diachronic survey, Peterson discerns two relational modes
between metaphysics of divine monarchy and Realpolitik in antiquity.67 There are
first those who construct the metaphysical conception of one God on analogy with a
particular manifestation of political monarchy (sc. "construction" approach). Among
these may be listed the hellenistic-Jew Philo, the Christian apologists Athenagoras
and Tertullian, as well as pagans such as Aristotle, the anonymous author of De
mundo, Maximus of Tyre, Aelius Aristides, and Celsus.68 There are further those that
legitimate a particular political monarchy through identification with the divine
monarchy (sc. "legitimation" approach). Here may be classed Origen and Eusebius.
The ideas of the latter had a prolific Wirkungsgeschichte in later Christian thinkers,
both East and West (cf. John Chrysostom, Ambrosius, Jerome, Orosius). This
legitimation endeavor is acutely characteristic of Eusebius' attempt to interpret the
Pax Augusta in terms of prophetic fulfillment of OT prophecies regarding
Volkerfrieden (e.g., Mic 5:4-5). The rise of Augustus (under whose reign Jesus was
65 It is not clear what Peterson means by "political problem" (he does not define the term). It
appears sometimes that he refers to the political consequences or implications of divine monarchy as a
problem for hellenistic-Jews and Christians, while at other times he seems to indicate that every
attempt to link the metaphysic of divine monarchy with political polity presents a theological
problem. His lack of referential clarity has been criticized; see infra n. 76.
66 Ibid., 62ff.
67 Cf. Ernst L. Fellechner ("Methode und These Petersons als Spiegel dogmatischer
Entschiedungen," in Schindler, ed., Monotheismus, 71-75) for a similar survey. Our analysis differs
from Fellechner's in that we do not believe his third category (sc. construction of polity from
metaphysics) constitutes significant enough a part of Peterson's argument in "Monotheismus" to be
distinctly enumerated. The two relational modes which we posit ("construction," "legitimation") are
evident already in the discussion of the Ps.-Aristotelian De mundo (Peterson, ibid., 53): "[T]he final
formulation of the unity of a metaphysical world-view is always influenced and predetermined (mit-
und vor-bestimmt) by the decision for one of the political possibilities of unity (sc. 'construction').
And yet the other (sc. relation) is immediately clear, that the differentiation of the 'Power' [potestas,
Suvapt^] from the 'Force' [apxp], which the author of De mundo makes, is a metaphysical-political
problem. When God is the prerequisite for the fact that there is potestas [buvapiq], then the one God
becomes the bearer of the auctoritas. Then monotheism becomes the principle of the political
auctoritas (sc. 'legitimation')."
68 Peterson, ibid., 54-62 (Philo), 70-71 (Athenagoras), 68-73 (Tertullian), 49-50 (Aristotle),
50-54 (Ps.-Aristotle), 71 (Maximus of Tyre, Aelius Aristides), 79-81 (Celsus).
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born) ushered in an era of political placidity and the cessation of political pluralism
through the unification of the nations under one monarch. For Eusebius, this was not
only necessary for the spread of the Christian faith, but this historical situation
further received a universalizing interpretation as corresponding to a shift away from
polytheism to belief in one God. What began under Augustus was secured with
Constantine's defeat of Licinius at Milvian Bridge. Constantine stands uniquely
related to the one God for Eusebius. By bringing his monarchical rule into
correspondence with divine monarchy in a universalizing-historical scheme,
Eusebius legitimates imperial rule on the basis of theology. In sum, Peterson gives
the impression that the concept of divine monarchy was linked in antiquity with
every attempt at political theology.69
If Peterson had stopped with the preceding analysis, "Monotheismus" might
appropriately be considered a prime example of a "social-descriptive" monotheistic
study. Yet his final intent is much broader, and what is surprising about the tractate is
the evaluative analysis he ascribes to both political-theological modes—construction
and legitimation—and his further paradigmatic use of this analysis for the endeavor
of modern political theology. Scattered throughout "Monotheismus" one finds
various judgments about the validity of the antique Christian political-theological
endeavor. We see this most clearly in Peterson's analysis of Tertullian70 but also in
the political use of divine monarchy by heretical groups such as the Arians.71
Whenever Christians attempted to build theological patterns of divine monarchy on
the basis ofRealpolitik (i.e., construction), the endeavor ended up (or was quickly
subject to ending up) in some heretical christology (e.g., subordinationism, Arianism;
cf. Praxeas). Further, when the political circumstances of imperial monarchy were
closely linked to the concept of divine monarchy (i.e., legitimation), it would not be
long before historical circumstance and political-theological challenges to orthodox
trinitarian doctrine from heretical groups (e.g., Arianism) would threaten the entire
69 He "politicizes" the concept of "divine monarchy" and moves it into the center of political
theology (Hartmann, "Entstehung," 20).
70 In his discussion of Tertullian, he opines, "Perhaps the uniformity (Geschlossenheit) of the
double principate, which permitted a »participatio imperii», had not permitted him to see that it is
impossible (unmoglich) to simply transfer the secular monarchy concept of pagan theology to the
Trinity, which certainly demands its own conceptual development" ("Monotheismus," 73). And again,
"Our observations have shown that the first attempts to combine the divine monarchy with the




process of political theology in the Roman Empire. Ultimately, neither the drive to
legitimate earthly empire through divine monarchy (Origen, Eusebius, Orosius) nor
to construct theology on the basis of polity (Aristotle, Ps.-Aristotle) worked, since
the concept of divine monarchy when tied to politics (the two were everywhere
united in antiquity)72 was simply incompatible with orthodox doctrine of the trinity.
In every case Christian attempts to unite the doctrine of divine monarchy with the
political sphere failed on theological and historical grounds. Not until after the
development of trinitarian dogma at Nicaea did the concept of divine monarchy lose
its "political-theological character" in the writings of Gregory Nazianzus.73 After
becoming unbound from relations to Realpolitik, divine monarchy could finally be
reconciled theologically (not politically) with orthodox trinitarian doctrine (Gregory
of Nazianzus; cf. Dionysius of Rome).
By showing at every stage of its brief history how the political-theological
concept of divine monarchy could not be reconciled with the orthodox trinity,
Peterson rejects altogether the validity of political theology as a Christian enterprise.
In light of the development of trinitarian doctrine at Nicaea, he does not find it
tenable for a Christian "political theology" to exist, inasmuch as the mystery of
trinitarian doctrine is incompatible with divine monarchy and the latter is always
equated with political theology in antiquity. He encapsulates this in the conclusion,
as follows:
Only on the soil of Judaism or paganism is something like a "political
theology" capable of existing. Christian proclamation of the three-in-one
God, on the other hand, stands opposite Judaism and paganism, because the
mystery of the trinity exists only in the Godhead itself, not in the creation.
Even so the peace which Christ seeks is not granted by any emperor, but is
alone a gift of the one who "is higher than all reason."74
The final allusion to Philippians 4:7 and the peace of God that "surpasses all
reason" grounds his ultimately dogmatic conclusion to this historically-detailed study
in the mysterious and hypernoetic revelation of God. There can be no concourse
between revealed Christian trinitarian doctrine and political theology. The nature of
the trinity is ultimately mysterious and not subject to human development as is
72 Ibid., 102: "Der Monotheismus ist eine politische Forderung, ein Stuck dcr Reichspolitik."





political theology. The latter produces theological difficulties with orthodox
confession. Trinity and divine monarchy can only be resolved theologically.
In the end Peterson draws conclusions from his study of antique political
theology to inform the present enterprise of Christian "political theology." He
dogmatically employs the various historical trajectories of ancient "political
theology" to deny the plausibility of any Christian "political theology" after the
development of orthodox trinitarian doctrine in the early fourth-century, on the basis
that political theology is inconsistent with the divinely-revealed mysterious nature of
trinitarian doctrine.75 In short, Peterson portrays divine monarchy as always having
been a political-theological problem in antiquity; further, neither the antique
constructing or legitimating political-theological functions of divine monarchy
worked because they collided against orthodox trinitarian doctrine! Only by the
transmutation of divine monarchy to an exclusively theological concept can it
become compatible with orthodox trinitarian doctrine, and only in Gregory does
divine monarchy cease being a political-theological problem and becomes an
exclusively theological one.
The dogmatic basis of Peterson's work, his interpretation of historical
sources, and his failure to define "political theology" have been criticized.76 Yet
"Monotheismus" has assumed and still retains an important role in the ongoing
discussion of political theology,77 and the kinds of sociological questions Peterson
asked were foundational to the development of that endeavor. Peterson moved
beyond the social-descriptive and sought to demonstrate how political circumstance
and ideology interacted within early Christianity (sc. social-explanation). Yet he did
not stop there. In his dogmatic application of the social (here, realpolitische) function
of divine monarchy in early Christianity to deny a comprehensive relationship
between trinitarian monotheism and "political theology" in the modern sphere,
Peterson engages in a study of monotheism which may ultimately be classed as
"historically-universalizing."
75 Ibid., 104-05; cf. Schindler, ed., Monotheismus, 9.
76 His work has spawned a multi-contributor edited volume in which his controversial
positions and his treatment of primary sources are investigated: Schindler, ed., Monotheismus. For
definitional criticisms, see Fellechner's contribution to the Schindler volume ("Methode," 71-75, esp.
71 n. 3); cf. supra n. 65. For criticism of his handling of texts, see the discussions of various authors
in Schindler (ibid., 23-70).
77 Most notably in the school of political theology represented by Jfirgen Moltmann and
Johann Metz; cf. Frithard Scholz, "Bemerkungen zur Funktion der Peterson-These in der neueren
Diskussion um eine Politische Theologie," in Schindler, ed., Monotheismus, 170-201.
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One additional work reflects the intersection between monotheism and
sociological approaches in early Christianity, Milan MachoveC's Jesus fur
Atheisten.1* A committed atheist Marxist, MachoveC evaluates the teachings of Jesus
and early Christianity on the basis of their social, political, and moral function—-for
their "bearing on real human problems."79 He begins by locating the thought-world
of Jesus and his first disciples in two principle Jewish religious concerns—
monotheism and prophetic-eschatological message (sc. the announcement of a
coming future age).80 What was distinctive about Jesus was his charismatic moral
power81 and his proclamation of "the demand which the 'future age' makes on men in
the present."*2 His teaching was not merely social or political but existential and
moral,83 insisting on the totalizing claim84 which the vision of the future holds for
"inner conversion" at present.85 In transforming the future eschatological vision into
a quotidian concern for the individual subject—every human "I"—Jesus aligns
himself precisely with the tradition of Mosaic monotheism, which MachoveC also
interprets existentially as a "concern of the subject, of the human 'I.'"86
Long before Jesus Moses introduced an anti-anthropomorphizing program
into Hebrew religion. Since God was no longer viewed as acting in human form, a
new impetus for specifically human action emerged from Mosaic doctrine.87 God's
role was subjectivated, relegated to the inner transformation of the individual, shifted
78 Published by Kreuz Verlag Stuttgart in 1972 and translated into English as A Marxist
Looks at Jesus (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976). All page references are to the English
translation. There is an interesting historical confluence here. Prof. Machovec organized a seminar in
Prague in the early 1960s on Christianity and Marxism at which he crossed paths with the likes of
Moltmann and Metz; cf. supra n. 77 and Peter Hebblethwaite in the introduction to Machovec, A
Marxist Looks at Jesus, 10.
79 Ibid., 191.
80 Ibid., 51-73.
81 Ibid., 85: "Here one must note that Jesus makes no fundamental distinction between 'this'
world and the 'other' world...," and again, "But because Jesus and his first disciples did not draw a
line between this world and the 'other' world, the consequences of his reflections about the Kingdom
of God concern this world, with its history, politics, social situations, and the real longings of real men
for their earthly future."
82 Ibid., 86; emphasis his.
83 Ibid., 97.
84 Ibid., 104: "[E]verything is subordinated to the all-encompassing and powerful idea of the
Kingdom of God with its demands of inner conversion."
85 Ibid., 167.
86 Cf. ibid., 57-62, 88,90.
87 Ibid., 58.
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to a sphere not "of cosmic and natural events but rather that of human self-
awareness, of need, guilt and the possible mission of the man who is thus
addressed."88 God, who no longer acts in human form, now speaks and imposes
moral norms as an external "Thou" upon the individual "I."89 According to
MachoveC this Mosaic move to God as "subject" rather than "object" was essential
for the development of existential human individuation (sc. being "wholly at one
with oneself') and the totalizing prophetic-eschatological tradition so necessary a
part of Jesus' own self-understanding.90 Insofar as Jesus carried forth this mission
there is coincidence with Mosaic monotheism. Jesus' message thereby represents the
synergistic confluence of two ancient Jewish themes—monotheism and prophetic-
eschatological message—yet with only one ultimate goal91—the realization of the
individual's true humanity by inner commitment to the fullness of the present in light
of vision of the future age.
When we come to subsequent Christian generations, however, the process of
messianic and christological interpretation progressively distorts the meaning of
Jesus' message and ministry. For MachoveC this process is expressed particularly
vividly in the gospel of John, in which "the dogmatic basis was prepared for the later
complete identification of Jesus with the Godhead as the 'second divine person' of
the Trinity, while at the same time being truly man."92 The early church—qua that
movement reflecting "the worship of a divinised Jesus"93—shifts from the purity of
Jesus' humanistic ideal. A different function for monotheism thereby emerges in the
early Church than was present in Jesus' preaching, though this distortion to worship
the "God-man" was not entirely "without value for man's self-knowledge, nor was it
simply an error, since it opened up (even though in a way which was remote from the
Galilean Master himself) possibilities of transcendence, of overcoming the status quo
and being open to a more demanding future."94
88 Ibid., 60.
89 Ibid., 61: "[T]he downfall of polytheistic ideas and nature worship is understood in Mosaic
monotheism as the defeat of the divinity of 'things', and therefore as the downfall of God as an
'object'. The divine is transferred exclusively to the realm of the subject and is brought into the







From Jesus' continuation ofMosaic monotheism and its humanizing program
to the later Church's divinization of Jesus, belief in one God takes a key place in
MachoveC's radically humanizing and subjectivized interpretation of monotheism in
Jesus and early Christianity.95 Belief in one God is not treated as an ideology or a
concept per se but only with reference to its function as an historical transition point.
The move to belief in one God becomes for MachoveC a critical first step in the
historical shift away from religion towards human individuation and the humanistic
enterprise of self-discovery—an historical step which ultimately and inexorably
necessitated the transference of the doctrine of God out of the religious realm into
something unreligious, humanistic, and atheistic. Mosaic monotheism conceived
humanism—and what a lengthy delivery it was!
It is difficult to evade the feeling that in aligning Mosaic monotheism and
Jesus' prophetic-eschatological message as allies in an existential turn towards a
moral humanism from which the early church more or less departed by divinizing
Jesus, we tangibly encounter not Moses or Jesus but MachoveC himself, or rather his
own deeply-held humanistic convictions and Sitz im Leben, his personal encounters
with the violence of Stalinism.96 MachoveC crafts a monotheism (and a Jesus)
palatable to a Marxist, yet a Jesus with a heart. What more can we expect from a
committed atheist who methodologically excludes divine transcendence and reduces
everything to a wholly immanent world?97 Despite its faults, Jesus fur Atheisten
provides a service in offering a macro-level historical interpretation of monotheism
and its role in the life and message of Jesus and the early church. MachoveC's study
illustrates the kinds of questions, concerns, and the use of a methodological approach
(Marxist humanism) to questions about the function of monotheism in early
Christianity.
The studies of Peterson and MachoveC make an interesting comparison. Both
link some facet of the social setting of early Christians—for Peterson, the political
Sitz im Leben\ for MachoveC, socio-economic realia—to the concept of early
Christian monotheism. Yet they are concerned with much more than the social
function of monotheism for the life of early Christians, and they do not attempt an
95
Despite the relatively small portion (ibid., 57-62) dedicated to the concept of Jewish
monotheism in Machovec's book we are not overstating the role of monotheism (viewed as a crucial
turn inexorably leading towards humanism) in Machovec's presentation.
96 Hebblethwaite, in ibid., 8-17.
97 Ibid., 15.
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explanation of social facts along the lines of the social-explanatory or social-
scientific approaches. From their respective interpretations of Christian monotheism
Peterson and MachoveC deduce inferences for a more totalizing meta-narrative. Both
have modern concerns which their interpretation of historical data serves. Both move
from historical data via questions of a social nature to a "universalizing"
interpretation. Their interpretations of historical data develop into theological or
dogmatic statements so as to become normative for modern society. In MachoveC the
entire monotheistic endeavor (viewed as shift towards humanism) justifies the
perpetuation of Marxist humanism in the modern era; for Peterson, it vitiates the
possibility of Christian political-theology.
2.AAnalysis
Each of these approaches to the study ofChristian monotheism has its own
distinctive utility. In this section we offer observations on these methods before
isolating and explaining the methodological approach of this thesis in the next
section. First, ideational-theological approaches, insofar as they heuristically limit
the investigation of Christian monotheism to the history of an idea, risk being
reductionistic, while social-descriptive studies, though helpful for clarifying social
context, offer little real explanatory ability. These approaches are descriptive and
scalar. They limit themselves to the presentation and description of conceptual and/or
larger socio-religious trajectories and trends related to early Christian monotheism.
Neither possesses the explanatory power needed to achieve the desideratum of this
thesis, elucidation and explanation of the social function of the concepts of divine
unity and uniqueness in early Christian literature vis-a-vis Jews.
Second, studies of an historical-universalizing type are fraught with perilous
methodological difficulties. The reader inevitably casts back his or her own modem
biases upon the antique world in order then to draw conclusions for the modem
setting. For Peterson, what is ultimately at stake is the relationship of the church and
its confessions to modern political function. For MachoveC, it is how a materialist-
Marxist interpretation of Jesus, as founder of the Western intellectual and spiritual
tradition, is morally necessary for the modern Marxist atheist to offset the
corruptions of violence observed in the Marxist states of his time. All readers project
their peculiar interests into readings of ancient texts. Yet there are degrees of
violence in this kind of retrojection. Those engaged in the historical-universalizing
approach seem particularly prone to abusing ancient texts. This tendency appears
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only mildly mitigated when the author is overtly self-aware of his methodology, as in
the case of MachoveC.
Third, no empirical sociology of antiquity is possible by virtue of historical
distance to our subject. Additionally, all that survives to historian and social-scientist
alike are ancient artifacts—epigraphs, literary texts, archaeological remains, certainly
not all of which are wholly representative of the actual cross-sections of antique
societies.98 Yet from this oftentimes sparse, sometimes enigmatic, and frequently
non-representative material an attempt must be made not only to identify but to
interpret social phenomena in the ancient world. The social-explanatory and social-
scientific approaches attempt this. They are prescriptive and vectorial, endeavoring
to explicate social phenomena and symbolic systems of thought in terms of interplay
among social forces. They deal with the ebb and flow of social processes and
generally ask Grundfragen along the following lines: How can the emergence or
perpetuation of a religious phenomenon be explained in terms of the symbol
structures and social matrix within which it came to be embedded? Or, How do we
narrate the social function of a religious phenomenon or "symbolic universe" in
terms of its interaction with other social forces in the larger social environment?
Yet these latter two approaches posit answers to these questions from slightly
different trajectories. Social-explanatory studies attempt explanation from firmly
within the bounds of historical-critical method. They posit solutions to social
questions by means of analogy with or abstraction from other social, structural, or
symbolic forms (cultic, linguistic, etc.) from the wider social matrix within which a
phenomenon is embedded. Only rarely do advocates of this approach explicitly
invoke theoretical anthropological or sociological models to achieve explanation.
Works that attempt, for example, to explain the rise of Jesus-devotion in earliest
Christianity posit conceptual models based on analogy with other preexisting
historical and conceptual categories or social symbols and practices. Scholars
observe, for example, certain preexisting categories of thought (e.g., hypostatized
Wisdom operative at creation) and social practices (e.g., angel-devotion) within early
Judaism which bear a particular similitude with early Christian devotion to a second
exalted figure alongside the one God. From there they propose various relational
links (historico-genetic, conceptual, cultic) between ostensibly similar phenomena in
98 We possess a disproportionate amount of ancient Christian literary evidence written by
Christian intellectuals, and modern scholars do not always account for epigraphic or archaeological
evidence, which provide data from other levels of social and economic status.
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order to clarify the social processes by which Jesus-devotion could have arisen
within an early-Jewish matrix.
Social-scientific approaches, on the other hand, are explicit in applying
theoretical models developed in those fields of study which have as their distinctive
interest the explanation of human actions and conceptual development in relation to
socio-environmental factors. Meeks interacts in his "Man from Heaven" (§2.2) with
"sociology of knowledge" and takes his methodological starting point to the study of
John's gospel from certain anthropological attempts to arrive at the "function of
myths in the societies that create them by means of close analysis of their
structure."99 Yet social-scientific approaches, too, operate on analogy and abstraction
from one community to another, for they project explanatory models developed
through study of modern societies and thought onto ancient historical data, across
wide temporal, cultural, and linguistic gaps.
Both social-explanatory and social-scientific approaches to Christian
monotheism are then distinctively positioned to answer questions of a social nature,
even while not always navigating the perils of reductionism.100 On the basis of
analogy and abstraction with ancient social structures and/or modern theoretical
models they have some measure of explanatory power. In both cases, however, the
methodological explanatory ability is directly dependent on the accuracy of prior
historical-critical and social-descriptive work. Any explanatory reading of history is
only as good as the socio-historical data on which it is based. Interpretive
explanations are also only as valid as the level of correspondence between the
historical community under investigation and that (antique or modern) community
with which the scholar would compare it. In the case of social-scientific studies,
there is a further danger, the relative accuracy or inaccuracy of the modern
theoretical model employed.
99 Supra n. 39.
io° ££ Thomas F. Best, "The Sociological Study of the New Testament: Promise and Peril of
a New Discipline," SJT 36 (1983): 181-94. There is no fool-proof means of answering historical
questions of a social-functional nature, neither by the historical-critical method nor by social-scientific
methods. Both tend towards reductionism, describing the nature and interplay of social processes in
terms of mechanistic categories which exclude a priori the possibility of religious transcendence; they
are completely immanent, "this-worldly," and allow for little possibility of transcendent otherness in
religious experience (Luke Timothy Johnson, Religious Experience in Earliest Christianity: A Missing
Dimension in New Testament Studies [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998] 12-26). Yet both have
played a formative role in the history of scholarly explanation and interpretation of early Christian
monotheism and are necessary approaches to furthering our understanding of the religion of "one
God, one Lord."
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The present thesis shares affinities with both social-explanatory and social-
scientific models. As previously noted, this study argues that during the second
century Christians actively engaged rhetoric and symbols of monotheism in diverse
literary strategies as a powerful ideological tool for resisting, repositioning, and
rereading Judaism and Jewish traditions in order to shape their own peculiar
collective identity. The present study is social-explanatory. We rigorously examine
the concepts of divine unity and uniqueness as they were employed vis-a-vis Jews
within certain second-century Christian writings. This requires tools and techniques
of an historical-critical nature, especially literary analysis.101 And we provide an
interpretation for understanding how the idea of one God alone actually functioned
socially as a symbol system among early Christian groups. Our approach further lies
along the border with social-scientific methods. The explanation we provide of
second-century Christian monotheism vis-a-vis Judaism represents a conscious
interpretation of the data in terms of identity construction, a burgeoning area of
social-studies.102 Similar to Meeks in his "Man from Heaven," we utilize close
literary analysis of six second-century Christian monotheistic texts (Ignatius'
Philadelphians, Magnesians\ Kerygma Petrou\ Aristides' Apology, Justin's Dialogue
with Trypho; Aristo of Pella's Disputation ofJason and Papiscus) as a pathway to
understand a community's mythic and symbolic thought structures. By identifying
and analyzing monotheistic modes of discursive reasoning within several second-
century Christian texts, we uncover the functionality of these patterns of thought vis-
a-vis Judaism. We suggest that the function of these monotheistic ideologies
expressed textually is best interpreted as a conscious Christian exercise in forming
the meaning of Christianness itself vis-a-vis Judaism. We are not familiar with any
attempt to-date to produce a broader interpretation of second-century Christian
monotheism in terms of identity construction. This thesis fills that void.
101 Literary analysis has emerged as a field of study in its own right. We catalogue it here
under historical-critical studies because it relies on techniques of close-textual analysis earlier
developed and still prominent within historical-critical methodology.
102 As evidenced, e.g., by a recent conference at the University of Manchester on this very
subject: "Identity Formation: Modern Languages Postgraduate Conference" in the School of
Languages, Linguistics, and Cultures (April 4, 2007). The editors of The Cambridge History ofEarly
Christian Literature, interestingly, included three summary chapters entitled "Articulating identity" at
the end of each section of their overview of Christian literature (Frances Young, Lewis Ayres, and
Andrew Louth, eds., The Cambridge History ofEarly Christian Literature [Cambridge: University
Press, 2004] chs. 8, 18, 38).
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5- Monotheistic Textual Strategies in the ShapingofChristian
identities
We have described our approach as a process of uncovering a series of
textual strategies designed to shape specifically "Christian" identities (vis-a-vis
Jewishness) in monotheistic directions. This formulation is not self-evident. The
supposition that texts both construct and influence identities raises concerns that
require theoretical justification. In this section we construct a theoretical interpretive
model that helps locate our investigation within a larger framework of the study of
Jewish and Christian relations in late antiquity (§3.1) and of the role of discourses,
and especially textual ones, in the construction of Jewish and Christian cultural
identities (§3.2).
3dShifting Paradigms for Jewish-Christian Relations in Late
Anticjuitg
Recent years have witnessed the beginnings of a monumental paradigm shift
in how scholars describe Christian and Jewish relations in late antiquity and, as a
correlate, how they understand the role played by textual discourse within that
complicated relationship. Scholars have for some time been accustomed to speak of
an early and discrete "Parting of the Ways" between Judaism and Christianity.103
Under this paradigm, some pivotal historic occasion(s)104 catastrophically
precipitated a final and lasting separation between Judaism and Christianity
sometime in the first or early second century. Whatever social ambiguities and
interactions may have existed between Jews and Christians prior to this historic
rupture were now past. In their place, relatively stable, fixed boundaries fossilized
between the two "religions." According to earlier versions of this paradigm,
103
Though the roots of the idea are earlier, the "Parting of the Ways" was popularized by the
British clergyman James Parkes ("The Parting of the Ways," in The Conflict of the Church and
Synagogue: A Study in the Origins ofAnti-Semitism [London: Soncino, 1934] ch. 3). Marcel Simon
reinforces the major lineaments of the traditional paradigm in his classic Verus Israel: A Study of the
Relations Between Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire (ad 135-425) (trans. H. McKeating;
The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization; New York: Oxford University Press, repr. 1996) ix-xviii,
3-97.
104 Various historical events are customarily postulated as momentous in crystallizing an
early break between Christianity and Judaism: Christian flight from Jerusalem to Pella prior to the
destruction of the Jewish temple (70 CE), Nerva's imposition of the fiscus Judaicus (96 CE), the
Trajanic revolts (115-117 CE), and the Bar Khokhba revolt (135 CE). To these the Birkat Ha-Minim
(read as a curse against Christians) is often adduced as corollary evidence of an early definitive
separation.
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normative, first-century Judaism—identified either with the Pharasaic sect or
conceived as an abstract reification of commonalities shared among various Jewish
sects'05—continued on in the form of rabbinic Judaism. This normative Judaism was
the "mother" religion from which proto-orthodox Christianity emerged as a separate
"daughter" religion.106 Another approach, recognizing the profound complexity and
variety of first-century Judaisms, invokes a different kinship metaphor. These
scholars envision Christianity and Judaism in the image of twin siblings.107
According to this metaphor, out of the great mass of first-century Jewish sects,
rabbinic Judaism and proto-orthodox Christianity survived the cataclysm of the
Jewish Wars to emerge simultaneously as brother religions from the same mother.108
The image of twins has a certain advantage for capturing some of the complexities of
Jewish and Christian relations in antiquity as well as their shared heritage. Yet the
sibling metaphor still portrays Judaism and Christianity as entirely autonomous
entities from the moment of birth.109 In either case, once the two religions were
formed, further contact between the two, though rare, was characterized almost
entirely by polemic and dispute over who was the rightful heir of first-century
Judaism.110 From the historic point of fracture, (rabbinic) Judaism and (proto-
orthodox) Christianity continued to develop along entirely divergent paths in relative
isolation from one another.
The traditional, value-laden111 "Parting of the Ways" model remains
105 On this, see Philip S. Alexander, '"The Parting of the Ways' from the Perspective of
Rabbinic Judaism," in James D.G. Dunn, ed., Jews and Christians: The Parting of the Ways a.d. 70 to
135. The Second Durham-Tubingen Research Symposium on Earliest Christianity and Judaism
(WUNT 66; Mohr [Siebeck], 1992; repr. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999) 2-3.
106 On kinship metaphors, see esp. Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the
Making ofChristianity and Judaism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) 1-6.
107 E.g., Alan F. Segal, Rebecca's Children: Judaism and Christianity in the Roman World
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
108 Martin Goodman presents this paradigm graphically in his "Modeling the 'Parting of the
Ways'" in Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed, eds., The Ways that Never Parted: Jews and
Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007) 121 (Figure 1).
109 Daniel Boyarin, a chief architect of the interpretive paradigm shift noted above, proposes
that we abandon such kinship metaphors altogether because of "the kinds of organic entities and
absolute separations" they imply (Dying for God, 8).
Some Christians, for example, argued that they were the true Israel (cf. Justin, Dial. 11.5).
For some Jews, if we may invoke Celsus' Jew, Christians had apostatized or revolted against their
ancient (Jewish) traditions (in Origen, Cels. 2.1; 3.5; 5.33).
111 See Judith Lieu, "'The Parting of the Ways': Theological Construct or Historical
Reality?" JSNT 56 (1994): 101-19.
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popular,"2 yet it has not gone entirely unchallenged. Increasingly dissatisfied with
what they perceive as the model's heuristic shortcomings and incongruities with
archaeological and textual evidence, many scholars in recent years have called for a
dismantling of the "Parting of the Ways" approach.113 Some have even posited new
sets of descriptive models in its place."4 While these scholars do recognize certain
early historical events, such as the destruction of the Temple and the Bar Khokhba
revolt, as important moments in shaping Jewish and Christian identities, they do not
regard these as definitive fracture points that would have caused a universal, early,
and distinct separation between "Judaism" and "Christianity" as separate religions.115
They prefer rather to push back the date of a much more-definitive and distinct
separation between rabbinic Judaism and orthodox Christianity to the fourth century
(or even later) when orthodox Christianity gained hegemony in the Empire.116
According to advocates of this approach, Christians and Jews were engaged in a
much longer, more profound history of cultural disentanglement than the traditional
"Parting of the Ways" model would allow. And rather than speak of early
Christianity and Judaism as separate "religions," these scholars refer to them as
112 E.g., Richard Bauckham, "The Parting of the Ways: What Happened and Why," Studia
Theologica 47 (1993): 135-51; Vincent Martin, A House Divided: The Parting of the Ways Between
Synagogue and Church (Studies in Judaism and Christianity; New York: Paulist Press, 1995); Segal,
Rebecca's Children,
113 See, inter alia, Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed, "Introduction: Traditional
Models and New Directions," in eidem, eds., The Ways that Never Parted, 1-24, and the
contributions in ibid.; Lieu, '"The Parting of the Ways;'" and Alexander, "'The Parting of the Ways.'"
114 Cf. Boyarin, Dying for God, 1-16; idem, Border Lines: The Partition ofJudaeo-
Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
115 On the difficulty with contrasting Judaism and Christianity as religions, see Daniel
Boyarin, "Semantic Differences; or, 'Judaism'/'Christianity,' in Becker and Reed, The Ways that
Never Parted, 65-85; idem, Border Lines, 8. loudaismos appears in Jewish sources first as an ethnic,
political, or cultural term (Shaye J.D. Cohen, The Beginnings ofJewishness: Boundaries, Varieties,
Uncertainties [Berkeley; Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999] 105-06), and
the label "Judaism" as a religion is itself a Christian adaptation.
116 Rosemary Radford Ruether ("Judaism and Christianity: Two Fourth-Century Religions,"
Sciences ReligieuseslStudies in Religion 2 [1972]: 1-10) and Jacob Neusner (Judaism and
Christianity in the Age ofConstantine: History, Messiah, Israel, and the Initial Confrontation
[Chicago Studies in the History of Judaism; Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1987] ix;
cf. "Why Judaism Won the Fourth Century as the True First Century in the History of the Judaic and
Christian West," in Major Trends in Formative Judaism. Third Series: The Three Stages in the
Formation ofJudaism [Brown Judaic Studies 99; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985] 77-85)
acknowledge the fourth century as definitively formative for separate Jewish and Christian identities.
Adam Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed suggest "that Jews and Christians (or at least the elites
among them) may have been engaged in the task of 'parting' throughout Late Antiquity and the early
Middle Ages, precisely because the two never really 'parted' during that period with the degree of
decisiveness or finality needed to render either tradition irrelevant to the self-definition of the other, or
even to make participation in both an unattractive or inconceivable option" ("Introduction," 23).
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complexly intertwining "cultures," "conversations," or "dialogues."117 The shift in
terminology is not insignificant. The latter terms offer a helpful corrective to the
traditional "Parting of the Ways" model, precisely because they focus on elements
both of convergence and divergence and on the interactive nature of relations
between Jews and Christians throughout late antiquity. Complex interdependencies
accompanied the long process of separation, not the least of which was the relation to
their shared cultural heritage, the biblical texts.118 In this new picture, scholars are
more apt to see parallel cultural discourses and fuzzy boundaries of identity.119 This
way of viewing things opens up possibilities for Christian culture to influence
developing rabbinic culture, and vice versa, in a way not envisioned by the earlier
paradigm.
^.2 TheoreticalModel: (Textual) Discourses and the
MakingofJewish and Christian Cultural identities
The shift in metaphors from "religion" to "cultures" and "conversations" is
heuristically helpful. It broadens our definitions of Christianity and Judaism out of
the narrower confines of strictly religious movements into the more complex image
of cultural systems that inhabit shared spaces.120 The metaphor of cultures, in
particular, recalls the fluid nature of cultural identities and the fuzziness of cultural
boundaries. Identities are constantly claimed and then reclaimed, negotiated and then
renegotiated. The process of creating discrete Jewish and Christian cultures was
much longer and much messier than traditionally recognized and involved various
processes of cultural differentiation and convergence. These concepts are all too
117 Daniel Boyarin prefers to speak not of two "religions" but of two "conversations" (Dying
for God, 11). Similarly, Galit Hasan-Rokem examines "interaction between cultures in terms of
dialogue rather than 'influence'" ("Narratives in Dialogue: A Folk Literary Perspective on
Interreligious Contacts in the Holy Land in Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiquity," in Guy G.
Stroumsa and Arieh Kofsky, eds., Sharing the Sacred: Religious Contacts and Conflicts in the Holy
Land. First-Fifteenth Centuries CE [Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1998] 127; cited in Boyarin, ibid., 10);
cf. also the studies in Marc G. Hirshman, A Rivalry ofGenius: Jewish and Christian Biblical
Interpretation in Late Antiquity (trans. Batya Stein; SUNY Series in Judaica: Hermeneutics,
Mysticism, and Religion; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).
118 Frances M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation ofChristian Culture (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Hirshman, ibid.; Boyarin, Border Lines.
119 See the essays in Judith Lieu, Neither Jew nor Greek? Constructing Early Christianity
(London; New York: T&T Clark, 2002, repr. 2005).
120 This is not to suggest that there were not in various locales more or less clearly
demarcated cultural identities in place that delineated Jewish from Christian. See infra n. 125.
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easily lost in the traditional "Parting of the Ways" model. Another insight to be
gained by this paradigm shift is the value of discursive processes in the articulation
of cultural difference and sameness and in the delineation of cultural systems. This
builds on insights from cultural anthropology in which identities can be regarded as
being both reflected and formed through the discourses that societies create.121
Discursive processes lie at the vanguard of the formation, negotiation, and
articulation of cultural identities.
With these insights about cultural discourses and identities in mind, we
propose the following working model in order to situate the argument of this thesis
within a broader framework of Jewish-Christian relations and of discursive strategies
of identity. For the first four centuries CE, Jews and Christians shared a cultural
heritage marked by various traditional symbols (scripture, circumcision, sabbath,
belief in one God, etc.). Within this overarching Judeo-Christian culture, individuals
and local communities occupied positions along a continuum of sub-cultural
identities, from non-Christian Jew, Christian Jew, Jewish Christian, and non-Jewish
Christian. The identities of individual Judeo-Christian communities were shaped and
reshaped through the discursive processes they themselves continued to reassert as
culturally significant, whether through their mythic structures, ritual systems,
classification schema, or oral and textual articulations.122 Localized communities
would ascribe (and reascribe) to themselves a given identity relative to other groups
of self-styled Jews and Christians by creating various patterns of discourse in relation
to traditional Judeo-Christian symbols.
121 Bruce Lincoln, in particular, offers interesting examples in his Discourse and the
Construction ofSociety: Comparative Studies ofMyth, Ritual, and Classification (New York; Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989).
122 Averil Cameron demonstrates that the emergence of Christian culture in the fourth century
took place largely because of the Christian ability to create meaningful discourses in relation to wider
Graeco-Roman cultural discourses (Christianity and the Rhetoric ofEmpire: The Development of
Christian Discourse [Sather Classical Lectures 55; Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1991]; cf. Keith Hopkins, "Conquest by book," in Mary Beard, Alan K. Bowman et ah, Literacy in the
Roman world [Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series 3; Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University of Michigan, 1991] 133-58). Frances Young demonstrates the same with respect to
Christianity's Jewish heritage by appealing to discursive patterns of biblical exegesis (Biblical
Exegesis). Daniel Boyarin has made a case that rabbinic Judaism gained hegemony in the fourth
century as the dominant form of Judaism largely through discursive process (Border Lines). The
theory of how communities construct their world through verbal and symbolic actions is explained in
Peter L. Berger (The Social Construction ofReality: A Treatise in the Sociology ofKnowledge
[Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967] and The Sacred Canopy: Elements ofa Sociological Theory of
Religion [New York; London: Doubleday, 1967; repr. 1990]).
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We suggest then that second-century (i.e., in our period of interest) Judeo-
Christian culture comprised complexes or webs of localized "discursive
communities" in contact through various interlocking discursive systems of
convergence and divergence from one another.123 All engaged in the negotiation of
distinctive identities through their patterns of discourse. Many (if not most) Judeo-
Christian communities remained quite complexly intertwined and their discourses
could overlap in surprising ways,124 though there were individuals and communities
for whom Jewish or Christian cultural identities were sharply differentiated.125 In a
given locale, one community of Christ-followers may have condoned circumcision
and placed preeminent importance on observing Sabbath and would have understood
itself through its patterns of discourse in important ways as both "Christian" and
"Jewish." This same group, one might imagine, may have had contact with other
self-styled "Jews" (individuals or groups) that nevertheless recognized in Jesus an
important personage, though not the Messiah. Identities were often blurred "on the
ground."
Movement towards disentangling Judeo-Christian culture was not the
inexorable process of disinterested spectators, but an active engagement by the rabbis
and elite among the church to establish different discourses126 and, in the case of
many Christians, to differentiate Jewish from Christian identities.127 This is
particularly the case in the second century, when both rabbinic Judaism and proto-
orthodox Christianity were engaged in parallel attempts to create orthodoxies, as
Daniel Boyarin has demonstrated.128 The process of differentiation into two clearly
demarcated cultural identities, Judaism and Christianity, occurred with some finality
123 This is not much different from the image of waves invoked by Boyarin (Dying for God,
7-16). While Alexander's model of circles is broadly helpful, it is much too simplistic ('"The Parting
of the Ways,"' 2).
124 As, e.g., in the practice of the Quartodecimani, Christians who depended on Jewish
pronouncements concerning the date of Passover.
125 As, e.g., among the second-century followers of Marcion, who completely rejected the
"Jewishness" of Christianity.
126 See supra n. 122.
127 Discursive juxtapositions of "Christian" and "Jewish" were a Christian endeavor; for the
rabbis, the minim were the object of contrast.
128 Border Lines. According to Boyarin, the process was eventually abandoned by the rabbis
in favor of ever-widening discourses of inclusivity, so that rabbinic Judaism ultimately rejected
attempts at creating itself in terms of a religion.
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in the fourth century at the earliest.129 Only then did the alternative discourses of
rabbinic Judaism and orthodox Christianity gain hegemony in the majority of local
communities. Those who had fought so hard to voice separate identities for their
communities had finally succeeded. Rabbinic Judaism and orthodox Christianity
emerged as the two dominant cultural forms out of the shared Judeo-Christian
heritage that had characterized earlier centuries. The long period of disentanglement
may thus be imagined as a story about various localized negotiations of Jewish and
Christian identities through a congeries of discursive strategies. The eventual cultural
separation between Jewish and Christian brothers was due in no small part to the
success of their alternative discourses.
And one of the very distinctive features about the Judeo-Christian cultural
tradition in late antiquity is that many of the discourse strategies described above as
having given rise to Jewish and Christian cultures were so often encoded as
specifically textual strategies.130 Our intertwining "discursive communities" were,
even more narrowly, "textual communities."131 Their corporate lives centered in so
many ways around texts, their production, distribution, and circulation.132 Their
collective identities were constructed on the basis of the particular texts they created,
129 Supra n. 116. Even into the fourth century (and beyond) there existed various
permutations of significant convergence in cultural identities (as John Chrysostom was painfully
aware; cf. also John S. Crawford, "Jews, Christians, and Polytheists in Late-Antique Sardis," in
Steven Fine, ed., Jews, Christians, and Polytheists in the Ancient Synagogue: Cultural interaction
during the Greco-Roman period [London; New York: Routledge, 1999] 190-200), even as there had
existed significant cultural divergences as early as the first and second centuries. Yet from the point of
Christianity's ascendency in the empire, more permanent and definitive separations of Jewish and
Christian cultural identities reified into two largely separate cultures—a "Parting of the Ways."
130 While Mary Beard rightly emphasizes the often undervalued role of writing in pagan
religion (Mary Beard, "Writing and religion: Ancient Literacy and the function of the written word in
Roman religion," in idem et al., Literacy in the Roman world, 35-58), there remain noticeable
differences between Judeo-Christian traditions and those of the broader Graeco-Roman religions as
regards the value of texts and writing in general. Cf. Harry Y. Gamble, Books and Readers in the
Early Church (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1995) 18; John F.A. Sawyer, Sacred
Languages and Sacred Texts [London; New York: Routledge, 1999] 60.
131 The phrase is borrowed from Brian Stock {The Implications ofLiteracy: Written
Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries [Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1983]; "Textual Communities: Judaism, Christianity, and the Definitional
Problem," in idem, Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past [Baltimore; London: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990] 140-158). By "texts," Stock intends texts "physical and mental"
("Textual Communities," 146). Though he developed the phrase to help interpret certain communities
in Medieval Europe, he acknowledges its usefulness (with modifications) for Jewish and Christian
communities in late antiquity.
132 See esp. Gamble, Books and Readers.
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transmitted, read, wrote, and lived out,133 and this despite the fact that many in these
communities would have been illiterate or only semi-literate.134 Texts were, after all,
read aloud.135 Regarding such textual communities, Brian Stock explains:
Wherever there are texts that are read aloud or silently, there are groups
of listeners that can potentially profit from them. A natural process of
education takes place within the group, and, if the force of the word is
strong enough, it can supersede the differing economic and social
backgrounds of the participants, welding them, for a time at least, into a
unit. In other words, the people who enter the group are not precisely the
same as those who come out. Something has happened and this
experience affects their relations both with other members and with
those in the outside world.136
And because Judaism and Christianity were more particularly communities
for whom ethics played an important role, "reading is an endowing of principles with
values for life situations."137 These communities not only read texts; they produced
them. To accommodate their literary production, Christians even appear to have
adopted a form of textual production, the codex, quite distinct from popular
bibliographic convention among Jews and pagans, the roll.138 Texts, both sacred and
convenient, acquired positions of prominence in these communities.139
133 Stock elaborates, "We can think of a textual community as a group that arises somewhere
in the interstices between the imposition of the written word and the articulation of a certain type of
social organization. It is an interpretive community, but it is also a social entity" ("Textual
Communities," 150), and again, "We can say that the members of such a community will, intend,
project, and shape their futures" (ibid., 152). Cf. Alan K. Bowman and Greg Woolf, "Literacy and
power in the ancient world," in eidem, eds., Literacy andpower in the ancient world (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994) 13.
134 As Robin Lane Fox sagely observes, "Many Christians came from a social class and a sex
(female) where literacy would be least widespread, yet as Christians they had sacred texts of the
utmost authority and value which were important to their own identity" ("Literacy and power in early
Christianity," in Bowman and Woolf, eds., Literacy andpower, 128). The majority of Christians (as
with all ancients) were illiterate or only semi-literate. William Harris estimates adult male literacy at
10 percent in the 2nd c. BCE {Ancient Literacy [Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press,
1989] 173, 272); he is followed by Gamble {Books and Readers, 5).
135 Gamble, Books and Readers, 8: "It may seem paradoxical to say both that Christianity
placed a high value on texts and that most Christians were unable to read, but in the ancient world this
was no consideration."
136 Stock, "Textual Communities," 150.
137 Ibid., 152.
138 On the codex see Colin H. Roberts and T.C. Skeat {The Birth of the Codex [London; New
York: Oxford University Press, 1983]), Gamble {Books and Readers, 49-66), and, more recently,
Larry Hurtado {The Earliest Christian Artifacts: Manuscripts and Christian Origins [Grand Rapids;
Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2006]).
139 While the importance of oral traditions, particularly about Jesus, continued into the second
century (cf. Papias [c. 125 CE; in Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 3.39], though note the cautionary comments of
Gamble, Books and Readers, 30-32), it gradually receded.
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To a large extent this emphasis on textuality can be attributed to the role
which scripture played already in first-century Judeo-Christian culture from which
both rabbinic Judaism and orthodox Christianity would later take shape. Christians
inherited a faith "of the book," early adopting as their own the sacred scriptures of
the Jews in Greek form (LXX). Intertextuality and traditions of rewritten scripture
permeate Christian texts.140 Christian discourse was biblically informed and shaped
the Christian culture that emerged in the third and later centuries,141 and rabbinic
textualizations of oral Torah emerged with significant intertextual connections to
written Torah. The importance of scripture within the Judeo-Christian tradition
hardly requires elaboration.
The significance of Christianity's other literature does, however, need to be
observed. In her recent work, Averil Cameron has shown how other, extra-biblical
texts functioned as highly significant in shaping an emerging Christian discourse
(and thus culture) in the second and later centuries.142 Martyr Acts and Lives ofSaints
assumed the character of sacred literature, functioning alongside scripture in
authoritative ways in the development of what it meant to participate in Christian
culture. The importance of texts and textuality for emerging Christianity also helps
explain why the battleground for early Christian doctrine was so frequently worked
out through texts, which became the field of contestation. Early Christian
communities (at least those which we treat) were loci where issues of social world-
construction met with a belief in texts as the place where such creative activity of
identity construction takes place. Christian and Jewish communities inhabited a
common Judeo-Christian culture which valued textuality as a tool for expressing and
shaping collective identity.
It is interesting to observe that to a large extent the momentous paradigm
shift in Jewish-Christian relations signaled here has taken place because of new ways
of reading textual evidence.143 Scholars have too often been complicit in the
140 Richard B. Hays, Echoes ofScripture in the Letters ofPaul (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989); Lieu, Christian Identity, 27-61.
141 See particularly Frances Young, Biblical exegesis.
142 Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric ofEmpire.
143 We do not wish to downplay the critical contribution which archaeological, epigraphic,
and numismatic evidence has made in this reevaluation. On this see, L. Michael White with E.M.
Meyers, "Jews and Christians in a Roman World, Archaeology 42:2 (1989): 26-33; Leonard Victor
Rutgers, "Archaeological Evidence for the Interaction of Jews and non-Jews in Antiquity," AJA 96
(1992): 101-18; F. Millar, "The Jews of the Graeco-Roman Diaspora between Paganism and
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narratives which orthodox Christians and rabbinic Jews themselves created through
their texts and which would seem to indicate an early and distinct separation between
Jews and Christians.144 The "Parting of the Ways" model, in large part, emerges from
straightforward readings "with the grain" of our earliest textual evidence. Yet texts
are not as straightforward as they first appear, as scholars are increasingly aware.145
They often hide and complicate historical realities, frequently present alternative
visions and interpretations of Christian and Jewish relations, and present constructed
realities. The "rhetoric" of the text does not always imitate (quite often it contradicts)
historical "reality." At their most innocent, texts attempt mimetic imitation. Yet
mimetic representation is still representation, and such texts give us only a partial
image of the "real" world. More violently, they attempt to overturn received
conventions or behaviors, to impose or affect new, alternative realities and identities.
Reading "against the grain" of the text to uncover these strategies has yielded
productive insights that have resulted in increased awareness of the complexity of
Christian and Jewish interactions and identities in antiquity. Deconstruction of texts
has gone hand in hand with deconstruction of the "Parting of the Ways" paradigm.
If, as we argue, texts act as vehicles for voicing identity in Judeo-Christian
textual communities, then we must also note that they voice a particular construction
of identity. Each of our six texts refers to Christians/Christianity, Jews/Judaism, and
the concept of "one God," and sets these in some constructed relation to one another.
They present an image of what it means to be "Jewish" and what it means to be
"Christian" and what it means to believe in "one God." In every case appeal in the
text to some constructed idea of "one God" represents a power bid146 at creating (or
reestablishing) an equally constructed identities of "Christian" and "Jew."
Recognition that our texts engage in acts of power raises the possibility that the
textual identities they create may run counter to prevailing communal identities and
that these texts may seek to shape the latter in a different direction. Some of our texts
may contest existing identities. Yet some of them may just as well reinforce and
Christianity, AD 312-438," in Judith Lieu, John North, and Tessa Rajak, eds., The Jews Among
Pagans and Christians (London: Routledge, 1992) 97-123.
144 Boyarin speaks of "a kind of general collusion between Jewish and Christian scholars (as
earlier between the Rabbis and the Doctors of the Church) to insist on this total lack of contact and
interaction [between Judaism and Christianity], each group for its own reasons" (Dying for God, 7).
145 On this theme generally see Lieu, Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the
Christians in the Second Century (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996).
146 Bowman and Woolf, "Literacy and power."
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rearticulate existing communal identities. In our readings, we must therefore be
sensitive to the nature of Jewish, Christian, and monotheistic identities being created,
sustained, or overturned by these texts.
With this theoretical model we may gain an appreciation for how texts were
an important mode in early Christianity for voicing discursive strategies that played a
part in the emergence of a distinctive Christian culture vis-a-vis a Jewish culture.
Within the web of textual communities that characterized the Judeo-Christian
tradition in the second century, textual discourses and strategies were a significant
factor in the staking out of various cultural identities. Emerging Judaism and
Christianity comprised webs of textual communities where the unique intersection of
textuality and discursive processes of communal identity were operative. These
processes invoked a variety of symbols from broader Judeo-Christian culture, one of
which was the idea of belief in "one God." It is this monotheistic sub-discourse that
we investigate for the second-century in this thesis.
ChapterOverview
In this chapter we framed the heuristic questions that direct our inquiry (§1).
Antique religions—and society in general—were permeated with concern for belief
and cultic reverence of the divine couched in terms of unity and plurality. Within that
context Christian cultic devotion to Jesus presented a tertium quid alongside
traditionally recognized forms of pagan and Jewish cult. It was bound to raise
ideological and social problems with Jews and pagans alike. In this thesis we
examine the Christian-Jewish aspect of this complex religious atmosphere, focusing
on how ideas of divine unity and uniqueness gave shape to second-century Christian
identities vis-a-vis Judaism. In section two we arranged key scholarly studies on
various aspects of Christian monotheism in terms of methodological approach. We
identified five such trajectories. In the third section we posited a theoretical paradigm
that integrated textual discourses about the one God within a larger narrative of
emerging Jewish and Christian cultural identities in late antiquity. The remainder of
this thesis is dedicated to elucidating the functions which concepts of divine unity
and uniqueness served within the "social world" of early Christianity as it relates to
Jews during the second century.
To speak of Christianity's "social world" is ambiguous and subject to two
interpretations. The first envisions the social environment within which Christian
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worship of "one God, one Lord" arose and spread—the factors and forces external to
Christianity yet which however haphazardly, surreptitiously, forcefully, or otherwise
influenced and interpenetrated the religion of Christ-followers. This "world" is the
social context, the great diversity of Graeco-Roman religions, occupied by various
Jewish religious communities as well as traditional and oriental cults dedicated to
pagan deities. It is a context within which second-century Christianity was a minor
(relatively unnoticed) sectarian religious movement.147 Chapter Two recreates in part
this "social world" in which seemingly miniscule Christian conclaves and
communities emerged and operated. We engage in social description of Jewish
religion, examining not what Christians reported or claimed about Jews, but what
Jewish texts and artifacts themselves say about the prominence of symbols of divine
unity and uniqueness in Jewish communities.148 We examine the pre-eminence of
divine unity and exclusivity rhetoric and exclusive cultic devotion to one God in
Jewish religion, arguing that in the latter half of the early Jewish period (ca. 167
BCE-70 CE) Jews generally asserted an "exclusivist monotheistic" religious stance
(§2). Rabbinic Judaism in no way vitiated the place of exclusivist monotheism, as
evidenced by the rabbis' growing anxiety and opposition to teachers of "two powers
in heaven" (§3). The presence of the latter attests lively intramural Jewish debate
over the nature of belief in "one God" between the rabbis and certain para-rabbinic
traditions. Among many diaspora Jews cultic worship of the Most High God also
manifests an exclusivist monotheistic penchant not comparably attested in the
inclusivist monotheism of pagan worship of the Most High God (§4). Though not the
only identifiable marker of Jewishness, belief in and worship of one God alone was a
sine qua non for most Jewish communities of what it meant to be "Jewish."
Exclusivist monotheism is arguably the central tenant of Jewish faith. In its earliest
decades and into the second century, Christianity was indebted often quite directly to
early Jewish texts, traditions, symbols, and ideologies of exclusivist monotheism for
its belief in one God as well as the rhetoric of uniqueness and unity that expresses
that monotheism (§5). Because belief in one God was so crucial an identity marker
147 Note the careful qualifications to "sectarianism" as a descriptive category for early
Christianity by L. Michael White ("Shifting Sectarian Boundaries in Early Christianity," BJRL 70
[1988]: 7-24).
148
By almost entirely avoiding Christian sources in Chapter Two a description of socio-
religious facts about divine unity and exclusivity in the larger religious environment may be
established, while simultaneously obtaining a level of abstraction from the inter-subjective "socially-
constructed world" of early Christian experience.
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for both Jews and Christians, it represents a promising area of study in early
Christian-Jewish relations.
Christianity's "social world" may also refer to that matrix of symbols which
Christians themselves constructed and projected, and which reflexed back upon them
via their symbol-specific structures and rituals. This is "the world as they perceived it
and to which they gave form and significance through their special language and
other meaningful actions."149 In Chapters Three through Five, we examine how
Christian sources utilize monotheistic concepts to shape the meaning of
Christianness vis-a-vis Jewishness.150 We investigate strategic uses of monotheistic
concepts in early Christian literature, looking specifically for contexts where Jews
are in view. These chapters broadly organize the diverse contexts and manners in
which Christians utilized monotheistic concepts in their thinking about Jews. Yet
they also interpret that process. Monotheism played an important role in three broad
trajectories of second-century Christian self-definition vis-a-vis Judaism. We
envision these monotheistic "trajectories" as part of a strategic process of Christian
resistance, repositioning, and rereading of traditionally "Jewish" symbols and texts
for the purpose ofcreating a distinctive sense of what it means to be "Christian."
A first trajectory in the monotheistic shaping of Christian identity appears in
the writings of Ignatius of Antioch (ch. 3). The literary shaping of Philadelphians
and Magnesians reveals that for Ignatius what fundamentally distinguishes
"Judaism" and "Christianism" is not monotheism but their respective response to the
revelation of God through Jesus in the gospel. And, he believes, the anti-gospel
influence of "Judaism" manifests itself operationally within the "Christian" church at
Philadelphia through certain patterns of scriptural interpretation and at the church in
Magnesia through cultic observance of sabbath rather than the Lord's Day. It is then
the gospel, not monotheism per se, that Ignatius uses as a tool for indexing difference
between "Judaism" and "Christainism." Monotheism (specifically divine unity) he
invokes, rather, as a powerful weapon for resisting threatening "Jewish" influence
within the cultic practices of the "Christian" churches at Philadelphia and Magnesia.
He appeals to social harmony based in the unity of God and mediated sacramentally.
149 Meeks, First Urban Christians, 8.
150 Pagan and Jewish references to Christians are not nearly as well-preserved as Christian
references to Jews and pagans, and at any rate are generally more enigmatic than the latter. We touch
upon non-Christian sources at various points though ultimately this thesis is predominantly a study of
Christian literature.
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In both Philadelphians and Magnesians, Ignatius ascribes the symbol of divine unity
with social and sacramental force and uses it as a prophylactic against harmful
context-specific "Jewish" influence. As an element of resistance brought to bear on
an already established divide between "Judaism" (anti-gospel) and "Christianism"
(pro-gospel), divine unity regularly reenacted in sacrament reinforces a specifically
"Christian" identity vis-a-vis "Judaism."
A second important trajectory in the monotheistic formation of Christian
identity vis-a-vis Judaism is the emergence of a Christian ethnoracial and cultic
identity particularly characterized by belief in one God (ch. 4). Proponents of
monotheistic classification strategies overtly utilized "knowledge" of the one God as
primary criterion for indexing sameness and difference between Christianity,
Judaism, and other groups. Kerygma Petrou and Aristides' Apology employ such
strategies to situate Christianity within a global framework alongside other religious
and/or ethnic collectivities. Each text reveals discrete social concerns for why these
strategies are used. Yet both share a desire to locate the "newness" of Christianity
alongside the more well-known status of Jews. In so doing, they effectively
reposition Judaism within the global framework of religious and ethnic groups to
clarify and legitimate the meaning of belonging to Christian identity.
A third trajectory in the monotheistic shaping of Christian identity emerges
through patterns of Christian reading that reimagine traditional Jewish cosmic
structures. Some Christians employed "two powers" hermeneutic strategies to
reinterpret Jewish scriptural traditions of exclusivist monotheism (ch. 5). Aristo of
Pella's Disputation ofJason and Papiscus and Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho
attest Christian readings which insinuate into scripture a second figure, Jesus,
alongside the one God. These sources demonstrate awareness that OT scriptures are
shared intellectual property of Jews and Christians. Aristo and Justin explicitly
recognize that scriptural texts are the proper locus for Christian-Jewish debate.
These "two powers" interpretive patterns thus reflect highly conscious attempts to
reread Jewish monotheistic textual traditions in a new way. They are sociological
strategies in the continual process of negotiating and indexing Jewish and Christian
identities. Through them an entire reconstruction of the symbolic universe of
monotheism can take place in explicitly Christian terms.
In the final chapter we briefly review the observations of this study and draw
conclusions about the monotheistic shaping of early Christian identity vis-a-vis
Judaism (ch. 6). Together these diverse monotheistic strategies reveal a complex
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network of early Christian literary production which made use of monotheistic
symbols and rhetoric as an implement to resist, reposition, and reread Judaism,
thereby producing a distinctly Christian identity. These strategies ofmonotheistic
identity construction legitimate distinctively "Christian" brands of monotheism.
Through them, Christians can embrace their identity as worshippers of the one God
in a "new" way (i.e., through Jesus) vis-a-vis the antique traditions of Jewish




Monotheism as Jewish Marker:
Divine Unity and Uniqueness in Judaism
The relationship between early Christianity and its immediate Jewish
religious milieux is complex and cannot be reduced to mere aphorisms. Indeed, there
is no single point at which Christianity can be said to overlap seamlessly with this or
that Jewish community or mode of thought. But overlap in some sense it did, and
scholars generally agree that the confession and worship of one God alone represents
a shared practice among Jews and Christians. Before embarking on an examination
of Christian monotheistic strategies vis-a-vis Judaism, it will thus prove useful to
examine some of the more important trends, beliefs, and cultic practices in Jewish
religion, and ask: In what ways were rhetoric and concepts of divine uniqueness and
unity at work in that part of Christianity's "social world" which the Jews inhabited?
Was there a general "monotheistic" atmosphere in Jewish religion that may enlighten
our investigation into Christian monotheistic identity construction?
This chapter paints the socio-religious context for primitive Christian
monotheism and for the second-century Christian monotheistic strategies examined
in this thesis. We look at how certain "monotheistic" forces and factors
predominated in Jewish socio-religious milieux in which first- and second-century
Christianity came of age. We offer first a definition of monotheism that integrates
myth, rhetoric, and cultic practices associated with belief in one God as relevant
indicators (§1). After investigating ways in which Jews expressed monotheism
cultically and rhetorically, we suggest that "exclusivist monotheism" provides the
category which best labels the dominant streams of early Jewish religion at the time
when Christianity was just emerging (§2).' This is especially important since several
1
Early Judaism provides the most important constitutive religious milieu for the immediate
development of primitive Christian monotheism. This conviction is shared by a growing number of
scholars who investigate earliest Christian origins. The last two decades, in particular, have witnessed
an upsurge of scholarly activity attempting to situate Christianity's origins firmly within a Jewish
matrix. In common with the older religionsgeschichtliche Schule, these scholars locate Christianity
within its larger cultural Graeco-Roman context. However, unlike earlier scholars in the history-of-
religions tradition, who sought to find substantial connections between Christianity and Graeco-
Roman religion(s), this new group of scholars believes the most influential context in which to
understand Christian origins is the Jewish religious milieu. Cf. Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ:
Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2003) 12-18; Jarl
Fossum, "The New Religionsgeschichtliche Schule: The Quest for Jewish Christology," in E.
Lovering, ed. (SBLSP; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991) 638-46; and Carey C. Newman, James R.
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scholars have challenged the use of "monotheism" as a category by which to
understand early Judaism. Rabbinic Judaism in no way attenuated the pride of place
afforded exclusivist monotheism in early Jewish religion (§3), yet their polemic
against certain minim that believe in "two powers in heaven" adumbrates a certain
variety in Jewish religious belief about God. Some first- and second-century Jews
(including Jewish Christians) outside the reach of rabbinic hegemony believed in a
second divine agent, the Word (Logos, Memra) of God. Yet this difference operates
within the context of a larger intramural (rabbinic and para-rabbinic) Jewish debate
over the nature and limits of belief in "one God." A number of monotheisms were
operative among second-century Jews. Here again, however, among diaspora Jews
the very popular cultic worship of the Most High God manifests an exclusivist
monotheistic penchant not comparably attested in the inclusivist monotheism of
pagan worship of the Most High God (§4). Belief in and confession of one God alone
therefore represents a fundamental and predominant marker of Jewish identity in the
first and second centuries of the common era, and Jewish exclusivist monotheism
(and binitarian patterns of belief) offer us an important basis against which Christian
attempts at formulating monotheistic identities can be measured (§5).
1. Defining "Monotheism"
First, some methodological ground rules. The term "monotheism" is
notoriously elusive.2 Since this chapter depends on how it is defined, it is worth
asking how one should determine whether the religion of a particular socio-religious
Davila, and Gladys S. Lewis, eds., The Jewish Roots ofChristological Monotheism: Papers from the
St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the Worship ofJesus (JSJSup 63; Leiden: Brill,
1999).
2 The issue is exacerbated with respect to Judaism and earliest Christianity because biblical
texts lack a sufficiently clear philosophical linguistic apparatus. For discussions of methodology and
the use of "monotheism" with particular relevance to the debate over Israelite religious development,
see Mark S. Smith ("Yahweh and Other Deities in Ancient Israel: Observations on Old Problems and
Recent Trends," in Walter Dietrich and Martin A. Klopfenstein, eds., Ein Gott allein? [OBO 139;
Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitatsverlag; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 1994] 223-27), Fritz
Stolz ("Der Monotheismus Israels im Kontext der altorientalischen Religionsgeschichte—Tendenzen
neurer Forschung," in Walter Dietrich and Martin A. Klopfenstein, ibid., 33-50), Gary A. Herion
("The Impact ofModern and Social Science Assumptions on the Reconstruction of Israelite History,"
JSOT 34 [1986]: 3-33), Baruch Halpern ('"Brisker Pipes than Poetry': The Development of Israelite
Monotheism," in Jacob Neusner, Baruch A. Levine, et al., eds., Judaic Perspectives on Ancient Israel
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987] 77-115), and David L. Petersen ("Israel and Monotheism: The
Unfinished Agenda," in Gene M. Tucker, David L. Petersen, et ah, eds., Canon, Theology, and Old
Testament Interpretation: Essays in Honor ofBrevard S. Childs [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988]
92-107).
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community is "monotheistic."3 We pause briefly here to note that when we speak in
this thesis of a community as "monotheistic," we refer to an identifiable socio-
religious group that understands itself as recipients of a tradition of belief in one God
and consistently expresses that confession by means of cultic and corporate devotion
to that one God.4 To determine whether a group is "monotheist," the historian of
religion should proceed inductively to determine a group's own self-definition by
examining two fronts, cultic acts and religious rhetoric (particularly confessional or
monotheistic-sounding language).
It is not our intention to provide a rigorous defense of this definition. To do
so would a lengthier discussion than is reasonable. We submit the following brief
clarifying comments. First, this approach to monotheism is inductive, the goal of
which is to locate a group's own socio-historical self-understanding.5 Our model is
certainly not the only one available, and sociologists might argue that it is incomplete
or at least not the best analytic tool, since there are always gaps in a community's
own self-understanding.6 Nevertheless, historians of socio-religious traditions should
proceed (at least initially) inductively from a group's own self-definitional activity—
11t is preferable to speak in terms of a community's belief system, since the theology of any
given individual will deviate in various particulars from that generally shared by the group.
Furthermore, emphasizing collective religion accords with assertions of the sociology of knowledge
that "the world-building activity of man," of which religion is a subset, "is always and inevitably a
collective enterprise," and "[wjhile it may be possible, perhaps for heuristic purposes, to analyze
man's relationship to his world in purely individual terms, the empirical reality of human world-
building is always a social one" (Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements ofa Sociological
Theory ofReligion [New York: Anchor Book, 1990 repr.] 7).
4 The work of Larry Hurtado has been influential in our thinking on this matter, though we
have modified his approach in several important regards. Cf. his Lord Jesus Christ, 29-53; "First-
Century Jewish Monotheism," JSNT11 (1998): 3-26. We adopt Emile Durkheim's definition of cult,
which "is a system of rites, feasts, and various ceremonies all having the characteristic that they recur
periodically" (The Elementary Forms ofReligious Life [trans. Karen E. Fields; New York: The Free
Press, 1995J 60). N.B. Our emphasis on cultic ritual in the Judaeo-Christian tradition is not intended
as a universal descriptive of all religious activity. Even some major religions—Buddhism and Jainism,
for example—do not possess the prominence of collective cultic activity we see active in the Judaeo-
Christian tradition (cf. Durkheim, ibid., 27-33).
5 Hurtado, "First-Century Jewish Monotheism," 5-9.
6 A more rigorous sociological analysis of a religious community may wish to move beyond
a group's self-understanding. Historians often create typological constructs that account for a group's
core identity. This allows them to join the diverse expressions manifest among the variegated
members of that group. This process involves viewing the movement from outside as an
unconstrained observer to the group's own internal social dynamics and traditions. It further involves
reifying the diverse religious phenomena into an "ideal type" that successfully models the
phenomenological reality. No such typology of a socio-religious system is perfect, yet it is hoped that
it adequately accounts for a majority of the data. See Michael A. Williams (Rethinking "Gnosticism:"
An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996]
29-50) for a helpful discussion of methodology.
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how it understands itself vis-a-vis the broader culture and within the panoply of its
own internal religious diversity. Third-party contemporary descriptions, however
imperfect or devoid of perspective arising from historical distance, provide a natural
corollary to a group's own self-testimony. Eye-witness accounts are closer to events
than modern researchers and supply real data about socio-religious issues as
understood by people at the time. Such external testimony should generally be
considered secondary and supplementary to a group's own self-testimony.
Second, cultic patterns of devotion and religious rhetoric are the primary
factors for identifying monotheism. There is an inextricable link between
cosmogonic myth, cultic devotional patterns, and religious rhetoric.7 Each provides
certain "hermeneutical keys" to the interpretation of the other; myth was after all
performed on a cultic stage, both ritually and rhetorically. Yet the role of myth is not
nearly as important as that of cultic behavior or religious rhetoric in determining a
group's "monotheistic" status. First, to utilize myth as a determinant for the presence
of monotheism necessarily requires one to make a priori assumptions about which
myths are compatible with monotheism. This leads inevitably back to the
presuppositions of the scholar and not the assumptions of the ancient world.8
Secondly, the meaning of myths change. Communities inject them with new
meaning or reimagine them. Myths or mythical fragments developed in a polytheistic
7 By "myth" we refer to traditional stories used to explain the origins and structure of the
universe in terms of symbols and imagery. Cosmogonies authenticate cultic behavior, for the various
cults of ancient religions were instituted by their respective gods (for gods establishing cults or laws,
see ANET43b; 68b; 69a f.; 311a; 316b; 385b; 5b; 397a, cited in Morton Smith ["The Common
Theology of the Ancient Near East," JBL 53 (1952): 142 n. 38]). Further, myths are expressed





Act Interpreted in Rhetoric
light of
8 For example, if one understands monotheism (mythically) as that belief in which there
exists only one first-principle, then they are forced artificially to exclude those Jews or Christians who
may have believed that Matter eternally existed (as second first-principle). Athenagoras presupposes
the preexistence of matter, while yet affirming that Christians do not worship it but the one who
shaped and formed it (Leg. 15-16). By all accounts one is hard pressed to find a Jewish or Christian
community dedicated to the worship of Matter as first-principle. Whatever first-principles existed
(God, matter, Idea-Forms, etc.), it is clear worship was reserved for God. For sociological purposes he
is the only first-principle worthy of worship.
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context mean something very different when applied in a monotheistic setting. It is
cultic patterns and rhetoric that permit the researcher to determine most clearly how
myth was understood in a particular community at a given time.
But what is the relationship between religious rhetoric and cultic devotion? Is
it reciprocal, or is one subordinate? Ritual acts are closely linked with verbal
expressions of religious devotion, so that clear-cut separation between practice and
profession is not strictly possible. In this sense, their relationship is reciprocal. Cult
aids interpretation of rhetoric; rhetoric uncovers significance in cultic acts. The value
of cultic practice and religious rhetoric is they both provide evidence by which to
understand a people's own religious self-perception. On the other hand, the value of
religious rhetoric should generally be subordinated to that of cultic devotional
patterns. Religious rhetoric is so firmly linked with historical setting and symbol
structures, that identical language about the deity (or a particular deity) in two
different contexts can often mean something very different.9 Nevertheless, such
rhetoric, when appearing within a monotheistic cultic setting becomes powerful
secondary testimony to the presence of monotheism. In those cases where the
historian knows little about cultic context, textual language remains our only
recourse, and conclusions can be drawn based on surviving rhetoric. However,
deductions based exclusively on rhetoric must be couched more cautiously than
those based on cultic practice. Such deductions can nevertheless be reasonable—
rhetoric is after all a means of expressing monotheism—if warranted by frequency or
potency of language and if the monotheistic-sounding rhetoric is closely aligned with
a literary context involving cultic issues.10 We demonstrate this latter point in relation
to Deutero-Isaiah (§2.2.2).
9 Devoid of identifiable cultic context, monotheistic-sounding language can signify any
number of things. Ancient Near-Eastern societies had a clearly polytheistic matrix within which very
monotheistic-sounding prayers, hymnic laments, and letters occurred. Devotees who created these
works often lavished their patron deity with universal language, themes of creation, the absence of
beginning, and rhetoric of incomparability that places that deity in a class of its own (e.g., A Hymn to
Amun-Re [ANET 365]; The Journey o/Wen-Amon to Phoenicia [ANET 25-29]). If one observes this
rhetoric without reference to the polytheistic cultus to which it is attached, one might inappropriately
conclude that they represent monotheistic belief. See further Smith ("Common Theology," 137^15)
and the brief comments of Rainer Albertz ("Der Ort des Monotheismus in der israelitischen
Religionsgeschichte," in Walter Dietrich and Martin A. Klopfenstein, eds., Tin Gott allein? [OBO
139; Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitatsverlag; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 1994] 80-81).
10 Paul Rainbow's study ("Monotheism and Christology in 1 Corinthians 8.4-6" [D.Phil,
thesis, Oxford, 1987]) has effectively demonstrated that frequency and force of theological rhetoric
can be a valid indicator ofmonotheism.
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Cultic devotional patterns should take priority and be used wherever possible
as the surest guide to accessing and interpreting a community's theological concepts.
As the most public expression of a people's religious devotion, cultic ritual provides
the clearest and most certain access to a group's own belief system and religious self-
identity." J. Danielou's comment on the sociological importance of cult in the
Graeco-Roman world is apropos:
It was by way of the traditional forms of worship that paganism
permeated the family, professional and civic life of the contemporary
world; and it was their refusal to participate in these rites which
constituted the principal ground for the accusation of impiety brought
against the Christians. Above all, therefore, it was these rites which the
Christians had to denounce without hesitation as a fraud; and they did so
by proving them to be a false cult inspired by demons and addressed to
demons. The cultus was the crucial issue. Opinion in the heathen world
on the nature of God or of the gods might vary; but the religious ritual
formed part of the very structure of civilization.12
A group's cultic behavior must be grasped against the background of how
that group interprets such behavior. A community may be willing to incorporate
certain religious practices that a modern scholar (with his or her own a priori
presumptions) might consider incompatible with monotheism, all the while they
retain an identifiable self-identity as "monotheist." For example, it may be perfectly
acceptable within certain socially-constrained parameters for a secondary-figure to
be corporately or publicly venerated within a religious community, which
nevertheless retains its distinct identity as "monotheist."
Third, emphasis on cultic praxis minimizes the modern, academic distinction
between monolatry and monotheism.13 The former, according to most religious
scholars, involves the condemnation of any worship directed towards deities other
than one patron deity, while the existence of other gods is not necessarily denied.
Monolatry requires the rejection of the worship of all other gods in favor of a group's
11 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation ofCultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973, rep. 2000)
112-18.
12 Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, vol. 2 in J. Danielou, A History ofEarly
Christian Doctrine (trans. J. A. Baker; London: Darton, Longman & Todd; Philadelphia: Westminster
Press; 1973) 18.
13
Precisely because there is so little distinction between monolatrous and monotheistic
worship. One may argue that monotheism represents a "universalizing monolatry," and we should
expect a missiological urge in monotheism not detectable in monolatry. Yet it is not certain that
missionary activity is inextricably linked with monotheism nor that ancients themselves made such a
distinction. Either way, conversion to Judaism, which had little missionary activity, and to
Christianity, with its highly active mission, both involved exclusive worship of "one God."
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own deity. Monotheism, it is claimed, goes further by explicitly rejecting the very
ontological existence of other deities.14 The technical, linguistic apparatus by which
modem scholars speak in terms of "polytheism" and "monotheism," however, is
highly anachronistic, and, if discussions of "monotheism" in Israelite and early
Jewish religion are any yardstick, the clarity these terms are intended to bring is long
in coming. First, it is highly unlikely that such methodological distinctions were ever
made among ancients, as Mark Smith reminds us when he notes that monotheism
"functioned as a rhetoric expressing and advancing the cause of Israelite monolatrous
practice." Religious distinctions were measured in terms of cultus. If one wished to
know a particular group's beliefs, he examined how that group worshipped.
Secondly, if religious valuations are measured with reference to cult rather than
concept, as we suggest, it is easy to see that the socio-religious implications of
monolatry are not wide afield from those of monotheism. Both enhanced a group's
distinctive self-identity with respect to outsiders15 and functioned socially as a type
of collective nationalism.16 By shifting cultic activity forward, conceptual differences
so often highlighted by modem scholars between monotheism and monolatry,
become less significant, and the scholar is freed to focus on social implications of a
group's devotional patterns.
In summary, if a religious community corporately confesses belief in one
God alone and understands itself as consistently and communally offering cultic
worship to that one God alone, one is justified in labeling it "monotheist." Inclusion
of additional figures in a community's corporate devotional patterns does not
inherently compromise its "monotheism" provided the group continually aligns itself
confessionally with one God alone and regards any devotion to such a second figure
within the context of its confession of one God. In such cases, the historian's first
instinct should not be to jettison the label "monotheism" but to understand how that
group harmonizes this second figure with its confession of one God.
14 So Mark Smith's forceful statement, "[I]n discussing monotheism, one must exclude the
reality of other gods" (The Origins ofBiblical Monotheism: Israel's Polytheistic Background and the
Ugaritic Texts [Oxford: University Press, 2001] 153; emphasis added). Cf. Michael Heiser, "The
Divine Council in Late Canonical and Non-Canonical Second Temple Jewish Literature" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University ofWisconsin, 2004) 9.
15 See Cels. 1.11, where Origen places the monolatrous and monotheistic options side-by-side
and does not distinguish them in this passage for purposes of his argument. Cf. V.H. Neufeld, The
Earliest Christian Confessions (NTTS 5; Leiden, 1963).
16 On nationalism and cult, see Smith ("Common Theology," 23).
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2. Jewish Religion from \6>J BCE—/0 CE
The nascent Christian tradition was birthed in a Jewish milieu, and it was a
Jewish religious environment which everywhere provided the most immediate
context in which Christianity took its first steps. The church was essentially a
breakaway Jewish sect; earliest Christians were Jewish believers in Jesus, and to a
large extent their basic confessions and practices continued those of Judaism. For
this reason, an investigation into the nature of Jewish religion in the period
immediately preceding the florescence of Christian Jesus-devotion will prove helpful
in establishing earliest Christianity's "social world." More specifically, since our
investigation is channeled towards certain monotheistic rhetoric and concepts and
their function within second-century Christianity, it is appropriate to demonstrate
that Jews in the latter half of the early Jewish period (i.e., 167 BCE-70 CE)17 were
already asserting an exclusivist, monotheistic religious stance, and were using the
rhetoric of divine uniqueness and unity to do so. The present investigation bolsters
the claim that the predominant theme in Jewish religion was one of exclusivist
monotheism, and that by the Roman era, Judaism was indeed characteristically
defined by belief in one God of the biblical tradition. This is not to suggest Judaism
was everywhere monolithic and that all religious Jews from the second century BCE
onwards were uniformly monotheistic in their faith confessions and practices. We
know this not to be the case; but deviations from a pattern are just that. The broadest
confession of the variegated religious expressions which may be labeled "Jewish" in
the Maccabean and Roman periods was that of allegiance to one God revealed in
Hebrew scriptures. We begin by briefly reviewing the long path towards popular
acceptance of monotheism in the Graeco-Roman period.
17 The terminus a quo corresponds roughly to the time of the Hasmonean revolt, and the time¬
frame closes with the destruction of Jerusalem's Temple. A number of monographs and articles treat
the religio-political history of this time. See Isaiah Gafni ("The Historical Background," in M.E.
Stone, ed., Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period [CRINT 2.2; Assen: Van Gorcum;
Philadelphia: Fortress: 1984] 86-213), Lester L. Grabbe (Judaic Religion in the Second Temple
Period: Beliefand Practice From the Exile to Yavneh [London; New York: Routledge, 2000] 1-31;
An Introduction to First Century Judaism: Jewish Religion and History in the Second Temple Period
[Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996] 1-31; Judaism from Cyrus to Hadrian. Volume 1: The Persian and
Greek Periods [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992]), Martin Hengel (Judaism and Hellenism), and Robert
A. Kraft and George W.E. Nickelsburg (eds., Early Judaism and its Modern Interpreters [SBLCP 2;
Atlanta: Fortress Press, 1986]).
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2.1 Towards Monotheism
Scholarly discussion about the nature, origin, and existence of early pre-exilic
Jewish monotheism played an important role throughout most of the twentieth
century, and it continues at present to be significant for the study of early Israelite
religion.18 Whatever the eventual outcome of the continuing conversation
surrounding Israel's early religious developments and origins, both archaeology and
the biblical text yield evidence indicating that Israelite devotion during the period of
the Judges and the monarchy incorporated the cults of various Canaanite deities and
accommodated a diversity of religious and cultic practices.19 There is a growing body
of evidence indicating that Israel's earliest religious beliefs and practices were
polytheistic and that popular Israelite religion up to the time of the Exile in the sixth
century BCE largely centered on worship of several deities.20 Reform movements
towards a mono-Yahwism were at best henotheistic with only an occasional glimmer
of monotheism.21 Israel would have to wait until her immurement in Babylon before
these monotheistic intimations received fuller expression in a doctrine of strict
18 For an excellent summary of the present state of the debate and its key players, consult
Robert Gnuse (No Other Gods: Emergent Monotheism in Israel [JSOTSup 241; Sheffield: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1997] 62-128). For more concise presentations see Mark S. Smith (The Early
History ofGod: Yahweh and the Other Deities in Ancient Israel [San Francisco: Flarper & Row,
1990] xix-xxvii) and B. Lang ("Vor einer Wende im Verstandnis des israelitischen Gottesglaubens?,"
TQ 160 [1980]: 53-60). Debates continue in a number of areas, particularly, (1) Israel's cultural
identity, (2) the nature of the Yahwistic cult, (3) the role of the monarchy, and (4) the nature and
extent of goddess veneration in pre-exilic Israelite religion.
19 Mark Smith, Early History, passim; idem, "Yahweh and Other Deities," 226; and Morton
Smith, Palestinian Parties and Politics that Shaped the Old Testament (London: SCM Press, 1987)
18. Hebrew scriptures confirm the scholarly assertion of Israel's Canaanite origins (Ezek 16:3, 45).
20 New epigraphic, iconographic, and archaeological discoveries substantiate a popular
veneration of gods alongside Yahweh in pre-exilic Israel. These discoveries include inter alia the
continued publication of the Mari letters and Ugaritic texts; inscriptions found at Deir cAlla, Kuntillet
cAjrud, and Khirbet el-Qom; the excavation of a cultic shrine at Ta'anach; the continued discovery of
new ostracon; new personal names upon seals (i.e., seal imprints); new analyses of previously
discovered artifacts; and the Aramaic version of Psalm 20 in Demotic. Cf. Smith, Early History,
108-181; P. Kyle McCarter, "Aspects of the Religion of the Israelite Monarchy: Biblical and
Epigraphic Data," in Patrick D. Miller et al., eds., Ancient Israelite Religion: Essays in Honor of
Frank Moore Cross (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987) 137-156; William G. Dever, "The
Contribution of Archaeology to the Study of Canaanite and Early Israelite Literature," in Miller, ibid.,
209-248; and Norbert Lohfink, "Gott: Polytheistisches und monotheistisches Sprechen von Gott im
Alten Testament" in idem, Unsere grofien Worter: Das Alte Testament zu Themen dieser Jahre
(Heder Freiburg: Neukirchener Verlag, 1977) 127-44. Lohfink sees in polytheism and monotheism
not zwei Sachen, but zwei Sprachen (pp. 138-41).
21 If, e.g., one is willing to grant this to Amos, as does Th.C. Vriezen (An Outline ofOld
Testament Theology [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2nd ed., 1970] 326).
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monotheism propounded through the preaching of Deutero-Isaiah,22 who used a
plethora of literary devices to bolster the universal dimensions of Yahweh's reign
(cf. §2.2.2). Deutero-Isaiah's efforts, coupled with the transition to a Buchreligion,
the destruction of most of the cultic shrines in the wake of the Exile, and the
Deuteronomistic reforms implanted at least the seeds of monotheism in Jewish
religion during and immediately after the Exile.23
Certainly, pre-exilic, syncretistic Yahwism survived into the post-exilic era.24
The syncretistic cult had been exported to northern Mesopotamia along with Israel in
722 BCE, as well as to Egypt and Babylon with Judah in the fifth- and sixth-centuries.
Evidence of the latter can be found in the fifth-century texts from the Jewish
community living in Elephantine in Egypt, whose syncretistic Yahwistic practices
demonstrate the ubiquitous nature of this phenomenon as far back as the Persian
Period and provide a glimpse into earlier pre-exilic Judaism.25 Traces of this old
syncretistic cult may even be found in later, post-second-Temple magical, "gnostic,"
or pagan circles.26 Even into the Hasmonean and subsequent Roman eras Judaism did
not represent a single monolithic entity, and one may rightly speak of many
Judaisms.21 The diversity of religious experience and expression preserved in the
literature of this period is astonishing, all the more so when set against the relative
22 The label "Deutero-Isaiah" is a modern category. Jews in the latter half of the second-
Temple period, early Christians, and "gnostic" groups would not have utilized such a term, as they
would have understood the book of Isaiah to be a unified work of composition. Nevertheless, Richard
Bauckham has observed that at least among early Christians these chapters would have been viewed
(though not labeled) as a distinct interpretive unit (God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the
New Testament [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999] 47). For our purposes, the term
"Deutero-Isaiah" may refer either to Isaiah 40-55 or its author (depending on context), and it remains
a helpful heuristic term, since much divine uniqueness language comes from this section.
23 Albertz notes the profound impact these events had not only upon the inculcation of
exclusive Yahwism within the state but in familial piety as well ("Der Ort," 84-85; also Hans
Rechenmacher, »Auf)ermir gibt es keinen Gott!« Eine sprach-und literaturwissenschaftliche Studie
zur Ausschliefilichkeitsformel [ATSAT 49; St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag, 1997] 196-98).
24 Susan Ackerman, Under Every Green Tree: Popular Religion in Sixth Century Judah
(HSM 46; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992) passim; Smith, Palestinian Parties, 62-74.
25 Translation of selected Persian Period texts from Elephantine are available in James M.
Lindenberger (Ancient Aramaic and Hebrew Letters [SBLWAW 4; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1994]
53-70). For texts throughout the entire history of the site see Bezalel Porten and J. Joel Farber {The
Elephantine Papyri in English: Three Millennia ofCross-cultural Continuity and Change [DMOA 22;
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996]).
26 Smith, Palestinian Parties, 63; M. Barker, The Great Angel: A Study of Israel's Second
God (London: SPCK, 1992) passim.
27 On the various sects of the period, see Gary G. Porton ("Diversity in Postbiblical Judaism,"
in Robert A. Kraft and George W. E. Nickelsburg, eds., Early Judaism and its Modern Interpreters
[SBLCP 2; Philadelphia: Fortress Press; Atlanta: Scholars Press: 1986] 57-80).
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uniformity of what later became Rabbinic Judaism as it developed and standardized
during the second century ce. Nevertheless, a notable change in the character of
popular Israelite religion began to assert itself during the second-Temple period.
Helped in part by factors listed above, monotheism was destined to become
assimilated into popular Jewish religion among Israel's diverse population centers.
2.2 Jewish Monotheism 06/&ce—/0 ce) ?
But can we go so far as to speak of "monotheism" as the predominant pattern
of Jewish religion during the second-Temple era? A number of scholars have
recently challenged the traditional image of a popular, first-century, monotheistic
Jewish religion. Among these, we refer to three in particular: Michael Heiser, Peter
Hayman, and Margaret Barker.28 Several commonalities in method are
distinguishable in their writings. Our comments and critiques are interspersed.
First, advocates of this view concur in casting doubt on the category
"monotheism" as a valid descriptor for first-century Judaism. They do not per se
(Heiser excepted) deny the existence of monotheistic strands at various times in
Israel's history,29 but they would deny to monotheism any place of prominence in
popular Jewish religion of the Graeco-Roman era. In its stead, Hayman and Barker
variously posit some form of dualistic Graeco-Roman Jewish religion more or less
continuous with pre-exilic Israelite religion. In his 1990 presidential address to the
British Association for Jewish Studies, Hayman contended "that it is hardly ever
appropriate to use the term monotheism to describe the Jewish idea of God, that no
progress beyond the simple formulas of the Book of Deuteronomy can be discerned
in Judaism before the philosophers of the Middle Ages, and that Judaism never
escapes from the legacy of the battles for supremacy between Yahweh, Ba'al and El
from which it emerged."30 Yet, although he highlights what he perceives as the
28 Heiser ("Divine Council") ambitiously argues for a monolatrous second-Temple Jewish
religion which retained the divine council of pre-exilic times (i.e., there was never a fusion of El and
Yahweh and the 'gods' of the divine council were never demoted to angelic beings). Peter Hayman
("Monotheism—A Misused Word in Jewish Studies?," JJS 42 [1991]: 1-15) and Margaret Barker
(Great Angel) argue also for a prominent dualistic pattern to Jewish religion.
29 Hayman speaks of "the monotheism which is more nearly attained in the Book of
Deuteronomy" ("Monotheism," 9). Barker admits a genuine monotheistic development in and shortly
after the exile with the work of Deutero-Isaiah and the Deuteronomists (Great Angel, 12-27). From a
reading of Heiser's "Divine Council," we find no sense in which he allows a genuine "monotheism"
in Second-Temple Judaism.
30 Hayman, ibid., 2.
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common practice of angel veneration, he later concedes the following: "For most
Jews, God is the sole object ofworship, but he is not the only divine being. In
particular, there is always a prominent number two in the hierarchy to whom Israel in
particular relates."31 Flayman speaks of "a cooperative dualism," of the supreme
creator God and a second figure, his vice-regent (or other spiritual agency) who
provides the point of contact with humanity. This dualistic pattern was firmly
impressed upon Judaism from the ancient Canaanite background to Israelite religion,
and it continued even into rabbinic Judaism.32 Similarly, in her work The Great
Angel: A Study of Israel's Second God, Barker advocates that Graeco-Roman
Judaism reflected a ditheistic tendency inherited from pre-exilic Jewish religion. She
attempts to demonstrate the continuation of this dualistic outlook by reexamining
sources traditionally understood as monotheistic (e.g., Philo, Qumran, Josephus,
etc.). Strictly speaking, though she confesses that "pre-Christian Judaism was not
monotheistic in the sense that we use the word," she does permit the existence of
monotheism in the Graeco-Roman era; what she challenges is any notion of its
predominance. Also of interest is the negative evaluation she gives to whatever
monotheism existed in second-Temple Judaism. For Barker, it is no positive
development, but a deviation (or devolution) from traditional ditheistic Jewish
religion. Heiser's approach and conclusions—he seems genuinely to deny the
presence of any monotheism in Judaism—differ slightly from those of Flayman and
Barker, yet he shares with them the challenge to traditional views of a predominantly
monotheistic Graeco-Roman era Judaism. His views are presented below.
Second, these scholars acknowledge a large measure of continuity between
Judaism of the Graeco-Roman period and the Canaanite roots and polytheistic
practices of ancient Israelite religion. In this respect, they address the nature of
Jewish religion conceptually-theologically and much less cultically. To the question,
How continuous was Graeco-Roman Jewish religious beliefsstill less, practice) with
its ancient Israelite precursors, they answer by attempting to demonstrate a strong
sense of continuity. The character of second-Temple Judaism thus depends largely
on how these scholars conceive the theological constructs of ancient Israelite
religion. They each begin with the conception that ancient Israelite religion esteemed
31 Ibid., 15; emphasis added.
32 "And even when, as in rabbinic Judaism, there clearly is one dominant divine figure, I
doubt whether the picture of God presented to us is really unitary at all" (ibid., 2).
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El as the most high God, with a pantheon of divine beings subordinate to him.
Yahweh was only one of these "sons of God" (DTDN "OH), one member of
the "heavenly host" (Q"Wn K22>), Israel's particular patron deity.33 From there the
proposals deviate. Hayman, following the traditional reconstruction, assumes an
ancient fusion of Yahweh with El, in which Yahweh became king of the divine cadre
after his identification with El Elyon, the head of the Canaanite pantheon.34 The
power void within the divine council was subsequently filled by a principal angel,
the other members of the divine council were demoted to angelic beings, and Israel's
dualistic religious construct persisted under a different guise.35 Heiser agrees with the
ancient assimilation of Yahweh to El. For him, however, there was retention—not
"demotion" to the ranks of angelic beings—of the members of the divine council.36
As such, Israel's cosmology even in the second-Temple era retained a belief in the
divine council and hence the existence ofmany gods, while practicing the exclusive
worship of only one God for Israel. This leads him to classify Jewish religion as
"monolatrous." Barker, on the other hand, does not accept the traditional
reconstruction. She doubts that a merging of Yahweh and El ever definitively
occurred in ancient Israelite religion. According to her, the dualistic pattern of
Graeco-Roman Judaism has its roots in the ancient relationship between
Yahweh—Israel's patron deity, "the son of Elyon," and chief among "the sons of
God" on the divine council—and El, the Most High God. Together, father and son
received Israel's cultic reverence. This belief in two deities was retained in force
despite the exilic reform efforts of the Deuteronomists and Deutero-Isaiah, which
sought unsuccessfully to eradicate Israel's classic belief in two gods. According to
Barker duality appears in a host of Graeco-Roman Jewish traditions and even
33 Cf. Deut 32:8-9. LXX, with support from DSS (cf. app. BHS), reads "the angels of God"
(dyysAojv 0£of>). Editors of BHS suggest the Vorlage of this lectio be reconstructed as bx "'33 or "33
Cvfi! ("the sons of God"). The reconstructed text would read: "When the Most High gave to the
nations their inheritance, when he separated human beings, he fixed the boundaries of the peoples
according to the number of the gods (=the sons of God). And Yahweh's portion was his people." MT
reads "the sons of Israel" (bi<~i& "Ua); cf. Gen 10; 46:27.
34 This identification (i.e., DTl7t<n Kin miT) Hayman regards as "the essential theme of the
Hebrew Bible" ("Monotheism," 5). On this fusion, see Gnuse (No Other Gods, 201-205) and Smith
(Early History, 7-12; Origins ofBiblical Monotheism, 142—45).
35 Hayman comments, "In post-exilic and later Jewish sources, of course, there is no
awareness that El Elyon was ever anything other than Yahweh himself, but the pattern of belief
revealed in [Deut 32:8f.] persisted" ("Monotheism," 6).
36 The term "demotion" appears specifically in Heiser's discussion of the divine council at
Qumran (§7.2; "Divine Council," 193).
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becomes the basis for early Christian worship of Jesus as Yahweh, son of the Most
High God.
Hayman, Heiser, and Barker share the belief that Yahweh belonged to the
class of divine beings in the Hebrew scriptures (DTI^N *'33), and they
interpret second-Temple Judaism in terms of "mythic" continuity with its ancient
roots. These scholars do not believe that Graeco-Roman Jewish belief (less so Jewish
cultic practice) ever significantly broke from the Canaanite mythological background
of ancient Israelite religion. Generally, these scholars allow some form of
monotheism to have existed in second-Temple Jewish religion, but they deny it a
place of prominence.37 They focus on theological continuity with the myths of
Israel's ancient religious past; cultic continuity (see below) receives only brief
mention as evidence of this dualistic tendency.
Third, these scholars highlight the long-lasting presence in Jewish religion of
an important secondary figure alongside the one God. This may be the figure of
Wisdom (corresponding to Yahweh's ancient female consort, Asherah),38 a principle
angel (a vizier who carries out God's will and can even bear his name), Philo's
"second God," Logos, etc. Principal agent figures (whether hypostatizations of
divine attributes, exalted patriarchs, or principal angels) were clearly important for
Graeco-Roman Judaism.39 The difficulty for scholars comes in knowing how best to
interpret evidence about them. Hayman is unequivocal in his assessment, "From the
book of Daniel on, nearly every variety of Judaism maintained the pattern of the
supreme God plus his vice-regent/vizier, or some similar agency who relates Israel to
God. The names change but the roles remain the same.. .Hardly any variety of
Judaism seems to have been able to manage with just one divine entity."40 The
general interpretive views regarding this second figure have already received brief
mention in the second point above. The issue of angel veneration receives treatment
below (cf. §2.2.1).
Fourth, though specifics of approach vary on a case-by-case basis, the
overarching methodology employed by scholars of this persuasion may be described
37 See supra n. 29.
38 Smith, Early History, 94-95.
39 Hurtado, One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998); Loren Stuckenbruck, Angel Veneration and Christology: A Study in
Early Judaism and in the Christology of the Apocalypse ofJohn (WUNT 2.70; Tubingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1995).
40 "Monotheism," 11; emphasis added.
60
as deductive, since it draws conclusions based on prior suppositions about what
constitutes monotheism. As good historians, each of these scholars addresses
relevant historical data. Yet they proceed to deduce the absence of monotheism in
Graeco-Roman Judaism by imposing modern categories and preconceptions of what
"monotheism" actually signifies.41 Hayman, for example, begins with the following
comment: "I do not intend to proceed here by setting up a model definition of
monotheism and then assessing the Jewish tradition against this yardstick."42
However, he continues by providing at least four criteria which to him demonstrate
the inappropriateness of "monotheism" as a descriptive term for Jewish religion. He
notes the absence of a clear doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and the presence of the
apparently common Jewish belief in mystical union with God.43 To these he adds the
presence of angelology and magical practice, "two areas where the steadily
increasing weight of evidence makes very clear the continuity of Jewish religious
belief and practice from its ancient Canaanite sources."44 Here Hayman crosses over
into performative cultic acts, albeit acts which he perceives as representative not of
monotheism. He concludes that Jewish angelology in the second-Temple and
rabbinic periods "reveals a pattern of religion that is anything but monotheistic," and
it actually seems to have represented "a development away from the monotheism
which is more nearly attained in the Book of Deuteronomy."45 A similar method is
evident in Heiser's work, who requires an explicit denial of the existence of other
gods before he is willing to apply the label "monotheism." For example, after going
to great lengths to demonstrate the absence of monotheism in Deutero-Isaiah,
traditionally interpreted as attesting a rigorous expression of an exclusivist
monotheism, he concludes:
11 So Hurtado, "First-Century Jewish Monotheism," 5-8.
42 "Monotheism," 2.
43 "Is a doctrine of monotheism conceivable," Hayman asks, "without a doctrine of creatio ex
nihiloT' ("Monotheism," 3). For him the absence of an explicit doctrine of creatio ex nihilo removes
"one of the most generally accepted components of monotheism," namely, God's omnipotence (ibid.,
4)! This is a shocking deduction, since the rhetorical evidence indicates a strong adherence to the idea
of God's universal omnipotence within first-century Judaism (cf. infra §2.2.2 and the sources cited in
n. 91 below). A number of early Christian "monotheists" spoke of the creative act in terms of one God
shaping preexistent matter, yet no self-respecting Christian would have worshipped matter as a second
principle alongside God (cf. supra n. 8)!
44 Ibid., 5. On differentiation ofmagic and religion see Durkheim (Elementary Forms,
39-44), whose aphorism "There is no Church ofmagic" highlights the contrapuntal nature of magic
relative to the shared, social aspect of "religion" (emphasis his).
45 Ibid., 8-9.
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Finally, one could ask what the author of Deutero-Isaiah (and other
canonical authors) could have done to go beyond the above phrases to
communicate a denial of the existence of other gods. Two options come
to mind. First, Deutero-Isaiah could have explicitly equated the other
with □'oxbo. Given the pre-exilic Israelite council's well-defined
hierarchy, such an explicit equation would have left no doubt as to a
redefinition of the other nations' crnbx. Second, the biblical author
could have said something along the lines of "the gods of the council are
not gods," or, "the sons of God are not DTlbx." Phrases that declare
"they are no gods" (nipn t6) and "it is no god" (Kin l<b) do
occur, but without exception they refer to idols made by human hands
and not the entities represented by those idols, or speak of inability in
comparison to Yahweh.46
Surely this is too stringent a test and does not allow for rhetorical flair and
flexibility. We should not expect ancient writers to compose in such a way as to
placate our modern desires for taxonomization and schematic clarity.47 The question
of Deutero-Isaiah's religious stance is treated below (cf. §2.2.2).
We offer the following comments and critiques. These scholars evince an
implicit preference for theological definitions of monotheism in terms of myth over
cultic patterns.48 That is, their approach defines early Jewish religion in terms of
"mythic" continuity with pre-exilic Israelite religion. Neither Barker nor Heiser
permit any significant shift in "mythic" meta-narrative between ancient Israelite
religion and early Judaism; Hayman acknowledges changes in certain narrative
elements of ancient Israelite religion (e.g., the assimilation of Yahweh to El), but
once the basic pre-exilic, dualistic myth had settled, that model remains relatively
stable into the second-Temple era. As noted above (§1) the popular penchant to
define monotheism in terms of myth is dangerous in that it inevitably leads back to a
priori presumptions about what elements constitute monotheism. Even if one grants
that the ancient dualistic pattern remained into second-Temple times (most certainly
46 "Divine Council," 120.
47 Whereas the explicit denial of the existence of other gods would help identify a text as
"monotheist," the absence of such an assertion does not necessarily indicate the lack of monotheistic
belief; argumentio e silencio is simply not conclusive. It is wholly inappropriate for modern scholars
to demand such an exclusivity statement before identifying a text or community as "monotheist."
Heiser's burden of proof is simply too heavy. Interestingly, Rechenmacher's study has also demanded
a rigorous, explicit denial of other gods for valid monotheism, yet he has come to an altogether
different conclusion about Deutero-Isaiah than has Heiser (»Aufiermir« 198-204).
48 Barker and Heiser restrict themselves with few exceptions to textual phenomena. In our
estimation, Heiser has not adequately addressed any cultic acts or their role in Israelite and later
Jewish religion. In his favor, Hayman posits angelology (and the use of magical texts) as evidence of
a dualistic religious practice, but his conclusion that this is the predominant practice of Second-
Temple Judaism is suspect.
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it did), what is really at issue is how Jewish communities of the second-Temple
period—not modern scholars—interpreted the two principles of the myth! Myths are
imbued with a measure of hermeneutic plasticity. Their interpretations change; the
symbolic world of myth takes on new significance in light of new sociological
settings and new cultic practices. Did second-Temple Jews understand a second
figure within the context of worship to one God alone? The existence of two first-
principles is not necessarily sufficient to exclude someone from being a monotheist.49
Cultic activity must be determinative in interpreting how Jewish cosmology was
perceived at the time.
In our opinion, neither Hayman, Barker, nor Heiser sufficiently allow for
significant change and diachronic dynamism within the Jewish religious tradition.
The Exile, in particular, was an event of radical religious and sociological
discontinuity with truly significant transformative power;50 at least it was sufficient to
transform many of Israel's corporate cultic practices. Religious developments
towards monotheism were happening elsewhere in the Axial Age, and there is
nothing per se preventing significant religious developments among the Jews.51
When we consider cultic behavior as the predominant factor in analyzing religious
49 Supra nn. 8 et 43.
50 Bob Becking, "Continuity and Discontinuity After the Exile: Some Introductory Remarks,"
in Bob Becking and Marjo C.A. Korpel, eds., The Crisis of Israelite Religion: Transformation of
Religious Tradition in Exilic and Post-Exilic Times (OtSt 42; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999) 1-8. Hans
Jiirgen Hermisson ("Diskussionsworte bei Dcuterojesaja: Zur theologischen Argumentation des
Propheten," in Jorg Barthel, Hannelore Jauss, et al., eds., Studien zu Prophetie und Weisheit:
Gesammelte Aufsdtze [FAT 23; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1998] 158) rightly observes
the diversity of experience and emotional upheaval that inhered in the Exile event: "Ein einheitliches
Bild der religiosen und geistigen Lage der Exilierten diirfte schwerlich zu entwerfen sein; wie iiberall
ist auch hier mit ganz verschiedenen Reaktionen auf die geschichtlichen Erfahrungen zu rechnen-von
Anfechtung und Zweifel bis hin zum Abfall vom Jahweglauben." At its worst Babylonian captivity
amounted to a profound existential crisis that threatened the very survival of Jewish faith. More
positively, however, the majority of Israel's sixth-century, creative theological reflection (excluding
Jeremiah) occurred in Babylon and surrounding districts, and the words of God found renewed
expression in a new cross-cultural reality through Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah. Repatriation led to
forced revaluation of the meaning and extent of Yahweh's reign, the understanding of his uniqueness,
and the reasons for the exile of his people. Whatever local and regional notions Jews previously held
regarding Yahweh's rule over his people had to be rethought in light of an international, foreign
context and without the objects of Yahweh's sacred cultus. Perhaps for the first time the Jewish
people were compelled to engage in a period of reimagining their own identity and that of their patron
God, especially in relation to the gods of the Weltmachte among whom they were living. This process
of transvaluation fueled by threat of forced internationalization and enculturation into a foreign
country moved certain key Jewish figures beyond a comprehension of Yahweh's uniqueness (evident
already in mono-Yahwism) into a deeper understanding of Yahweh's universal reign and exclusive
existence as the one true God.
51
E.g., the monotheistic cult of Ahuramazda (in Persia no less) originated during this time.
On the "Axial Age" (coined by Karl Jaspers) consult Gnuse (No Other Gods, 214—26).
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belief, it should be readily evident that cultic patterns changed significantly between
Israel's pre-exilic Canaanite roots and Graeco-Roman Judaism. Not the least,
Ezekiel's image of solar-worship (heliolatry) within the First Temple no longer
applies to the worship practices of the Second Temple. Cultic idol-shrines were
destroyed. Surely new cultic patterns which arose after the Exile necessitate a
revaluation of Jewish religion in terms of cultus.
Contrary to these scholars, we believe there is ample testimony to
characterize the predominant forms of Graeco-Roman era Judaism as monotheist. To
begin with, sources outside the Jewish tradition are aware of Jewish commitment to
worship one God.52 These sources clearly indicate that those who did not participate
in (and who were at times hostile to) Jewish religion understood Jews as devotees of
one God alone; but did Jews view themselves as monotheists? For this one needs to
look at cultic patterns (§2.2.1) and religious rhetoric (§2.2.2) within Judaism of the
Hasmonean and Roman period.
2.2.1 Cultic Devotion to One God Alone
The most obvious example of cultic worship indicating the exclusive
monotheistic character of second-Temple Judaism is temple sacrifice directed
towards the one God. Though not the only datum, the practice of offering oblations
both daily and at appointed festival times in cultic sacrifice to the God of Israel
represents prima facie evidence for the presence (and one might argue
predominance) of exclusivist monotheism in early Judaism. At least it represents an
interest by the priestly cadre in disseminating monotheistic religion to Jewish faithful
from the chief Jewish cultic center. Jerusalem was the spiritual capital of Judaism,
and the influence of its religious practice was felt throughout the Jewish world,53
though most Jews by virtue of geography were not privy to the daily comings and
goings of temple life. The morning and evening Tamid offerings constituted a daily
52 Tacitus Hist. V.5; Juvenal Sat. XIV.96-106; cf. John Gager, The Origins ofAnti-Semitism:
Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity (New York: Oxford University Press,
1983) 67-88. Celsus regarded Judaism as a departure from polytheism to monotheism (Cels.
1.23-24). The testimony of Numenius (second century CE) that the Jewish God was "without
communion with others (dKoivoivrixov), and Father of all the gods (7caxEpa rcavxcov xcov Gecov), who
will not allow anyone to share in his honour" (Edouard des Places, Numenius: Fragments. Texte e'tabli
et traduit [Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1973] fr. 56) demonstrates more his syncretistic tendencies than
those of the Jews.
53 Joachim Jeremias, Jerusalem zur Zeit Jesu (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958)
1.86-89.
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reminder to the priests, inhabitants, and visitors of Jerusalem of the uniqueness of
Israel's one God,54 but it was especially at festival times, when Jews from around the
inhabited world would come to the temple to express corporate devotion to one God,
that monotheistic cultic observance was most clearly disseminated from Jewish
religious authorities at Jerusalem to Jews in the imperial provinces.55 In addition to
this localized sacrificial practice, there was among certain groups an eschatological
expectation that the nations would one day come offering cultic sacrifice to the God
of Israel at the Jerusalem temple.56 This universalizing vision of sacrificial worship to
the one God was embedded in Israel's prophetic literature,57 and it represented the
totalizing expectation—not merely the desire—for the full manifestation of
Yahweh's universal reign qua the only God. To these groups at least, requirements
for sacrificial worship of one God were not limited to Israel, and their faith should
not be labeled merely "monolatrous."58
The temple was not the only outlet for expressing corporate Jewish devotion
to one God; there was also the synagogue. And at least one practice was shared
between the two—public recitation of the Shema (Deut 6:4-5). During the
Hasmonean and Roman periods the Shema, which may have originally demonstrated
the qualitative unity of God or of Israel's unique relationship to Yahweh,59now finds
currency in strongly monotheistic, confessional texts, designed to express God's
quantitative unity—his utter uniqueness as the sole God. The Mishnah preserves the
memory of priests daily reciting in the Temple the Shema and Decalogue, in
conjunction with Deut 11:13-21, Num 15:37-41, and several benedictions after the
Tamid offering.60 The memory of this pattern within first-century Palestinian
synagogal worship is retained in later Talmudic texts.61 The custom of daily
54 Cf. Exod 29:42; Num 28:3, 6; m. Tamid 3:5; 4:1.
55 Cf. Acts 2:1, 8-11; Jeremias, Jerusalem, 1.66-97.
56 E.g., Sib. Or. 3.564-72, 715-23, 772-75. Cf. Wolfgang Schrage, Unterwegs zur Einzigkeit
und Einheit Gottes: Zum "Monotheismus" des Paulus und seiner alttestamentlich- friihjudischen
Tradition (Neukirchen Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2002) 32-35.
57 Cf. Isa 2:2; 55:5; 56:7; 60:3, 5; 66:20; Jcr 3:17; 16:19; Ezek 37:28; Mic 4:2; Hag 2:7; Zech
8:22-23; 14:16; Mai 1:11. Prophetic expectation did not always include all Israel's ancient enemies;
some would find themselves on the wrong end of God's judgment!
58 Pace Heiser, "Divine Council," 15.
59 Smith, Origins ofBiblical Monotheism, 153.
60 See m. Tamid4:3; 5:1; m. Ta'an. 4:3; cf. m. Ber. 2:2.
61 See b. Ber. 10b—1 la; y. Seb. 4.2; Sifre Deut. 34; y. Ber. 1.3. The Houses of Hillel and
Shammai and the early Yavneans purportedly debated the precise practice of the when and how of the
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recitation also seems to have functioned in the Qumran community,62 but the earliest
and perhaps most scintillating piece of evidence pointing to religious appropriation
of the Shema remains the Nash Papyrus.63 These four second-century bce papyrus
fragments64 contain the Shema (Deut 6:4—-5)65 preceded by the entire Decalogue
(probably from Deut 5:6-21 rather than Exod 20:2-17)66 on a single leaf (i.e., not as
part of a scroll).67 The close collocation of these two texts indicates the use of the text
as a lectionary or for instructional purposes,68 though one cannot be certain whether
the document was produced for public or private use. Nevertheless, at the least the
Nash Papyrus adumbrates a pattern that was present—and even retained from earlier
ritual use of Shema, not the fact that it should be read. That is, the practice of reading the Shema was
previously established. Cf. Jacob Neusner, From Politics to Piety (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1973) 112; The Rabbinic Traditions About the Pharisees Before 70. Part II: The
Houses (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971) 41-42.
62 See 1QS 10:10; cf. E.P. Sanders, Judaism: Practice and Belief63 BCE-66 CE (London:
SCM Press; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992) 196.
63 Initially edited and published by Stanley A. Cook ("A Pre-Massoretic Biblical Papyrus,"
PSBA 25 [1903]: 34-56).
64 W. F. Albright ("A Biblical Fragment from the Maccabaean Age: The Nash Papyrus," JBL
56 [1937]: 149), correcting the earlier estimate of Stanley Cook ("Pre-Massoretic Biblical Papyrus,"
51) that the papyrus should be dated to the first quarter of the second century ce, dates the text on
paleographic grounds to the Maccabaean age (165-137 bce), indicating that the text should probably
be located in the second half of the second century bce, contemporary with the Roberts fragments of
Deuteronomy. Albright's conclusions have been largely accepted by other paleographers. See Frank
Moore Cross ("The Development of the Jewish Scripts," in G. Ernest Wright, ed., The Bible and the
Ancient Near East: Essays in honor of William Foxwell Albright [The Biblical Colloquium 1961; repr.
Winona Lake, Indiana: Eisenbrauns, 1979] 135) and Joseph Naveh (Early History of the Alphabet: An
Introduction to West Semitic Epigraphy and Palaeography [Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew
University; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982] 162-63), cited in Paul Rainbow ("Jewish Monotheism as the
Matrix for New Testament Christology: A Review Article," NovT 33 [1991]: 82 n. 9). But V.A.
Tcherikover and A. Fuks (eds., Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum (3 vols.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1957) 107 n. 48) prefer a first- or second-century ce date on the basis of "historical
evidence," by which they mean the Talmudic references indicating the Decalogue—Shema liturgical
pattern. Since these references "refer in the utmost cases to the last decades of the Temple," they are
compelled to accept a later date {op. cit., 107 n. 49). We see, however, no reason to doubt Albright's
conclusions despite the reservations of Tcherikover and Fuks.
65 The text of the Shema preserved by Stanley A. Cook ("Pre-Massoretic Biblical Papyrus,"
Plate II) reads:
('im "pa)1? ^(aa -prO^x mrr nx nan)xi xin nnx mrr irn^x mrr ^(xacr a)/is2.
The presence of X1H after inx is conspicuous.
66 That the Shema would occur in conjunction with a copy of the Deuteronomic Decalogue
makes sense in light of the proximity of the Shema and Decalogue in the biblical text of Deut 5—6
and the injunction in Deut 6:6 to remember "these words." Albright avers that the Nash Papyrus
presents a divergent form of the Deuteronomic Decalogue, most closely related to Vaticanus ("A
Biblical Fragment," 175).
67 Pace Cook, "Pre-Massoretic Biblical Papyrus," 36. The juxtaposition of Decalogue and




times?—in the first-century temple and synagogal practice of the recitation of the
Decalogue followed by confession of the Shema.
The Decalogue and Shema were further worn on the hands and forehead of
many faithful Jews in fulfillment of the command in Deut 6:8,69 and mezuzot were
placed upon household and other doors.70 The use of phylacteries (tefillin) and
mezuzot containing the Shema is well-attested at Qumran,71 and there is no reason to
doubt that this practice was limited to that location in light of the biblical enjoinder
in Deut 6:6-9 and the evidence above.72 The placement of the Shema on doorposts
indicates further that the confession "the Lord is one" was not limited to synagogal
or temple recitations, but penetrated into family religiosity, that is, the basic fabric of
religious and social life. This conclusion finds support in debates among later rabbis
and the practice of daily prayers.73 On the individual level, one may envision a
spectrum of religious adherence to this practice—one person reciting the Shema
daily, another weekly, yet another as often as perceived necessary, and still another
not at all.
We suggest that it is in the places of public worship—the temple and
synagogue—in the very acts of sacrifice and public recitation of the Shema that we
see most clearly the significant break from pre-exilic syncretistic Yahwism, where
the public veneration on cultic altars of such deities as the Queen of Heaven (Jer
7:18; 44) alongside of Yahweh was not only tolerated but quite popular.74 Similarly,
some form of solar worship (heliolatry) had been connected to the temple in exilic
times,75 but we find no (overt) traces of this practice in the Second Temple. By the
69 Matt 23:5; Let. Arist. 159; Josephus Ant. 4.213.
70 Let. Arist. 158; Josephus Ant. 4.213.
71 Phylacteries: 4Q129-30, 4Q135, and 4Q140; mezuzot: 4Q150 (prob.), 4Q151. In J.T.
Milik, ed., Qumran Grotte 4, II: Tefillin, Mezuzot et Targums (4QI28-4Q157) (DJD 6; Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1977).
72 Deut 6:6 indicate that all God's commands, but primarily the Decalogue (note □"'"Din
n'pxn in 5:22 [cf. Deut 12:28] as well as the preponderance of forms from the root 137 in Deut 5
which link this section with the command in 6:6), are to be remembered in the ways specified in 6:6-
9. On the use of tefillin and mezuzot, see Sanders (Judaism, 196-97).
73 Cf. Josephus Ant. 4.212. Sanders' comment is apropos, "[T]he early rabbis linked prayer
with saying the Shema', and consequently they thought of the morning and evening prayers as being
said privately at home" (ibid., 203).
74 Note also the continued post-exilic veneration of a female deity (named Anatyahu; i.e., the
Queen of Heaven) at Elephantine in Egypt. The fifth-century BCE Jewish community at Elephantine
demonstrates the ubiquitous nature of syncretistic Yahwism as far back as the Persian Period and
provides a glimpse into earlier pre-exilic Judaism (supra n. 25).
75 Ezek 8:16.
67
first century, many images from Israel's earlier pre-exilic worship had become
absorbed in such a way that they no longer posed a threat to Israel's monotheism;76
myth was reinvented. To whatever extent Israel's earlier syncretism was retained in
popular Graeco-Roman Jewish religion, there is no evidence that this was of a public
and cultic nature, nor that it was tolerated as the "accepted norm." The Deuteronomic
reforms succeeded at the very core of public worship practice in the very heart of
Judaism's most sacred temple. There was significant departure from earlier Israelite
religious cultic practices at the very core of the cultic apparatus and presumably of
the cultic rhetoric; what it meant to be a worshipper of Yahweh changed. Unless we
give due weight to this dynamic shift, we will not properly evaluate the nature of
Jewish religion.
There were, of course, dissident groups—most notably at Qumran—
sectarians who had broken from the temple apparatus and its sacrifice. Yet this break
occurred for reasons of fundamental disagreement about temple administration, not
about the monotheistic penchant they found there. There is no evidence that these
denizens of the northwestern shores of the Dead Sea ever practiced anything other
than monotheism, as their practice of corporately hymning and praying to the one
God alone indicates.77
Another datum to incorporate is the practice of public prayer. The act of
prayer itself is by no means a mark of monotheism, but a number of scholarly
analyses of extant Jewish prayers have demonstrated that all the prayers in the non-
canonical second-Temple Jewish literature were addressed to the God of Israel alone
utilizing highly monotheistic rhetoric. This must be construed as first-hand evidence
76 So, e.g., astronomical symbols appear on synagogal reliefs; cf. Rachel Hachlili (Ancient
Jewish Art and Archaeology in the Land of Israel [HO; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988]) and J.H.
Charlesworth ("Jewish Interest in Astrology during the Hellenistic and Roman Period," ANRW
20.2:926-50). Terminology and imagery formerly attested in Asherah worship became incorporated
in the figure of Wisdom (supra n. 38). Martin Goodman argues that such images are not incompatible
with Jewish belief in one God ("The Jewish Image of God in Late Antiquity," in Richard Kalmin and
Seth Schwartz, eds., Jewish Culture and Society under the Christian Roman Empire [Leuven: Peeters,
2003] 133-45). Erwin R. Goodenough (Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period. Volume 8:
Pagan Symbols in Judaism [Bollingen Series 37; New York: Pantheon Books, 1958] 221) judges that
the "invasion of pagan symbols into either Judaism or Christianity.. .involved a modification of the
original faith, but by no means its abandonment." For him, hellenized Jews accepted the "value" of
the pagan symbols but not their "explanation." This they did "with the same scom of pagan gods,
myths, and rites as the Christians and the rabbis showed" (ibid., 224), and remained "equally loyal to
their Jewish heritage of devotion to the Jewish God, Torah, and People (ibid., 226).
77 See n. 62.
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for the presence of a monotheistic penchant.78 From the apocalypses and Jewish
polemic literature to the sectarian literature of Qumran, there is no evidence that
Jews deviated from the practice of directing their prayers to the one God. However,
enough epigraphic and secondary testimony has survived attesting the Jewish
practice of prayers directed apotropaically towards angels that some forms of angel
veneration must have existed in Graeco-Roman era Judaism.79 This is further
bolstered by references preserved within primary Jewish literature possibly attesting
the practice of sacrifice directed towards angels.80 If all of the cultic patterns
mentioned above indicate a fundamental cultic commitment within Graeco-Roman
Judaism to exclusivist monotheism, what then are we to make of the practice of
veneration to angels or other personal divine agency figures81 that clearly held an
important role to some Jews?82
78 See the studies of Rainbow ("Monotheism and Christology," 1.49-51, passim), Henry J.
Wicks (The Doctrine ofGod in the Jewish Apocryphal and Apocalyptic Literature [London: Hunter &
Longhurst, 1915] 122-29), N.B. Johnson (Prayer in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha: A Study of
the Jewish Concept ofGod [SBLMS 2; Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1948]), and J.H.
Charlesworth ("A Prolegomenon to a New Study of the Jewish Background of the Hymns and Prayers
in the New Testament," JJS 33 [1982]: 265-85; "Jewish Hymns, Odes, and Prayers (ca. 167 bce-135
ce)," in R.A. Kraft and G.W.E. Nickelsburg, eds., Early Judaism and its Modern Interpreters
[Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986] 411-36).
79 For epigraphic evidence, see C.E. Arnold's unpublished paper ("Mediator Figures in Asia
Minor: Epigraphic Evidence," SBL Consultation on Jewish and Christian Mediator Figures in Graeco-
Roman Antiquity, San Francisco, November 1992), cited by Hurtado ("First-Century Jewish
Monotheism," 17 n. 36). The practice of apotropaic appeal to angelic beings continued into rabbinic
times (cf. Hayman, "Monotheism," 10-11).
For secondary testimony to Jewish angel worship, see Col 2:18; Kerygma Petrou (in
Clement, Strom. 6.5.39^11); and Origen, Comm. Jo. 13.17; Cels. 1.26; 5.6 (note Origen's counter¬
argument in 5.6). The value of reference to angel veneration in Aristides Apol. 14 (Syriac), however,
is too often overrated; it actually offers a veiled attestation of a strongly monotheistic penchant in
Jewish cult (see infra ch. 4 n. 113)! The fact that such activity was later proscribed by the Rabbis
indicates they perceived the practice as posing a real threat to Jewish monotheism.
The names of angels eventually found a place in the public liturgy of medieval synagogues,
yet this in no way implies any practice of corporate angel veneration in the Middle Ages—however
local or ubiquitous. L. Zunz (Die synagogale Poesie des Mittelalters [Berlin: Julius Springer, 1855])
provides a list of approximately forty angels so referenced (Supplement 22, pp. 476-79), though he
notes (p. 149), "Keins dieser Gebete konnte den Betenden zu glauben veranlassen, dass sein Heil von
einem andern als von Gott abhange; auch ist nur in einem, in aramaischer Sprache, Michael, in einem
ahnlichen Metatron genannt und in einer, iibrigens ungebrauchlichen, Selicha werden 22 Gottes- und
Engelnamen mit eingefuhrt." The latter comment refers to the hymn (from Greece?) DEI "[DDY1N ("I
will exalt You, the Name;" ibid., 301-02).
80 Pseudo-Philo 13:6; 34:2.
81 Conceptually, personified (hypostatized?) divine attributes (sc. Logos, Wisdom) should be
distinguished from the category of personal divine agency figures (sc. principal angels, exalted
patriarchs) when discussing early Jewish belief, since there was within the ancient Jewish mind a
qualitative difference between Creator and created (cf. Rainbow, "Jewish Monotheism," 84). In the
realm of religious practice, one would be hard pressed to find evidence of devotion, whether private or
public, directed towards God's Wisdom or Logos in Graeco-Roman Judaism; these were powerful
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Did devotion to a "second figure" alongside God constitute a serious threat to
Jewish monotheism? In reference to theology and cult, one could contend that
devotion to a "second figure" alongside the one God does pose such a threat.
Certainly the Rabbis argued so,83 and they mounted "a tremendous propaganda battle
in the midrashim to downgrade the angels and stress Israel's superiority to them."84
Nor were they arguing only against the theological significance of a second exalted
figure; they were concerned with actual worship practices. On the other hand, from
the paucity of primary Jewish references attesting the practice of devotion to a
second exalted figure, one may be justified in concluding it was limited in scope (see
further §3 below). It is clear that in some Jewish communities certain principal
angels (e.g., Metatron) took on a sustained importance theologically, and several
texts preserve traditions about the exaltation of certain patriarchs to angelic status
(e.g., Enoch, Moses, and Jacob).85 These figures were endowed with numinous
qualities, were closely involved in carrying out the purposes of God, and could even
be invested with the divine name. Yet despite the powerful theological presentations
of these personal beings in this literature, there is no clear-cut example that any
exalted patriarch or principal angel ever received corporate veneration in Jewish
circles nor that the crucial Jewish distinction between Creator and creature was ever
corporately broken. Further, there exist a number of apocalyptic passages in which a
human is explicitly forbidden from worshiping an angel, whom he has mistakenly
identified with God.86 An investigation into epigraphic evidence (with special
extensions of God's power, but were not objects of worship. Rather, it was personal divine agency
figures and principal angels that came closest to encroaching upon the cultic worship of Yahweh and
posed a greater threat to his cult.
82 On angel veneration, see Samuel Cohon ("The Unity of God: A Study in Hellenistic and
Rabbinic Theology," HUCA 26 [1955]: 474—76), Barker (Great Angel, 70-96), Hurtado (One God,
One Lord, 28-35 et ch. 4), Stuckenbruck (Angel Veneration, 75-103), Michael Mach
(Entwicklungsstadien des judischen Engelglaubens in vorrabinischer Zeit [TSAJ 34; Tubingen: J.C.B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1992]), Saul M. Olyan (A Thousand Thousands Served Him: Exegesis and the
Naming ofAngels in Ancient Judaism [TSAJ 36; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993]),
Charles Gieschen (Angelomorphic Christology: Antecedents and Early Evidence [AGJU 42; Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1998]), Bauckham (God Crucified; "The Throne of God and the Worship of Jesus," in The
Jewish Roots ofChristological Monotheism [JSJSup 63; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999] 43-69).
83 Alan Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and
Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill, 1977).
84
Hayman, "Monotheism," 7. He further notes the prominence of referring to God and his
angels in Jewish magical texts, but the evidence is from Talmudic or later periods (ibid., 10).
85 Cf. 2 En. 22.6-10.
86 Cf. Apoc. Zeph. 6.15; Ascen. Isa. 7.21-22; Rev 19:10; 22:8-9; see Bauckham, "Throne of
God."
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reference to the role of angels) led Clinton Arnold to grant that angels were invoked
apotropaically in certain Jewish inscriptions, though he concluded that the epigraphic
testimony simply does not point to any kind of organized devotional pattern in which
Jews "gather regularly to adore, pray to, and worship angels."87 Personal divine
agents, however exalted and proximate to the one God, were clearly distinguished
from that God in respect to corporate cultus. There seems to have been no sense in
which the one God of Israel was ever in jeopardy of losing his corporate, cultic
preeminence within the predominant streams of Judaism, and there is simply not
enough evidence to state affirmatively that a corporate cultus devoted to angels or
exalted patriarchs existed at all within early Judaism; the practice appears to be
private.88 Rainbow rightly comments, "[Sjurely such worship of angels as there
might have been was a declension from a socially shared ideal."89 Even if one were
able to locate an indisputable instance of corporate cultic reverence of a being other
than the true God within second-Temple Judaism (a concession which has yet been
demonstrated), the question must still be raised as to how significant that instance
would be, given the numerous Jewish writings which have come down to us that not
only attest no such veneration but rather actually support the conclusion that Jewish
religious practice was solidly monotheistic.90
2.2.2 Rhetoric as Clue to Jewish Monotheism
A number of scholars have investigated aspects of Graeco-Roman Jewish
monotheistic rhetoric,91 and most of these have received brief review elsewhere.92 In
87 "Mediator Figures," 21 (cf. pp. 26-27), cited by Hurtado ("First-Century Jewish
Monotheism," 17). Similarly, note Goodenough, Jewish Symbols, 8.228: "Many individual
Jews.. .seem to me to have been paganized, but not the Judaism of the group as a whole."
88 Rainbow comments, "It is difficult if not impossible to demonstrate that there was any
widespread Jewish movement toward cults other than that of the one God" ("Jewish Monotheism,"
83).
89 Ibid.
90 Further, one would have to ask whether it could not have occurred within an "orthodox"
conception of monotheistic cult. As Michael Frede observes with respect to Christianity, "Even on an
orthodox [Christian] view there is a place for the invocation or even the veneration of the angels and
the saints in some sense of these words" ("Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy in Later Antiquity," in
P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede, eds., Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity [Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1999] 64). Note also the conclusions of Rainbow ("Jewish Monotheism," 85), who quotes Gerhard
Pfeifer (Ursprung und Wesen der Hypostasenvorstellungen im Judentum [AzTh 1/31; Stuttgart:
Calwer Verlag, 1967] 66, 102).
91 On the emergence of monotheistic rhetoric before the Exile, see Smith (Origins ofBiblical
Monotheism, 151 ff.). On rhetoric in Graeco-Roman Judaism, see Cohon ("Unity of God," 425-79),
Adolf Schlatter (Wie sprach Josephus von Gott? [BFCT 1/14; Giitersloh: Bertelsmann, 1932]), R.J.H.
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our opinion, the single most significant analysis of second-Temple Jewish rhetoric is
the D.Phil, thesis of Paul Rainbow, who undertook a rigorous evaluation of
monotheistic rhetoric in early Judaism (ca. 200 BCE-100 CE). Rainbow's analysis of
Jewish religious rhetoric led him to note that over half of all the monotheistic Jewish
texts (which he surveyed) functioned in either creedal or confessional statements or
in prayers.93 This is simply astonishing, and it demonstrates how deeply imbedded
monotheistic rhetoric was within the corporate religious practice and psyche of early
Judaism. The sheer frequency of this monotheistic language within the religious
rhetoric of early Judaism in general and its inclusion into corporate and private
devotion strongly indicate that Jewish religious language functioned to voice an
already highly developed monotheistic scruple. In this section we focus on the
appearance of monotheistic rhetoric within Deutero-Isaiah and its later reception and
examine additional references to language of divine exclusivity and unity in early
Jewish texts, since these latter types of language bear most directly on this thesis.
Since we have already had occasion to mention the use of the Shema in
Jewish religious practice, perhaps the best place to begin investigating these aspects
of unity and exclusivity rhetoric in the early Jewish period is with an examination of
a set of monotheistic statements found in Deutero-Isaiah (esp. chs. 41-52) and of the
reception these texts received in later Judaism. The prophet launches a salvo of "I"-
style speech placed in the mouth of God, including: mrP 'ON/'OJN (41:17; 42:6, 8;
43:15; 44:24, 45:3, 5-8, 18-19, 21; 49:23, 26; cf. 43:11), XT! WrON (41:4; 43:10,
13; 46:4; 48:12; 52:6; cf. 43:25; 51:12), JTOtO with jnnx MX (44:6; 48:12; cf.
41:4), ^X (43:12; 45:22; 46:9), "JTI^N m,T "'DX/'OIIN (41:13; 43:3; 48:17;
51:15), "[Tl^X (41:10), and the extended "I"-declarations in which ""jX or "03X are
doubled for emphasis (43:11, 25; 48:15; 51:12), a technique characteristic of
Shutt ("The Concept of God in the Works of Flavius Josephus," JJS 31 [1980]: 171-87), Wicks
(Doctrine ofGod), Rainbow ("Monotheism and Christology;" "Jewish Monotheism," 78-91), and
Schrage (Unterwegs, 18-27). To the above list, we would add for NT monotheistic rhetoric (as a
legitimate source of Graeco-Roman Jewish expression) David Ball ('I Am' in John's Gospel: Literary
Function, Background, and Theological Implications [JSNTSup 124; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1996]) and Catrin H. Williams (/ am He: The Interpretation of'AntHu' in Jewish and Early
Christian Literature [WUNT 2.113; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2000]). A. Marmorstein's
influential article ("The Unity of God in Rabbinic Literature," HLJCA 1 [1924]: 467-99) complements
the theme for rabbinic literature.
92 See Hurtado's helpful analysis ("First-Century Jewish Monotheism," 10-12).
93 Rainbow, "Monotheism and Christology," 1.49. See particularly Appendix 1 (ibid.,
2.224-286), where Rainbow has performed a rather exhaustive cataloging of Jewish monotheistic
texts from the period ca. 200 BCE to 100 CE.
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Deutero-Isaiah's style.94 Additionally, a number of divine "formulas of exclusivity"
("there is no other God besides me"; cf. 43:11; 44:5-6, 8; 45:5-6, 21; 46:9) and
"formulas of incomparability" ("there is no one like me"; cf. 44:7; 46:9) occur.95
With these various self-predication formulas, Yahweh himself, the covenant God of
Israel, could boast of his own exclusive existence as the sole God as well as his
incomparable uniqueness, saving power, and universal hegemony. He places himself
in a class of his own. The programmatic amassing of these divine "I"-speeches in
Deutero-Isaiah is designed rhetorically to emphasize Yahweh's utter uniqueness,
incomparability, and exclusive existence as God. These formulas voice a strict
monotheism in a manner rather unique to this portion of the OT.96
Or do they? In his Ph.D. dissertation, Michael Heiser raises this interesting
and important question. He contends that the rhetoric of Deutero-Isaiah, often taken
as the most clearly monotheistic language in the OT, actually bears the rhetorical
force of incomparability—not exclusivity—language, since, for Heiser, the meta-
narrative of pre-exilic, exilic, and post-exilic Israelite religion is a monolatry in
which the ancient divine council motif is retained.97 Yahweh is simply elevated to
incomparable status above these other gods within Israel's own belief system. For
Heiser, Deutero-Isaiah was actually a proponent of monolatry not monotheism.
Strictly speaking we cannot utilize the criteria of actual cultic practice to
analyze Deutero-Isaiah's religious assertions, for there are no clear indicators as to
what he or his community actually practiced historically by way of cult.98 There are,
however, a number of rhetorical indicators that lead me to diverge from Heiser's
94 Cf. also Deut 32:39; Hos 5:14.
95 Rechenmacher (»Aufler mir,« 161-76) identifies four formulas which occur in
combination with the exclusivity formula (Selbstidentifikationsformel, Fremdidentifikationsformel,
Erkenntnisformel, Unvergleichlichkeitsformel) and three which "vergleichbare Inhalte ausdriicken
konnen" (Unvergleichlichkeitsformel, Nichtassoziationsformel, Alleinigkeitsformel). Only the
"formula of incomparability" occupies a Sonderstellung as both combination partner and candidate for
equivalent semantic value (semantische Gleichwertigkeit) to the exclusivity rhetoric (cf. ibid., 161 n.
419).
96 With the Deutero-Isaianic "self-identification formulas" (= selbstdndiges Personal-
pronomen + Gottesname) the idea of one God is positively affirmed; with the "exclusivity formulas"
the existence of other gods is negated. Thus are met Rechenmacher's necessary elements of the
definition of monotheism (»Aufier mir«, 191-92). We are happy to note that we found ourselves in
agreement with Rechenmacher's basic conclusions even before accessing his thoroughgoing work on
OT exclusivity rhetoric (cf. ibid., 184-86; 195-204).
97 See his discussion in "Divine Council," 102-21.
98
Reconstructing the historical setting of the composition of Deutero-Isaiah has always
proven a slippery prospect.
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incredulity in this regard, the first of which actually does concern cultic apparatus.
The reader of chapters 40-55 of Isaiah cannot but notice the sardonic and vehement
quality of the author's foments against the cultic apparatus of idolatry itself (cf. Isa
40:18-20); even God himself is presented as sharing this sentiment (44:6-20;
46:1-2). This technique appears commonly in Jewish apologetic literature as a means
of discrediting the practice of idolatry (e.g., Wis. 13-15), but here it seems to be
aimed directly at discrediting the existence of any other god that could possibly be
responsible for animating these idols.
Second, there is in Deutero-Isaiah's rhetoric a genuine denial of the existence
of other gods. The almost rapid-fire succession of exclusivity statements aimed at
denying the actual existence of any other gods demonstrates this. Scholars have long
noted a number of parallels between the rhetoric of Deutero-Isaiah and the prayers,
hymns, and inscriptions of the ancient Near East," but we submit that the language
of Deutero-Isaiah is to some extent distinctive among the cultic language of the
ancient Near East. The 1jN/1D3N-patterns found particularly in Isaiah 41-51 have
similar counterparts in the self-predication hymns or "hymns to oneself' of the
Sumerian literature, in which a deity praises his or her own attributes or abilities, as
Dion has demonstrated.100 Morton Smith has further observed the presence of
exclusivity language in worship addressed to a patron deity.101 He notes, "The god
being worshiped is regularly flattered—that is to say, exalted. Though he may
occupy a minor position in the preserved mythological works, yet in the worship
addressed to him he is regularly represented as greater than all other gods. It is often
said that he created not only the world, but also the other gods. He is the only true
99 For a listing (through 1968) of relevant literature on the use of Babylonian and other
ancient Near-Eastern language in Deutero-Isaiah, see Shalom M. Paul ("Deutero-Isaiah and
Cuneiform Royal Inscriptions," JAOS 88 [1968]: 180 n. 3); for a brief overview of the history of the
debate, consult Eugene H. Merrill ("The Language and Literary Characteristics of Isaiah 40-55 as
Anti-Babylonian Polemic" [PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1984] 4—12).
In discussing parallels between Deutero-Isaiah and cuneiform literature, one must be
careful not to attribute to Babylonian influence that which Deutero-Isaiah used from his pre-tradition.
If Benjamin Sommer's proposal is correct (and we believe it has merit), Deutero-Isaiah was fond of
using Jeremiah (cf. A Prophet Reads Scripture: Allusion in Isaiah 40-66 [Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998] 61-66, passim). This observation led Paul ("Deutero-Isaiah," 184-86) to
exercise caution in attributing the oft-repeated Deutero-Isaianic motif of prenatal divine selection
(e.g., 49:1, 5) to Babylonian influence (particularly the royal inscriptions), where the theme appeared
from Assur-reS-isi I (1130-1113 BCE) to Nabonidus (556-539 BCE).
100 H.-M. Dion, "Le genre litteraire sumerien de l'«hymne a soi-meme» et quelques passages
du Deutero-Isai'e," RB 74 (1967), 215-34.
101 "Common Theology," 135^17.
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god; sometimes, even when worshiped in close connection with other deities, the
only god."102 The overlaps are significant enough to have spawned at least one high-
quality dissertation directed towards literary analysis of these parallels.103 If
monotheistic-sounding language exalting one god above all others occurs readily in
cultures outside Israel, in sources of a clearly polytheistic background, in what sense
can we speak of the "distinctive" quality of Deutero-Isaianic rhetoric? Only with
respect to the strict exclusivity statements such as those found in Deutero-Isaiah in
which a deity posits his or her own exclusive existence—"there is no god but me."
Smith's examples of exclusivity language demonstrate this specific type of rhetoric
only on the lips of worshippers fawningly addressed to a deity among the pantheon
and always limited to terse adjectival additions, such as "sole God," "only Lord," etc.
A survey of highly relevant literature produced no precise counterpart to this
language in the contemporary cultures,104 and we posit that Deutero-Isaiah is truly
being rhetorically creative at this point. Indeed, of the explicit rejection of the
existence of all other gods by a deity such as occurs in Deutero-Isaiah we have yet to
locate a single instance in the religious language of the polytheistic cultures. A
divinity may claim to create by himself (e.g., ANET 6b)—even to create the other
gods—or to be the only savior, et cetera, but nowhere do we find rejection of the
existence of the other gods in the pantheon. Perhaps this is due to the fact that such
an assertion cannot obtain internal consistency within a polytheistic matrix. If such
statements do occur, they are relatively rare, and certainly not collated with the kind
102 Ibid., 138-39. Smith comments further, "This does not mean, of course, that he is actually
thought to be the only god; the expression is usually no more than a form of flattery; only in a few
special cases does it come to be taken literally. As a form of flattery it is often an expression of local
patriotism, which achieved it by a chain of exaggeration something like this: Our god is the greatest of
all gods, there is none other like him, there is none other" (ibid., 139^10).
103 We refer to Merrill's "Language and Literary Characteristics."
104 We welcome correction on this point. The author is no specialist in the field of ancient
Near Eastern cultures; nevertheless, a search through the references in Smith's "Common Theology,"
Merrill's "Language and Literary Characteristics," and the sources utilized in H.-M. Dion's famous
"Le genre litteraire" (cf. 222 n. 36), revealed not a single instance of a deity denying the existence of
other gods such as that found in Deutero-Isaiah, where it appears with astounding frequency! The
closest, and most intriguing, parallel appears in the self-generation account of Re (sc. "After I had
come into being as the sole god, there were three gods beside me;" ANET 6b), who also claims, "and 1
made (in concept) every form when I was alone.. .before (any) other had come into being who could
act with me" (ANET 6b). These last two texts represent close parallels to Deutero-Isaiah, but they also
presuppose that other gods would subsequently come into existence, such that there was a time when
Re existed without counterpart, but now he is surrounded by other gods. By personal correspondence,
Prof. Nicholas Wyatt at New College, Edinburgh, also confirmed that he was unaware of any such
exclusivity statements in ANE literature comparable to those in Deutero-Isaiah. Deutero-Isaiah's
language is "distinct."
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of frequency found in Deutero-Isaiah. This alone indicates distinction between his
rhetoric and the concepts it represents and that of other ancient Near Eastern cultures.
In investigating the literature, scholars must look for actual parallels.105 Apparently
this type of language was the near exclusive inheritance of Israel's prophetic
tradition.
Beyond this, one may add some more traditional factors used to recognize
monotheism, though we should stress it is the cultic context and religious rhetoric
that point most firmly in the direction of monotheism here. We may note that
Yahweh worked entirely alone at creation (cf. Isa 40:12-17, 28-31; implied).
Yahweh alone—not the other gods—has the ability to tell the future, as he himself
declares (Isa 41:23; 44:7-8; 48:3-5), and his reign universally extends over the
entire earth so that he does with the nations what he wills (e.g., Isa 40:15-17; 41:2;
52:10). This universal scope is expanded to include cultic practice as the prophet
anticipates a universal dimension to the cultic worship of Yahweh through the
administration of his servant (cf. Isa 55:5). Further, Yahweh's salvation of his people
(wri^K nyiET) will be universally recognized (Isa 52:10, 15).106 Apparently,
Deutero-Isaiah's ridicule of idolatry reveals that the worship of worthless idols is
vain not only for Israel, but for the nations too! It is Yahweh's absolute sovereignty
over history, over the future (and its predictability) that demands his worship and
demonstrates the utter impotence of other fictitious "gods" to act.
Of course, to examine the rhetoric of the Hebrew texts of Isaiah does not
necessarily place us outside of the time period of interest. These texts were later
reappropriated during the Roman period as the discovery of Hebrew manuscripts of
Isaiah uncovered in the caves of Qumran demonstrates. Even beyond Qumran, it is
likely that these texts had become imbedded within the religious life (if not the very
liturgy itself) of the synagogues of Palestinian Jewry in the first century CE (cf. Luke
4:16-21), though we know very little about the existence of set lectionaries for the
105 A point well-stressed by Samuel Sandmel ("Parallelomania," JBL 81 [1962]: 1-13) and
T.L. Donaldson ("Parallels: Use, Misuse, and Limitations," EvQ 55 [1983]: 193-210).
106 Jews did not seem to back this conviction up with a missionizing agenda. Martin
Goodman explores the evidence for a Jewish proselytizing mission before commenting, "On
examination, then, the evidence for an active mission by first-century Jews to win proselytes is very
weak. I think that it is possible to go further and to suggest that there are positive reasons to deny the
existence of such a mission" ("Jewish Proselytizing in the First Century," in J. Lieu, J. North, and T.
Rajak, eds., The Jews Among Pagans and Christians in the Roman Empire [London; New York:
Routledge, 1992] 70). There was, nevertheless, popular apocalyptic expectation that Yahweh would
be universally worshipped.
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Haftorah during this time period. Even as early as the second century bce,
continuing interest in these monotheistic texts may be demonstrated by their
incorporation into the Old Greek translation. Yet to argue from the inclusion of
Isaiah (as a religiously authoritative text) in the Greek translation of the Bible at the
hands of Alexandrian Jewry or from its presumed usage in first-century ce synagogal
worship is not to provide unequivocal evidence of a ubiquitous reappropriation of
this Deutero-Isaianic literature or rhetoric. What it does demonstrate is the
continuing presence of this language within the textual traditions of early Judaism,
though admittedly, this tradition of divine-predication language did not find heavy
usage within the continuing Jewish tradition in the exactform it took in Deutero-
Isaiah (see below). The formula of divine self-exclusivity does, however, occur in
some additional prophetic literature (cf. Isaiah 63:3, 5; Hos 13:4; Joel 2:27) as well
as Deut 32:39107 (=LXX Odes 2:39). Outside these biblical texts and apart from the
possible exception of the Passover Haggadah and 2 Enoch (33:8; 36:1), if these latter
two are datable to the Roman era or earlier,108 the discourse of divine self-exclusivity
does not find further expression in early Jewish literature.
The language of divine self-exclusivity in which Yahweh so unequivocally
pronounced his exclusive existence as universal and sole God did, however, continue
to receive special attention in early Jewish literature through a series of modified,
counterpart, and cognate expressions, which we may call "confessions (or
107 The peculiar phrasing of MT Deut 32:39 ptO; there is no god with me; cf.
Deut 32:12), in conjunction with other language which does not positively deny the existence of other
gods (cf. Deut 5:7; 32:12) would seem to indicate that the Hebrew text of Deut 32:39 does not contain
the same specificity and detailed rejection of the existence of other gods as found in Deutero-Isaiah.
LXX Deut 32:39, however, clearly shifts the language in the direction of an exclusivist monotheism
(koA ouk eoiiv 6eo<; rcXfiv fpo-0). This movement towards an unambiguous monotheistic statement
from the text of Deut 32:39 also occurred in other versions: PTgs, Pesh, and Vg, but not SamP. See
Williams, I am He, 68-74, 86-102.
108 For a late third-century dating (240-220 BCE) of the Passover Haggadah, consult Louis
Finkelstein ("The Oldest Midrash: Pre-Rabbinic Ideals and Teachings in the Passover Haggadah,"
HTR 31 [1938]: 291-317), who posits 150 BCE as an alternative interpretation. The section in question
(the text reads "ICIR Kin 1]R) forms a midrashic commentary on Exod 12:12, which itself is
offered in the Haggadah as an explanatory comment on the main text of Deut 26:8. Thus it forms a
kind of midrash on a midrash. Following Williams (/ am He, 201-05), we are inclined to date this text
to the post-Christian era, believing it to be of secondary character. The third century CE represents the
absolute terminus ad quern, since the Passover midrash is cited in the tannaitic midrashim.
On the date of 2 Enoch, see F.I. Andersen ("2 (Slavonic Apocalypse of) Enoch. A New
Translation and Introduction" in OTP 1.94-97), who notes that "dates ranging all the way from pre-
Christian times to the late Middle Ages have been proposed for the production of 2 Enoch." Lester
Grabbe (Judaic Religion, 98-99) situates it in the Roman era (63 BCE-70 CE).
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acclamations) of exclusivity."109 In these acclamations, a second party confesses and
proclaims the exclusive existence of Yahweh as the one true God (e.g., "You alone
exist"; "there is no other besides him").110 This shift away from the strongly divine
rhetoric of Deutero-Isaiah towards a confessional stance represents to some extent a
move from epiphanic revelation towards cultic confession,111 and it corresponds
further to a general movement away in our period from the prophetic practice of
speaking directly in the name of God. We believe it is justifiable to assert that the
nearest conceptual basis for this type of language is Isaiah 40-55 and Deut 32:39 and
possibly other Jewish texts (2 Sam 7:22; 1 Kgs 8:60) whose authoritative role was
recognized among various Jewish communities, and not the generic language of
prayer common in the ancient Near East. If we are correct in viewing this larger body
of confessions of exclusivity as related to divine-exclusivity language of Deutero-
Isaiah and Deuteronomy, then it is probable that Jews of the second-Temple period
were reading Deutero-Isaiah monotheistically.
Perhaps what is most astonishing about this body of exclusivity language
taken as a whole is the evidence it offers for the variety of settings, in particular
cultic settings, within which this exclusivist language was used."2 Such a cultic-
communal application of this language is only intuitive, for by their very nature,
these exclusivity statements are confessions spoken by a votary to the one God. In
the extant early Jewish literature, this rhetoric was incorporated into the language of
corporate {Hel. Syn. Pr. 4.26-7; 1QH 15:32; 18:9; Sir 36:4; 2 Esd 19:6) and private
prayer (1 Kgdms 2:2; 2 Kgdms 7:22; 4 Kgdms 19:15, 19; Jdt 9:14).113 It is invoked in
public blessings (3 Kgdms 8:60) and at least one acclamation (Isa 45:14). It is placed
upon the mouths of the faithful, and it appears on the lips of pagans (Bel 41; Ps.-
109 These statements are numerous and include the following: Deut 4:35; 32:12; 1 Kgdms 2:2
= Odes 3:2; 2 Kgdms 7:22 = 1 Par. 17:20; 3 Kgdms 8:60; 4 Kgdms 19:15, 19 - Isa 37:16, 20; Isa
45:14; Dan 3:96 [3:29 Eng.]; Bel 41; 2 Esd 19:6; 4 Ezra 8:7; Jdt 9:14; Wis 12:13; Sir 36:4 [36:5
Eng.]; 1QH 15:32; 18:9; 20:11, 19; 1QS 11:18; 4Q377 f2:8; 4Q379 f22i:5; 4Q504 5:8b-9a; Ps.-Orph.
17; Sib. Or. 3.629, 760; Hel. Syn. Pr. 4.26-7; and 2 En. 47:3. Of course, not all of these stem from our
period of interest.
110 These statements bear similitude with those of Isaiah 41-52 and are probably related to
them directly. This confessional-exclusivity form was already present (though not preeminent) in the
writings of Deutero-Isaiah (cf. 45:14).
111 Cf. Rechenmacher, »Aufier mir,« 168-69.
112 OT literary genres in which exclusivity formulas occur are discussed by Rechenmacher
(ibid., 176-80).
113 The texts of these passages literarily position acclamations of exclusivity in the context of
private prayer, yet the corporate language and parenetic content often used in these texts signal that
they were composed for public consumption.
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Orph. 17). Indeed, the ascription of this language of exclusivist monotheism to a
pagan monarch presents one of the more genuinely shocking motifs in this analysis
(Dan 3:96; Bel 41), and it appears both to highlight the universal nature of the one
true and only God and to exhort the faithful against too extensive an assimilation into
pagan culture. Another truly astonishing element is the appeal for gentile conversion
to the one true God based upon the fact of his exclusive existence qua God (Sib. Or.
3:629). In this latter text, the Sibyl issues a plea for repentance to be demonstrated
through the offering of a sacrificial hecatomb, indicating that confessions of
exclusivity were appropriate to sacrificial contexts. The appeal to pagan sources
(interpreted monotheistically) to bolster the case for the universal nature of the one
unique God is not uncommon, and it is not surprising that we find confessions of
exclusivity in such contexts (cf. Ps.-Orph. 17). Confessions of exclusivity appear in
texts from Egypt (LXX; Sib. Or.), Palestine (1QH; 1QS), and a later text (ca. 150 CE)
possibly composed in Syria (Hel. Syn. Pr. 4:27). As though the language of
exclusivity were not sufficient enough to express the true nature of the one God,
these texts appear in the context of other anti-idolatry statements (4 Kgdms 19:15,
19), a theme about which more will be said below.
Alongside this tradition of divine exclusivity language, in which God himself
or his people affirm his own exclusive existence, one may consider the tradition of
human self-predication also encountered in Isaiah (47:8, 10) as well as Zephaniah
(2:15), a tradition which reappears in the second-Temple (Sirach 36:9) and post-
second-Temple eras (Sib. Or. 5.173; cf. 5.186, 190-92). In this group of statements,
a human speaker boasts of his or her own power (and usually military prowess) by
means of a confession of exclusivity (e.g., "I am, and there is no one besides me"). In
Isaiah 47 and Zeph 2, these exclusivity statements are coupled with the absolute
confession eyco eipi (for Heb. "^Nl). In the former passage, we see personified-
Babylon and in the latter Nineveh. In Isaiah, Zephaniah, Sirach, and Sib. Or. 5, this
language is placed on the lips of foreign empires or rulers (personified
Babylon/Nineveh or foreign nations) and represents an early Jewish stream of
argumentum contra imperium on the basis of God's universal sovereignty as the one
true God. On the one hand, these statements expose the unbridled hubris and
arrogance of world empires, which represent for the author the basest level of human
pride. By means of this language, the author can fulminate against oppressive
nations. But below the surface, this language is actually a carefully crafted argument
in favor of the sole God. By presenting the corporate pride of empire as a complete
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and utter refusal (not merely a misunderstanding) to acknowledge the presence of the
sole God, the author highlights the actual existence of the one true God, who alone
exists and reigns in universal sovereignty. This group of texts then stands in a kind of
dyadic relationship with the divine self-exclusivity and confessional exclusivity
statements. Together they work synergistically to reinforce a strong, exclusivist
monotheistic stance. The one set affirmatively emphasizes Yahweh's unique
existence as sole God; the other brings his exclusiveness into relief by negatively
denouncing the folly of human hubris.
It is true that the use of "there is no other" by Babylon and Nineveh does not
exclude the ontological existence of other cities and nations. On analogy with this,
Heiser argues that the divine self-exclusivity statements actually do not exclude the
existence of other deities (sc. the divine council concept continues in the monolatry
of Deutero-Isaiah)."4 For him, the point of "HI? ]\X (divine self-predication) is "not to
deny the existence of other gods, but to affirm that Yahweh is unique and the only
god for Israel,""5 However, in his analogy between 1117 px and the human self-
predication "HI? DSN, he has overlooked a larger distinction in the lexical forms of
divine and human self-exclusivity statements, which actually reverses his argument.
The linguistic and lexical structures of these human exclusivity statements are
consistently different from those of the divine exclusivity statements in both Hebrew
and Greek manuscript traditions."6 The rhetoric of human self-exclusivity is to be
sure merely designed to differentiate the speaker as plenipotent over all other city-
states, yet the overall force of that rhetoric demonstrates the feckless folly of
specifically human pride in the face of Yahweh's universal power. It serves to
safeguard the uniqueness and exclusiveness of the creator, by distancing him from
the creature!
The discussion above has focused on self-exclusivity expressions, but another
Deutero-Isaianic expression of significance appears also, the phrase Kin 13K/,'D3K ("I
am he"), which became the absolute (i.e., non-predicated) eyco eipi ("I am") later
114 So Heiser, "Divine Council," 95-96.
115 Ibid., 96; emphasis added.
116 All the divine self-exclusivity statements use one of the following to express exclusion:
[ma] pN Hlbatra]; laba DSN; TlblT px; ma px; mba px, while human self-exclusivity
statements (Isa 47:8, 10; Zeph 2:8) are unanimous in their use of ma ,0EX. Lexical distinction
between these two types of statement is drawn in Hebrew, and it apparently was not overlooked by the
translators of LXX (divine self-exclusivity: ovk nape^ epou; owe [eti] tcXtiv epou; human
exclusivity: oijk e-cepa; ouk pet' epe ext).
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reappearing in the writings of the NT."7 Outside LXX versions, the absolute use of
eyco eipt occurs nowhere else in the Jewish corpora or the non-Jewish Greek
literature included in the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae corpus, and it does not
resurface until the NT (cf. Mark 14:62; John 8:24, 28, 58; 13:19).118 When it later
resurfaces in Rabbinic literature, Kin "ON provides a succinct expression of God's
claim to exclusiveness and uniqueness."9
In addition to the rhetoric discussed above, confessions of "God is one" occur
frequently in writings with Jewish origin from the second century bce to the first
century ce. Among these we may include the fragment attributed to Sophocles by
Clement of Alexandria {Strom. 5.113), which he says were preserved in a Jewish
work entitled "On Abraham and the Egyptians" and which he (spuriously) attributes
to Hecataeus of Abdera.120 We may also mention here Ps.-Hec. 5; Aristob. 4:5 = Ps.-
Orph. 10; LXX Dan 3:17; and the benediction in Apoc. El. (C) 2:10. Further
evidence may be obtained from first-century Jewish inscriptions which attest an
apotropaic use of the phrase "one God" (etq Geoq; cf. 1 Cor 8:6; Eph 4:6).121 In the
case of early Judaism, eiq- and povoq-formulae appear with such frequency and
force, that their presence should be classed as indicative of monotheism.122 Indeed,
the juxtaposition of the adjective "one" (eiq) or "only" (povoq) with the title "God"
(0eoq) or "Lord" (Kupioq) appear so frequently that their use may rightly be
117 Unlike the later Targumim, which demonstrate a penchant to formulating new divine self-
predication statements, which were not present in the Vorlage (e.g., TPsJ Isa 41:4; 43:10; 48:12;
51:19; FT-P Gen 3:22; Exod 20:3), there are no significant additions or subtractions of self-
exclusivity formulas in LXX Isaiah. There is, however, the addition of the absolute use of eyto eipi in
LXX Isa 45:18. This may not be meaningful, however, since it is conceivable that LXX was simply
translating a Vorlage that read N"~ 13N instead of mn1 NR. The apparatus of BHS shows no Heb MSS
with the variant Kin NK at this verse.
118 Williams, I am He, 11 n. 50. On the questionable nature of reconstructing the original
Semitic phrases from the Old Slavonic translation in Apoc. Ab. 8:3 and 9:3 (translated "I am he" and
"It is I," respectively, in OTP 1.693), see ibid., 11. At any rate, the text of the Apocalypse was written
no earlier than 70 ce, for it shows awareness of the Temple's destruction.
119 On the use of Kin "OK in Rabbinic literature, see ibid., 86-213.
120 R. Doran believes this fragment must antedate Josephus ("Pseudo-Hecataeus. A New
Translation and Introduction," in OTP 2.907).
121 Erik Peterson, Eig Qeog: Epigraphische, formgeschichtliche, und religions-geschichtliche
Untersuchungen (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1926) 276-99.
122 In his analysis of Jewish theological language from the second century bce to the end of
the first century ce, Rainbow observes that et<; occurs in conjunction with 0eo<; or Ktipioc; in thirty-one
out of one hundred and forty-nine Greek passages surveyed (21%); povoi; appears with 8e6<; or toipioi;
in twenty-three passages (15%); cf. "Monotheism and Christology," 1.47-48.
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considered a standard Jewish technique.123 Based on prophetic writings, the rhetoric
of divine exclusivity and unity took on a specifically monotheistic tone in Judaism
unexperienced in the "pagan" world, where votaries would use a congeries of
monotheistic-sounding language to invoke the favor of whichever deity they were
appealing to at the moment.124 This observation is no less true as regards that popular
version of inclusive pagan monotheism that regarded the many gods of traditional
cults as aspects or modes of a single divine nature, or God.125 To be sure, rhetoric of
"one and only God" is found there, yet not with the frequency that it appears in
Jewish sources. Early Jewish religion and rhetoric was exclusive; and so was its God.
5- Rabbinic and Para-rabbinic Monotheisms
Having established that "exclusivist monotheism" best describes the
predominant streams of early Jewish religion, a detailed look at divine unity and
uniqueness in rabbinic Judaism is not necessary. It suffices only to demonstrate that
monotheism continued to exert a formative influence in the rabbinic era. We mention
here a few currents and sources for the reader's further consultation. The significance
of divine unity for rabbinic Judaism has been brought out most admirably in articles
by A. Marmorstein and S. Cohon.126 The divine exclusivity language of Deut 32 and
Deutero-Isaiah appears frequently in conjunction with the phrase Kin "ON (Kin X3K),
which has been discussed in detail for rabbinic-era sources in Catrin William's
excellent monograph I am He: The Interpretation of 'Ant Hu' in Jewish and Early
Christian Literature.
Of note is the fact that divine unity language assumes particular significance
during this period for the liturgy, as Marmorstein notes, "No teaching of the Law and
Prophets acquired such a prominent place in the liturgy and the homilies of the Jews
as the doctrine laid down in Deut. 6.4: 'Hear, O Israel, The Lord is our God, the Lord
123 Cf. Ibid., 1.32-33.
124 Gerhard Delling ("MONO! 0EOX," TLZ 8 [1952]: 470) explains, "Es ist
selbstverstandlich, dafi der polytheistische Fromme den Gott, an den er sich im gegebenen Falle
wendet, mit moglichst hohen Aussagen zu ehren sucht." The worshipper would curry the favor of a
particular god by boasting in hyperbolic and superlative language of that god's hegemony and unique
nature. Certainly, there was occasional place in popular Graeco-Roman religions for near exclusive
devotion to a patron deity, but this is usually the result of a special relationship with a patron deity
(nevertheless understood in a polytheistic matrix).
125 On this, see below Chapter Two §4.3 and the articles in P. Athanassiadi and Michael
Frede, eds., Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).
126 Marmorstein, "Unity of God;" Cohon, "Unity of God," esp. 441-47.
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is One.'"127 Marmorstein's study focused on rabbinic (Haggadist) argument of the
first four centuries, but his conclusion that the concepts of divine unity lay at the very
core of corporate expressions of Jewish devotion can be telescoped onto Judaism of
the second-Temple period, as we have shown above.128
But divine unity and exclusivity rhetoric also play powerful roles in
internecine Jewish debates as well as polemic against external pressures.
Marmorstein opines that "It was very necessary to emphasize this idea in the liturgy,
for the doctrine of God's unity was more exposed to the opposition of the world
outside the Synagogue, and to misrepresentation inside the Synagogue, than any
other teaching of Judaism."129 He notes three forces "arrayed against this doctrine in
fierce battle:" (1) adherence (or mere advocates) of the polytheistic cults, (2)
"gnostics" and their two powers, and (3) Christians (who identified Jesus with God
and advanced the doctrine of the trinity) and Jewish heretics (inclined to the worship
of angels or to false conceptions about God).130
Evidently, the long-persisting, dualistic pattern noted by Hayman and Barker
continued into rabbinic-era Judaism and became a source of significant dispute over
the boundaries of Jewish monotheism and Jewish identity.131 R. Jochanan records a
number of tricky texts which could easily be—and apparently were being!—
construed in a dualistic sense, including Gen 1:25-27; 11:5-7; 35:3-7; Deut 4:7; 2
Sam 7:23; and Dan 7:3.132 The rabbis expended much energy in polemicizing against
this perceived dualism, and the unity and exclusivity language of texts such as Deut
32:39, Isa 41:4, and 44:6 becomes commonplace in this polemic.133 It appears that
127 Marmorstein, ibid., 467.
128 As Marmorstein acknowledges (ibid.).
129 Ibid., 468-69.
130 Ibid., 470.
131 On this, see especially Daniel Boyarin, "The Gospel of the Memra: Jewish Binitarianism
and the Prologue to John," HTR 94 (2001): 243-84, and Border Lines: The Partition ofJudaeo-
Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) chs. 4-6.
132 Ibid., 491, and Segal, Two Powers, 148-49. To these may be added Josh 22:22; 27:19; and
Ps 50:1.
133 One area of work that has yet to be fully explored, but promises fruitful results to the
scholar skilled enough to undertake it, is the appropriation of Deutero-Isaianic passages in the debates
between rabbinic Jews, hellenistic Jews (e.g., Philo), Christians, and biblical demiurgic traditions. The
most thorough analyses of this phenomena to date has been performed by Alan Segal ("Judaism,
Christianity, and Gnosticism," in S.G. Wilson, ed., Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity, Volume 2:
Separation and Polemic [SCJ 2; Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986] 133-61).
"It cannot be merely accidental," Marmorstein claims, "that all these verses, for instance, Isa. 42.8;
47.6; Deut. 32.39, etc. occurring again and again in undoubtedly apologetic or polemical sayings,
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some portion of this reaction was directed against Christians (and later "gnostics"),
whose inclusion of a second figure alongside God was perceived by the Rabbis as a
threat to a developing "orthodox" Jewish monotheistic ideology and cultic
practice.134 Yet there should be little doubt that rabbinic "two powers" polemic was
also directed against some Jews, and polemic against those who believe in "two
powers in heaven" recalls how certain strands of Jewish para-rabbinic practice also
continued to tolerate belief in a secondary heavenly agent alongside the one God
even into the second century and third centuries.
Daniel Boyarin finds evidence of such a pre-Christian Jewish "two powers"
belief in Philo's teaching about the Word (Logos) of God and in the targumic Word
(.Memra) of God.135 The former, he claims, provides evidence of belief in a second
personal heavenly figure, God's Logos, among a hellenistic diaspora Jew.136 Yet
Philo is not simply "a sport, a mutant, or even a voice crying in the wilderness," for
he "was clearly writing for an audience of Jews devoted to the Bible."137 Other,
Semitic-speaking Jews also held to a similar version of "Logos theology" (or,
"binitarian monotheism").138 Boyarins argues that the targumic Memra is "not a mere
name," simply a means of avoiding anthropomorphism, "but an actual divine entity,
or mediator."139 By appealing to the hellenistic diaspora Jew Philo (and via
extension, his community) and by locating "Logos theology" in the ancient
Palestinian and Babylonian synagogues (through the targums), Boyarin believes that
the para-rabbinic "two powers" belief in a personal Word of God alongside the one
God was the predominant form of Jewish monotheistic belief in first- and second-
century Judaism.140 He observes:
always recur in the anti-Jewish polemics of the Church and the dialogues, partly in older, partly in
younger sources" ("Unity of God," 491). See particularly Chapter Five of this thesis.
134 Segal, ibid., 260-67.
135 In Targum Onqelos and the extant Palestinian targums.
136 "Gospel of the Memra" 249-52.
137 Ibid., 252, 249, respectively.
138 By "Logos theology" Boyarin intends "a general term for various closely related
binitarian theologies" ("Gospel of the Memra" 260). His emphasis on theology indicates that by
"binitarian" he intends only to indicate a pattern ofbelief that posits a second heavenly agent in close
association with the one God. Hurtado, on the other hand, uses the term "binitarian" to indicate
patterns ofcultic devotion to a second figure alongside the one God.
139 Ibid., 255.
140
Logos theology is "the religious Koine of Jews in Palestine and the Diaspora" (ibid., 260).
Cf. also ibid., 254: "Although the official rabbinic theology suppressed all talk of the Memra or Logos
by naming it the heresy of 'Two Powers in Heaven,' both before the Rabbis and contemporaneously
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There is no reason to imagine, however, that "rabbinic Judaism" ever
became the popular hegemonic form of Jewish religiosity among the
"People of the Land," and there is good reason to believe the opposite.
Throughout the rabbinic period, there is evidence of a vital form of
Judaism that was not only extrarabbinic but which the Rabbis explicitly
named as a heresy, the belief in "Two Powers in Heaven," in our terms,
Logos theology. This doctrine became for the Rabbis, as it had been for
orthodox Christian writers from Justin on—from the exactly opposite
point of view—the touchstone of orthodoxy. Some Jews, perhaps even
most Jews, resisted the efforts of Justin to appropriate the Logos
exclusively for Christianity, as well as the efforts of the Rabbis to
"collude" in that exclusion. For those Jews, even in Palestine, the Logos
(named memra "word" in their spoken Aramaic) remained a pivotally
important theological being.141
Boyarin's conclusion that the Memra of God in the Aramaic targums
represents a genuine personal hypostatization is not self-evident (nor universally
accepted by targumic scholars).142 Neither is it certain that Philo's Logos is a fully
personal entity, as it is later for Justin.143
Yet, even if his conclusions are granted, they do not necessarily call into
doubt the nature of first- and second-century Jewish religious patterns as broadly
monotheist. Unlike Heiser, Hayman, and Barker (§2.2), Boyarin himself does not
believe the predominance of Jewish "Logos theology" casts doubt on the category
"monotheism" as a valid descriptor for first- and second-century para-rabbinic
Jewish belief.144 On this point we agree. Even with Boyarin's specialized reading of
the targumic Memra, there is no evidence that worship or devotion were regularly
directed to a personal Logos (or Memra) or other secondary entity in the context of
para-rabbinic Jewish devotion to the one God in the synagogues where the targums
with them there was a multitude ofJews, in both Palestine and the Diaspora, who held onto this
version of monotheistic theology" (ibid., 254; emphasis added).
141
Boyarin, Border Lines, 89.
142 Robert Hayward (Divine Name and Presence: The Memra [Totowa, NJ: Allanheld,
Osmun, 1981]) doubts that the divine Memra represents a hypostatization in the Targums, though
Alejandro Diez Macho does prefer to see "en el Memra de Yahve del Targum algo mas que una pura
metonimia verbal" ("El Logos y el Espiritu Santo," Atlantida 4 [1963]: 393).
143 Cf. Oskar Skarsaune, The Prooffrom Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr's Proof-Text
Tradition (NovTSup 56; Leiden: Brill, 1987) 409-24.
144 "Gospel of the Memra," 249: "[T]here was nothing strange about a doctrine of a deuteros
theos, and nothing in that doctrine that precluded monotheism." He comments, "Although...official
rabbinic theology sought to suppress all talk of the Memra or Logos by naming it the heresy of Two
Powers in Heaven, before the Rabbis, contemporaneously with them, and even among them, there
were a multitude of Jews, in both Palestine and the Diaspora, who held this version ofmonotheistic
theology" (Border Lines, 116-17; emphasis added).
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were regularly being read in Palestine or the diaspora.145 There is simply no explicit
evidence that adherents of para-rabbinic "two powers" traditions ever conceived of
themselves as anything other than operating under the broad confession of "one
God."146 It was, after all, the rabbis, and not the adherents of "two powers"
themselves, that characterized the "two powers" belief as violating the unity of God.
Boyarin's analysis helpfully highlights the plurality and fluidity of beliefs in
"one God" in first- and second-century Judaism. If his analysis is correct (on this we
are less certain), then the very nature of Jewish monotheism was under dispute
between rabbis and some circles of para-rabbinic Palestinian and diaspora Jews
during this time. On the one hand, the rabbis presented "binitarian patterns" as at
odds with (their own understanding of) belief in "one God." The rabbis sought to
confine the concept to a single divine being who expresses himself in a plurality of
modes.147 The strain of strict monotheism among the rabbis coexisted alongside para-
rabbinic binitarian patterns of monotheistic belief in which a secondary divine agent
was closely related to the one God and acted with divine authority. The existence of
this secondary figure, it seems, constitutes the very battleground over which Jewish
identity as monotheist was debated and constructed across the second and third
centuries. Rabbinic Judaism eventually won the debate in the fourth century, after
which time Jewish monotheism became synonymous with the version of strict
monotheism offered by the rabbis. After this point, all who posited a second divine
agency were considered to have violated the parameters of Jewish monotheism.
This plurality should not engender doubt, however, as to whether Jewish
religion was truly monotheist. This was an intramural debate over what patterns of
belief and cultic practice could be acceptably subsumed under Jewish worship of
"one God." The confines of the confession themselves were not called into doubt.
145 Note Boyarin's careful qualification on the limits of our knowledge about Jewish worship
as regards the Jewish Logos (Border Lines, 119): "There may be no gainsaying his [Hurtado's]
demonstration, I think, that worship of the incarnate Logos is a novum, a 'mutation,' as he styles it,
introduced by Jesus people, but the belief in an intermediary, a deuteros theos, and even perhaps
[emphasis added] binitarian worship was common to them and other Jews." For Boyarin, the
incarnation of the Logos/Memra represents a Christian "mutation" on earlier patterns of Jewish
binitarian theology. For Hurtado, Christian patterns ofcorporate devotion to a second heavenly agent,
Jesus, represent a "mutation" from pre-Christian Jewish monotheistic cultic practice. Neither doubt
that the major patterns of pre-Christian Jewish belief and practice should be designated "monotheist."
146 If we may invoke the prologue of the fourth gospel (as does Boyarin) and the epistle to the
Hebrews as evidence of intra-Jewish versions of "two powers" belief, it is clear that adherents to "two
powers" did not understand themselves as operating outside the parameters of acceptable Jewish
belief and practice.
147 On rabbinic modalism, see Boyarin, Border Lines, 128-47.
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The existence of the debate itself presupposes that Jews of all stripes shared common
ground in the idea of one God and that the issue of debate was whether this
monotheism could or should tolerate the presence of a secondary divine agent
alongside God.
T. The Most High God and the Jewish Diaspora
The presence of certain "two powers" strands of theology among para-
rabbinic Jews complicates somewhat any attempt at portraying a unified picture of
Jewish monotheism of the second and third centuries in terms of beliefs about the
one God. A variety of patterns of belief concerning the one God were represented
within the pale of Jewish monotheism. The strict monotheism of rabbinic Judaism
represents a largely Judaean provenance,148 yet we have seen how at some remove
from rabbinic influence, some diaspora Jews (as also in Palestine) held to a pattern of
"two powers" theology. Yet patterns of belief are not practices of devotion,149 and
there is every reason to suppose that the various ideological patterns concerning the
one God existed within a context of strict monolatrous devotion to the one God alone
even within the context of popular diaspora Jewish religion. Textual evidence for the
Jewish diaspora is scant. Most of what we can reconstruct from diaspora Judaism is
epigraphic or iconographic in nature, and there is reason to believe that icons were
not incompatible with belief in one God.150 There is little textual evidence for popular
binitarian patterns of devotional practice within the scope of diaspora Judaism,151 and
there is much powerful evidence that the practice of devotion to one God alone
represents the predominant strain of diaspora Jewish religion.
148 So, too, many (if not most) pagan accounts of Jewish practice and what they regarded as
the separatism of Jewish monotheism are descriptive of Jews in Judaea; cf. Judith Lieu, Christian
Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 122-26.
149 See Chapter Two §1.
150 Goodman, "The Jewish Image of God," 133-45.
151 There is no indication that Philo worshipped the Logos. If an original Jewish prayer lies
behind the text of (the now Christian) Apostolic Constitutions 7.33-37, as Wilhelm Bousset argued
("Eine jiidische Gebetssammlung im siebenten Buch der apostolischen Konstitutionen," NKWG
[1915]: 435-89, discussed in Simon, Verus Israel: A Study of the Relations Between Christians and
Jews in the Roman Empire (AD 135-425) [trans. H. McKeating; The Littman Library of Jewish
Civilization; New York: Oxford University Press, repr. 1996] 53-60), then we have perhaps such a
textual instance of binitarian pattern within diaspora Judaism. The text of ch. 36 wishes that souls
"might come into the remembrance of that Wisdom which was created by Thee" (cited in Simon,
ibid., 54).
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We are speaking of the cult dedicated to worship of the Most High God
(Theos Hypsistos). Spread throughout the entire eastern Mediterranean, the
Hypsistarian cult represents the most pervasive and popular cultic activity shared by
Jews and pagans.152 Stephen Mitchell notes the importance of the Hypsistarian cult in
monotheistic discussions, avering, "More than any other cult of the Roman world,
the worship of Theos Hypsistos has been taken to illustrate the predisposition among
pagans of the second and third centuries ad to worship a single, remote, and abstract
deity in preference to the anthropomorphic figures of conventional paganism. In
other words it has a key place in discussions of monotheism in the later Roman
Empire."153 Yet the cult of Hypsistos was also the property of Jews, who appealed
frequently to Theos Hypsistos in religious ritual.154 It therefore provides a unique
point of entry for comparing the nature of diaspora Jewish religious expression vis-a¬
vis other (i.e., pagan) "monotheistic" expressions. In this section, we explore the
extant inscriptional evidence to the Hypsistarian cult and argue that diaspora Jewish
worship in the Hypsistarian cult is fundamentally different from that among pagan
Hypsistarians and represents a version of "exclusivist monotheism."155
152 For a listing of documentation (typically epigraphic in nature) for the Theos Hypsistos
cult, consult Stephen Mitchell, "The Cult of Theos Hypsistos between Pagans, Jews, and Christians"
in Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity, 128-147, and the bibliographic sources listed there (p. 128).
Throughout the remainder of this section, bolded numbers reference Mitchell's list. Mitchell's work
does not include those inscriptions published after 1999, for which the reader is referred to the
appropriate volumes of SEG.
153 Ibid., 92.
154 Cf. ibid., 110-21. Theos Hypsistos had been used as early as the third century BCE in
reference to the Jewish God. The Jewish epigraphs dedicated to the Most High God are conveniently
discussed by Paul R. Trebilco, Jewish Communities in Asia Minor (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991) 133-37, who collected inscriptions identified as Jewish in the
editio princeps or by himself. These correspond, in order of appearance, to numbers 283, 285, 288,
llObis, 106, 107,108,109bis, 105, 207, 206, 85, 86, 87, 84, 88, 230, 202, and 203 in Mitchell's list
{op. cit.), 128—47.
The evidence for Christian use of the term in cultic contexts is less significant and for all
intents and purposes is negligible for this thesis. Cf. Mitchell, ibid., 121-25. For Christian equivalents
of "the Most High God" (and variations), see, e.g., Mark 5:7 = Luke 8:28; Luke 1:32, 35, 76; 6:35;
Acts 7:48; 16:17; Heb 7:1; J Clem. 45:7bis; 59:3; Ign. Rom. 1:0; Theophilus, Autol. 2.31; Irenaeus,
Epid. 8; Haer. 3.16.3; Sib. Or. 1.179); the language was inherited from LXX (cf. 1 Clem. 29:2; 52:3;
Irenaeus, Haer. 5.34.2).
155 In a recent contribution Richard Bauckham has collated a list of the use of "the Most
High" in all extant second Temple Jewish literature ("The 'Most High' God and the Nature of Early
Jewish Monotheism" in David B. Capes, April D. DeConick, et al., eds., Israel's God and Rebecca's
Children: Christology and Community in Early Judaism and Christianity. Essays in Honor ofLarry
W. Hurtado and Alan F. Segal [Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007] 39-53). The examples cited by
Bauckham are almost entirely from the milieu of Palestinian Judaism, where he observes, the title of
the Most High "does not function to evoke YHWH's presidency of a council of other gods" (ibid.,
48). Upon summarizing the scant literary evidence for the western Diaspora, Bauckham concludes, "It
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-f-. / Methodology
Questions of interpretation loom large in historical analysis of the
Hypsistarian cult. The issue primarily centers around the relationship between pagan
and Jewish adherents to the cult. There is a great deal comparable between pagan and
Jewish uses of Theos Hypsistos, and many scholars, following the suggestion of
Cumont that the cults of Yahweh and Sabazios were merged in Asia Minor, have
been quick to propose interpretations that posit direct and strong Jewish influence
upon the popularity of not only the title Theos Hypsistos but certain cultic activities
among pagan Hypsistarian cults.156 Stephen Mitchell, for example, claims close
contact between Jews and pagans, and speaks of the Hypsistarian cult in terms of a
singular, ubiquitous eastern Mediterranean religious movement under which Jews
and pagans were both subsumed. While he does allow for local and regional
developments of the cult independent of Judaism, he apparently thinks none of the
Hypsistarian cults were untouched by the synagogue, as they all absorbed Jewish
elements.157 In this regard he speaks of Jewish communities as a "powerful role
model" for these monotheistic Hypsistarian cults. His view of an intense
pagan-Jewish cross-fertilization is captured perhaps most clearly in his identification
of the "God-fearers"—non-Jewish sympathizers with Jewish beliefs who attended
synagogues—with the followers of Theos Hypsistos (it is unclear to us whether he
includes followers of Zeus Hypsistos in this equation).158 Comparing evidence for the
cult of Theos Hypsistos from both literary (NT and patristic) sources and epigraphs
(from Tanais on the north shore of the Black Sea) with that for the "god-fearers"
may not be accidental that in the three exceptions other than Philo and in several of the exceptions in
the works of Philo (Post. 91-92; Plant. 58-60; Leg. All. 3:82), 'the Most High' is accompanied by
other divine titles or descriptions that reinforce the significance of the title 'the Most High' as
indicating the uniquely divine sovereignty over all things. Perhaps, in the Diaspora context, this
unpacking of the title was necessary, as it does not seem to have been in Palestine" (ibid., 49). This
suggests an atmosphere in the western Diaspora in which the boundary between Jewish and pagan
rhetoric of the "Most High" may have been quite similar.
156 For the evidence, see Trebilco, Jewish Communities, 240 n. 20.
157 Cf. "The Cult of Theos Hypsistos," 126-27.
158 Mitchell is not clear on this point. It appears to us that in his analysis of the theosebeis in
§6, he limits his discussion to followers of Theos Hypsistos alone and thus does not include those of
Zeus Hypsistos or Hypsistos. This seems a reasonable deduction from both his methodological intent
(i.e., his chief enquiry is directed towards the almost 200 inscriptions mentioning Theos Hypsistos; cf.
ibid., 100) and from the title of his article. If this is the case, Mitchell nowhere gives a convincing
argument as to why the dedications to Zeus Hypsistos should be left out of his analysis of the
theosebeis.
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(0eooe(3eic;, oe(36)xevoi, (poPobpevoi tov Geov) Mitchell proposed that the two be
identified. He concludes, and we quote him here at some length:
The evidence for the cult of Theos Hypsistos and for the god-fearers of
the inscriptions and the literary sources runs in strict parallel.
Dedications for Theos Hypsistos occur at almost all the places where
god-fearers appear (Cos, Aphrodisias, Miletus, Trades, Philadelphia, in
the Bosporan kingdom, Rome). More important, given the randomness
of epigraphic survival, the geographical distribution of the two sets of
evidence is virtually identical, covering Syria, Asia Minor, old Greece
and Macedonia, and the north shore of the Black Sea. The theosebeis are
only missing from Egypt, where Theos Hypsistos occurs, while Theos
Hypsistos is little attested in the Latin West. The followers of the god,
however, may be identified in Africa with the groups known as
Caelicoli (see §7). The chronological span of the two phenomena also
matches closely. Most of the testimonia for the god-fearers, like those
for Theos Hypsistos, occur between the first and fourth centuries, but
the Septuagint version of 2 Chronicles, written around 200 BC, contains
a passage referring to Jews, god-fearers, and proselytes in the phrase
redact a-uvayrayf] 'IapctrA kou o'l (po(3oi)pevoi teat o'l £7tia-uvT|y|ievoi,
while a passage in the Jewish Antiquities suggests that theosebeis were
identifiable at the time of the Maccabean revolt. These correspond to the
earliest Hellenistic attestations of Theos Hypsistos in inscriptions and
literary sources. At the other end of the time range, not only do several
of the inscriptions for god-fearers, including, I believe those from
Aphrodisias and Sardis, belong to the fourth century or later, but the
crucial passage of Cyril of Alexandria, which reveals expressis verbis
that the worshippers of Theos Hypsistos called themselves theosebeis,
dates to the early fifth century.'59
But the strongest evidence, he claims, is that the beliefs and practices of the
two groups "precisely coincided."160 That is, at the level of theology and cultic
activity, the Theos Hypsistarii were indistinguishable from the "god-fearers" attested
elsewhere in the sources. Later in his impressive article of nearly seventy pages on
the subject, he opines, "The Jews of the Dispersion had found a common religious
language with a vast number of Gentile worshippers, and they forged a shared
tradition, current throughout the eastern Mediterranean, of monotheistic worship. By
any definition this was one of the most spectacular demonstrations of religious
syncretism that the ancient world has to offer."161 Christians as well (at least in rural
Asia Minor), it is claimed, were stepping "without friction or confrontation" into a





god,"162 and in so doing, Mitchell envisions an eastern Mediterranean socio-religious
climate in which pagans, Jews, and Christians intermingled rather seamlessly.
Mitchell's conclusions arise from his particular methodological approach
towards epigraphic evidence for the Hypsistarian cult. He comments, "The 200
surviving inscriptions which specifically refer to Theos Hypsistos are strikingly
uniform. It is an important question to ask not what differentiates them, but what they
have in common. We need to find out why worshippers chose to address their god by
a name that fitted both pagan and Jewish patterns of belief. Instead of assuming that
the inscriptions need to be sorted into Jewish and pagan groups we should try to see
if they make sense as a single body of material, treated on its own terms."163 He thus
urges caution against distinguishing between Jewish (or Judaizing) and pagan
Hypsistarians on the basis of epigraphic evidence which has no clear identifying
marks, as he comments, "The difficulty lies in the fact that most 'pagan' or 'Jewish'
examples of the term Theos Hypsistos are formally indistinguishable from one
another and that the arguments for assigning them to either category are rarely
decisive."164 To be fair, Mitchell does not argue that the two groups should never be
distinguished in historical analysis; indeed, he notes, "In a large number of cases the
pagan credentials of the cult are unambiguously clear from the fact that the god is
named not Theos but precisely Zeus Hypsistos."165 Rather, he offers a corrective to
the procedure of arbitrary or rash ascription of social provenance and stresses that in
the majority of cases the two groups simply cannot be distinguished with any
certainty on the basis of the surviving archaeological and inscriptional evidence.
Thereby, the evidence requires that they be treated as one.
Though writing prior to Mitchell's article, Paul Trebilco, nevertheless,
following a number of other scholars, disagrees with this assessment and offers the
following comments:
The trend towards monotheism meant that a number of different gods
were thought of as the Supreme deity or the 'Highest god', quite
independently of Jewish influence. The frequency of the title 'Theos
Hypsistos' in non-Jewish contexts reflects this tendency to concentrate
162 Ibid., 121-22.
163 Ibid., 100; emphasis added. In all, Mitchell places the number of dedications to Hypsistos
or Theos Hypsistos at 197 and those to Zeus at 81 (op. cit. 101). We were unable to confirm these




powers in the hands of one exalted deity. Thus, there was sufficient
reason for pagans to use 'Hypsistos' of any god and sufficient usage in
clearly non-Jewish circles for there to be no need to suggest that Jewish
influence was involved. Further, there is also no reason to think that the
use of the title by a pagan would suggest to another passer-by that the
dedicator was a 'Judaiser'. 'Hypsistos' was a vague title and it would
not be clear which god was being referred to. Jewish influence would
not have been an explanation for the use of the epithet in the period of
its use; neither is it required now to explain its popularity.166
After his investigation of nineteen Hypsistos inscriptions bearing "clear signs of
Jewish provenance," Trebilco comes to the opposite conclusion as Mitchell that "in
an albeit limited number of cases, Jews and pagans shared the same religious
vocabulary."167 Later he concludes by noting, "We have seen that scholars like
Cumont and Nilsson argued that Judaism in Asia Minor was at times a strange
mixture of Judaism and paganism. These arguments have been based on the
supposed links between Yahweh and Zeus (or other gods who were also called
'Hypsistos') and Sabazios. We have shown that both of these connections are
unfounded. No evidence has arisen from this study to suggest that Judaism in Asia
Minor was syncretistic or had been compromised by paganism."168 Trebilco
represents a scholarly cadre that distinguishes more strongly than Mitchell and others
between Jewish and pagan worship of Theos Hypsistos.
Was there then, as Mitchell claims, little to no distinction between pagan
Hypsistarian worship and that of the Jews? Or are we to follow Trebilco in seeing a
strong separation between Jewish and pagan instances of Hypsistarian worship?
Before examining the epigraphic evidence, a few methodological comments are in
order. First, Mitchell's scepticism about separating Jew from pagan is to a certain
extent reasonable. There is a great deal in common in the rhetoric of the majority of
Hypsistarian inscriptions, which read simply Theos Hypsistos, such that
identification as Jewish or pagan is largely not possible with any certainty (even
given archaeological context). So, for example, the terms (ptAopcopouoq,
(piA.oKai0ap, and eboepcov as self-referential terms appear in both clearly Jewish and
pagan inscriptions (cf. 86, 89). Furthermore, there is close connection between
Jewish and pagan Hypsistarians in Tanais north of the Black Sea, where we find four
166 Jewish Communities, 132. For a list of scholars who follow this view, see op. cit. 240 n.
21.
167 Ibid., 143; cf. 137^40; emphasis added.
168 Ibid., 142.
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inscription dedicated to Theos Hypsistos by eio7coir|TOi aSeAxpoi oePopevoi Oeov
■u\|na"tov (sc. adopted brothers who worship the Most High God; cf. 96, 98, 100,
101), apparently of pagan Hypsistarians possibly adopted into a Jewish worshipping
community.169 The relief of an eagle found near one of these demonstrates that there
may have been little distinguishing Jewish and pagan Hypsistarians in this region.
No doubt this parity of rhetoric is due to the larger social context, and such examples
demonstrate the possibility of a significant cross-fertilization between Jewish and
pagan Hypsistarians in any given locale. Such similarities argue against drawing too
distinct and unequivocal a demarcation between Jewish and pagans in Tanais north
of the Black Sea, for example. Doubtless there were other areas of varying degrees of
syncretism throughout Asia Minor and elsewhere, and Trebilco may jeopardize his
case when he wishes to remove significant Jewish influence (at least on the
terminology of Hypsistos) from all but a few Hypsistarian cults, noting, "We have
also seen that in a very limited number of cases, two of which were in Asia Minor,
pagans or pagan groups used the title 'Hypsistos' because of Jewish influence."170 In
this sense, we must be careful to allow for the uniformity of historical data and not
rush too quickly towards classifying every Hypsistarian cult or worshipper under
more than one taxon.
However, this is not to suggest that we can make no distinctions between
pagan and Jewish Hypsistarians when we analyze the data. Trebilco's approach is
not altogether without merit, for there are some identifiable differences in language
in some of the epigraphs which have already with relative certainty been
provenanced as Jewish or pagan. In such cases, it would seem irresponsible not to
tease out the implications of the two groups when the data more clearly permit it. We
should not be agnostic about all epigraphic evidence. One helpful method of analysis
would be to begin by examining the epigraphs clearly-identifiable as pagan in origin
and those clearly Jewish in provenance.
The main difference between these two capable scholars comes in how they
address the data, that is, the question of methodology. Should the evidence be
examined as a whole or should one attempt to dissect it into parts? It is this issue
which leads to vastly different conclusions between Mitchell and Trebilco. Viewing
169 Pace ibid., 139, though Trebilco notes "Jewish influence could have been involved" in
these inscriptions; emphasis original.
170
Although, he does acknowledge that there may be more cases, "but it is exceedingly
difficult to demonstrate that such Jewish innfluence did in fact occur" (ibid,, 142).
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the data as a holistic unit of similar rhetoric, Mitchell believes the epigraphic
evidence requires a more uniform Hypsistarian cult able to include Jews and pagans
(after all, the majority of inscriptions have no clear socio-religious identifying
markers). Focusing on Jewish evidence, Trebilco sees a distancing of Jewish groups
from their pagan counterparts. A type of unifying dialectic appears to me possible.
While we acknowledge the unity of much of the data which Mitchell has highlighted,
it seems to us best to first examine those texts for which the data itself allow for (or,
even demand, one might say) more clear cut distinctions. We propose to begin by
dissecting the Hypsistarian cult, in order to compare the "clearly" pagan with the
"unambiguously" Jewish inscriptions. As will become apparent, a number of
differences in the rhetoric and cultic settings of the epigraphs themselves support
such an approach. After extracting these texts of more certain provenance, the
remaining body of texts—a majority as it turns out—can be isolated. These may be
claimed by whatever ambiguous and arbitrary means scholars imagine as Jewish or
pagan and should thus be claimed for neither, if the process of historical research is
not to be damaged. We turn now to the evidence.
-f.2 Epigraphic Evidence
The designations Hypsistos, Theos Hypsistos, and Zeus Hypsistos describe
different manifestations of a larger religious phenomenon in the ancient eastern
Mediterranean world, that of worship directed towards one highest God. The
phenomena associated with the cult of Hypsistos were widespread, and the extent
inscriptions permit a few observations regarding geographical orientation. The
simple designation Hypsistos occurs in over two-thirds of the epigraphs found in
Athens, and the unqualified name occurs almost nowhere else.171 In the Roman
province of Achaea, (i.e., mainland Greece; and excluding the Pnyx sanctuary at
Athens), Macedonia, the coastal cities of Caria, Carian Stratonicaea, Bithynia, and
Syrian Palmyra, Zeus Hypsistos is amply represented,172 and inscriptions bearing this
171 At Athens: Hypsistos (2, 5-7, 9-10, 12,15, 17-20, 22, 23), Zeus Hypsistos (4, 8, 14, 21),
and Theos Hypsistos (1, 3,13). Clear references to Hypsistos occur elsewhere only at Thracian
Kavalla (61), on Delos (109), and in central and south coastal Asia Minor (sc. Iasos [131], Bagis
[164], Germa [203], and Phrygian Nacolea [219]. It is not certain that 212 reads just Hypsistos.
172 I.e., in mainland Greece (not including Athens): Zeus Hypsistos alone is attested (24-28,
29-30?, 31-32). In Macedonia: Zeus Hypsistos (34—36, 38-42, 44-50, 52-54, 59), Theos Hypsistos
(37, 43, 55-58), and Theos Zeus Hypsistos (51). At Caria: Zeus Hypsistos (129-30, 132-34, 137-46,
148-52,155-57), Theos Hypsistos (127-28,135, 136, 147, 153, 158), Hypsistos (131). In Bythynia:
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designation are found as far away as Petra (282) and Egypt (287).173 Theos Hypsistos
predominates nearly everywhere else in the eastern Mediterranean, including central
Asia Minor and the north shore of the Black Sea, and has an exclusive presence on
Cyprus and Crete.174 This distribution, of course, includes inscriptions from both
Jewish and pagan provenance and views the Hypsistarian movement in its
geographic entirety. Regional or local variations on Zeus or Theos Hypsistos also
occur, such as the conflated form 0eoq Zei>q byioxoc; (51), Zebq onpavioq \)\|/ioxoc;
(269), the extended o dyuoxdxoq 0e6q i)\|naxoc; ocoxfip (135; cf. 136), or the
reference to 0e6q uyioxoq davXoq (256) and the much more frequently attested 0eoq
x)\|/iaxoc; e7tr)K6o<; (69, 75, 90,104, etc.).
If we now attempt to dissect the Hypsistarian cult, and to compare the
clearly-provenanced pagan and Jewish inscriptions, a number of differences arise
that are noteworthy. First, pagan provenance is readily idenitifiable in those eighty-
seven clear cases where reference to Zeus Hypsistos occurs. If we examine the
relevant inscriptions further, we find that a number of epigraphs make explicit a
larger syncretistic theology often only implicitly at work in the Zeus Hypsistarian
cult, as for example a dedication from the Aegean isle of Cos apparently representing
the interests of a labor union. It reads as follows (105a):
[Au x>\|aoxg> kav'Hpa [OJupavia kou IJoaeiScovi 'AacpoAeuo taxi
'ArcoX/Uovi iced dXXoiq Geou; vxep xf|<; Koncov rcoXecoq oi crocKKotpopoi
oi and xf|q KoAupvac; E7rovr|aav ek xtov iSiwv
To Zeus Most High and to Hera Ouranios and to Poseidon Asphaleios
and to Apollo and to the other gods on behalf of the city on the island of
Cos, the sack-bearers from Kalumna, constructed from their personal
funds.
This practice of collocating Zeus Hypsistos with other deities occurs elsewhere in the
Aegean, as for example at Delos we read (110a):
Ail uijncjxcp Kai Seoii; oii; xoxx; Pcopoix; iSpuoaxo
To Zeus Most High and to the gods for whom these altars were
established.
Similarly, the following inscription from Carian Mylasa should be mentioned
(137):
Zeus Hypsistos (189-90), Theos Hypsistos (191-92). In Syria: Zeus Hypsistos (270-78), Theos
Hypsistos (279).
173 Trebilco, Jewish Communities, 128, comments, "[W]e know of a temple of Zeus
Hypsistos at Thebes, a precinct at Iasus, a priest at Mylasa and a cult association at Edessa."
174 I.e., Theos Hypsistos at Cyprus (243-65) and Crete (119-24).
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e7t\ axe<pavri(p6po'u 'Apiaxeou tot> Mekavoq xox> 'ATtokkcoviou lepeax;
Aioq x)\j/iaxo-u kcu Tu%r|q 'AyaGfiq
On behalf of the crown-bearing magistrate Aristeos of Mylasa, priest of
Apollo, of Zeus Most High, and of Tyche Agathe.
The clear, genitival collocation of this last inscription leaves little doubt that this
priest served three deities. In Stratonicaea the cult of Zeus Hypsistos may have been
linked (at least in the mind of one worshipper) to emperor devotion (140). These
examples are only representative of the inscriptional evidence (cf. 54,140, 269,
277).175 Such cultic association of Zeus Hypsistos with an additional deity was
common practice in Carian Stratonicaea, where a lesser divinity referred to either as
(to) 0eiov (141, 143-46, 148, 155-56), (Gefoq) avyiXoq (142, 150, 151), or 0e\ov
pacnZucov (149, 152; cf. 157) appears as an additional figure to Zeus Hypsistos,
most likely representative of some form of local angel worship, since these figures
are not traditional to Greek polytheism.176 Additionally, there are occasions where a
Zeus Hypsistos inscription appears in cultic context with portrayals of other gods
(81, 182, 185). In the example above, we saw that reference to Tuxr) can refer to the
goddess Tyche (cf. 140),177 but there is little reason to suppose that the pagan phrase
dyaGf) xuxh in the additional four instances in which it appears in dedications to
Zeus Hypsistos (51, 180, 287; 190 possibly excepted) is anything other than a
common oath or talismanic formula akin to "in God's name" or "by the favor of the
gods." There are then twenty-one clearly identifiable inscriptions explicitly linking
Zeus to additional deities, thirteen of which are located in Stratonicaea; another in
reference to the emperor cult; no further clear reference to the goddess Tyche; and
three occurrences with portrayals of other gods. That is, of the eighty-seven clearly
identifiable dedications to Zeus Hypsistos, nearly thirty percent of them have him
cultically associated with other gods.
Inscriptions to Zeus Most High often occur in conjunction with an
iconographic image of an eagle (e.g., 24, 36, 38, 49) or a thunderbolt (cf. 29, 269,
272), symbols commonly associated with Zeus, and the list of clearly pagan
inscriptions above can be expanded to include those which attest Theos Hypsistos in
175 That the phrase 0ecd peyctXw in 277 is not a mere circumlocution for Zeus is shown from
the fact that Zeus Hypsistos is elsewhere referred to with the superlative pEyiaxw (cf. 270, 273).
176 Mitchell, "The Cult of Theos Hypsistos," 102. The lesser divinity appears also with Theos
Hypsistos (147,153).
177 No Jewish use of this phrase is known, unless one considers 98 and 100 as indicating
converts to Judaism.
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collocation with the aquiline symbol (1, 65, 68, 89-90, 92, 96, 115, 121,158, 176,
191, 195). This is reasonable, though not necessarily definitive.178 One might also
include those additional inscriptions from the Hypsistarian cult at the Pnyx in Athens
(2-3, 5-7, 9-13,15-20, 22-23), from Tanais (91, 93-95, 97-102, 103), from Carian
Stratonicaea (153-54), et cetera, which though they do not appear directly with an
eagle are nevertheless proximate to such images. Yet the inclusion of these latter,
though tempting, is methodologically unsound, for the mere proximity to Zeus
Hypsistos cult and accouterments does not indicate that there were not others at the
same cult who genuinely did not associate Zeus with Theos Hypsistos. The
inscriptions from the cult to Theos Hypsistos at Serdica (cf. 69-73), however, joined
as they are with multiple images of eagles, are more likely linked with Zeus and may
reasonably be included. Nevertheless, the eighteen additional iconographic
inscriptions show us that worshipers at times referred to Zeus Hypsistos by the term
Theos Hypsistos as well as Hypsistos"9 and it appears that in some cultic centers,
followers of Zeus Hypsistos could worship side-by-side with devotees of Theos
Hypsistos and Hypsistos without feeling any compunction in so doing.
All told, the cult of Zeus Hypsistos was no small affair, and one can say with
relative certainty that of the 105 extant inscriptions of clearly pagan provenance,180
over a quarter of those distinctly demonstrate a willingness to assimilate symbols of
traditional or local deities alongside of worship of Zeus. For a large number of
worshippers and worshipping communities associated with the cult of Zeus
Hypsistos, the reverence of other gods was not inconsistent with devotion to the
highest Zeus. Furthermore, it is evident that a number of votaries to Theos Hypsistos
associated him with Zeus though they chose not to directly apply the name of the
exalted Olympion to the highest God in their dedicated epigraphs. We should
remember, however, that the majority of dedications to Zeus Hypsistos mention no
other deities alongside of him, and it is not beyond plausibility to assume that many
worshipers simply associated Zeus alone with the highest God without feeling any
compulsion to placate other deities.
178 Cf. Trebilco, Jewish Communities, 139 et 244 n. 59.
179 Hypsistos is included on the basis of Zeus' close association with the Hypsistarian cult in
Athens.
180 I.e., 87 clear Zeus Hypsistos and 18 Theos Hypsistos inscriptions showing associations
with Zeus.
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If we assume the accuracy of Trebilco's list, and we see no reason to doubt
his selection, then there are a total of twenty identifiable Jewish epigraphs to the
highest God,181 not including the few in which he detects Jewish influence. As with
the pagan inscriptions above, rhetorical indicators and cultic setting are clearly
important in identifying Jewish sources. Among the typically Jewish language one
may note the term Almighty (jtavxoicpdxcop; e.g., 84-87) applied to the deity, f|
Ttpooeuxp (sc. house of prayer; cf. 109), and the adjective eukoynxoc; (sc. blessed; cf.
85). The first two of these occurs almost exclusively in Jewish contexts, and only
rarely in pagan contexts,182 yet Mitchell's warning should be noted, since there are
cases where the pagan associations of an inscription are clear and yet one finds a
typically Jewish term (cf. 51, dp/cruvdycoyov). Elsewhere, we find specifically
biblical language such as xov icuptov xrov 7rvet)p,dxcov xa\ 7xaor|<; aapicoc; (sc. the
Lord of spirits and of all flesh; cf. 110 and LXX Num 16:22; 27:16), 'Ayeicc
Kccyacpuyfj (cf. Sacred Refuge; cf. 230 and LXX Ex 17:15; 2 Sam 22:3; Ps 17:3;
30:4; 2 Macc 10:28, etc.), dpdq Speuavov (sc. sickle of the curse; cf. 207 and LXX
Zech 5:1-5), or Siivapu; utinaxob (sc. power of the Most High; cf. 203 and LXX Pss
45:2; 58:17), all of which point very strongly towards Jewish provenance.183
Fortunately, the Jewish provenance of this language is many times backed up
through archaeological evidence.184 Each of these has been provenanced and
discussed by Trebilco and there is no reason to repeat his work here. We mention
only that these date from the second century BCE to third century CE, and the clear
majority of these inscriptions display nothing other than what one might think
consistent with Jewish worship of the one God, Yahweh, whom they address as
Hypsistos (cf. 109) and more commonly Theos Hypsistos. On the other hand, apart
from the specifically Jewish terminology, biblical references, and cultic settings,
these inscriptions display little difference from many of the other Theos Hypsistos
inscriptions! One distinctive element about many of these inscriptions is the clear
reference to the proseuche (cf. 85, 88, 202, 283, 285, 288) or their clear provenance
from a proseuche (106-09). These inscriptions leave little room to suppose that Jews
181 See infra n. 154.
182 Pace Laurence H. Kant who claims jupooEuxh appears "only in a Jewish context"
("Jewish Inscriptions in Greek and Latin," ANRW 20.2:707); cf. Trebilco, Jewish Communities, 242
nn. 41—42 and the patristic evidence infra.
183 The term Kayacpvyi) does not occur elsewhere outside of LXX; cf. Trebilco, ibid., 136 et
242 nn. 45-46.
184 Cf. ibid., 133-37.
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were mingling in cultic contexts with their pagan Hypsistarian neighbors outside of
the synagogue. Furthermore, there is no additional figure of devotion alongside of
the highest God, whom we have no reason to doubt the Jews identified with Yahweh.
One dedication is set up "for the Great God Most High in heaven and for his holy
angels and for his venerable house of prayer" (202), and the text proceeds from
heaven to earth in such a way as actually to distance the Most High from the angels.
Two of the epigraphs, however, both from Gorgippia and both clearly related, stand
out in this regard (cf. 85, 86). The opening dedication "to the Most High God,
Almighty, Blessed" (0ero byioxco rcavxoKptixopi exAoyrixcp) on both and the
appearance of "set up in the house of prayer" (dve0r|K£v x[f)t] jrpoaeoxfp) on the
first would indicate that these are Jewish inscriptions. Yet both texts close with the
common pagan oath formula "under Zeus, Ge, and Helios" (wo Ata rf)v "Hkiov).
A clue to this may rest in the fact that these texts represent manumission documents.
The freeing of a slave represented a religious ritual necessitating the act being
performed in the house of prayer, while the pagan oath formula may represent
nothing more than the fulfillment of a legal requirement. Similar practices are
attested elsewhere among Jews in such legal contexts.185 Furthermore, neither text
attests the peculiarly pagan phrase dyccGfj xbyo found very frequently at nearby
Tanais (cf. 90-95, 97-100,102), yet it is probably too much to suggest that these
inscriptions demonstrate a programmatic avoidance of pagan connotations except
where required (i.e., by law). At any rate, these epigraphs do not likely represent the
kind of syncretistic cultic practices we saw present in the Zeus Hypsistos cult, though
it may demonstrate a certain measure of Jewish willingness to accommodate pagan
practices (or legal requirements?).
But these "clear" (or at least significantly less ambiguous) examples comprise
only 125 (105 pagan + 20 Jewish), or just under forty-five percent, of the total 282
dedications to the highest God. That is, in over half of all inscriptions we have no
way of identifying Jewish or pagan texts, no specific means of accessing with
relative certainty the referent behind Theos Hypsistos. That leaves a large category of
inscriptions which are not clearly identifiable as either Jewish or pagan and which
should most likely be taken as representative of some mixture of the two, though it is
simply impossible to determine with any measure of certitude how many of these are
likely to be Jewish or likewise pagan. Furthermore, in this remaining body of texts,
185 Ibid., 136.
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there is a referential ambiguity inherent in the designations Hypsistos and Theos
Hypsistos. Who was this highest God? Which God precisely is referenced by the
language? Trebilco rightly highlights this point: "[Dedications or inscriptions to
'Theos Hypsistos' are sometimes clearly to deities other than Zeus or are made to an
unnamed pagan deity who was worshipped under this general name.. .Hence the
same title can be used for a number of different gods. For example, in Syria 'Theos
Hypsistos' (and also 'Zeus Hypsistos') was used to refer to the local Baal of a region,
who was often a mountain god. In Lydia, 'Thea Hypsiste' was used for some form of
the Mother goddess. In Egypt, Hypsistos was used as an epithet of Isis. Clearly,
'Theos Hypsistos' or 'Hypsistos' can designate a whole range of exalted
deities...[0]nly a Jew or a Judaiser would understand that 'Theos Hypsistos' referred
to Yahweh. There were many 'Highest gods' and a pagan hearer or reader would
understand the referent of the term to be the deity he or she considered to be
supreme, if in fact he or she considered any deity in this position. They would not
think of Yahweh."186With this final group, scholars must content themselves with
referential ambiguity and not seek to exceed the bounds of what the data permits.
Two observations seem to me permissible.
First, the syncretism which we saw in many of the clearly pagan epigraphs
above appears also in some of these inscriptions but certainly with less frequency.
We have already seen two such possible associations of Theos Hypsistos with other
gods in the discussion of the two provenanced Jewish manumission documents
above, though the link between the highest God and the oath "under Zeus, Ge, and
Helios" may be little more than a legal necessity in the context (85-86). In the
unprovanenced texts, at least one Theos Hypsistos inscription was closely connected
to a cultic statue depicting the goddess Larmene (172). Further, a dedication in Lydia
to Thea Hypsiste represents some form of goddess worship (167; by a man no less!).
Other examples attest to a syncretistic theology behind some elements of the Theos
Hypsistos cult, as, for example, on an inscription from an altar at Pergamum which
reads (186):
['HXJicoi 0[e]cp ij\|/[i]aTGn Tcmov euyhv
Tatios, a vow to Helios God Most High.
At Pisidian Andeda we read in an epigraph from the second or third century
(228):
186 Ibid., 128-29, 143.
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Koivxoq Noupipioq iepe'uq Mtivoi; Ofulpaviou Korea xpTipaTigpov
ave^riKE \)\)/iaxcp
Kointos Numerios, priest ofMen Ouranios dedicated to the Most High
God in accordance with an oracle.
Here, as in the cult of Zeus Hypsistos, we find that a priest's obligation
towards a particular deity did not dissuade him from directing his devotion to another
deity, named "the Highest God." Elsewhere we find Theos Hypsistos associated with
Meter Theon (37), Hecate (147), Thea Larmene (172), Meter Oreia (232), Helios and
Nemesis (284), and Hosios and Zeus (sic; 220). Excluding the clearly-provenanced
Jewish inscriptions (85-86), these conflated Theos Hypsistos dedications number
only ten, barely over six-percent of the Hypsistos inscriptions of undetermined
pedigree.
Second, Trebilco has examined five cases in which he detects Jewish
influence behind a pagan's use of Theos Hypsistos. In at least one of these
inscriptions clear Judaizing tendencies can be detected (205), and in four others he
allows that Jewish influence "could have been involved" (96, 98, 100-01).187 Of
course, Trebilco acknowledges "that there will be some cases in which such (Jewish)
influence will go undetected," since Jewish influence, for example, is less likely to
be discerned behind the use of Theos Hypsistos where a pagan makes a dedication to
a pagan deity.188 There is thus evidence from the inscriptions themselves that some
pagans sympathized with Jewish worship of the highest God and adopted elements
from them. The number of cases highlighted by Trebilco is relatively few, but
enough to suggest that we can with confidence state that there was a measure of
cross-fertilization between Jew and pagan in some elements of the Theos Hypsistos
cult. Such cross-fertilization is further confirmed for the fourth century at least from
patristic sources. Gregory of Nazianzus, for example, indicates that the Hypsistarians
(at least the group his father had formerly been aligned with) rejected the idol
worship and animal sacrifice of the pagans, and observed the sabbath and Jewish
dietary regulations, yet shunned circumcision.189 Similarly, Gregory of Nyssa groups
the Hypsistiani together with the Jews as those who confess god as b\|/0iotov p
7cavTOKpdtopa while not acknowledging him as 7iaxepa.190 It is not entirely self-
187 Cf. ibid., 137-39; emphasis original.
188 Ibid., 138.
189 Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 18.5 (PG 35.990-91).
190 Gregory of Nyssa, C. Eunom. 2 (PG 45.482-83).
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evident whether the group of "earlier Messalians" mentioned by Epiphanius is to be
identified with the Hypsistarian cult.191 He nowhere designates them as offering
devotion to "the highest God," but does report for us that they adore one God whom
they call rcavxoKpdxopa and worshipped in their own extra-mural cultic centers,
which they refer to as places of prayer (Trpooeuxod), with the lighting of many lamps
and torches and with much hymning. He compares these proseuchai with the one
mentioned in Acts 16:13. The affinities with Judaism are indisputable, yet, as
Epiphanius reports, this worshipping community is comprised entirely of non-Jewish
constituency. He further mentions the cultic use of lamps, a practice known to exist
elsewhere in the Hypsistarian cult. There appears little reason then to deny that
Epiphanius is describing a group belonging to the cult of Theos Hypsistos. At any
rate, if this group is not genuinely part of a local Hypsistarian cult, then at least it
shares strong affinities with the descriptions found in the other patristic sources listed
above.
But how far does this Jewish-pagan syncretism extend? Does the relative
uniformity of the remaining dedications to Theos Hypsistos support Mitchell's
suggestion of a world of religious syncretism, "a religious culture which spanned the
pagan-Jewish divide," an environment in which pagan and Jew moved together in
worship to the one God?192 It is clear that there is some cross-fertilization as the
discussion above has shown, but we simply have no way of knowing how many of
the remaining epigraphs are Jewish or pagan. Can we confidently assert a large-scale
pagan-Jewish syncretism on the basis of such evidence? We cannot assume that the
remaining data is simply split 50-50 between Jewish and pagan sources, and if so,
then what ratio should be assumed and on what basis? Furthermore, the randomness
of epigraphic occurrence ensures that the data which exists certainly does not
comprise all that existed. No, we must remain somewhat agnostic with respect to the
unprovenanced data. Mitchell's aligning of the followers of Theos Hypsistos with
"god-fearers" is disturbing (at least on the basis on which he chooses to do it).
Judging from the epigraphs, the designation of choice for the Hypsistarians was
eu^dpevot not GeooePeu;. The latter term occurs nowhere in the inscriptions
containing a dedication to the highest God. The synonymous oePopevoi, on the other
hand, occurs in at least one locale in only four inscriptions from the first-half of the
191 Pace Mitchell, "The Cult of Theos Hypsistos," 92-97.
192 Ibid., 126.
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third century directly connected with the cult of Theos Hypsistos (96, 98,100,101).
We find eu^dpevot, however, in dedications to both Zeus and Theos Hypsistos, at
Sinope on the southern shore of the Black Sea, in Phrygia, on Cyprus, and in the
Levant (e.g., 198, 209, 215, 247, 249, 266, 275-77, 292). The only patristic witness
to explicitly make this connection is the fifth-century Cyril of Alexandria.193 Surely
this is enough to call Mitchell's proposal into question. The simple juxtaposition of
two sets of evidence (i.e., for the cult of Theos Hypsistos and for the "god-fearers"),
as Mitchell has done, and the "strict parallel" between them constitute only
circumstantial evidence, hardly worthy of his wide-ranging suggestion.
Evaluation
How are we to classify the Hypsistarian cult? In light of the pagan usage of
Hypsistos, Trebilco states that "the term would not even imply monotheism for a
pagan reader. Rather, it would simply suggest the creation of a hierarchy in their
pantheon."194 Mitchell, on the other hand, refers to the movement as "quasi-
monotheistic."195 How are we to evaluate the movement on the basis of cult and
rhetoric?
Statistical analysis of epigraphy is inherently dangerous given the
randomness of epigraphic distribution and survival. Nevertheless, the data do permit
us to draw some conclusions. In the analysis above, we saw that there were eighty-
seven clearly identifiable dedications to Zeus Hypsistos, twenty-five of which
(~30%) verbally or iconographically link Zeus to additional deities. Over half of
these (sc. thirteen) are located in Stratonicaea and appear to be linked to a local
manifestation of angel worship. Eighteen additional inscriptions dedicated to Theos
Hypsistos have clear affinities with Zeus, and demonstrate that votaries at times
chose to refer to Zeus Hypsistos by the term Theos Hypsistos. Of the 105 total clearly
pagan inscriptions dedicated to Zeus, only twelve (sc. a meager 11%), excluding the
cult at Stratonicea, demonstrate clearly identifiable syncretism with other gods in the
Zeus Hypsistos cult. The clear majority of extant inscriptions dedicated or associated
with Zeus Hypsistos demonstrate nothing more than the identification of the highest
God with the Olympion Zeus. Of the twenty epigraphs from Jewish provenance, the
193 Cf. Ibid., 96.
194 Trebilco, Jewish Communities, 130.
195 Mitchell, "The Cult of Theos Hypsistos," 127.
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clear majority display nothing inconsistent with the worship of one God, Yahweh,
whom they address as Hypsistos or Theos Hypsistos. That is, no syncretistic
tendencies are present and the exclusive devotion to one highest God is upheld. The
two manumission documents from Gorgippia reading a clearly pagan oath formula
"under Zeus, Ge, and Helios" do not threaten this conclusion to any significant
extent. We see very little evidence in the epigraphs of wide-scale syncretism of Jews
towards paganism, though we readily acknowledge that we can only identify as
Jewish with some measure of confidence only a small portion of the available data.
The remaining 157 dedications with no clearly Jewish or pagan provenance represent
the majority (~56%) of all extent Hypsistos inscriptions. It is interesting that there is
very little to distinguish these unprovenanced epigraphs from those clearly
provenanced as Jewish! Both have similar forms and are dedicated simply to Theos
Hypsistos or Hypsistos, with no explicit reference as to which God is actually being
addressed. All in all, only twenty-five epigraphs out of 282, or less than ten percent,
demonstrate any demonstrable syncretism in the worship of the highest God. These
occur in the inscriptions of clearly pagan origin and always in dedications to Zeus
Hypsistos. Even allowing for the epigraphic habit, this is astonishing and
demonstrates, as Mitchell has noted, a large sense of uniformity in the language
across the cult (or, at least across the dedications directed to the highest God)!
Nevertheless, Trebilco reminds us that the terms Theos Hypsistos and Hypsistos have
a great deal of referential ambiguity, and we cannot assume the same reality behind
the same terms. Mitchell is correct in observing that "Zeus Hypsistos and Theos
Hypsistos are not two ways of denoting the same reality," but "at the practical level
of cult, the association between them was extremely close."196
But there is a sense in which the cross-fertilization so ably argued by Mitchell
is not as significant in the direction towards paganism as it is towards Judaism. There
is, for example, no clear identification of a Jew setting up an epigraph to Zeus
Hypsistos nor syncretising worship of the highest God with other deities. Jewish
references to pagan oath formulas (85-86) obviously indicate some sort of move in
the pagan direction among the Jews in Gorgippia, but are we to interpret this as a
serious infraction against Jewish self-identity, as representative of the entire Jewish
community, or as a mere legal necessity in the act of manumission? There is a clear
break between Jewish worship of the Most High God and pagan worship of Zeus
196 Ibid., 99.
104
Hypsistos. These two groups will need to be evaluated on their own terms; no one
category will cover both. Furthermore, when we looked at the devotees to Hypsistos
and Theos Hypsistos, there was clear evidence of adoption of Jewish practice on the
part of some pagan Hypsistarians. That is, there were some followers of Theos
Hypsistos who moved towards Judaism in such a way as to be associated even with
the Jewish houses of prayer. These are no doubt "god-fearers," the theosebeis that
Mitchell makes much of. But they represent only a portion of the Theos Hypsistarian
movement, not its entirety. Most of this data came from fourth-century patristic
sources but was confirmed in the epigraphs themselves. Ironically, this more uni¬
directional model of pagan syncretism to Judaism is adequately described by a
phrase from Mitchell, who speaks of Judaism as a "powerful role model" for the
worshippers of Theos Hypsistos. Another group of Theos Hypsistos followers
worshipped freely side-by-side devotees of Zeus Hypsistos. At Athens, for example,
we saw that worshippers of Hypsistos, Theos Hypsistos, and Zeus Hypsistos co-
occupied the Pnyx sanctuary. Evidence of co-worship among these groups appears
around many of the prominent centers for Zeus Hypsistos cult (sc. mainland Greece,
Macedonia, the coastal cities of Caria, Bithynia). The followers of Theos Hypsistos
represented by a group of epigraphs comprising the largest were pulled, it seems, in
one of two directions. The variety of evidence demands a partitioned approach to the
cult. These groups will need to be evaluated on their own terms; no one category will
cover both.
So was the cult of Theos Hypsistos truly monotheistic in nature? Inasmuch as
the followers of Zeus and Theos Hypsistos direct their cultic worship towards one
highest God (although not referentially the same God!), they are monotheists. This
goes also for the inclusion of other deities in the syncretistic forms of Zeus Hypsistos
worship; these should be interpreted as internally consistent within the cultic
framework and with the monotheism it represents. But inasmuch as their
communities represent a conglomeration of multiple referents, they are inclusive.
One woman worships Helios, another Isis, yet another man worships Zeus, but all
refer ambiguously to their deity as Theos Hypsistos. We thus suggest that the cult of
Zeus and Theos Hypsistos be classified as "inclusivist monotheism." This category
applies also to those Jews who may have assimilated such practices, though we have
no clearly discernible traces of Jewish syncretism in the inscriptional evidence;
nevertheless, such probably existed in some communities. Furthermore, the
epigraphic evidence provides certainty in classifying Jewish devotees of Theos
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Hypsistos as "monotheists." And like their counterparts, Jewish communities
possessed a willingness to cultically accomodate "god-fearing" Theos Hypsistarians.
But this probably involved only those who would take on a shared referent to Theos
Hypsistos as Yahweh, though the epigraphs alone do not tell us such. That is, they
apply an excluding criteria to those who desire to worship among their ranks. If this
is the case, and we suggest it is, then such Jewish communities may be referred to as
representing "exclusivist monotheism." The picture is that of a spectrum. On the one
side lies the cult of Zeus Hypsistos and a willingness to incorporate in common
worship those who do not share the same referent when speaking of Theos
Hypsistos. On the other side are those Jews who likewise have a willingness to
include others, but only insofar as they share the same referent when speaking of
Theos Hypsistos. In between lie any number of religious believers in Theos
Hypsistos, some willing to allow for ambiguity, others taking on the Jewish God
alone as the highest God.
5- Jewish "Exclusivist Monotheism" and Christianity
In light of the above evidence of religious practice and profession, we see no
alternative but to refer to the dominant expressions of first- and second-century
Judaism with the label "monotheist." Pagans acknowledged it;197 the majority of
Jews also, it seems, acknowledged it through their rhetoric and practice. Of course
there were deviations from the predominant devotional patterns that we have seen,
but these were just that—deviations.198 Devotion to angels or a second figure
alongside the one God, though it apparently existed, was never publicly or
corporately countenanced within Judaism of late antiquity; in the absence of any
compelling evidence to the contrary, it is best to confirm the monotheistic character
of Judaism's corporate cultic practices. Monotheistic rhetoric was closely conjoined
in Judaism with cultic act, and an examination of Deutero-Isaianic rhetoric, the
Shema, and other "one God" language revealed the central significance of
monotheistic rhetoric for Jewish worship and life. The sheer preponderance of this
197 Supra n. 52.
198 We may also mention two Jewish epigraphs from Egypt (mid-second to late-first century
BCE) discovered in the Temple of Pan at Resediyeh (CPJ 1537, 1538) and two additional Jewish
epigraphs dedicated with pagan invocations, respectively, Dis Manibus (CIJ 678) and Iunonibus (CIJ
77*). The implications of these finds are not immediately self-evident, and they may reflect pagan
converts/sympathisers with Judaism. See Ross S. Kraemer's discussion ("On the Meaning of the Term
'Jew' in Greco-Roman Inscriptions," HTR 82 [1989]: 41-43, 46, 49).
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language in all spheres of life, but particularly in the religio-cultic arena is further
sufficient to point in the direction of "monotheism" as an appropriate descriptor for
second-Temple Judaism. With its characteristic self-predication style, the rhetoric of
Isaiah 41-52 may be considered primus inter pares in a larger set of rhetorical
formulas of predication later appropriated in the corporate worship of early Judaism,
albeit in modified form. The use of unity and exclusivity rhetoric within corporate
devotion to the one God represents within early Judaism a pursuit of exclusivist
monotheism, and to a large extent demonstrates the pervasiveness of monotheistic
belief within familial religiosity and the cultic activity of early Judaism.
There is further no evidence to suggest that this predominant monotheistic
penchant in early Judaism had changed by rabbinic times. Though patterns of "two
powers" belief may have been predominant in first- and second-century para-
rabbinic Jewish traditions, competing monotheistic ideologies (rabbinic vs. para-
rabbinic) seemed not to have encouraged devotional practices that violated strict
monolatry to the one God, even among Jews of the diaspora. Belief in and confession
of one God represents therefore a fundamental marker of Jewish identity in the first
and second centuries CE. And, since first- and second-century Christianity emerged
as a web of textual communities in discursive interaction with similar webs of Jewish
textual communities, exclusivist monotheism offers us an important symbolic basis
against which Christian attempts at formulating identities can be measured. The next
three chapters explore how Christians utilized belief and rhetoric of divine unity and





Divine Unity and the Marginalizing of "Jewish" Influence in
Two Anatolian Churches
The emergence of the nascent Christian movement from monotheistic Jewish
religion, long-established and esteemed for its antiquity, was accompanied by a
complex variety of ideological and religious expressions, as individuals and
communities of Christ-confessors constantly reevaluated and reimagined the
relational boundaries of their relatively newfound faith with their monotheistic
Jewish heritage. What constituted the identity of this new faith? Was it really
something "new" at all? Was it fundamentally Jewish? Gentile? Somehow both? If
so, how? Could (or even should) ancient Jewish customs like circumcision or
sabbath observance be practiced by one who believed in something "new" in Jesus?
How was Jesus to be understood within the constraints of traditional Jewish
monotheism (sc. the "Jesus problem")? The questions were answered quite
differently and with a diversity parallel only to the form in which they could be
asked. And there were Christian voices which reenvisioned the relationship of
Christian identity and Jewish identity in terms more closely associated with
traditional Jewish religious practices, forms, or ideologies than many other Christians
preferred. We are fortunate to possess two letters from a Christian bishop written
around 113 CE1 to communities in Anatolia to warn them of harmful "Jewish"
influence which he perceived as operating within some of the churches there.
In this chapter we examine how Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, strategically
appeals to the concept of divine unity to counteract what he considers harmful
"Jewish" influence within the Christian communities at Philadelphia and Magnesia.
The distinctive literary shaping of two of his seven authentic epistles2 reveals that the
1 On the date see Stevan L. Davies ("The Predicament of Ignatius of Antioch," VC 30 [1976]:
178-80; cf. Klaus-Gunther Essig, "Mutmassungen uber den Anlass des Martyriums von Ignatius von
Antiochien," VC 40 [1986]: 105-17).
2 Theodor Zahn (Ignatius von Antiochien [Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1873]) and J.B.
Lightfoot (The Apostolic Fathers, Part II: S. Ignatius, S. Polycarp [2d ed.; London: MacMillan, 1889]
vol. 1) established the authenticity of seven letters of the Middle recension. William Schoedel ("Are
the letters of Ignatius of Antioch authentic?" RelSRev 6 [1980]: 196-201; Ignatius ofAntioch: A
Commentary on the Letters ofIgnatius ofAntioch [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985]
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influence of "Judaism" within the "Christian" church manifests itself operationally
through certain patterns of scriptural interpretation (Philade lphians\ §1.1) and cultic
observance of sabbath rather than the Lord's Day (Magnesians\ §1.2). However,
Ignatius fundamentally differentiates "Judaism" from "Christianism" ideologically,
on the basis of their respective response to God's revelation in the incarnational
ministry of Jesus Christ. Whereas response to the gospel provides for Ignatius the
criterion3 distinguishing "Judaism" from "Christianism," it is modes of religious
practice (i.e., scriptural reading and sacramental observance) that provide for him the
operational indicia for identifying in the church those cultic patterns that are
"Christian" vis-a-vis those that are "Jewish" (§1.3).
These important observations confirm that it was not monotheism that served
for Ignatius as criterion or indicium for distinguishing "Judaism" and
"Christianism, "but other factors. Monotheism, rather, functions for him as a
powerful weapon for resisting threatening "Jewish" influence within the cultic
practices of the Christian communities at Philadelphia and Magnesia. Against this
"Jewish" threat Ignatius injects an equally-cultic response. He appeals to repentance
unto social harmony based in the unity of God mediated sacramentally (§2.1). In
both Philadelphians (§2.2) and Magnesians (§2.3), Ignatius ascribes the symbol of
divine unity with social force and uses it as a prophylactic against harmful context-
specific "Jewish" influence threatening the "Christian" church from within. As an
element of resistance brought to bear on an already established divide between
"Judaism" and "Christianism," divine unity reinforces, reflexively and secondarily, a
specifically "Christian" identity vis-a-vis "Judaism." The bishop offers a complex
reimagination of "Judaism," fruitful not only for its historic value but for providing a
detailed glimpse into the varied processes of Christian monotheistic world-
construction in dialogue with Christian counter-voices more closely affined with
"Judaism" (§3).
4-7) and C.P. Hammond Bammel ("Ignatian Problems," JTS 33 [1982]: 62-97) respond to alternative
theories by Weijenborg, Rius-Camps, and Joly.
3 Criteria represent collectively-ascribed standards of identity on which judgments about
group similarity and dissimilarity are made. Indicia are (usually external) evidences of established
identity and are the operational basis on which ready judgments of individual membership are made.
On criteria and indicia see Donald L. Horowitz ("Ethnic Identity," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P.
Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity: Theory and Experience [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975]
119-20).
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1. Context: "Jewish" Influence in Asia Minor
In this first section we analyze the literary construction of Ignatius'
opponents and the nature of the problem with "Judaism" in the letters of
Philadelphians (§1.1) and Magnesians (§1.2). In each work, Ignatius gives
distinctive literary shape to his opponents and the threat they pose. Since he had
personal knowledge of the situation in Philadelphia and had heard by report about
the situation in Magnesia, we suggest the literary depictions of his opponents harken
back to historical realities in these communities, though doubtless imperfectly and
certainly not disinterestedly.4 At the least they provide for us a picture of the criteria
and indicia that distinguish for Ignatius "Judaism" from "Christianism" (§1.3). The
close textual evaluation we perform in this section is critical. It provides a more
sustained methodological base for understanding how Ignatius uses divine unity as
an ideological tool for Christian identity construction, a motif we explore in the next
section (§2).
1.1 "Judaism" as Interpretive Strategy (Pfiilacielpf iansj
Bishop Ignatius dictated Philadelphians from Troas.5 The opening greeting is
unparalleled in length and complexity among his letters to the Anatolian churches,6
and its emphasis on the suffering, resurrection, and blood of Christ as well as
ecclesial unity, followed closely by a brief yet distinctive polemic on behalf of the
(unnamed!) bishop's charismatic authority (1.1), presages a sense that something
serious threatens the social fabric of the community, at least as Ignatius sees it.7 The
4 In Appendix A we advocate a "thick(er) description" of the literary shaping of Ignatius'
opponents as a method for solving classic interpretive conundrums in the Ignatian epistles. Our
proposed technique uses literary shaping as a window to historical setting.
5 Phld. 11.2.
6 Schoedel, Ignatius, 195. On Philadelphians' distinctive structure among the letters see
Hermann Josef Sieben ("Die Ignatianen als Briefe: Einige formkritische Bemerkungen," VC 32
[1978]: 14-15).
7
Philadelphians is the only missive in which the bishop remains unnamed and "wird wie auf
etwas Selbstverstandliches auf das eiq ETuioKOTcoq gepocht (Phld 4; 1,1; 3,2)" (Henning Paulsen, Die
Briefe des Ignatius von Antiochia und der Briefdes Polykarp von Smyrna. Zweite neubearbeitete
Auflage der Auslegung von Walter Bauer [HNT 18, Die apostolischen Vater 2; Tubingen: J.C.B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1985] 29). Ignatius perceived the bishop's authority as particularly threatened.
He (as elsewhere) begins with praise, though here uncharacteristically not of the addressees but of the
bishop (Sieben, "Ignatianen," 14-15; Jerry Sumney, "Those Who 'Ignorantly Deny Him': The
Opponents of Ignatius of Antioch," JECS 1 [1993]: 356). At the same time this is the only letter not to
conclude with the customary greeting xodpeiv. Questions about episcopal authority may have arisen in
connection with the bishop's frequent "silence." On episcopal "silence," see Henry Chadwick ("The
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sense of imminent danger escalates with the opening salvo of warnings in the letter
body: "Flee division and false teaching" (2.1; cf. 6.2; 7.2); "Stay away from the evil
plants" (3.1); "Do not let yourselves be mislead" (3.3);8 culminating in a final
exhortation to stave off division, "Make every effort therefore to celebrate one
eucharist" (4.1). The term "division" (pepiopoq) appears five times in this letter
(only once elsewhere),9 indicating that for Ignatius the brand of "false teaching"
found at Philadelphia posed a particularly serious threat to communal harmony. The
acute emphasis on division and schism contrasts sharply with frequent reference to
communal "unity" throughout the missive10—a contrast again unparalleled among
the Anatolian epistles." The overwhelming force on warnings against "division" and
admonitions to unity appears slightly odd since Ignatius seems elsewhere to
presuppose that the Philadelphian Christians have been "established in harmony from
God" (inscr.)12 and confesses to have found not "division but filtration" among them
(3.1). Such concessions should, however, be understood in terms of rhetorical flare
and conformity to "the diplomatic atmosphere of Hellenistic letters (both private and
official) whose purpose is to make a firm but polite request."13 The community's
harmonious life clearly remains contingent in his mind, and the situation at
Philadelphia is not so resolutely pleasant as Ignatius would wish.14 His concern is
tangible and harkens back not only to his firsthand experience with the Philadelphian
Silence of Bishops in Ignatius," HTR 43 [1950]: 169-72), Peter Meinhold ("Schweigende Bischofe.
Die Gegensatze in den kleinasiatischen Gemeinden nach den Ignatianen," in idem, Studien zu Ignatius
von Antiochien [Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979] 19-36), and Schoedel (Ignatius, 56-57,
76-78).
8
Dependent on 1 Cor 6:9-10 (Schoedel, ibid., 198; Robert M. Grant, "Scripture and
Tradition in St. Ignatius of Antioch," CBQ 25 [1963]: 323). For the "permissive" passive see BDAG,
s.v. 7tXavd(o 2.C.8.
9 2.1; 3.1; 7.2bis; 8.1; and Smyrn. 8.1 ("und dort wie eine Wiederholung von Ph 7,2 wirkt;"
so Jakob Speigl, "Ignatius in Philadelphia: Ereignisse und Anliegen in den Ignatiusbriefen," VC 41
[1987]: 361). Note pepi^co in Magn. 6.2.
10 4.1; evotp^: 2.2; 3.2; 5.2; 8.1; 9.1; opovoia: inscr.; 11.2; ev evt: inscr.; evcock;: 4.1; 7.2;
8.1.
" Speigl, "Ignatius," 371.
12 Subjective genitive [0eou]; cf. Schoedel, Ignatius, 21-22.
13 Ibid., 51. The verbal noun "filtration" is processual in force. At the time of Ignatius' visit,
the Philadelphian church was involved in a process of "filtration," such that there had not yet been
definitive expulsion of false teaching. Paul Donahue, "Jewish Christianity in the Letters of Ignatius of
Antioch," VC 32 (1978): 92: "Although Ignatius minimizes the degree of dissension within the church
at Philadelphia by describing it as filtering rather than as division, it is clear that such division exists."
14 The issue was not resolved by the time of Ignatius' writing (11.1b), and conformity with
episcopal authority remains contingent (inscr.: pctkioxa eav ev evi oioiv).
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church15 but also to reports recently received from his liaisons from Antioch, Philo
and Reus Agathopous (11.1b). These two legates had been "dishonored" in
Philadelphia (11.1) by the same "specious wolves" Ignatius personally encountered
there (2.2).16 When he therefore speaks with concern of the operation of "Judaism" as
a threatening influence in the church at Philadelphia, we should pay all the more
attention to the manner in which he gives literary shape to "Judaism."17 How does
Ignatius construct "Judaism" in Philadelphiansl The relevant descriptive texts occur
in 5.1-9.2:
51bBut your prayer will make me complete to God, that I might attain the fate in
which I have been shown mercy, having fled to the gospel as to the flesh of
Jesus and to the apostles as to the presbytery of the church.
5 2And we also love the prophets, since they too made their proclamation with
the gospel in view, and they hoped in him and waited for him, in whom by
believing they too were saved, being in the unity from Jesus Christ (ev6tt|ti
It;aon Xpiaxo-0), saints worthy of love and admiration, attested by Jesus Christ
and included in the gospel of the common hope.
61aBut if anyone exposits Judaism ( IouSa'topov eppr|v£-uti) to you, do not listen
to him. bFor it is better to listen to Christianism (Xpionaviopov) from a
circumcised man than [to listen to] Judaism from an uncircumcised one. "But
both, if they do not speak about Jesus Christ, are to me gravestones and tombs
of the dead, on which only the names of men are written.
6,2Flee therefore the deceits and the ambush of the ruler of this age, lest, being
worn down by his intention, you become weak in love; but all of you gather
together with an undivided heart.
7 '"For even though certain people wanted to deceive me in a fleshly way, yet
the Spirit is not deceived, since it is from God. For it knows whence it comes
and where it goes, and it exposes hidden things. While with [you] I cried out,
saying with a loud voice—the voice of God:
"Pay attention to the bishop and the presbytery and the deacons."
7 2To be sure, there were those who suspected me of saying these things as
having known beforehand about the division caused by some, but the one in
whom I am bound as prisoner is my witness that I did not come to know [this]
from any human being. Rather, it was the spirit who proclaimed, saying these
words:
15 3.1 (o\>x oti jtotp' upiv pepiopov eupov) and the personal account of 6.3-8.2.
16
Assuming the opponents of 6.1-8.2 are identical with "those who dishonored" the liaisons
in 11.1b. Ignatius hopes for the redemption of both (8.1; 11.1), such that their identification is
probable; cf. Schoedel, Ignatius, 214; Sumney, "Opponents," 356.
17 Zahn (Ignatius, 261-72; 373-78), C.K. Barrett ("Jews and Judaizers in the Epistles of
Ignatius," in Robert Hamerton-Kelley and Robin Scroggs, eds., Jews, Greeks and Christians:
Religious Cultures in Late Antiquity [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976] 232-38, 240), and Speigl ("Ignatius,"
360, 368-69, 372-73) recognize the heuristic value of Philadelphians as an entry point to the Ignatian
epistles.
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"Do nothing apart from the bishop. Guard your flesh as the temple of God.
Love unity; flee divisions. Become imitators of Jesus Christ even as he is of
his father."
8 2aNow I exhort you to do nothing in accordance with selfish ambition, but in
accordance with knowledge about Christ. bFor I heard some people say, "If I do
not find [it] in the archives,181 do not believe [it] in the gospel. And when I said
to them, "It is written," they answered me, "That is the question at issue." cBut
for me Jesus Christ is the "archives;" the inviolable archives are his cross and
death and his resurrection and the faith which comes through him; by these I
want to be justified through your prayers.
91 "The priests were also good, but better is the High Priest who has been
entrusted with the Holy of Holies, who alone has been entrusted with the
hidden things of God, bfor he himself is the door of the Father through which
enter Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and the prophets and the apostles and the
church—call these—into the unity of God (eiq evott|tc£ Beou). 2aNow the gospel
possesses something distinctive, namely, the coming of the Savior, our Lord
Jesus Christ, his suffering, and the resurrection. bFor the beloved prophets made
their proclamation with him in view (KaxijyyEtXav eiq au-cov), but the gospel is
the imperishable finished work. CA11 things together are good, if you believe
with love.
The entirety of 5.1-9.2 is concerned with evaluating competing claims to
authority. One by one the authority of the gospel (8.2; 9.2), apostles (5.1b; 9.1),
prophets (5.2a; 9.1), patriarchs (8.2; 9.1), Ignatius' opponents (7.1-2; 8.2), the
bishop of Philadelphia (7.1-2; cf. inscr.; 1.1-4.1), and Ignatius himself (7.1-2) are
variously at issue. These observations suggest a priori that conflict in Philadelphia
manifests itself in terms of the relation between mutually-exclusive systems of
religious authority competing within the same social space. And Ignatius constructs
this conflict in terms of "Judaism" versus "Christianism."
Yet what does he intend by "Judaism?" Are we to think of rigorous
observance of Jewish law? Or perhaps the "idea of Judaism rather than its
practice?"19 An intial answer emerges by tracing two themes. First, "gospel" appears
no less than three times in 5.1-2, matched by its threefold appearance in 8.2-9.2. It
represents a key motif in the dispute with "Judaism," as Ignatius understands it.20
Interpretation of "Jewish" traditions and texts also represents a particularly
prominent concern, as expressed through epprivebri (6.1), the flashback in 8.2b, and
the explanation of OT themes in 9.1. Frequent juxtaposition of imagery—prophets/
gospel, "Judaism'T'Christianism," archives/inviolable archives—further suggests
18 On the variant apxEion; (g) / dpxaioic; (GL), see Lightfoot (Ignatius, 2.271) and Paulsen
(Briefe, 85-86).
19 Schoedel, Ignatius, 200.
20 "Gospel" occurs just twice outside Philadelphians (Smyrn. 5.1; 7.2).
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that to discover what "Judaism" is for Ignatius, we must properly define the relation
between the above two themes in the logic of Philadelphians. We trace these motifs
in greater detail, beginning with 5.1-6.2.
The extended introduction of OT prophets in 5.2 appears odd for its relative
lengthiness compared to the brevity accorded the "gospel" and "apostles" in 5.1b.
Yet the extended treatment is intentional. It reflects a response directed to specific
accusations previously levelled against Ignatius by his opponents. Those who deal in
"Judaism" regard Ignatius' respect for OT prophetic authority as lackluster (cf. 8.2),
so Ignatius offers his counter-claim. Not only has he "taken refuge in the
gospel...and in the apostles" (5.1), he "also loves the prophets."21 Like the apostles,
the prophets made their proclamation with the gospel in view, placed their hope in
Jesus, waited for him,22 and were saved by believing in him. In sum, they
participated in "the unity from Jesus Christ," a reference to the "unity conferred on
the church by God."23 They have been insinuated into the "gospel of the common
hope" shared by Christians.
To his respect for prophetic witnesses, Ignatius contrasts his opponents'
teachings. Phld. 6.1 concerns the interpretation and proclamation of "Judaism"
within the context of the Christian community (cf. ugiv). Ignatius designates their
teaching "Judaism" and boldly aligns it with "the deceit and entrapment of the ruler
of this age" (6.2). He warns his audience to resist the exposition of "Judaism" in the
church (6.1a) and explains this proscription, according to the following paraphrase:
"For it is better to hear Christianism from a circumcised Jewish (or Gentile?)
Christian than Judaism from an uncircumcised Gentile Christian. However, if they
don't speak about Jesus Christ (i.e., if they teach 'Judaism'), both men are but
markers pointing to that which is dead, upon which are inscribed merely human
names." In Philadelphia, "Judaism" manifests itselfas an interpretive system that
does not exposit Jesus Christ; "Christianism" is that which does. Ignatius
establishes a binary opposition of mutual-exclusion between "Judaism"
('IonScaopoq) and "Christianism" (Xpumavtapoq).24 "Judaism" is the "other"
21 Kai...8e (5.2) is additive (cf. Eph. 2.1).
22 Ignatius regards the prophets as having waited for the parousia of Christ's incarnation (cf.
Magn. 9.2), and the apostles for the parousia of his return.
23 Schoedel, Ignatius, 202.
24 He probably coined the term "Christianism" consciously vis-a-vis "Judaism." Cf. Judith
Lieu, Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second Century (Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 1996) 29-30; '"I am a Christian': Martyrdom and the Beginning of 'Christian' Identity,"
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against which he indexes "Christianness," and he seals its insufficiency, qua
religious system, with macabre funerary imagery of gravestones and tombs (6.1c).
The illustration deprives his opponents of "the right to bear the Christian name"25
and, more acutely, offers an illustration of the (dead, human) authority of "Judaism"
vis-a-vis that (living, divine) authority of "Christianism."
Description of Jew and Gentile in terms of circumcision and non-
circumcision has suggested to some that the teaching of "Judaism" at Philadelphia
comprised recommendation of circumcision (and perhaps other markers of
"Jewishness").26 Yet it seems preferable to understand this language rhetorically as
heightening the force of the argument over competing systems of authority. The
polarizing rhetoric of 6.1b does not indicate that circumcision (or any other
particularly "Jewish" observance) represents the content of the teaching at issue. It is
invoked as an image, a highly-recognizable symbol of "Jewishness," to draw the
sharpest possible binary categories of mutual-exclusion. By using a key "Jewish"
identity marker to highlight the severity of contrast with "Christianism," Ignatius can
emphasize the absurdity of listening to the exposition of "Judaism" within the
"Christian" church! Nothing in the remainder of Philadelphians suggests that the
practice or observance of circumcision or sabbath is at issue in Philadelphia.27
Our interpretation of 5.1-6.2 comports well with the report of 8.2-9.2,28
where we encounter a resume of Ignatius' direct experience with false teachers in
Philadelphia. What lies at stake in 8.2 is the relation of the gospel to OT scripture.
"Some people," Ignatius recalls, asserted, "If I do not find [it] in the archives," by
which they mean OT scriptures,29 then "I do not believe [it] in the gospel."30 In
in Neither Jew nor Greek? Constructing Early Christianity (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2002;
2005 repr.) 215-18. Ignatius was fond of coining Christ-compounds (xpiotovopot;; xptotocpopoi;;
XpioTopaSia). louSoaapot; first appears in 2 Macc 2:21 and 8:1 as an antonym of ekkpviopo^ (4:13)
(Shaye J.D. Cohen, The Beginnings ofJewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties [Berkeley;
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999] 105-06).
25 Paulsen, Briefe, 84.
26 E.g., Meinhold, "Schweigende Bischofe," 28-29.
27 In contrast, the rhetoric ofMagnesians confronts "Jewish" praxis (§1.2).
28 7.1-2 is discussed below (§2.2.1).
29 This is the most convincing reading (William R. Schoedel, "Ignatius and the Archives,"
HTR 71 [1978]: 97-106) and comports with Ignatius' use of "it is written" (8.2b) elsewhere in
reference to OT (Eph. 5.3; Magn. 12.1).
30 The alternative—"If I do not find [it] in the archives, I do not believe in the gospel"—is
unconvincing (pace Paulsen, Briefe, 86), for as Lightfoot observes, "The parallelism demands" the
other reading (Ignatius, 2.271).
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dispute with Ignatius, these "people" raised a critical issue regarding interpretive
authority. Which has hermeneutical seniority? OT scriptures or the gospel message
attesting the events of Jesus' passion and resurrection, and the faith that comes
through him? Bishop Ignatius meets their concern by pointing to OT scriptures—"It
is written"—in a bid to prove that gospel events were proclaimed in advance by the
prophets, who themselves already participated in the gospel.31 His attempt was
unconvincing. The disuaded opposition responded, "That is the question at issue."
The "question at issue" is not the testing of the gospel message against OT scriptures
per se32 but the systematic prioritization in the church of the authority of OT textual
witness over that of the gospel and the interpretation of OT scriptures in a manner
that denies that the gospel is contained in the OT. By characterizing this as
"Judaism" and insisting that this system is alien to "Christianism" Ignatius can
demand that it not be present within the church.
Moving out of historical resume,33 Ignatius counters his opponents by
constructing an alternative symbol system. His "archives" are a person, Jesus Christ,
and "the inviolable archives" are key salvific events pertaining to Christ, "his cross
and death and his resurrection and the faith which comes through him" (8.2c).
Reference to Christ's passion and resurrection does not indicate that Ignatius
counters a docetic tendency. Possible references to docetic teaching in
Philadelphians are so scant and ambiguous as to make this conclusion virtually
certain.34 The gospel imagery must not be read apart from the larger polemic over
interpretive authority. Ignatius' opponents do not read OT witnesses in a manner that
necessarily directly denies the physicality of Jesus' suffering and resurrection, but in
a way that "exposits" them in a "Jewish" as opposed to a "Christian" manner (cf.
31 Cf. 5.2; Magn. 8.2-9.1.
32 As we find among Jews in the synagogue at Beroea (Acts 17:11).
33 Whether the arguments advanced in 8.2c-9.2 were ever raised during the dispute at
Philadelphia or are first put forward here is insignificant. Literarily, the argument of 8.2c-9.2 is linked
to the polemic of the preceding resume. Ignatius perceived the issues in these paragraphs as important,
if not in his personal encounter, then at least for his literary rebuttal.
34 Lack of "docetic" reference—which appears in every other Asian letter—is striking.
Possible indicators of docetic christology (cf. inscr.; 3.3; 5.1; 9.2) must be "mirror read" with great
uncertainty back into the historic situation to find doceticism among the opposition at Philadelphia.
The (supposedly) clearest reference to docetic christology, that of dissociating oneself "from the
Passion" (3.3: tw 7cd0ei), indicates Ignatius' evaluation of the status of "Jewish" schismatics. Because
they participate in "Judaism," a system of thought that rejects Christ's gospel (i.e., suffering), those
who engage in "Judaism" within the church do not effectively participate in his suffering (cf. inscr.;
3.2), even if they partake of the eucharist.
116
6.1). "Christianism" is established on Jesus Christ's "cross and death and his
resurrection and the faith which comes through him" (8.2c). To interpret
"Christianly" is necessarily to include the gospel within the purview of ancient
scripture. It is to exposit OT "archives" through the "inviolable archives."
"Judaism," conversely, rejects Jesus Christ's cross, death, and resurrection and the
faith which comes through him. To read "Jewishly" is to exclude (directly or
indirectly) fundamental elements of the gospel—Jesus' death, resurrection, and faith
in him—from the purview of the ancient, divinely-authorized OT witnesses. It is to
read OT "archives" apart from the vantage point of the "inviolable archives." The
two systems of exposition are mutually-exclusive, for they are grounded in
incompatible worldviews.
Ignatius continues his appeal for "Christian" hermeneutic. Pointing to Jesus'
preeminence (9.1), he advocates the distinctive priority of gospel "archives" to the
"prophets" in a way that nevertheless does not exclude the latter from participating in
the former (9.2). "The priests were also good," he continues, "but better is the high
priest," better, that is, because of his exclusive (povoq) care over the holy of holies,
over the secret things of God (9.1a).35 Here Ignatius defends his respect for OT
priests (cf. 5.2a), yet he does so to demonstrate the high priest's preeminence.
Through divine appointment the high priest alone stands as "the door" through which
all who have ever witnessed to and participated in the gospel—patriarchs, prophets,
apostles, and church—enter into God's unity (9. lbc). Ignatius presents the high
priest christologically,36 and his argument thereby relates to the issue of
hermeneutical authority under discussion (cf. 8.2c). Jesus is preeminent because he
keeps divine mysteries. Any message about him must also be preeminent! "Now the
gospel," Ignatius notes, "possesses something distinctive," the events themselves of
the savior's incarnation, passion, and resurrection (9.2a). Why distinctive? Because it
represents "the imperishable finished work" of God through Jesus, while the beloved
prophets only "made their proclamation with him in view." Ignatius prioritizes the
35 Hans-Werner Bartsch interprets "holy of holies" sacramentally—in terms of a conflict in
Philadelphia between a sabbath and a Lord's Day eucharist observance (Gnostisches Gut und
Gemeindetradition bei Ignatius von Antiochien [BFCT 2/44; Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1940]
39-47). However, if sacramental practice is at issue in Philadelphia, it is surprising that the contrast
between sabbath and Lord's Day is nowhere explicit in Philadelphians (as it is in Magnesians). We
are inclined to reject Bartsch's proposal.
36 On the christological interpretation of "the door" in light of LXX Ps 117:20 see Bartsch
(ibid., 48-49). Doubtless Ignatius provides for us here an example of the type of "Christian"
hermeneutic he urges.
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gospel, not in a way that excludes or supplants the testimony of OT witness. The two
operate in synergy. His reference to priests as "good" (9.1a) and to patriarchs and
prophets as participating in "the unity of God" (9.1c) solidifies his favorable attitude
towards OT witnesses, while demonstrating the all-inclusive nature of the
"distinctive" gospel "archives." The patriarchal and prophetic message is good when
read in conjunction with that of apostles and church. "All things together are good"
he says, if they lead to faith "with love" (9.2c; cf. 8.2c).
For him, ancient and more recent witnesses enter into "God's unity" (9.1c)
through one "door," Jesus Christ. What Ignatius intends by participation in "God's
unity" is complex (see §2.2.1). Yet within the argument of 5.1-9.2, participation in
divine unity reflects at a minimum the collective witness of patriarchs, prophets,
apostles, and church to the single message, which Ignatius equates with "the
inviolable archives" of the gospel. To exposit "Christianly" is to participate with
saints of all ages in the gospel of Jesus Christ and in God's unity. For Ignatius,
patriarchs, prophets, apostles, and church all participate through Jesus Christ in the
unity of God. Theirs is a single, common witness from God pointing always to the
one Christ (cf. 4.1). To exposit "Jewishly," on the other hand, is to read in a way that
effectively excludes the gospel from the purview of patriarchs and prophets. This is
then to reject the gospel and the unity of God. We have come full circle. Phld. 9.1-2
explains why the exhortation of 6.1 is true, namely, that "it is better" to listen to the
interpretation and exposition of "Christianism" than "Judaism."
1.2 "Judaism" as Mode ofCultic Practice (Magnesiansj
Having not personally visited the Christian community at Magnesia, Ignatius
composed his letter to the Christians there from Smyrna in reliance on information
provided him by a handful of Magnesian delegates (the bishop, two presbyters, and a
deacon).37 We should not anticipate the same depth of personal familiarity with the
situation at Magnesia as witnessed for Philadelphia. Nevertheless, Ignatius
authorizes his exhortations in Magnesians on the basis of his personal contact with
the entire Magnesian community through the members of its delegation.38 We should
thus avoid too great a suspicion about the contextually-directed nature of the literary
37 Magri. 2.1; 6.1a; 11.1 (etcei eyvcov); cf. Rom. 9.3-10.3.
38 6.1a (ercei ovv ev xoii; TupoyEypappivoK; rcpoaaOTOu; to 7tav 7tX.fj0o<; E0£(6ptioa ev 7uctei
xai r|yd7rrica, rcapaivaj); 2.1a.
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shaping of Magnesians. As in Philadelphia, there is a problem with "Judaism" at
Magnesia (8.1; 10.3). Yet this affinity should not lead us too quickly to equate either
the Sitze im Leben of the purported conflicts in the two cities or the identity of the
opponents. Ignatius addresses a somewhat different concern at Magnesia, one which
he explicitly labels "judaizing" (lonSa't^eiv). How does he give literary shape to the
manifestation of "Judaism" in Magnesia?
Magnesians 8-10 provides a carefully articulated argument against
"Judaism." We offer a few general observations from the following structural layout,
which organizes the argument of 8.1-10.3:
81aDo not let yourselves be misled by false doctrines and antiquated myths, since they are useless.
bFor if we are still living according to Judaism,
cwe confess that we have not received grace.
8 2aFor the most divine prophets lived according to Christ Jesus
—this is why they were persecuted—-
bbeing inspired by his grace
cso that those who are disobedient might be fully convinced
dthat there is one God
who revealed himself through Jesus Christ his son,
who is his word which came out of silence,
who in every way pleased the one who sent him.
9laIf then those [sc. disobedient] who lived39 in antiquated practices came to newness of
hope,
bno longer sabbatizing but living according to the Lord's [Day],40
on which our life also (kou) arose through him and his death
—which some deny—...,
9'2how will we be able to live apart from him
of whom the prophets too were disciples in the Spirit...?
"""Therefore do not be insensible to his kindness.
bFor were he to imitate how we act
we would no longer exist!
"Becoming learners of him, therefore,
let us learn to live according to Christianism.
dFor one who is called by a name other than this is not of God.
ia2aDo away, then, with the evil leaven, which has become old and sour,
and turn to the new leaven, which is Jesus Christ.
Be salted with him...
10 3aIt is absurd to proclaim Jesus Christ and to judaize.
For Christianism did not believe in Judaism,
but Judaism in Christianism...
39 Oi...dvaarpa<pevTE<; (lit. the ones who lived). Though syntactically a simple article, oi
bears anaphoric force and refers back to the preceding idea (i.e., the disobedient of 8.2c). There is a
clear parallelism between 8.2cd (those who arc disobedient might be fully convinced that there is
one God...) and 9. la (those who lived in antiquated practices came to newness of hope).
40
KupiaK-qv refers to the Lord's Day [i.e. Sunday], as clarified by contrast with
"sabbatizing" and with the following phrase. In Did. 14.1, K-opiaKT]v Kupiou [Lord's (Day) of the
Lord] probably refers to Easter Sunday; cf. Gos. Pet. 9.35; 12.50; Melito (Eusebius, Hist. eccl.
4.26.2). G reads Korea KupuxK-qv ^ayqv £wvtE<; (sc. "living according to the life of the Lord," or,
"living life according to the Lord's"), likely a later scribal attempt at explaining the unaccompanied
adjective.
119
The argument opens with an admonition: "Do not let yourselves be misled by
false doctrines or antiquated myths, since they are worthless" (8.1a). The exhortation
against indulging "false doctrines" and "antiquated myths" evinces the bishop's
concern for what he perceives as the particularly threatening content of some strains
of thought at Magnesia. The importance of the instructive content of these myths is
betrayed further through reference in this section to "disciples" and "(only) teacher,"
but also through the later description of such teachings as "evil doctrine" (11:1). The
apparent emphasis on dogmatic substance naturally arouses our curiosity as to what
Ignatius means when he refers to "myths," and any number of solutions have been
offered, from "gnostic" cosmology to the literal interpretation of scripture!41 Yet the
question itself is somewhat misguided, since Ignatius interprets these myths
primarily in terms of their sociological function. This is apparent from his subsequent
evaluation—"since they are useless." "Antiquated" and "useless" these myths have
no functional religious value. Whatever they reference (the answer is not important),
for Ignatius these "strange doctrines" and "antiquated myths" are functionally linked
(explanatory yap) to religious practice, particularly with "living according to
Judaism" and a denial of "grace" (8.1b). Consider the following lexical survey from
8. lb-10.1 highlighting religious praxis: "to judaize" (iovScu^ew), "to observe
sabbath" (aa(3pom£eiv),42 "to imitate the way we act," "those who are disobedient,"
"antiquated practices," and the particularly important "living in accordance with."
The frequency of these phrases (esp. £f|v Kara, "which Ignatius loves")43 in this
section is unparalleled in the Ignatian letters and indicates that the bishop perceives
something cultically distinctive occuring at Magnesia.44 Imagery of religious praxis
permeates his analysis and appears more prominent than doctrinal content, yet for
him proclamation and praxis are inexorably linked. The interpretation of mythic
imagery and doctrine in terms of religious function is evidenced also in reference to
"disciples" (lit. "learners") as those who "learn to live in accordance with (kccicx)
41 Cf. Sumney, "Opponents," 362 n. 109.
42 LXX Exod 16:30; Lev 23:32; 26:34-35; 2 Chr 36:21; 1 Esd 1:38; 2 Macc 6:6.
43 Paulsen, Briefe, 82. Cf. Eph. 6.2; 8.1; Trail. 2.1; Rom. 8.1.
44 Einar Molland is simply incorrect to deny the praxis aspect of this "heresy" ("The Heretics
Combatted by Ignatius of Antioch," JEH 5 [1954]: 6). Only in Magnesians is the false teaching
characterized with its own specific £f|v Kata-phrase! The single occurrence elsewhere in the Ignatian
epistles in reference to false teachers (Phld. 3.2: Kara 'Ipoo-Ov Xpiaxov ^covxei;) specifically
anticipates the repentance of those who teach "Judaism."
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Christianism" (10.1). These "antiquated myths" threaten the practice of "living
Christianly" in Magnesians.
Yet Ignatius does not target just any mode of life, but that which he
peculiarly aligns with and characterizes as "Judaism" and which he envisions as
diametrically opposed to a lifestyle aligned with "Christianism" (cf. 8.1b; 10.1c).
This emerges from the opening conditional clause explaining his opposition to
"antiquated myths," as the following interpretive expansion highlights: "For if, and
let us assume so,45 we are still living according to Judaism, then in this case we
confess by our mode of life not to have received the grace of Christ Jesus" (8. lbc).
This motif between two modes of life, one marked by "Judaism" the other by
"grace," characterizes the remainder of his explanation in paragraphs eight through
ten and is confirmed by a number of rhetorical pairs:
If we live in accordance with Judaism (8.1b) // we confess not to have received grace (8.1c)
The prophets lived in accordance with Christ Jesus (8.2a) // being inspired by his grace (8.2b)
If those who lived in antiquated practices (9.1a) // came to newness of hope (9.1a)
If those who lived in antiquated practices (9.1a) // how can we live apart from Jesus (9.2a)
no longer sabbatizing (9.1b) // living according to the Lord's [Day?] (9.1b)
In these pairs a conflict of diametrically-opposed lifestyles emerges. To live
Kara 'Ioubcaapov is to live apart from Christ's grace. To live Kara Xpioxov
'Irioobv, as the most godly OT prophets did, is to be "inspired by his grace." The
contrast is heightened by threefold reference to "antiquated" things (qua things
associated with "Judaism;" 8.1a; 9.1a; 10.2a), paralleled by the threefold reference to
Christ's grace/kindness (8.1c; 8.2b; 10.1a). An even broader structural parallel
further emphasizes this opposition. Two exhortations frame Ignatius' appeal to the
prophets and the bulk of his discussion of living "Jewishly" in 8. lb-9.2. The first,
we have seen, calls for avoiding "antiquated myths," an image somehow aligned
with "living Jewishly" (8.1a); the second appeals for sensitivity to "the kindness of
Jesus" (10.1a). Reference to the prophets in 8. lb-9.2 sits Janus-faced, helping
explain (8.1a: yap) the call to avoid Jewish "myths" and becoming the basis (10.1a:
o-uv) for the plea for attentiveness to Christ's grace. In Magnesians 8-10 what is
contrasted is not "Mosaic law" and "God's grace," but "living according to Judaism"
and the reception of "Jesus' grace," or £f|v Kara 'IonScacpov (8.1b) and Kara
45 The first-class condition is assumed true for argument's sake, though Ignatius actually does
intend that there are some in Magnesia who "live according to Judaism."
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Xptaxuxviapov (10.1c). Whatever "grace" means theologically for Ignatius,46 we
cannot overemphasize that in the rhetoric ofMagnesians grace or "living according
to Christianism" represents a mutually-exclusive alternative and superior lifestyle to
living "according to Judaism."
In the historical review of 8.2-9.lb, Ignatius is concerned about some in
Magnesia who still (pexpt vbv) live "according to Judaism" and consequently apart
from grace (8. lbc). In view of this situation he draws on traditional symbols from
Jewish antiquity as key illustrative material. The prophets, he explains, "lived in
accordance with Christ Jesus," a fact attested by their persecution and which was the
very grounds of it (8.2a). They were endowed with Jesus' "grace" to proclaim their
message (8.2b) "so that those who are disobedient might be fully convinced" (8.2c)
of the one God and his son, Jesus Christ (8.2d). By demonstrating that Hebrew
prophets were thoroughly "Christian"—living Kara Xptaxov 'Irioouv, being
"endowed by his grace," and proclaiming one God and his son—Ignatius shows the
absurdity of "Christians" living "Jewishly."
He reasons with his audience: "If then those who lived in antiquated practices
came to newness of hope, no longer keeping sabbath (sc. "sabbatizing") but living
according to the Lord's [Day], how will we be able to live apart from Jesus Christ?"
(9.lab, 9.2a). Who are "those who lived in antiquated practices?" Surely OT
prophets cannot be in view, as Molland and Hilgenfeld proposed,47 for Ignatius
regards them as having preached a message in conformity with Christ Jesus, and they
cannot be said to "have lived in antiquated practices" (i.e., "Judaism") from his
perspective. Nor are they, as Zahn proposed,48 contemporary "judaizers," Jews who
converted to Christianity yet continue to live according to "Judaism," for it is evident
from the additive use of Kcd in 9.1c ("our life also arose") that Ignatius refers to a
group other than himself and his contemporaries. The most plausible solution
identifies "those who lived in antiquated practices" with its nearest antecedent,
"those who are disobedient" of 8.2c,49 for whose faith the prophets were inspired by
Christ's grace in their ministry (8.2bc). Ambiguity still remains. Are these
46 On this question see Thomas F. Torrance (The Doctrine ofGrace in the Apostolic Fathers
[Edinburgh; London: Oliver and Boyd, 1948] 56-89), Schoedel (Ignatius, 239), and Virginia Corwin
(St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960] 164-71).
47 Molland, "Heretics," 3-4; Adolf Hilgenfeld, Ignatii Antiocheni et Polycarpi Smyrnaei
epistulae etmartyria (Berlin: Schwetschke, 1902) 280 [non vidi].
48 Ignatius, 372.
49 Ouv (9.1a) is explanatory of 8.2c.
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"disobedient" contemporaries of the prophets who were converted to living
"according to Christ Jesus" and who ceased observing sabbath in favor of Sunday
(9.lab)? Or, as Schoedel suggests, are these "the early disciples who once lived as
Jews (by observing sabbath) but came to live as Christians (by observing
Sunday)?"50 For whom was the prophetic ministry inspired? Either suggestion is
permissible, yet the former necessitates a wholesale telescoping of Christian ritual
observance into ancient Jewish traditions. It is possible that Ignatius believes
contemporaries of the prophets were persuaded to abandon sabbath and adopt
Sunday worship; in such reimagining of history, he may have relied on traditional
prophetic lampooning of sabbath observance as in Isa 1:13.51 However, Schoedel's
interpretation makes best contextual sense. Ignatius never explicitly claims the
prophets preached christological monotheism (8.2d), only that they were imbued
with Christ's grace so that their ministry and message would (eventually) lead to that
confession.52 The prophets were Jesus' "disciples...in the Spirit" (9.2), not having
"the advantage of looking back to Christ's fleshly presence,"53 but preaching in
anticipation of his appearance (9.2). The christological content of their message
became manifest through Christ's incarnation and death (cf. 10.3; Phld. 9.1).
If those early Christian disciples "who lived in antiquated practices" received
of the message and ministry of the prophets and converted to "newness of hope" (sc.
the message of christological monotheism; cf. 8.2d), expressed by switching from
sabbath to Lord's Day observance, how will we Christians be able to live apart from
Jesus Christ? The bishop offers choice between two modes of life, one Kara
'IouSouapov, another Kara Xpratov 'Iriaouv. And he urges his hearers not to be
insensible to the kindness (sc. grace) of Jesus, a point he pushes home with his
strongest illustration yet (10.lab). Assuming the earlier supposition that "we are still
living according to Judaism" (cf. 8.1b), Ignatius claims that if Jesus were to imitate
the way we act when we "live according to Judaism"(8.lb) by "sabbatizing" (9. la)
instead of "living according to the Lord's Day" (9.1b), then we would no longer
exist. Quite simply, we who are called "Christians" would no longer exist because
"Christianism" as something newly initiated by Jesus (cf. 9.1a) would never have
50 Ignatius, 119-20, 123. That OT prophets preached for the sake of Christians is a frequent
motif elsewhere (1 Cor 10:6, 11; 1 Pet 1:11-12; Justin 1 Apol. 31 ff.; Irenaeus Haer. 4.20.5).
51 Cf. Barn. 15.8; 2.4-6; 9.4; 10.11-12.
52 8.2c: si<; to juAr)po(popr|0fjvca; cf. Phld. 9.2.
53 Schoedel, Ignatius, 124.
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existed (10.1b)!54 That is why it is absurd for those who are designated "Christian,"
and are "of God" (cf. 10. Id), and who "proclaim Jesus Christ," to "judaize" (cf.
10.3). The two modes of life are incompatible, inasmuch as they are constructed on
competing religious systems, "Judaism" and "Christianism."
In one sense, the "antiquated myths" hold the key for the entire missive, as
the purpose statement in 11.1 cannot be understood apart from the discussion of
8-10. "Now I write these things...because...I want to forewarn you not to get
snagged on the hooks of worthless opinions but instead to be fully convinced about
the birth and the suffering and the resurrection, which took place during the time of
the governorship of Pontius Pilate. These things were truly and most assuredly done
by Jesus Christ, our hope, from which may none of you ever be turned aside" (11.1).
The contrast of the incarnate ministry of Jesus with "worthless opinion" in 11.1 must
be interpreted in light of the argument of 8-10,55 specifically the ministry of OT
prophets. The prophets, Ignatius earlier noted, were "inspired by Christ's grace so
that those who are disobedient might be fully convinced" of the message of
"Christianism"—of one God and one Lord (8.2b-d). And, like them, Ignatius now
writes his letter so that its recipients might "be fully convinced" about the truth of
Jesus' incarnate ministry. The "worthless opinion" he warns them of in 11.1 parallels
the "false doctrines" and "antiquated myths" he had railed against in 8.1a by
illustration from the prophets (8.2-9.2). Ignatius therefore by continuing to polarize
"Judaism" and "Christianism" as systems of cultic activity, a process he had begun in
8.1, carries on in 11.1 the prophetic ministry. This suggests that the proper
interpretation of his exhortation to be convinced of the physical ministry of Jesus in
11.1 is best interpreted with respect to its cultic function, specifically in terms of the
"Judaism" practiced by those envisioned in 8-10.
The overall force of 8-10 was the polarization of "Judaism" and
"Christianism" as alternative cultic systems/modes of life. To "live Jewishly"
amounts effectively to a functional denial of the pivotal importance of
"Christianism." To partake of any teaching which leads to a practice associated with
the former is ipso facto to deny practice of the latter and its doctrine (cf. 10.1b, 3a).
Now Ignatius argues that it is "worthless opinion," "false doctrine," "antiquated
myths" which have effected a separate gathering on sabbath (sc. the performance of
54 Smyrn. 1.2: "from the fruit of the cross we [exist], from his divinely blessed suffering!"
55 Anaphoric use of taoxa (11.1).
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"Judaism") in Magnesia. Inasmuch as observing sabbath is "Jewish," this amounts to
a rejection (or at least an absurd supplementation) of the "Christian" Lord's Day,
effectively denying the fundamental, pivotal significance of the incarnation, passion,
and resurrection. It was these events after all that rendered "Judaism" obsolete and
"antiquated" (cf. 9.1a; 10.2a). To partake of "antiquated myths" and thus cultically
observe "Jewish" sabbath represents the rejection of "Christianism" (cf. 10.lab) and
thereby the salvific import of Christ Jesus.
Whatever the "false doctrines" and "antiquated myths" about which Ignatius
warns his audience may indicate, for him they are functionally and cultically affined
with "Judaism" particularly envisioned in Magnesians as an antiquated system
according to which (team) one may live (sc. "judaize"), especially by observing
sabbath (sc. "sabbatizing").56With the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ
Jesus has come newness of hope—the message of christological monotheism and life
according to Christ's grace. "Sabbatizing" and the practices of "Judaism" have
become "old and sour" (10.2a), no longer useful (cf. 8.1a). For those who are called
by the name "Christian" (4.1; 10. Id) to continue living by these "antiquated"
practices (8.1a; 9.1a) amounts to an "absurd" (ocxorcov) acceptance of an outmoded
system, "Judaism," and a concomitant denial of the newness of Christ's grace in
"Christianism" (8.1b). Such "Christians" in reality cease to "be Christians" (4.1;
10.1b).
!.f> The Logic of "Judaism" vs. "Christianism:" Criteria and
Indicia
In the preceding discussion we set "Judaism," "Christianism," and related
terms in quotations as a reminder that the "Judaism" and "Christianism" we
encounter in Philadelphians and Magnesians are those perceived and constructed by
Ignatius. What is "Judaism" and "Christianism" to him? Superimposing the images
from Philadelphians and Magnesians we uncover the following observations.
First, "Judaism" is for Ignatius a religious system that fundamentally rejects
the revelatory significance of the gospel, Jesus Christ's cross, death, and resurrection
56
Ignatius doubtless envisions other "Jewish" practices in the "judaizing" category (cf. pi.
7cpaypaoiv in 9.1a and the all-inclusive summary in 10.3a), such as circumcision or dietary
requirements. Nevertheless, "sabbatizing" is his preeminent concern in Magnesians precisely because
it represents participation in a shared meal separate from the single community who meets under the
one divinely-authorized bishop. Sumney's analysis that sabbath observance is not at issue remains
unconvincing ("Opponents," 360-64).
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and the faith which comes through him (cf. Magn. 8.1bc; 10.Id, 3; 11.1; Phld. 3.3;
6.1c). "Christianism" is an alternative religious system that defines itself on the basis
of its faith in the distinctive salvific value of Jesus' death and resurrection. The
single criterion57 that he uses to distinguish "Judaism" and "Christianism" is
their respective response to the gospel. The gospel is the pivotal historic event that
differentiates "Christianism" from "Judaism." It is the gospel that renders "Judaism"
antiquated and useless (Magn. 8.1; 9.1) and that ushers in something profoundly new
in "Christianism" (Phld. 9.2). Because of the historical advance through the gospel
from "Judaism" to "Christianism," the progression from old to new, Ignatius can
claim that "Christianism did not believe in Judaism, but Judaism in Christianism"
(Magn. 10.3).58 When Ignatius speaks of "Judaism" and "Christianism" he has in
mind, respectively, the ancient, traditional religion of Judaism and the new religious
movement bound to Christ. For him, these two religions are mutually exclusive. If
"Judaism" and "Christianism" are for Ignatius incompatible and distinctive religious
movements, in what sense can he then speak of "Judaism" in the "Christian" church,
as he does in Philadelphians and Magnesiansl This leads to our next two points.
As systems of religious authority, "Judaism" and "Christianism" possess their
own distinctive cultic practices and strategies of reading. For Ignatius, adherents to
the Jewish religion thus live and read scripture according to "Judaism," that is, in a
way that essentially rejects the gospel. Similarly, proponents of the Christian religion
live and read scripture according to "Christianism," that is, in a way that subjects all
of life to the gospel and the faith that proceeds from it. Sabbath observance is a
distinctive manifestation of "Judaism," because it fails to recognize the significance
of Sunday, the Lord's Day, the peculiarly "Christian" day of worship on which
Christ was resurrected according to the gospel. Patterns of scriptural exposition that
fail to see Jesus in the testimony of Hebrew patriarchs and prophets are likewise
manifestations of "Judaism." "Christian" readings locate Christ in the OT scriptures.
Patterns of living and reading are functional indicators, operational indicia, of the
expression of "Judaism" or "Christianism" within a worship community. These
indicia emerge for Ignatius from the well-established criteriological difference
57 On criteria and indicia, see supra n. 3.
58
Undoubtedly a claim that the historical progress of "Christianism" incorporates both
Jewish and Gentile ethnicities within the universal church (Smyrn. 1.2).
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between "Judaism" and "Christianism," that is, along the lines of their response to
the gospel, the earthly manifestation of God in Christ.
Finally, "Jewish" cultic patterns and modes of scriptural reading (i.e., indicia)
can affect "Christian" thought and practice. The presence of "Jewish" indicia within
the "Christian" church, however, threatens to undermine the very criterion on which
the distinction of these two religions exists. The presence of "Jewish" cultic patterns
and scriptural reading in a "Christian" community threatens the effective power of
the gospel in that church's ministry, for to live or interpret "Jewishly" is effectively
to deny Christ's incarnation, passion, and resurrection. In Philadelphians and
Magnesians, the conflict with harmful "Jewish" influences provides the referential
frame against which rhetoric about Christ's earthly life (sc. the gospel) must be
interpreted. When Ignatius warns "be fully convinced about the birth and the
suffering and the resurrection, which took place during the time of the governorship
of Pontius Pilate," and further affirms, "These things were truly and most assuredly
done by Jesus Christ" (Magn. 11.1), he cautions against the threat which "Judaism"
(not a supposed docetism!) poses to the manifestation of the gospel in their midst.
The same observation applies to the many interjections that punctuate these two
epistles.59 As we will see below, this is closely linked with a threat to the very unity
of God, and requires a response from Ignatius grounded in a discourse and logic of
divine unity.
2. Resisting "Judaism:" Divine Unity and Ecclesial Unity
We now see that the fundamental Ignatian criterion for differentiating
"Judaism" from "Christianism" is the respective response to God's revelation in the
earthly ministry of Jesus Christ and to the new faith that comes through him. Modes
of religious practice (i.e., scriptural reading and sacramental observance) provide for
Ignatius operational indicia for identifying "Christian" cultic patterns vis-a-vis those
that are "Jewish." Our reading ofPhiladelphians and Magnesians suggests that
Ignatius uses categories ofdivine unity and uniqueness neither as criteria nor indicia
for differentiating "Christian" and "Jewish" identities. Yet, even a cursory reading
through the Ignatian epistles demonstrates that the unity of God, Jesus, and the
59 Magn. 9.1 ("Through him and his death, which some deny"); Phld. inscr. ("fully convinced
of his resurrection"); 3.3 ("he dissociates himself from the Passion"); 5.1 ("I have taken refuge in the
gospel as the flesh of Jesus").
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church (evcooiq-motif) comprises a highly significant thematic element within his
theology.60 If not as indicium or criterion, how then does the unity-motif operate for
Ignatius in the process of forming a distinctly "Christian" identity vis-a-vis
"Judaism" at Philadelphia and Magnesia? We argue that Ignatius invokes the concept
of divine unity to resist harmful "Jewish" influences.
There is an underlying logic operative in Philadelphians and Magnesians in
which Ignatius expresses the unity of God and Jesus functionally in terms of Jesus'
earthly, incarnational obedience to his Father and in terms of his faithful work of
uniting believers of all ages into one "cosmic" church (§2.1). For Ignatius, this
cosmic unity must be regularly incarnated and reconstituted in the life of the church,
according to a pattern in which the earthly church imitates the (functional) unity
which Jesus shares with the one God (§2.2). To bring the communities of
Philadelphia (§2.2.1) and Magnesia (§2.2.2) into line with this divine plan of
"cosmic" unity vis-a-vis threatening "Jewish" influence, Ignatius repeatedly invokes
motifs of social harmony through a series of exhortations designed to enhance
collective solidarity with ecclesial leadership. Philadelphian and Magnesian
"Christians" must reclaim again and again the (functional) unity of Jesus with God
by regular participation in the eucharist and collective cultic association under the
authority of the divinely-appointed bishop, presbyters, and deacons. In this way,
God's unity, socially reclaimed and repeatedly reenacted in performative cultic acts,
offers a means of habitually reconstituting "Christian" identity by resisting
differentiating forces of "Judaism" (§2.3).
60 Some scholars overstate the thematic significance of the ev(oon;-motif for Ignatius,
elevating it above even his theo\ogy and christology proper. Joachim Rogge, for example, claims:
"Nicht nur die kurz angezogenen Themenkreise, sondern auch die AuBerungen iiber Kultisches,
Sakramentales, Pneumatologisches, Christologisches, 7Vi«?-logisches, leiten dazu an, Ignatius von
dem weder Alt- noch Neutestamentlichen Begriff der evcooic; her zu verstehen. Seinem nicht spezifisch
christlichen Einheitsprinzip subsumiert Ignatius alles," and (on Eph. 14), "die Gottesvorstellung
selbst dem gnostischen Einheitsprinzip subsumiert ist!" (""Evtoou; und verwandte Begriffe in den
Ignatiusbriefen," in ...undfragten nach Jesus: Beitrdge aus Theologie, Kirche und Geschichte,
Festschrift fiir Ernst Barnikol zum 70. Geburtstag [Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1964] 48, 50;
emphases added). Also too aggressive is Hans Freiherr von Campenhausen (Kirchliches Amt und
geistliche Vollmacht in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten [BHT 14; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul
Siebeck), 1953] 107-08: "Vielmehr stoBen wir hier auf das Grundanliegen seiner gesamten Theologie
und Soteriologie") and Theo Preiss ("La mystique de Limitation du Christ et de l'unite chez Ignace
d'Antioche," RHPR 18 [1938]: 197-241). Such uber-evaluations of the evwoiq-motif often result
from all-too-hasty impositions of various "gnostic" religio-historical schema on Ignatius' letters.
Appendix B discusses the Antiochene provenance of Ignatius' unity-motif, details scholarly
proposals of possible religio-historical backgrounds, and offers our specific proposal for how best to
investigate this motif in the epistles.
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2.1 Unity ofGodand Jesus-. Solidarity for the Church
A binitarian shaping imbues Philadelphians and Magnesians. God the Father
and Jesus Christ are persistently invoked together in the opening inscriptions and
concluding exhortations, as a matter of course (Phld. inscr.; 11.1; Magn. inscr.; 15),
but also elsewhere {Phld. 1.1; 3.2; Magn. 5.2). God is not only universal "Father" of
creation, but more specifically "Father of Jesus Christ" {Phld. 7.2; Magn. 3.1). Jesus,
in turn, is uniquely "his Son" {Magn. 8.2; 13.1).61 A triadic pattern of unity also
manifests itself. Ignatius hopes the Magnesian "Christians" prosper "in (ev) the Son
and the Father, and in (ev) the Spirit," that is, in God's unity {Magn. 13.1). The Spirit
is syntactically delineated, because it operates for Ignatius as an extension, the
productive power, of the Father and Jesus. The Spirit is "from God" {Phld. 7.1) and
is the Spirit of Jesus {Phld. inscr.; cf. Magn. 9.2). To utter something in the Spirit is
to speak with God's voice {Phld. 7.1-2). This binitarian and triadic language
establishes for the readers of these letters a pattern of intimate heavenly relations
between Jesus, his Spirit, and God the Father. It is clear that the unity of God and
Jesus represents a central theme of Ignatius' personal theology.
Yet when we evaluate how this pattern of divine unity functions discursively
in the arguments of Philadelphians and Magnesians, it is surprising to find neither a
metaphysical nor an ontological emphasis to the motif. Unity of "essence" or
"substance" between Jesus and his Father seems everywhere presupposed in these
missives, yet there are no unambiguous expressions of that motif! An examination of
the brief statements that situate Jesus alongside God uncovers a highly imminent and
functional approach to the unity of God and Jesus. Jesus participates in unity with
the one God because, united to him in intent and act, he fulfills God's plan on
behalf of the "Christian" church. That plan is to join believers of all ages into a
cosmic unity with God and one another. Jesus carries out this plan in every age, yet it
is distinctly the events of the gospel—his incarnation, life, death, and resurrection
—that highlight his unity with God.62 The gospel is for Ignatius the fulcrum of
revelatory history because (1) it reveals the unity of the one God and his Son and (2)
it establishes the basis on which the church of all ages participates in God's unity.
The following observations clarify these claims.
61 Plural wot occurs nowhere in Ignatius' epistles!
62 Christ also operates for Ignatius in accordance with the Father's will at creation (cf. Rom.
inscr.), though this is not highlighted in the conflict with "Judaism."
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First, the functional, incarnational nature of divine unity is explicit in Magn.
7.1, "The Lord did nothing without the Father, either by himself or through the
apostles, for he was united63 with him." United with God in purpose, Jesus never acts
apart from the Father's will. According to Ignatius, for Jesus to be united with God is
for him to do nothing without God, or rather, to obey God in everything! And this is
precisely what Jesus accomplished in the incamational events of the gospel. Again
and again, language expressing Jesus' unity with the Father revolves around his
earthly, incamational ministry. "There is one God," Ignatius asserts, "who revealed
himself through Jesus Christ his Son, who is his Word emitted from silence, who in
every way pleased him who sent him" (Magn. 8.2). Here, Ignatius envisions Christ's
incarnation as the verbal emission of God. From heaven's silence, God speaks his
revelatory Word into the world. And what is spoken reveals him who speaks in
perfect obedience.64 Through Jesus' obedience, humans see God. Christ reveals God
because he imitates God. "Be subject to the bishop and one another, as Jesus Christ
[was subject] to his Father in the flesh, and as the apostles [were] to Christ and to the
Father" (Magn. 13.2). Again, in a proclamation to the Philadelphian community,
epitomized in Phld. 7.2, Ignatius includes the image. "Become imitators of Jesus
Christ, even as he [is an imitator] ofhis Father." Through imitation of God, Jesus
reveals his Father on earth. In this way, he is steward of God's mysteries (Phld. 9.1).
Christ's earthly obedience is also visible in two claims that at first glance
express his pre-incamational unity with God, precisely where we might anticipate
ontologic claims to divine unity. Ignatius refers to "Jesus Christ, who before the ages
was with the Father and appeared at the end of time" (Magn. 6.1). Reference to
"before the ages" is the most explicit pre-incarnational statement in Magnesians or
Philadelphians, yet it is endowed here with incarnational significance. "Therefore,"
Ignatius continues, "let all you who have received a divine agreement in your
convictions (opotjOeictv ©eon) respect one another." The bishop's exhortation
appeals logically (ovv) by analogy to a "divine agreement of convictions" that
existed between God and Jesus "before the ages!" This divine agreement, we learn
from 6.1, respected Jesus' "appearing at the end of time" (i.e., incarnation). Far from
a statement of ontologic unity between God and the pre-incarnate Jesus, Magn. 6.1 is
a claim about how Jesus obeyed the Father by coming to earth! Similarly, Magn. 7.2
63 'Hvcopivoi; civ; so GL; absent from Syf, Ar, and John of Damascus.
64 The imagery and language are Johannine.
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relates how Jesus processed "from one Father, remained with and returned to the
One." This is not a claim about Christ's precosmic generation but about the gospel.65
Jesus descends "from the Father," that is, at the Father's bidding he becomes
incarnate. He is obedient to (i.e., "remains with") the Father throughout his earthly
ministry, and returns to his Father (at the consummation of his earthly obedience) in
a resurrected body. Ignatius articulates the unity of God and Jesus in Magnesians
and Philadelphians functionally, in terms of the Son's harmony of will with the
Father and his obedience in carrying out God's plan in the gospel.
The divine plan Christ fulfills in the gospel is the unification of the "cosmic"
church. Through his passion, Jesus unites believers of all ages into one body and
brings them to the Father by faith through himself. Thus, in his obedience to God,
Jesus guides the ongoing life and growth of the present "Christian" church. He
"cultivates" (through his Spirit) the contemporary church, as intimated in Phld. 3.1,
which describes "evil plants [i.e., tradents of "Judaism"], which are not cultivated by
Jesus Christ, because they are not the Father's planting." Horticultural imagery
details the cooperative operation on behalf of the present church of the Father, who
plants seed, and Jesus Christ, who cultivates it.
The "cosmic"66 church motif surfaces in Philadelphians and Magnesians
particularly in relation to Jesus' effective actions on behalf of OT patriarchs and
prophets. He is "the door to the Father, through which Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,
and the prophets and the apostles and the church enter in; all these come together in
the unity ofGod" (Phld. 9.1). Thus OT prophets, too, are "in the unity from Jesus
Christ" (Phld. 5.2). As suggested earlier (§1.1), the unity into which patriarchs,
prophets, apostles, and the church enter is their shared participation in a unified
christological message, that is, their preaching of the gospel. The prophets "made
their proclamation with the gospel in view, and they hoped in [Christ] and waited for
him" (Phld. 5.2).67 They are Jesus' "disciples in the Spirit, who anticipated him as
their teacher" (Magn. 9.2). Saints of all ages constitute a community ofwitnesses
65 Lightfoot, Ignatius, 123; Schoedel, Ignatius, 117.
66
Ignatius does not use the term "cosmic," yet it is an appropriate descriptor. Believers of all
ages are transposed into a heavenly community through the singular harmony of Jesus with God's will
in the gospel.
67
Trj<g Koivfji; eXttiSot;. The article assumes possessive force given the context and the
semantic range of Koivfji;.
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whose concordant message is produced by God and attests the validity of the gospel
and ipso facto of "Christianism."
Yet unicity of proclamation arises from an even more fundamental reality.
Through obedience to God in the gospel, Jesus has united believers of all ages into a
single community of the saved, with OT prophets, priests, and patriarchs joining
apostles and contemporary Christians. The gospel is "our common hope" in which
believers of all ages participate, including the prophets who "too were saved...,
being included in the gospel" (Phld. 5.2). Christ "raised [the prophets] from the dead
when he came" (Magn. 9.2).68 The cosmic ecclesia participates in "unity from Jesus
Christ" (5.2).69 Through Christ's incarnational obedience, "Christianism" becomes
that system "in which 'every tongue' believed and 'was brought together' to God"
{Magn. 10.3), both Jew and Gentile (cf. Smyrn. 1.2). Jesus' earthly obedience to God
has produced a single "cosmic" community, into which the faithful are joined in
salvation through the singular mode of entry—the "door of the Father," Jesus Christ.
This cosmic ecclesial unity is effected by the unity of God, the cooperative efforts of
Father and Son. The uniting of "cosmic" ecclesia into the "Christian" church is not a
levelling out of all historical distinction between the OT era and the gospel (cf. §1.3).
Ignatius recognizes something "new" in the gospel. Precisely because of "Christ"
something new exists in "Christianism." The gospel is the fulcrum of history, the
prismatic lense through which Ignatius views God's activity of uniting all things in
Jesus. Through Jesus heavenly realities were united to the earthly realm in a "unity
of flesh and spirit." Through Christ's unity with God expressed functionally in his
obedience in the gospel, "Christianism" emerged out of "Judaism" {Magn. 10.3), the
cosmic community of patriarchs, prophets, apostles, and the church was conjoined in
harmony with each other and to the unity of God and Jesus. A totalizing logic of
divine unity functionally constituted in the gospel possesses Ignatius and drives his
approach to the harmful differentiation which "Judaism"—the anti-gospel—threatens
at the churches in Philadelphia and Magnesia.
68 Reference to Matt 27:52-53?
69 Peter Meinhold, "Die Anschauung des Ignatius von Antiochien von der Kirche," in idem,
Studien zu Ignatius von Antiochien [Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979] 58: "Durch den Glauben
an Christus sind die Patriarchen, Propheten und Apostel und auch die empirische Kirche in die
,,Einheit Gottes" gekommen."
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2.2 Unity from Godand Jesus: ReclaimingDivine Unity
The "Christian" church is constituted by Jesus. He assembles it into a cosmic
unity, establishes its leadership according to a divine pattern,70 effects its social
harmony,71 and continually cultivates and guards it.72 Through the ongoing operation
of his Spirit, Jesus fulfills his revelatory gospel ministry73 by extension through the
"Christian" church.74 By "imitation of Christ" the church is the continuing
incarnation of Jesus in the world.75 Acting as the earthly representative of the risen
Jesus to mediate the one God to humanity the church perpetuates Jesus' own
revelatory ministry. And in "Christian" obedience and collective social harmony is
reflected analogously the unity of Jesus with his Father in the gospel.76 In sum,
through its social harmony and unity, the "Christian" church is the ongoing
outward revelation of the one God.
For Ignatius, what the church does matters. Through its collective harmony or
disunity, the church either reflects or jeopardizes, respectively, the continued
effectiveness of the gospel, the manifestation of the one God among humans through
the revelatory ministry of Jesus in his passion and resurrection. Magn. 1.2 expresses
this contingency. Ignatius prays on behalf of all "Christian" churches that "[there
70 Phld. inscr. (bishops, presbyters, and deacons are "appointed by the intent [ev yvaSpfl] of
Jesus Christ, whom according to his own will he firmly established by his holy Spirit"); 1.1; Magn.
6.1 (ecclesial leaders "have been entrusted with the service of Jesus Christ").
71 Magn. 1.2 ("union of flesh and spirit from Jesus in the churches"); 15.1 ("you who possess
an undivided spirit, which [oq; masc. by attraction to 'Iriaoui; Xpicxoq] is Jesus Christ"); Phld. 4.1
("one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ and one cup [leading] unto unity through his blood").
72 Phld. 3.1; 5.1.
73 Magn. 8.2.
74 Phld. 4.1; Magn. 7.1: plot TrpoaEuxiy plcc 8et|cu;, eii; vou*;, pla eAtui;, ev dyobtri ev xf)
Xapa xr\ apcopco, o eaxiv 'Iqaouv Xpicxov. So L, Antiochius (ca. 620 CE). G reads ei? eortv
'Irjaouv Xpicxov. The former, we believe, preserves Ignatius' distinctive view that cultic practices in
the "Christian" community constitute (i.e., continually incarnate) Jesus Christ. The subsequent text
confirms this (7.2): ktivreq coq elq <£va> [so Latin, Armenian] vaov avvxpEXEXE 0eou, coq etc! ev
0uciaaxi]piov, E7U Eva 'Iriaouv Xpiaxov. The unified cultic apparatus of the church (cf. repeated (be,)
instantiates the one Jesus Christ (no comparable d><;).
75 Imitatio Christi recurs through the Ignatian epistles, and is a key theme in Ignatius'
ministry at Philadelphia {Phld. 7.2) and to the Magnesian community as well {Magn. 7.1; cf. language
of discipleship [9.1-10.1] and "living Kara Xpiaxiavicpov" [§1.2]). Christian reenactment of Jesus'
unity with God reconstitutes the cosmic "union of flesh and spirit" (cf. §2.1). It is to realize divine
unity (spirit) afresh on the earthly plane (flesh) through the church's harmonious life. The pattern was
first evident in the gospel ministry of Jesus, who imitated God. In the logic underlying Philadelphians
and Magnesians Ignatius links Jesus' ministry to the ministries of local churches.
76 On the church and its bishop as reflection {Abbild) of heavenly realities (Vorbild), see
Meinhold ("Anschauung," 57-66).
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may be]77 in them a union (evcocuv) of flesh and spirit..., of faith and love,..., and,
what is more important, of Jesus and the Father." The analogy between Jesus and his
church is so powerful for Ignatius that the failure of any "Christian" community to
fulfill its (Christ-imitative) obedience actually threatens the manifestation of divine
unity in that church's midst! If the churches do not fulfill their commission to extend
God's revelation on earth through their unity with one another and with God, then
the unity of Jesus and his Father is not actualized afresh in that community. Social
disharmony in the church hinders Jesus' revelation of God on earth!
And this is precisely the threat which the influence of "Judaism" in the
practices of the "Christian" communities of Philadelphia and Magnesia raises. The
harmonious life of these churches remains contingent in Ignatius' mind because of
continuing "Jewish" influence.78 Against this differentiating "Jewish" threat he offers
a powerful response that integrates his ideology of divine unity with cultic practice
designed to inculcate that ideology in the community's ongoing life.
The "Christian" churches at Philadelphia and Magnesia must continually
reclaim their unity with one another and with God as a means of resisting harmful
"Jewish" influence that threatens to differentiate these communities from within and
thereby to destroy the effective manifestation of God's unity among them. These
communities must ensure their ongoing establishment "in the harmony of God."79
Again and again, they must reenact by their social harmony the solidarity which
Jesus—whose body they are80—possesses with God, and they must regularly realign
themselves in their unity with the cosmic church. Yet such reenactment is contingent,
because it involves acts of human will in ongoing communal solidarity. Ignatius
recognizes this.81 He matches the contingency of human action by a powerful social
agency, a set of performative cultic acts that repeatedly inculcates and reenacts the
church's unity with its divinely-appointed leaders—bishops, presbyters, and
77 The subjunctive is required by context; this is a prayer in hope, a request that the churches
fulfill their responsibility.
78 See n. 14; Magn. 4.1; 5.2.
79 Phld. inscr.
80
Though language of the church as Christ's "body" is not present in our two epistles, it is,
interestingly, present in the single passage elsewhere that speaks of "Jews." Smyrn. 1.2 refers to
Jesus' "saints and faithful, whether among Jews or among the nations, in one body of his church."
81 "Living Christianly" is learned behavior {Magn. 10.1). Ignatius' frequent mention of
"disciples" and "learning" indicates that solidarity with "Christianism" involves human processes of
development and choice.
134
deacons—and in so doing regularly reconstitutes their unity with God, the "Bishop
of all."82 Chief among these acts is the eucharist, participation in Christ's body and
blood (i.e., his gospel), mediated to the community through its leadership.83
Examination of our epistles demonstrates the transposition of the unity-motif from
heavenly reality to an imminently social, concretized theme to be reenacted in the
church as a weapon of resistance against "Judaism."
2.2.1 Philadelphia
In Philadelphians, Ignatius regards the simultaneous co-existence of radically
incompatible ways of reading OT scripture as profoundly threatening the church's
unity. For him, "Judaism" in the "Christian" church at Philadelphia undermines the
authority of the church's leadership and their teaching of the gospel, and jeopardizes
the manifestation of God's unity among them. The clearest description that
"Judaism" threatens ecclesial leadership at Philadelphia comes in Ignatius' personal
reminiscence of a conversation he held with "certain people" (i.e., tradents of
"Judaism")84 associated with the "Christian" community there (Phld. 6.3-8.1).85
These people ostensibly tried "to deceive him" by concealing the true nature of their
beliefs and concerns (7. la). In the course of dialogue with them Ignatius became
upset. Enthused, he acclaimed two charismatic utterances that he regarded as
uniquely inspired by God's Spirit: "Do nothing apart from the bishop" and "Pay
attention to the bishop, the presbytery, and the deacons."
Both utterances, comprising a single conversation, foster obedience to church
authorities. Ignatius rubber-stamps them with the divine authentication often
82 Mann. 3.1.
83 Phld. 4.1; Magn. 7.1-2.
84 In 6.1 Ignatius firmly aligns the "false teaching" of his opponents with "Judaism" (§1.1).
The entirety of 6.3-8.1 which exposes the threat to episcopal authority is bracketed within a textual
inclusio in which Jewish themes appear prominent (5.1-6.2; 8.2-9.2). A single group of opponents is
thereby envisioned throughout Philadelphians (pace Christine Trevett, "Prophecy and Anti-Episcopal
Activity: a Third Error Combatted by Ignatius," JEH 34 [1983]: 1-18). Cf. Matti Myllykoski, "Wild
Beasts and Rabid Dogs: The Riddle of the Heretics in the Letters of Ignatius," in Jostein Adna, ed.,
The Formation of the Early Church (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 354.
85 For relevant texts from 6.3-8.1, see supra §1.1. Formal elements mark 6.3-8.1 as a unit:
(1) The imperatives are confined to 6.1-2 and resume in 8.2a; (2) a shift in temporal frame from the
present in 5.3f. to reflection on past events in 6.3; (3) the word of thanks (6.3) points to 7.1-2, and the
self-defense (8.1) emerges from events described there (cf. 8.1a: ouv); (4) pev...8e links 8.lab
internally and ouv (8.1c) links it with 8. lab; and (5) the introduction of 7rapaica7.<B (8.2) is an
important structural signal for Ignatius (Sieben, "Ignatianen," 8-18).
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accorded such charisma.86 The "prophetic" nature of his exhortation to unity was for
him self-evident, and there is little reason to doubt his sincerity. He addressed "the
division caused by some" without prior knowledge of it. Though the divine seal-of-
approval failed to convince his opponents, his words must have appeared so keenly
suited to actual events in Philadelphia that his detractors claimed Ignatius had prior
knowledge of the situation. There existed in Philadelphia, it seems, a group of
Christians whose hermeneutical activity Ignatius characterized as distinctly
manifesting "Judaism," because it effectively precluded gospel events from OT
prophetic witness (§1.1). This pattern of "exposition" had already rent the
community's social harmony and significantly threatened the authority of the bishop
and other ecclesial leaders (7.2). From Ignatius' perspective, tradents of this
hermeneutical method still threatened the ongoing cultic solidarity of the
Philadelphian "Christian" community (11.1).
In his letter to the Philadelphians, Ignatius issues claims and admonitions
specifically against this threat to the entire leadership apparatus. The motif surfaces
in the opening inscription, where he greets the church, "especially if they are at one
(ev evt) with the bishop and the presbyters and deacons with him." It is further
confirmed by the charismatic admonitions of 7.1-2 (above) and Ignatius' hope that
his "Jewish" opponents repent and return to "the council of the bishop," a stylistic
reference to the presbytery couched in terms of relation to the bishop (8.1).87 Closer
examination of the letter reveals greater subtlety. Ignatius' primary concern is the
threat which "false teaching" (sc. "Judaism") poses uniquely to episcopal authority.
The inscription mentioned earlier formally offsets presbytery and deacons from the
bishop. The former are those "with the bishop."88 This distinction concords with
mention elsewhere of presbytery and deacons as those "with the bishop" (4.1) and
enlightens Ignatius' reference to repentance and "belonging to God" in terms of
synergy "with the bishop" (3.2; cf. 8.1). The extensive opening blessing at 1.1-2
represents a not-so-subtle polemic on behalf of specifically episcopal authority,
highlighting both the divinely-authenticated origin of the bishop's ministry as well as
86
E.g., to jrvEupa ot> Tt^avdtai, anb Beou ov; iXaAovv lieydXri cpcovfj, Seov tptovfj; etc. On
the prophetic character of Philadelphians 7 see Trevett ("Prophecy," 5-8 and nn. 14, 16-17); cf.
Campenhausen, Kirchliches Amt, 112-16.
87 Cf. Magn. 6.1; Trail. 3.1. On the unique bond between bishop and presbyters for Ignatius,
see Schoedel (Ignatius, 46, 112-13).
88 Note articular position: xoic; ahv auTcp 7ipEopuTEpoiq Kod SiaKovoiq.
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his godly character and conduct. Textual indicators point to the threat which
"Jewish" interpretive patterns pose against episcopal authority as Ignatius'
primary concern for the "Christian" community of Philadelphia. Insofar as he
regards the presbytery and deacons as in accord "with the bishop," it is natural for
him to include their authority in his admonitions and warnings. The danger of
"Judaism" is palpable for Ignatius.89 And inasmuch as the bishop's authority is
uniquely representative of all harmony and ecclesial order (3.2)—a common Ignatian
theme—a threat to his leadership represents vicariously a threat to the stability of the
entire church. If unity with the bishop and with the presbytery and deacons is not
maintained, how can the unity of God be continually realized anew in the ongoing
gospel ministry of the Philadelphian community?
There can be but one response to an alternative system of authority (i.e.,
"Judaism") that challenges the authority of the very persons Ignatius regards as the
only proper authorities, the charismatically-derived bishop, presbyters, and deacons.
Ignatius must resist the former by reinforcing the latter in the social harmony of the
Philadelphian church. He spells out this logic in 2.2: "In your unity" with the
bishop,90 "Jewish" false teachers "will find no opportunity." Calls to resist false
teaching are simultaneously calls to unite with the bishop and his teaching (cf.
2.1-2). The admonitions of 7.1-2 are the characteristic appeals of his entire missive:
"Do nothing apart from the bishop" and "Pay attention to the bishop, the presbytery,
and the deacons." Similar imagery reinforces the urgency of uniting with the bishop.
To be "with the bishop," Ignatius claims, is "to belong to God and Jesus Christ"
(3.2), that is, to participate in the unity of Jesus with God. Alternatively, those
tradents of "Judaism" must "repent and enter into the unity of the church" before
they "will belong to God" (3.2). They must unite themselves to "the council of the
bishop" (8.1). Only then will they "return to the unity of God" (8.1). Solidarity with
the charismatically-appointed ecclesial leadership provides the only solution to the
manifestation of "Jewish" teaching occuring in Philadelphia. General exhortations to
"gather together" (6.2) and to "do nothing in a spirit of contentiousness" must be
evaluated in light of this context. They are calls to submit to ecclesial authorities and
thereby to reinforce the unity of God in their collective harmony. By so doing, they
will resist "Judaism."
89 Of the five occurrences of "division" in Philadelphians, three occur in 7.2-8.1!
90 I.e., shepherd (2.1).
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As Christ's unity with God in the gospel was incarnational, so too the
church's realization of the gospel through resistance of "Judaism" must occur in
highly incarnational ways. In Philadelphians, the strongest manifestation of unity
with the bishop comes in the church's participation in one eucharist. The link
between episcopal authority and eucharistic practice is evident in the exhoration of
4.1: "Make every effort therefore to celebrate one eucharist, for there is one flesh of
our Lord Jesus Christ, and one cup which leads to unity through his blood; there is
one altar, just as there is one bishop, together with the presbytery and the deacons."
The leadership of the community mediates the grace of God in the gospel
sacramentally (i.e., in Christ's body and blood) to his church. The call to sacramental
unity coheres with the call to episcopal, presbyteral, and deaconal authority in
Philadelphians. Collective social harmony reconstituted regularly through
participation in one eucharist under the singular authority of the bishop and the
presbytery and deacons is the most certain prophylactic against threatening
differentiation posed by the insinuation of the teaching of "Judaism" (i.e., the
anti-gospel) within the church. In the disursive logic of Philadelphians, by
resisting "Jewish" differentiation through obedience to the bishop in repeated
celebration of the one eucharist, the community remains within "the unity of God"
(9.1) and reenacts its participation in the cosmic ecclesia, "the unity of Jesus Christ"
(5.2).
2.2.2 Magnesia
A similar concern about the threat that "Judaism" poses against episcopal
authority and social solidarity permeates Magnesians. And here, too, Ignatius utilizes
imagery of divine unity and the cultic reenactment of divine unity to resist
"Judaism."
Though the main "burden of the communication" begins with the Ttapcavco in
Magn. 6.1,91 there is a series of "digressions"92 in 3.1-5.2 which are not entirely
interruptive, since they strongly foreshadow concerns in the body of the letter itself
regarding the issue of episcopal authority. They piggy-back off the introduction in
91 So Schoedel, Ignatius, 112 n. 2; cf. Sieben, "Ignatianen," 13, 16-17.
92 So Schoedel. A number of structural elements indicate this is an appropriate designation.
Note jrapaivco followed by the customary series of formal imperatives at 6.1 (cf. "imperatival"
admonitions in 3.1 -2; 4.1: 7cpE7cetv) and the reintroduction of the delegates from Magnesia in 6.1 a (cf.
2.1).
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which Ignatius praises the "very well-ordered nature" of the Magnesian "Christians'"
love towards God (1.1). The exhortations in these digressions clarify how that "well-
ordered" love should be and apparently is, to some extent, being manifest in
Magnesia (cf. 11.1). The entire force of the digressions of 3.1-5.2 rests on an
appeal to social harmony and solidarity with the bishop,93 couched in
characteristically Ignatian admonitions to do what "is right:" "It is right (rtpeTtei) for
you not to take advantage of the bishop's youthfulness, but to grant him every
respect according to the power of God the Father,..., even by cooperating with him
as one wise in God;" "It is right (rcpeTtov ecriv) to obey [the bishop] without any
hypocrisy;" and "It is right (7tpe7tov...ecmv) not only to be called 'Christians' but to
actually be [Christians], unlike some who designate [a man] 'bishop,' but do
everything independently of him [sc. of his authority]." In obeying the earthly bishop
the Magnesian "Christians" are actually reenacting (and thereby actualizing) the
unity of God manifest by Jesus in the gospel. Quite simply, by yielding to the bishop
"who is seen" (rov (JkeTtopevov) they honor him "who is unseen" (xov aopatov).
They unite themselves with God, the Father of Jesus Christ and Bishop of all
(3.1-2). This latter imagery recalls that Ignatius' exhortations to obedience and
social unity under episcopal authority are fundamentally grounded in his theology of
divine unity (§2.1).
It appears that a sociologically identifiable group (tiveq) had emerged in
Magnesia,94 which, though they refer to Damas by the title "bishop" nevertheless do
not "act in good conscience" because they meet together separately from the rest of
the community apart from the direct or delegated authority of the bishop (4.1).95
Ignatius readily concedes that these evaluations reflect his opinion (poi) of their
motives, yet in this mild concession he in no way condones such behavior. Rather, he
characterizes the meetings of "such persons" as "invalid" (pp Pe(3cdco<;) and not "in
accordance with the commandment" (ko.x evto^pv). The sectarian group
93 The prime example of this solidarity is deacon Zotion (2.1) and the presbytery (3.1).
94 There is no literary indication that the group that engages in separate meetings (4.1; cf.
7.1a) is different from those that practice "Judaism" in 8-10. The final imperative in the series from
6.1-8. la is linked directly (cf. ycip) to the description of the opposition in 8.1 b—10.3.
95 From Smyrn. 8.1-2 (ekevvt] pepala ebxapiotia fyyeicQco r| vnb xov ejucjkotcov oncra, i) w
av avxbq Ejmpe\|/t|), we see that Ignatius permitted alternative eucharists, as long as they occurred
under the authority of a leader delegated by the bishop. Separate eucharistic celebrations are not,
therefore, inherently incompatible with Ignatius' calls to social harmony and communal unity. Yet
without the bishop, presbyters, and deacons it is not possible for a community to be called a "church"
(Trail. 3.1).
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undermines the authority of bishop Damas.96 According to Ignatius, they "take
advantage of the bishop's youthfulness." Their separate meetings are described as an
unwillingness to yield to the Damas' authority (3.1). Inasmuch as they confess
Damas as "bishop" yet do not acknowledge his authority, by meeting without him,
they act hypocritically (kcc-ccc rmoKptcnv) and are disrespectful (3.2), not only to the
presbytery (who do not "exploit the bishop's apparent youthfulness") but also to
God, the Father of Jesus Christ and Bishop of all (3.1b-2). Ignatius warns against
such perfidy in equally striking black-and-white dualities by invoking a pair of
alternatives suggestive of the "two ways" teaching common in hellenistic-Jewish and
early-Christian literature.97 Two ways lie before the community, death or life (5.1).
Yet this is formally no warning at all. Our bishop was so enthused it seems that he
forgot to include an appropriate admonition, urging his hearers to choose life. The
anticipated warning at 5.2 is simply missing, making redolent the urgent nature of
the appeal against these unauthorized separate meetings. We suggest these separate
meetings involved the celebration of sabbath rather than the Lord's Day under the
authority of a different bishop than Damas (cf. 8.1-10.2). These meetings are not
unofficiated; they are rather officiated by an alternate authority, probably one with
greater perceived stature because of his age. Because this group participates in
"Jewish" indicia by "sabbatizing" and "judaizing," Ignatius regards them as
introducing the threat of "Judaism" into the majority "Christian" community. As
such, they pose a peculiar threat to bishop Damas' authority, and, for Ignatius, to the
realization of the unity of God in the gospel ministry at Magnesia.
The rhetorical force of these so-called "digressions" (3.1-5.2) is hardly
digressive. It reinforces the admonitions that line the letter-body proper in 6.1-7.2
and which themselves link with the discussion of "Judaism" in 8-10 through the
admonition at 8.1.98 The formal "burden of the communication" begins, as
customarily for Ignatius, with the "I exhort you" (7rctpcuvco) at 6.1a followed
immediately by a series of seven imperatives in 6.1b-7.2. As in Philadelphians and
in the earlier digressions, these admonitions and exhortations have as their leitmotif
the encouragement of godly harmony and solidarity with the bishop, presbyters, and
96 The comparitive conjunction (toarcEp kou) and correlative adjective (oi toiowoi) in 4.1
descriptive of the sectarian group have in view all three preceding admonitions (3.1-2) which describe
the threat to episcopal authority.
97 1QS 3:13-4:26; Did. 1-6; Barn. 18-20.
98 See n. 94.
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deacons. There is striking affinity with the preceding digressions, creating a literary
unity. "Let there be nothing among you," Ignatius appeals, "which will be capable of
dividing (pepioca) you, but be united (eva>0r)Te) with the bishop and the leaders, as
an example and lesson of incorruptibility" (6.2b), an ostensive challenge to the
aforementioned sectarian group. Against those who meet separately and "do
everything apart from (xcoprq) the bishop" (4.1), Ignatius exhorts the community to
"do everything in godly harmony" (6.1) and to "do nothing without (aveu) the
bishop and presbyters" (7.1). Against those meeting separately the bishop
admonishes the Magnesians to meet together "in the same place" with "one prayer,
one petition, one mind, one hope, etc." (7.1b). The entirety of these exhortations
revolves around the principle of social unity within the church, yet Ignatius grounds
this unity foundationally in the unity of Jesus with his Father (6.1b) and a christology
of imitation (7.1a). "Therefore," he admonishes, "as the Lord did nothing without
(ctveo) the Father (for he was united with him), either through his own agency or
through the agency of his apostles, so you must not do anything without (oven) the
bishop and the presbyters" (7.1a).
The frequency of these imperatives and the collocation of the motif of social
harmony with the admonitions in 3.1-5.2 demonstrate that this is no mere
hypothetical concern but one which Ignatius perceives as fully evincing itself in
Magnesia. For Ignatius the call to ecclesial unity in 3.1-7.2 is closely linked with a
sharply perceived sense of threat to the social fabric and to solidarity with the
leadership in Magnesia posed by some who "live according to Judaism." Into this
context of dispute over eucharistic practice, which poses a direct endangerment to
the bishop's authority and hence to the community's solidarity and gospel ministry,
comes the emphatic call to harmony of religious practice under the proper authority
of the bishop and presbyters. This is seen in the threefold repetition of an action verb
accompanied by the preposition "in accordance with" (Kara): "show the bishop all
due respect in accordance with the power (Kara Sbvapiv) of God the father" (3.1)
and "obey in accordance with no hypocrisy at all (Kara pr|8ep(av tmoKpiaiv)"
(3.2), in contrast to those who do not "meet together in a valid manner in accordance
with the commandment (xax' evTO^qv)" (4.1). As we have seen, this little
preposition is not insignificant for our bishop and his overall argument against
"Judaism" as a mode of cultic living (i.e., "judaizing," "sabbatizing;" §1.2).
What is required to counteract the influence of "Jewish" cultic practices in
the "Christian" community at Magnesia is an equally cultic response. All who would
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bear the name "Christian" must participate in the corporate life of the one (majority)
community that meets under the authority of the single bishop Damas on the Lord's
Day. "Let there be one prayer, one petition, one mind, one hope...Let all of you run
together as to one temple of God, as to one altar, one Jesus Christ, who came forth
from one Father and remained with the One and returned to the One" (7.1b-2).
2.2.^ Observations
Philadelphians and Magnesians are undergirded by Ignatius' concern that
these communities regularly reconstitute their unity with God and Jesus through
solidarity with their bishop, presbyters, and deacons as manifest in programmatic
assembly and participation in a single eucharist. Emphasis on ecclesial leadership
manifests Ignatius' logic of divine unity, for the earthly order in the ecclesia is
established and modeled on a heavenly pattern. This Abbild-Vorbibf9 pattern is
clearly indicated in his description of "harmony from God" in terms of ecclesial
orderliness, "with the bishop presiding in the place of God and the presbyters in the
place of the apostolic council,100 and the deacons, who are most dear to me, having
been entrusted with the service of Jesus Christ, who before the ages was with the
Father and appeared at the end of time."101 For Ignatius, the unchallenged continuity
of the authority of ecclesial leaders is the surest guarantee of the continuing
solidarity of the community (and ipso facto) of Christ's unity with God being
incarnated anew in that community. His admonitions towards unity with ecclesial
leaders reflect his larger program, an attempt to realize God's unity in the church's
social life as a tool of resistance against "Judaism." For Ignatius, this solidarity with
ecclesial leadership is cultically mediated, particularly in the eucharist.
5- Divine Unity, Social Solidarity, and "Christian" identity
In his letters to Philadelphia and Magnesia the bishop of Antioch engages in a
process of constructing "Christian" identity through the creation and maintenance of
99 See n. 76.
100
T07T0V.. .X07C0V GLgl; T07t0V.. ."TU7COV SA; cf. 6.2.
101
Magn. 6.1. The fact that the apostolic council is insinuated between God and Christ and is
reflected in the presbytery is of little concern. Ignatius is quite free in his analogies. Note 7.1, where
the Father is reflected in the bishop and presbyters and Jesus in the church; 13.2, where the Father is
modeled in "the bishop" (cf. 3.1) and Jesus in the church. What is of concern is the larger cosmic
ordering of the episcopal structure of the earthly church.
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distinctively "Christian" boundaries vis-a-vis "Judaism." He has in his own thinking
already clear-cut distinctions between "Judaism" and "Christianism." The two are
differentiated for him in terms of a single criterion, their rejection of or faith in the
revelation of the one God in the gospel, respectively (§1.3). Christ's incarnation,
death, and resurrection have historic significance for Ignatius as the fulcrum on
which all human events pivot and on which "Judaism" becomes obsolete and
"Christianism" becomes the continuing revelation of God in Jesus Christ. And the
gospel has cosmic significance. It instantiates the unity of Jesus with his Father, and
through that unity of will and obedience the universal church of patriarchs, prophets,
apostles, and the contemporary church is constituted into a single cosmic body which
participates in unity with God and with one another.
For Ignatius, "Judaism" is anti-gospel! Cultic patterns that are characteristic
markers of "Judaism" (i.e., "Jewish" indicia) thus have no place in the corporate life
of the "Christian" church, which prides itself on faith in the gospel. To entertain the
presence of "Judaism" in the church is effectively to reject the value of the gospel,
and to reject the gospel is to reject the very events that enact Jesus' unity with the
Father (§2.1)! When Ignatius encounters in Philadelphia certain patterns of scriptural
exposition which read the OT apart from a gospel framework, and when he learns
about cultic celebration of sabbath occuring among some in Magnesia, for him, this
threatens the very unity of God, the continuing revelation of the one God through
Jesus in the ongoing life of the "Christian" churches at Philadelphia and Magnesia as
expressed in their harmonious social unity. The practice of "Judaism" (anti-gospel)
among "Christians" undermines the project of regularly reclaiming the significance
of being "Christian" (pro-gospel) in these communities.
His response to a threat that so radically undermines the manifestation of
divine unity in the continuing gospel ministry of the churches is to match that threat
by a program that reinforces the unity of Jesus with God and of the church's unity
with God and with one another as manifest through social solidarity with their
leadership. And what better way to resist "Jewish," anti-gospel influence than by
reinforcing the very criterion that "Judaism" in the "Christian" church undermines
and that identifies "Christianness"—faith in the gospel (i.e., participation in God's
unity). He exhorts these communities to meet together regularly and to participate in
that cultic drama which itself reenacts the gospel, the eucharist, under the God-given
authority of ecclesial leaders. In this way, their unity and harmony with their leaders
and with one another is frequently reconstituted. The very cultic practice grounded in
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the fundamental events of the gospel (thereby in God's unity) serves as prophylactic
against "Judaism" in their midst. Through the enactment of this symbol system,
God's unity, socially reclaimed and reenacted in performative cultic acts, offers a
means of habitually reconstituting "Christian" identity by resisting differentiating
forces of "Judaism." The symbol system of Jesus' unity with God, regularly worked
out socially and ideologically, reconstitutes "Christian" identity and acts as a tool for
resisting "Judaism," whose influence threatens to differentiate these communities
into "Jewish" and "Christian."
Such is the logic in Philadelphians and Magnesians. These epistles testify to
a fervent atmosphere of claim and counter-claim among some second-century
Anatolian "Christian" communities respecting the meaning of "Christianness" vis-a¬
vis "Jewishness." Ignatius negotiated "Christian" identity in this context by using
monotheistic ideology as a tool for resisting "Judaism." By transposing the idea of
Jesus unity with God to the imminent, cultic practice of these churches, he gave them
a mechanism for regularly reclaiming their distinctly "Christian" identity and thereby
for combatting "Judaism" in their midst.
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Chapter Four
Repositioning Jewish "Religion" and "Race:"
Monotheistic Classification Strategies
In the last chapter we saw how Ignatius ascribed the symbol of divine unity
with social force and used it as a prophylactic against what he characterized as
harmful "Jewish" influences threatening the "Christian" church from within. The
image of God's oneness offered for Ignatius neither a criterion nor indicium for
distinguishing "Judaism" and "Christianism," but a context-specific ideological basis
for repentance unto social harmony and away from anomic differentiation which the
presence of "Judaism" in the "Christian" church threatened. It was only as an
element of resistance brought to bear on an already established divide between
"Judaism" and "Christianism" that divine unity reinforced, reflexively and
secondarily, a specifically "Christian" identity vis-a-vis "Judaism." In contrast to the
bishop from Antioch some Christian communities employed an alternative
monotheistic strategy to shape their collective consciousness vis-a-vis Judaism. For
these groups the concept ofGod's uniqueness provided an opportune criterion for
identifying and indexing sameness and difference with Judaism (and other groups
external to the Christian community). In this chapter we offer an interpretation of
two such strategies of monotheistic classification as they occur, respectively, in the
texts of Kergyma Petrou (§1) and Aristides' Apology (§2). Despite their clear
differences both texts reposition Judaism within the global framework of religious
and ethnic groups in order to clarify and legitimate for Christians and others the
meaning of belonging to Christian identity (§3).
These roughly contemporaneous early second-century texts have been
carefully selected. Above all and most importantly for the present purpose Kerygma
Petrou and Apology are united by common appeal to "knowledge" of the unique God
as key criterion for distinguishing and evaluating various social groupings. They
share a number of rhetorical and discursive similarities and a common doctrine of
God. Nevertheless, closer inspection reveals several disparities. Kerygma Petrou and
Apology do not share the same organizational pattern of group classification. Their
attitude and approach towards Judaism differ decidedly. Their internal logic and the
manner in which they appropriate God's uniqueness demonstrate nuanced
distinctiveness. The texts manifest different permutations of interconnectivity
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between monotheism and other criteria of classification, particularly respecting the
role of Jesus in legitimating religion. Nor is the (ostensive) purpose for which each
uses its peculiar monotheistic strategy identical. These divergences are perhaps all
the more significant when one considers the oft-made proposal that Kerygma Petrou
may have exercised some measure of direct literary influence on Aristides' Apology}
If true—a concession by no means certain—then the divergences of the latter from
the former highlight an intentional, strategic shift in discursive technique. These
differences reflect the different geographical settings, social Sitze im Leben,
community-specific concerns, and intended audiences of Kerygma Petrou and
Apology, as we will see. The nuanced monotheistic strategies in these two pivotal
texts of the sub-apostolic period merit closer attention.2
1. Keryspia Petrou: Three "Ways" of 0eoaePeia
Scattered throughout Clement of Alexandria's Stromata (primarily book six)
are found portions of a much earlier Christian work, which Clement designates the
"Preaching of Peter" (Kerygma Petrou [ATP]).3 We know very little for certain about
' Argued, e.g., by J. Armitage Robinson (in J. Rendel Harris, ed., The Apology ofAristides on
Behalfof the Christians [TS 1/1; Cambridge: University Press, 1891] 86-99), Richard Raabe (Die
Apologie des Aristides aus dem Syrischen iibersetzt [TU 9,1; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1892] 29-30),
and Henri Irenee Marrou (A Diognete. Introduction, edition critique, traduction et commentaire [SC
33; Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1951] 101, 111-12, 121-22). Ernst von Dobschiitz regards Robinson's
attempt as misguided and avoids asserting "eine direkte Verwandtschaft" (Das Kerygma Petri kritisch
untersucht [TU 11,1; Leipzig, 1893] 33-34, 37-38, 80; cf. Henning Paulsen, "Das Kerygma Petri und
die urchristliche Apologetik," ZKG 88 [1977]: 5 n. 21). Michel Cambe suggests Kerygma and
Apology may have shared a common source (Kerygma Petri. Textus et commentarius [CCSA 15;
Turnhout: Brepols, 2003] 173-74, 239-41). Wolfram Kinzig (Novitas Christiana. Die Idee des
Forschritts in der alten Kirche bis Eusebius [FKD 58; Gottingen, 1994] 150-52) provides tabular
comparisons of Kerygma and Apology.
1 These texts have received some attention of late by Kinzig (ibid., 147-52), Judith Lieu
("The Race of the God-Fearers," JTS 46 [1995]: 488-90; Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of
the Christians in the Second Century [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996] 164-77), and Denise Kimber
Buell ("Rethinking the Relevance of Race for Early Christian Self-Definition," HTR 94 [2001]:
460-62; "Race and Universalism in Early Christianity," JECS 10 [2002]: 429-31).
3 KP survives in ten fragments according to Dobschiitz's enumeration (Kerygma, 18-27),
retained in the present chapter. Erich Klostermann proposed an alternative system ("Reste des
Kerygma Petri," in idem, Apocrypha I. Reste des Petrusevangeliums, der Petrusapokalypse und des
Kerygma Petri [KIT 3; 2nd ed.; Bonn: A. Marcus und E. Weber's Verlag, 1908] 13-16),
supplemented by Henning Paulsen ("Kerygma," 5 n. 22). All ten fragments are found in Clement's
Stromata: la {Strom. 1.29.182.3), lb (2.15.68.2), 2a (6.5.39.2-3), 2b (6.7.58.1), 3a (6.5.39.4-40.2), 4a
(6.5.41.2-3), 5 (6.5.41.4-6), 6 (6.5.43.3), 7 (6.6.48.1-2), 8 (6.6.48.6), 9 (6.15.128.1-2), and 10
(6.15.128.3). Parallel fragments appear in Clement's Eel. 58 (fr. lc) and were used by the "gnostic"
Heracleon (frs. 3b, 4b, cited in Origen Comm. Jo. 13.17.104). For text and French translation see
Michel Cambe's recent study {Kerygma, 150-61). KP's embeddedness in Stromata (et al.) presents a
series of difficulties related to extracting each fragment from its position within the citing text, and
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KP. It is likely a product of early second-century (114-115 CE?) Egyptian
Christianity.4 The strong emphasis on the person of Peter may suggest the work of a
Petrine group or school, and this would not be inconsistent with community interests
in the apostle elsewhere in the early second-century.5
A number of structural, thematic, and perspectival similarities with second-
century apologetic works suggest KP belongs within (and even began) the apologetic
genre.6 Yet this, of course, depends on how one defines the phenomenon of early
Christian "apology." If the term designates a literary genre which interprets (and
defends) one's own minority culture to the larger culture in which that group lives
then the intended audience has significant functionality for understanding the text;
apology is literary self-presentation and defense to outsiders.1 In Christian apology
this generally involves an imperial audience. This (standard) definition does not deny
an intra-group function to apologetic literature, yet it certainly attenuates the role
apology takes in shaping communal self-identity. This meaning of "apology" does
not, however, ring true with what we can reconstruct of KP, which seems quite by
design to be an intra-Christian parenetic text.8 To all appearances KP records
(ostensively) an apostolic discourse to Christian believers by the apostle Peter who
acts as representative of the twelve apostles to transmit their tradition to the faithful
Cambe's study represents the most thoroughgoing effort to date to clarify "le ieu du texte citant et du
texte cite" (ibid., 15-137).
4 Heracleon used KP in his mid-second century commentary on John (cited by Origen Comm.
Jo. 13.17.104) as did an anonymous commentator on the first Psalm sometime prior to Clement (cited
in Strom. 2.15.68.1-2; cf. Dobschiitz, Kerygma, 10; Cambe, Kerygma, 45). Heracleon, Clement, and
Origen have ties to Alexandria. Additionally, KP shares affinities with another work of Egyptian
provenance, Sibylline Oracles book three (3.8-22, 29-31; Cambe, ibid., 225-26; cf. Valentin
Nikiprowetzky, La troisieme Sibylle [EPHESE: Etudes Juives 9; Paris: Mouton, 1970] 227-29), and
mention of zoolatry (fr. 3) fits well in an Egyptian context. If we accept this provenance, KP may
have been produced prior to the Trajanic revolt (115-117 CE) after which Egyptian Judaism lost
substantial political clout.
5 Cambe, Kerygma, 186-87; cf. 381. On representations of Peter in the second century see
Enrico Norelli («Situation des apocryphes pe'triniens,» Apocrypha 2 [1991]: 31-83) and C. Grappe
(Images de Pierre [EHPHR 75; Paris, 1995]; non vidi).
6 So J.N. Reagan (The Preaching ofPeter: The Beginning ofChristian Apologetic [Chicago,
1923]) and Robert Grant (Greek Apologists of the Second Century [London: SCM Press, 1988]
39-40), though the latter also notes its function as literature within the church.
7 Cf. Grant, ibid., 9-11.
8 As Paulsen demonstrates ("Kerygma," 30-37; cf. 30 n. 201; cf. Cambe, Kerygma, 167-68,
380).
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(cf. frs. 4a, 5, 9, 10). If this analysis is correct, KP occupies an important "role de
transition" in the development from apostolic to apologetic Christianity.9
Aside from the first, the fragments may be grouped into two broad thematic
types: declarations of Peter (frs. 2-5, 9-10) and logia of the resurrected savior (frs.
6-8), presumably set within some narrative framework now too difficult to discern
or recover. We examine these in turn to see what KP says about Judaism,
monotheism, and Christian identity.
1.1 Exhortation of Peter to the Christians (Fragments 2-5)
Fragments two through five comprise a literary unity10 and represent a portion
of KP which Michel Cambe labels the Exhortation de Pierre aux Chretiens sur la
veritable religion (hereafter Exhortation). In what must have constituted a key
section and significant portion of the entire argument of KP the subject matter turns"
in Exhortation to an explication of the doctrine of God and a program of
schematizing human groups according to their cultic patterns and participation in
religious knowledge. Fragment 2a introduces the fundamental topic of discussion:12
Peter says in the Preaching: IJExpot; ev to} Krip-uypotTi keyev
"Therefore know that there is one God, Tvvcooicete ox>v oti eic; 0eo<; eoxvv
who created the beginning of all things oq dpxT)v itdvtmv erco'vnoev
and possesses authority over (their) end, kcci zeXovq (sc. 7ctivTcov) eljouoiav ex<ov
,s[and] (this is) the unseen (God), [icai]13 o dopaxoq,
who sees all things; 05 id navxa opa,
9 Note especially Paulsen (ibid., 30-37). Quote from F. Blanchetiere ("Aux sources de l'anti-
judaisme Chretien," RHPHR 53 [1973]: 356).
10 Cambe's research has been particularly helpful in demonstrating the theological unity of
Exhortation (Kerygma, 76-78, 165-280). Dobschiitz juxtaposed fragments two to four yet argued that
a portion of KP between fragments four and five is now missing (Kerygma, 21, 45, 79). Following
him, Paulsen comments, "Das Ausgefallene kann aber nicht sehr erheblich gewesen sein, da die
kompositionelle Einheit von fragm. 2 [= 2-5 Dobschiitz] deutlich ist" ("Kerygma," 7 n. 31).
11 Initial ouv (fr. 2a) presupposes prior material.
12 Bold text reflects our evaluation of the scope of KP. We make no attempt to supply all
textual variants or proposed emendations. The following signs are employed:
[ ] text whose inclusion in KP is disputed
[[ ]] later scribal interpolation into the text of Clement
() translator's explanatory comment.
13 Did Clement introduce kch to fuse two originally distinct portions of KP1 Pierre Nautin's
structural argument that kou o marks a twofold strategy is instructive ("Les citations de la 'Predication
de Pierre' dans Clement d'Alexandrie, Strom. VI.v.39-41," JTS 25 [1974]: 102-03), and the




who contains all things;
is in need of nothing,
otxcapTi-cos,
0? to itavxa x<Bpei,
ave7ci8ef|i;,
of whom all things have need
and through whom they exist;










H. who created all thingsby his powerful word
[[according to the gnostic writing]],
[which is his son].






This highly balanced and stylistically elegant (even hymnic)16 passage opens
with the call to recognize a single God, described as the master of history, who
created the beginning (dpxn) of all things and holds authority over their end (xe^oq).
The close apxp-xe^oq pairing, common in other hellenistic-Jewish and early-
Christian sources,17 suggests that these qualifiers be understood in terms of their
cosmologic value as evidence of "une theologie de la transcendance."18 The unique
creator God is not contingent on the created cosmos. He remains unaffected by
history and contains the beginning and end of all human life and events, which in
turn depend on him for their existence.
This depiction of a single transcendent creator God surfaces just as acutely in
the second half of this introduction to Exhortation (fr. 2ap). The unique God is
described primarily in terms of what he is not, through a series of negative qualifiers:
dopaxoq, dxcopr|xoq, dveTuSepq, dKaxa>.ri7txoq, (aevaoq), acpGapxoq, and
d7roirixoq.19 The text proceeds along the via negationis and avoids defining the
supreme God in terms which might be dangerously near to delimiting or constraining
14 This difficult phrase is likely a later insertion into the margin of Stromata (cf. Nautin, ibid.,
103). On this and the following textual issue see Cambe (Kerygma, 70-73).
15 In KP: Cambe. Comment of Clement: Hilgenfeld, Stahlin-Friichtel, Nautin, Dobschiitz,
Descourtieux, Klostermann, though the latter expresses some doubt in his apparatus.
16
Beautifully described by Paulsen ("Kerygma," 14-15; cf. 20 n. 125, on the style of
fragment 5). See also Eduard Norden (Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte
religidser Rede [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956] 180-81).
17 Sib. Or. 8.375-76; Wis 7:18; 4 Ezra 6:1, 6; 2 Bar. 48:7; 54:1; cf. Philo Opif. 82.
18 Cambe, Kerygma, 203-208.
19 Note the frequent a-privative. 'Aevaoi; (lit. ever-flowing) is actually a positive descriptor
that fits nicely in the stylized text since it begins with a.
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him.20 The negative statements are framed in terms of the one God's absolute
freedom; he is never the object ofexternal agency. God is not liable to being seen,
contained, rendered needy, comprehended, brought to an end, corrupted, or created.
Nothing external to him can subject him to deficiency or contingency. The first,
second, third, and last of the negative adjectives are structurally balanced,
respectively, by a corresponding positive attribute accompanied by dq/ov ta navxa:
the unique God is the unseen who sees all things; the uncontained who contains all
things; etc. These positive descriptions highlight divine transcendence from a
somewhat different direction. Whereas negative descriptors highlight divine freedom
from external agency, the positive claims are framed in terms of his authority to act
as supreme subject who effects all things. This authority is most clearly seen in his
creative power. God is said to have created the totality of things "by his powerful
word" (^oycp 8uvdpeco<; cnnon), a statement which evokes reference to the divine
creative fiat of Genesis 1 and which may have christological import (see Excursus).
This closing statement parallels the opening reference to the all-inclusive creative
activity of God (2aa). According to Peter the prerogative to create is an exclusive
one. Emphasis on divine uniqueness reverberates throughout the passage,
particularly in frequent reference to the multiplicity of "all things" (rcc navxa [4x];
cf. also tcccvtcov), which stands in sharp contrast with the singular uniqueness of this
God (eiq Seoq). Ele acts as the only supremely creative subject.
The introduction to Exhortation expresses the deity in terms of a single,
unique God who is supremely transcendent and created all things. Both halves of the
argument (fr. 2aa(3) are harmonious. The rhetoric and concepts are dependent on
other precursors. The portrait of the divine nature emerges from the via negationis
and the idea of the first principle in hellenistic philosophy. The concept of the single
creator God who speaks all things into existence emerges from biblical tradition
mediated through hellenistic-Judaism.21 Nevertheless the carefully stylized text
indicates this depiction of God is the product not simply of inherited tradition but of
a well-reasoned and thoughtfully-articulated theology of transcendence. The
author(s) shapes the text in a way that demonstrates theological awareness and, as we
20 On the via negationis see A.-J. Festugiere ("La doctrine Platonicienne de la transcendance
divine au iic siecle," in La Revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste, vol. 4: Le Dieu Inconnu et la Gnose
[Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1954] 92-140).
21 A.J. Malherbe, "The Apologetic Theology of the Preaching of Peter," ResQ 13 (1970):
205-23.
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will see, consistency with the comprehensive argument of Exhortation. All further
references to "the God" in Exhortation must be understood in terms of the deity
described here.
There is still a more subtle strategy at work. If we may trust Clement's
attribution of these words to Peter, fragment 2a represents not just any "knowledge"
(cf. yivoioKere) of the true God but reflects apostolic knowledge. Fragment two
presupposes that Peter has appropriate "knowledge" of the one true God and
disseminates it faithfully to his audience. This is an important observation, for it is
this God and particularly the knowledge ofhim against which the human
collectivities are indexed in the following fragments of Exhortation.
Excursus: Christ—The 'Ap%rj jtavt<ov and A6vapt<; 0eou?
In his recent study Michel Cambe acknowledges that fragment 2 "is perfectly legible
without any christological reference." Yet in addition to a cosmologic reading of the
fragment Cambe champions an explicitly christological interpretation in which
Christ is viewed hypostatically as "Principle of all things" ('Apxh 7tdv"ta>v; fr. 2a«)
and "Power ofGod" (Auvapic; anion; fr. 2ap).22 Christology clearly holds an
important relationship to theology elsewhere in KP (cf. frs. 5-7, 9). A strong
connection between the two is therefore possible in fragment 2. Cambe offers the
following observations regarding 'Ap%f| 7tavicov:
1) In Stromata Clement offers an explanatory comment to the first part of
fragment 2: '"For there is in reality one God, who made the apxij of all
things,' Peter writes, indicating the first-born Son and understanding
exactly the phrase: 'ev 'Apyf) God made the heaven and the earth'"
(Strom. 6.7.58.1 = fr. 2b). Clement offers his own christological
interpretation of fragment 2 (1) by identifying dpyri 7tccvi(ov of KP with
the first-born Son and (2) crediting KP with a correct christological
reading of ev dpyri in Gen PI.23
2) This christological interpretation of Gen 1:1 is older than Clement and
well represented in early Christianity. Cambe notes Theophilus' Ad
Autolycum (10) and Justin's Dialogue (61.1.3).
3) The nearest parallels to KP are the self-designations of God and Christ
(eyc6...fi apxfi K«t to xekoq) in Revelation (21:6, 22:13; cf. 1:8) and
Melito's Pasch. 104-05. In these cases "the binomial dpyrj and tekoq
functions with a perfect symmetry of its two elements." In KP, however,
the pairing is somewhat asymmetric, with slight emphasis on the former
element, since apxij is introduced by a full verb whereas xeXoq is
indicated by a participle. This formal structure lends itself to dpyfj as
christological appellation without requiring the same of tekoq.
4) Revelation 3:14 uses dpyfj alone as christological title in a creation
context (f) dpyn xfjcg Kxiaecoq too 0eou) as an "actualisation de Prov 8,
22 Ibid., 198-201; 208-21; cf. 56-60, 70-73, 386-87. Initial citation from p. 208.
23 In Eel. 4.1-2 Clement offers a similar reading (Son = 'Apxi)) though from LXX Hos
2:lb-2et 1:7a.
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22 et de Gen 1, 1." Col 1:15-18 evinces a similar interpretation. These
two texts are "des expressions similaires du «primat» du Christ en
relation avec les relectures protochretiennes de Prov 8, 22 et de Gen 1,
1."
In ctpxp 7trivTcov, Cambe argues, is wedded a philosophical theology (ccpxij-xeXoc;)
and a christological intention ('Apxp rttivxcov)!24 A similar situation may exist for
Xoyco 5-uvdpecoi; ccuxob (fr. 2ap). Cambe comments:
1) Should 7.6yoq be understood as an impersonal designation ("by his
powerful word") or a personal appellation ("by the Word of his power")?
Two objections are commonly leveled against the latter. First, personal
agency requires 8id not the dative Xoyco, yet Cambe provides parallels
where the dative marks personal agency. Second, if personal, why would
the author have included Snvdpecoq orbxot)? Cambe objects that Zoyoq
and Sbvceptq often appear together (particularly in second-century
apologists), sometimes synonymously, sometimes in qualitative relation
("word of his power," "power of his word").
2) The phrase xouxeoxt too mob may be original to KP and qualifies the
view that Xoyoq is the central interpretive term. Grammatical concord
requires that it modify the genitive Suvdpecoq ("by the word of his
Power") rather than the dative Xoyco ("by his powerful Word"). A
christological reading placing Sbvccpiq in relief is preferable.
3) The Auvapiq-view offers stylistic balance and theologic synergy between
the opening and closing of fragment 2, between the one "who created the
'Apxn of all things" (fr. 2aa) and "who created all things by the word of
his Abvocpu;" (fr. 2ap). The awkwardness of the last phrase in which God
is said to create "by the word of his Power" when in Genesis 1 he is said
to create by his own word is ameliorated by the opening phrase. God
created all things by first establishing a creative principle ('Apxij) through
which he spoke things into existence. Parallels occur in Epist. Apost. 3,
Justin (Dial. 128), and Clement (Strom. 1.2.1A).
Cambe's interpretation is distinctive and refreshing, yet ultimately inconclusive.
Similar phrasing to fr. 2ap appears of Christ in Heb 1:3 within a cosmic context
(cpepcov xe xa navxa tqj pf|pocTi xfjq 8x>vdp,Eco<; abxou) yet certainly not in a way
that permits either pijpaxr or Suvapecoi; to constitute personal appellations. And, if
xooxeaxi xob mob represents a Clementine addition, as so many commentators
agree, it is certainly not self-evident that any member of 7.oyq> Sovctpecoq amob
must be understood hypostatically.25 Further, there is no clear affirmation that in
dp%f| rcdvxcov of fr. 2aa is to be found a reference to Christ. If a christological
24 Markus Vinzent also reads 'Apyij Jtavxeov christologically and offers a modalist
interpretation ("Tch bin kein korperloses Geistwesen.' Zum Verhaltnis von Kijpuypa netpov,
'Doctrina Petri', 8i5aaKceM.cc nexpov und IgnSm 3," in Reinhard M. Hubner and Markus Vinzent,
eds., Der paradox Eine [Leiden; Boston; Koln: Brill, 1999] 241-287).
25 Most scholars who opt for a christological reading identify Christ with Xoyo<; rather than
Sbvapu; (elsewhere KP refers to Christ as vopot; Kai Xoyoq [frs. la,b,c]). Paulsen offers no decision
on whether A.oyo<; or 8-uvapic; should be favored as key christological term ("Kerygma," 21-22). That
God created the world through a hypostatized Logos-Word is a theme traditional to hellenistic
Judaism (Joachim Jeremias, "Zum Logos-Problem," ZAW 59 [1968]: 82-85). The mere presence of
Aoyoi; in a creation-context does not, however, necessitate a hypostatized reading, and the absence of
the article before Xoyoq in KP attenuates the likelihood of such a reading. It is best to regard
Suvripecoi; as a genitive of quality (cf. BDF §165) and interpret the anarticular koyoq in terms of the
divine creative fiat.
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reading underlies fragment 2 at all, it is entirely submerged, provided xomecm xov
mob is a secondary Clementine addition. It seems best to acknowledge the
uncertainty of Cambe's reading and content ourselves with establishing KP's
christology on more certain grounds. It is knowledge of the nature of the unique,
supremely transcendent, creator God of fragment 2, and not christological
monotheism per se, by which groups are indexed in Exhortation.
The subsequent fragments of Peter's Exhortation (frs. 3-5) concern the
participation of different collectivities in the knowledge of the unique God. The text
divides the inhabited world into three groupings—Greeks, Jews, and Christians and
schematizes each party in terms of its respective 0eooe(5eta ("piety"), conceived as
the quality of their knowledge of the one God26 as manifest in their manner of cultic
worship.27 The exercise begins in fragment 3a with an evaluation of the Greek mode
of worship:28
And he (Peter) adds:
"Worship this God not in the manner of the Greeks..., for they are
moved by ignorance and do not understand the God [as we (do), in
accordance with perfect knowledge].29
''The things he gave them the right to use they worship, giving shape
to wood and stones, bronze and iron, gold and silver—of the same
material as themselves and for their own use—and erecting things
that ought to be at their service for their well-being.
Y(They worship) also things which the God gave them for food: birds
of the air, things that swim in the sea, reptiles of the land, wild
animals along with domesticated quadrupeds of the field, weasels
and mice, cats, dogs, and apes.
sNot only do they slaughter their own means of sustenance as
sacrifices to mortal beings,30 but they are also ungrateful to the God
26 Cf. E7tiaxaa0ca (frs. 3a, 4ab), yivcoaKEiv (4a), dyvoobatv (4b), pavedverv (5).
27 Cf. crEpSeiv (frs. 3a, 4ab, 5). BDAG, s.v. ctePcd: "to express in gestures, rites, or ceremonies
one's allegiance or devotion to deity, worship." Substitution of 7tpoaKDveiv for oePeiv in fr. 3b is the
adaptation of Heracleon or of Origen's citation of Heracleon (Cambe, Kerygma, 27).
28 Fragment 3b (Origen Comm. Jo. 13.17.104) reflects an obviously shortened form: "pp 8eiv
ko(0' "E77.r)vai; 7rpoaKuveiv, xa xf|<g (Apt; 7tpdy|i.ata drcoSExopevoax; icai T-axpebovxai; i;iAoi<; Kai
Xi0oi<;." The same obtains for fragment 4b (see n. 35).
29 The portrait of KP is clear; the Greeks do not know God. The disputed qualification is
Clement's, for whom the "most excellent among the Greeks" do know the same God as Christians "by
approximation" (mxa 7tepuppacnv), "not in accordance with certain knowledge" (on xax' £7ciyva>aiv
TcavxeXfi; Strom. 6.5.39.1, 4; 40.1).
30 Codex L is difficult: Kai xa 'i8ux Ppcopaxa Ppoxoiq bvpaxa 0i3ouoiv seems to indicate a
cult to the dead (alt. emperor veneration? Cf. Wis 14:15-20; Lactantius Inst. 1.15, 20), since ppoxoi;
refers to "mortal" persons in the literature (BDAG s.v. ppoxoc;). If introductory Kai (fr. 3a8) is additive
it lends credibility to this reading. However, the use of Ppoxo<; in fragment three is intentional. First,
Ppoxog provides a useful homophonic counterpart to ppoipccxa (w-o is frequently subject to auditory
confusion) in a passage stylized with homophonic pairs (xpqcea><;-xpficuv; veKpce-veKpoig; 06paxa
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when they offer dead things to dead things as if to divine beings.
Because of these things they deny he exists.
Peter begins by exhorting his audience not to worship "this God" in the
Greek manner (Kara Touq "EM.r|va<;). The reason for the warning is simple enough.
Greeks cannot be trusted in religious matters because they are "moved by ignorance"
and "do not understand God." Any validity to their cult is entirely excised from the
text, precisely because Greeks are envisioned as devoid ofknowledge of the unique
God. If they do not have knowledge of God, how can they worship him properly?
Their ignorance is observable from the very cultic practices they observe, as the
remainder of the argument demonstrates.
Greeks are idolatrous (3a(3) and zoolatrous (3ay), practicing forms of cultic
worship that, in the logic of KP, categorically confuse the nature of created and
creator. Material products are made of the same created matter as humans (Tfjq GArjc,
ccurcov) and are given by the creator God (tov eScokev antou;) for human benefit (eiq
Xpf|oiv; xppaecoq). Animals too are created as gifts from God (a 5e8cokev aurolq)
for human consumption (elq Ppcooiv). The retooling and recasting of materials and
slaughtering of animals is entirely appropriate when done in accord with their
divinely-created purpose, for human benefit. Yet to reshape material products and
slaughter animals for use as ritual objects (cf. 3a8) in the worship of material things
(3ap) and animals (3ay) is a categorical misappropriation both of the divinely-
intended purpose of the "givenness" of created goods and the "givingness" of the
creator as well as of the living nature of the unique God. The final summation
heightens the irony (3a5). Greeks offer animals ("given" for their own consumption
and use) as sacrifices to "mortal" animals subject to death, as though these were
living "divine beings!"31 And they demonstrate their fundamental ungratefulness to
Sboootv). Second, it conceptually parallels veKpoi; which closely follows—ppoxoii; ("to beings
susceptible to death") and veKpoii; ("to dead things"). Each homophonic pair (Ppcoixaxa-Ppoxoi;;
vEKpa-veKpoi;) references not an ostensive cult of the dead, but indicates, respectively, zoolatry and
idolatry. Worship of beings subject to death (zoolatry) or of dead things (idolatry) is indexed against
worship of "this [i.e., unique] God" (fr. 3aa). Admittedly, this reading represents an exceptional use
of Ppoxo; applied not to "mortal" persons but to animals qua "mortal" beings. However, as lectio
difficilior which accounts for the balanced, homophonic style of the text and retains an ideological
parallel to veKpoii;, we regard it as more probably authentic. Potter's emendation (Clementis
Alexandrini Opera Omnia [Oxford, 1715]; repr. in PG 8-9) to ppcotoii; (followed by many others)
eases the reading and would follow naturally on discussion of zoolatry: "And they slaughter their own
means of sustenance as sacrifices to things given (them) for sustenance (sc. animals)." The
emendation does not fundamentally alter the twofold reading (zoolatry-idolatry) of fr. 3a5.
Nevertheless, it attenuates the important conceptual parallel of the passage—Ppcotoii; ("to things given
for food") does not match with veKpoii; ("to dead things") as fluidly as does Ppoxoi;.
31 The text does not argue that there exist "gods" (i.e., demons) behind Greek worship nor
that Greeks direct their worship to many gods (cf. infra n. 49). Rather, the argument reduces Greek
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the unique God when they offer dead materials (particularly in the form of idols) to
dead idols and elements (sc. material products) as if the objects of their worship were
living deities! To sacrifice mortal, created, contingent things to mortal, created,
contingent objects is to reject the ultimacy of the immortal, eternal, uncontingent
nature of the creator who made all things and "of whom they have need and through
whom they exist" (fr. 2a). The pervasive materiality lying behind the externals of
Greek ritual culture amounts to a denial of the unique God's existence (3a8), and
Greek piety thereby represents the grossest of errors.
The structure of fragment 3 evinces a carefully planned and executed
argument, not a simple stereotyping of Greek religion:
A Worship not in the manner of the Greeks (3aa) (Worship)
B For they are moved in ignorance and do not know God (3aa) (Knowledge)
A' They worship materials and animals (3a(fy)
The twofold AB-AB pattern in the theologically-oriented classification
scheme demonstrates a fundamental relation between ritual worship and knowledge
of the divine; they are interlocked. The cultic exercises of Greek worship are
externalizations of the fundamentally "ignorant," material, earthbound nature of
Greek religion, the continuing practice of which only reinforces ignorance of the
divine nature. This is why Peter enjoins his audience not to worship in the Greek
manner. As a collective Greeks do not participate in knowledge of the unique God.
To follow their religion is to share in a way of piety that is really not pious at all, for
it effectively denies the existence of the one true God!
The text begs one final question. What is meant by "the Greeks?" KP ascribes
Greek identity to a single collectivity with no explicit subdivisions. This is slightly
odd, for the indictment of zootory-cum-idolatry is traditionally (with rare exception)
leveled not against all Greeks but specifically against Egyptians in Jewish and pagan
worship to the veneration of completely material elements as though these were divine beings when in
fact they are not (cf. frs. 3a(3y)! KP shows no awareness of the nuanced understanding of iconism and
pagan statuaries demonstrated later, for example, in Celsus' 'A^t|0ti<; Xoyo<;.
C They worship materials (3a|3)
D They worship animals (3ay)
D' They sacrifice to "mortal" animals (3a5)
C They sacrifice to "dead" idols (3a5)
(Worship)
B' Thus they deny he exists (3a8). (Knowledge)
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apologetic literature.32 Whereas the presence of animal worship may reflect KP's
Egyptian provenance, the skillful aggregation of idolatry and zoolatry in the logic of
fragment 3a points to a broader strategy at work for constructing Greekness. The
practice of idolatry and zoolatry are stylistically and discursively interwoven for the
specific purpose of demonstrating the "material" commonality at the root of all
"hellenistic" religion and ritual culture. In the schematization strategy of
Exhortation, the foremost constitutive criterion ofGreek identity is religious activity,
not primarily ethnicity.33 And in joining these two religious practices the entire pagan
religious apparatus is in view.34 All the complexity of Graeco-Roman religions and
mystery cults (in Egypt and elsewhere) is reduced in KP to a single overarching
"materialistic" religious system, whose component practices (idolatry and zoolatry)
are closely integrated in ignorance of the unique God.
Peter next admonishes his audience to avoid the Jewish way of worship,
described in fragment 4a:35
And...he (Peter) will say again in this way:
"And do not worship ("this God")36 in the manner of the Jews. ''For
those, while supposing that they alone know the God, do not have
knowledge (of him), Ysince they render service to angels37 and
archangels, to month and moon. 5And if the moon does not appear
they do not observe the sabbath which is called "First," nor do they
observe the new moon, nor the Festival of Unleavened Bread, nor
the Festival (of Booths?/Pentecost?), nor the Great Day (of
Atonement).
32 Derogatory accusations of Egyptian idol- and animal-worship are well-trodden themes in
Jewish (cf. Wis 11:15; 12:24; 13:1-17; 15:18-19; Let. Aris. 138; Sib. Or. 3.29-31; 5.278-80) and
pagan apologetic (cf. Herodotus Hist. II, 65-74; Juvenal Sat. XV, 1-7; Plutarch Is. Os. 71). KP,
however, evidences none of the traditional lampooning of theriolatry (or idolatry), but offers instead a
sober theological assessment.
33 This does not exclude ethnoracial concerns, though one should acknowledge that
ethnoracial concerns are submerged in the approach of Exhortation. For ethnicity and religious
practice as interlocking symbol systems see the discussion of Aristides' Apology below (§2).
34 Dobschiitz (Kerygma, 34) and Cambe (Kerygma, 229) suggest that the text could just as
easily have spoken of "the pagans." The point is valid, yet neither seems to recognize that there did
not exist a Greek word for "pagan" in the second century!
35 Fragment 4b reads (Origen Comm. Jo. 13.17.104): "pp-ce Kara 'IouSaiorx; aepetv to
0eiov, E7t£i7U£p teat auto) povoi oiopsvoi e7uataa0ai 0eov ayvoovaiv auTov, katpEuovTEq ayyekoK;
ka'i ppvi ra'i asT/pvTy"
36 Note fragment 4b: oePeiv to 0eiov.
37 Alternative punctuation permits another reading: "while thinking they alone know this
God, they do not know that they render service to angels..." The form of the text in Origen argues
strongly against this (fr. 4b: ayvoouaiv aurov kaTpeuovTEq ayyeXou;).
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The impetus for the opening proscription is simple. Like their "ignorant"
Greek contemporaries Jews do not know the one creator God. They nevertheless
distinguish themselves from pagans in both their pretensions to divine knowledge
and in the precise manner of their cult. Jews are guilty of singular arrogance, for they
believe they have exclusive rights to the knowledge of the unique creator God. Yet in
spite of their bold presumptions Peter assures his audience that "those" Jews
actually do not know God. This brazen estimation is deducible from Jewish ritual (fr.
4ay). Rather than venerating the true God Jews render their cultic service directly to
angelic authorities and to the month and to the moon which regulates their
calendrical cycle.38 The text envisions a single, comprehensive Jewish cultic system
in which angelic authorities are closely coordinated with and responsible for lunar
locomotion and thereby the regulation of the Jewish religious calendar.39 There is no
room in this model for angelic powers to be understood merely as intermediaries in a
cosmic system ultimately organized and supervised by the unique, supremely
transcendent, divine monarch. Such an evaluation would permit Jews to actually
worship the unique God through mediation of secondary figures. The text, rather,
implies that Jews do not worship God at all but that angels, moon, and month are
themselves the recipients of Jewish worship.40 The tightly integrated, holistic Jewish
religious system does not have place for worship of the unique God.
There are similarities with the evaluation of pagan worship. Fragment 4a
highlights the ultimate materiality of the Jewish ritual system. The feasts and
festivals that comprise the external cultic apparatus are entirely dependent upon a
created object (moon) and the time-cycles regulated by it (month). And if the moon
in its unpredictability should not appear, Jews do not hold their primary festivals and
38 The phrasing of Clement's citation (fr. 4a) might suggest two groups of independent cultic
recipients benefit from Jewish worship—angelic authorities and the moon (with its regulatory cycles).
However, Origen's citation—"rendering service to angels and to month and to moon" (fr. 4b)—more
clearly demonstrates the integrated nature of the Jewish cultic system. On this see Cambe, Kerygma,
243-44.
39 Some such system seems to be in view in Col 2:16-18 and possibly Gal 4:8-11.
40 The dative case (ayyekou;, dpxotyye7.oic;, ppvi, ceVijvTi) with Xaxpeueiv does not indicate
here the means of cultic service (sc. "by mediation of angels and archangels, by month and moon"), as
it does, e.g., in Luke 2:37 (vr|ax£iau; icai Serjaeaiv) and Phil 3:3 (TtVEupaxi 0eou). Rather, the dative
frequently appears with Xctxpeueiv to mark 0eoc, as object of worship (e.g., Acts 24:14; Heb 9:14;
12:28; Philo QE 2.105, LXX Exod 3:12; 10:7-8; 1 Esd 1:4; Dan 6:27) and other objects of worship
particularly contrasted with God (cf. Acts 7:42 [xfj expand xou oiipavou]; Rom 1:25 [xrj kxioei
Jtapa xov Kxioavxa]), as is the case in KP fragment 4a. The same obtains for fragments 3b and 4b, in
which Origen qualifies Greek kaxpeuEiv as directed kcci Xi6oiq and that of the Jews as
dyyekoiq kcci pqvi kcci ceLrjv-ri.
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celebrations, whether weekly (sabbath),41 monthly (new moon), or annually (the
three great festivals; fr. 4aS). The fickleness of the moon's waxing further contrasts
with the stability of the unique uncreated God. However, there is also carefully
nuanced distinction between Greek and Jewish worship. Whereas the former
confines itself to the sphere of earthbound material objects and created animals,
Jewish worship has similitude of transcendence. In the geography of the ancient
cosmos, angelic beings, stars, and planetary objects occupied a level at least one step
removed from the earthbound and closer to the supremely divine sphere. Yet despite
this appearance of transcendence the apparatus of Jewish cult is ultimately
constrained by created quantities and is excluded from "knowledge" of the
"uncontained" God who contains all things!
This presentation evinces slight awareness of historical realities. Reference to
Jewish suppositions about knowledge of the unique God reflects awareness of Jewish
confessions epitomized in the Shema. Similarly, some Jewish worship of secondary
heavenly agencies doubtless took place, as we observed in Chapter Two.42 Yet the
vast majority of evidence indicates that such worship practices occurred in private,
individual (rather than public, communal) ritual so that veneration of angels can
hardly be said to characterize Jewish religion as a whole, which is more
characteristically marked by exclusivist monotheism. Beyond this, transposing
Jewish dependency on the moon in the fixing of their calendrical cycles into an
image of Judaism as an essentially lunar cult is quite surprisingly removed from
historical realities. The text presents a rather astonishing characterization of Judaism
as a single, coherent entity characterized by the worst possible deviations from
monotheistic cult. KP's assessments are in every respect inappropriate when applied
to all or even the majority ofJews, and it is here that the text betrays its
characterization of Jews as "d'origine livresque."43 Some measure of characterization
is necessary when ordinating sameness and difference among groups, yet in KP there
41 On the difficult arippatov.. .to XEyopevov jcpwtov see Cambe (Kerygma, 249-55).
42 Cf. also Marcel Simon, Verus Israel: A Study of the Relations between Christians and Jews
in the Roman Empire. AD 135-425 (trans. H. McKeating; The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization;
London: Vallentine Mitchell & Co., 1996, reprint) 339-68; "Remarques sur l'Angelolatrie Juive au
Debut de l'Ere Chretienne," in Marcel Simon, Le Christianisme antique et son contexte religieux.
Scripta Varia. Volume II (WUNT 23; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1981) 450-64; 453-54:
"L'existence d'un culte des anges peut en effet etre tenue pour assuree dans certains milieux juifs ou
judai'sants," though it developed "essentiellement en marge du judaisme officiel."
43 Simon notes parallels in Christian literature and highlights Stephen's discourse in Acts 7 as
"la source de cette accusation d'angelolatrie adressee aux Juifs" ("Remarques," 459).
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is a complete reduction of historical diversity in contemporary Jewish religion.
Assuming this fragment has not been truncated in Clement's citation, fragment four
demonstrates further no awareness of the revelatory role of ancient Judaism. It offers
a rather limited scope of attack against Judaism.
It is, however, a very consciously and carefully crafted attack, centered upon
the dialectic between knowledge of God and cultic comportment:
A Worship not in the manner of the Jews (4aa) (Worship)
B For they think they know God (4ap) (Knowledge)
B' but they do not have knowledge (4ap) (Knowledge)
A' Since they worship angelic beings and celestial entities (4ay) (Worship)
The cultic exercises and calendrical cycles of Jewish religion are mere
externalizations of the cult's fundamentally "ignorant," material nature. And the
perpetuation of angel veneration and lunar worship only reinforces ignorance of God.
Hence Peter admonishes his audience not to worship in the Jewish manner. Like
Greeks, Jews do not participate in knowledge of the unique God. However, where
Greeks sacrifice to created objects as though they were living "divine beings" and
thereby deny God's existence, Jewish worship at least has a pretense of divine
knowledge. The Jews suppose they know "the God" of fragment 2a (fr. 4ap) and
have a semblance of transcendence to their worship. Yet in both regards they are in
error, for they are arrogant in their claims and ultimately worship created things
rather than the creator God. While recognizing these nuanced differences between
pagans and Jews, Exhortation ultimately aggregates them together in shared
ignorance of the God proclaimed by the apostle Peter.
Peter's program of indexing sameness and difference among religious groups
continues with the introduction of a "new" and "third way" of worship in fragment
five:
Then he (Peter) produces the end of his search:
"So then, as for you, as you learn the things we are handing down to you
observe44 (them) with piety and justice by worshipping the God in a new
manner (kouvcoi;) through Christ.
pFor we find in the scriptures how the Lord says:
"Behold I establish a new covenant (kocivtiv 8ia6f|kt|v) with you,
not like I established with your fathers on Mount Horeb."
44 <t>vXdaaeo6e is imperative, not indicative, as comparison with the introductory phrases of
fragments two to four demonstrates.
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It is a new (veav)45 (covenant) he established with you.
^Indeed (yap), the cultic practices (xa)46 of the Greeks and Jews are obsolete
(jtakaia), but it is you Christians who worship him in a new manner (Kaivw?),
in a third way (xpixco yevei).
The text transitions to a third group, now clearly identified as the Christian
audience of Exhortation. As in fragments three and four the opening admonition of
fragment five is linked to oePeoSat tov 6eov, yet with a subtle though important
strategic difference. Fragment five occupies itself not with establishing Christian
cultic "knowledge" of God vis-a-vis pagan and Jewish "ignorance" but is concerned
to establish the epistemic basis on which "a new manner "47 of worshipping God (1)
should ever have arisen and (2) why Christians are the rightful inheritors of it. To
accomplish the argument KP grounds (1) knowledge of God in apostolic tradition
requiring a "new way" of worship through Christ (fr. 5a) and (2) the need for a "new
way" of worship in the pronouncement of Christ (fr. 5(3).
In light of the prior critique of pagans and Jews and the assessment that they
lack knowledge of the unique God, Peter now admonishes his Christian audience to
appropriate apostolic tradition and teaching as the only proper basis for true worship
of God (fr. 5a). The force of the admonition falls on the command to "observe the
things we are handing down to you." Reference to apostolic tradition may recollect
some prior moral exhortations in KP now no longer preserved, as the qualification
"with piety and justice" might indicate. At a minimum, however, it recalls the earlier
discussion of fragment 2a in which the authentic portrait of deity was disseminated
through a specifically Petrine "knowledge" of God. The following phrase makes this
clear. Apostolic tradition is observed "by worshipping the God in a new manner
through Christ." As representative of the twelve ("we;" cf. frs. 7, 9), Peter's
preaching constitutes correct knowledge of the unique creator God. And he does not
mediate just any monotheism. The unique God must now be worshipped "through
Christ." The christological element gives apostolic (hence, Christian) knowledge of
the unique God its "newness" of content but also its chronologic frame. Worship of
45
Change from k«ivo<; to veo<; "hat nichts zu bedeuten" (Dobschiitz, Kerygma, 49 n. 1); it
represents "une variation stylistique" (Cambe, Kerygma, 257-58).
46 In light of the contrast between the "new manner" of Christian worship with the now
antiquated "things" (xa) of the Greeks and Jews, it seems best to understand the plural article as
referential ofmodes of worship or "cultic practices," as we have translated.
47 Variants of the concept of "newness" occur four times in this brief passage (icaivtoi; [bis],
Karviiv, veav) and are twice contrasted with something viewed as old (xoi<; Tcaxpticnv -upwv) or
"antiquated" (7cakairi).
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the unique God through Christ represents a "newly" mediated tradition recently
handed down from apostles who received it directly from the Lord himself.
The second trajectory in the argument represents an explanation and further
legitimation of the initial admonition to observe apostolic tradition by worshipping
God "in a new manner." Keying off the phrase "a new covenant" (iccavpv 8ux0fjKT|v)
in Jer 31:31-32 (LXX 38:31-32),48 fragment 5py lays forth further grounds (yap)
upon which Peter's call to worship God "in a new way" is actionable. In Jeremiah 31
the Lord Jesus himself foretold how a "new covenant" would replace the covenant
made "with your fathers" on Mount Horeb. Not only did the apostles mediate
directly from Jesus a new tradition of monotheistic worship, the Lord himself also
testified in scripture that he would establish with Christians a new way of GeooePeia
different from that of their predecessors (see below). There is now an incumbent
obligation on all peoples to worship the unique God not in the manner of the Jews or
Greeks but "in a new way through Christ." The conclusion to the midrash—"It is a
new (covenant) he established with you" (5p)—offers tight terminological relation to
the first half of the Jeremiah citation:
No strict correspondence to the second half of the citation occurs. Peter's midrash
keys rather on the contrast between "establish with you" and "established with your
fathers" to offer a comparison between the now antiquated cultic activity of Greeks
and Jews and the "newness" of Christian worship. The establishment of a new
covenant (i.e., new way of GeooePeux) for KP requires the obsolescence and
invalidity of other prior forms of GeoaePeux. Jeremiah is cited (1) to demonstrate that
Christ announced in advance that he would establish a new way of knowing the one
God and (2) to contrast the newness of what was promised in Christ from the oldness
of other ways of relating to God. In light of Jeremiah 31 and the entire force of
Exhortation Peter offers his final summation: "Indeed, the cultic practices of the
Greeks and Jews are obsolete, but it is you Christians who worship him in a new
manner, in a third way." All three groups are presupposed as directing their
worship to the unique God, who is the only proper object of cultic devotion.49 Yet
48 On the citational form see Cambe (Kerygma, 272-80). Dobschiitz attributes the unique
form of this text to the "sehr schriftkundigen" author (Kerygma, 48-49).
49 That pagans attempt to direct their worship to the unique God is evident in fragment 3a:








the worship practices of the Greeks (Kara xorx; "EAAr|va<;) and Jews (Kara
'IouSaiouq) are now obsolete in light of the Lord's proclamation. It is only the new
(Kaivdjc;), third way (xpuco yevet) of worship that permits legitimate access to the
unique God, and that is the property of Christians alone (fr. 5y) who have received it
from Jesus himself (fr. 5(3) transmitted through apostolic tradition (fr. 5a).
Fragment five evinces the same attention to stylistic detail as was present in
the previous fragments, though the argument is phrased somewhat differently. Peter
employs a scriptural midrash keyed on the language of "you," "new," and "establish"
in Jer 31:31-32 to legitimate the "newness" of Christian worship of the unique God
through Christ. When we understand that for KP "covenant" describes a way of
relating to the unique God, the following structure emerges:
"As for you, observe apostolic tradition by worshipping God in a new way.
pFor Christ proclaims he establishes with you a new way of relating to God
not like [the wavl he established with your fathers.
It was a new rwavl he established with you.
yIndeed Greek and Jewish [i.e., other] ways of relating to God are obsolete
but you Christians worship God in a new way.
The Jeremiah citation stands at center of the argument and provides linguistic
markers by which the initial call to worship God "in a new way" can be made (fr. 5a)
and the final assessment of Greeks, Jews, and Christians naturally follows (fr. 5y).
The citation is essential to the polemic of fragment five and programmatic to the
entire schematizing argument of Exhortation. From it follows the need for (1) a new
way of worshipping the unique God, (2) the concomitant obsolescence of old ways
of worship, and (3) a new basis on which to worship God, namely, through Christ. At
the heart of the strategic framework of religious classification in Exhortation lies a
scriptural midrash introduced by four simple words: ebpop,ev...ev xaTq ypaipcaq.
Grounding the oppositional configuration of "us" versus "them" and legitimating
Christian distinctiveness and "newness" in an authoritative scriptural text, in which
Jesus himself proclaimed in advance this new movement, represents a socially-
Cambe rightly observes: "[N]i le Kerygme de Pierre ni Clement n'imaginent que le culte des Grecs
puisse viser un autre dieu que le Dieu unique" (Kerygma, 67). Similarly for the Jews "this God" is the
implied object of worship in fragment 4 and is confirmed in their claim that "they alone know the
God."
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significant strategy for the author(s) and ostensibly the community to which he
appealed.50
In sum, Exhortation engages in a global indexing of sameness and difference
between religious communities. Greeks, Jews, and Christians are indexed according
to the criteria of their cultic participation (or lack thereof!) in the knowledge of the
unique creator God (0eoae|3eia). The text everywhere presupposes that these groups
share the common goal of worshipping the one God described in fragment 2a. Yet in
Peter's assessment neither Greeks nor Jews "know" this God. The former misdirect
their worship of him to material objects and animals and are disqualified from divine
knowledge. They use created things as ritual tools in the worship of elements, idols,
and animals as if those were divine beings (fr. 3a). Jews, likewise, misdirect their
worship of the unique God in favor of created entities—angelic authorities, month,
and moon. There is a semblance of transcendence in Jewish cult absent from Greek
religion, for Jewish worship is directed to heavenly and astral objects. Yet this
similitude offers no substantive escape from materialism, and Jews are therefore
guilty of singular pride in claiming exclusive knowledge of the unique God. KP
secures true BeooePeux as the property of Christians alone, since only they have
received through authoritative channels true knowledge of the unique God and of a
"new way" of worshipping him. This knowledge was revealed through apostolic
preaching, presented in terms of Peter's proclamation, and Christ Jesus himself had
proclaimed in advance (sc. Jer 31:31-32) the inauguration of a "new" religion in
place of old ways of worshipping God. This new Beoocpeta is conceived in terms of
time and content, for the unique God may now be worshipped in true BeooePeta and
perfect knowledge only when done "through Christ ."Exhortation vouchsafes
50 Norelli observes an "activite systematique de recherche, dans les Ecritures" and notes that
evptcKew (frs. 5p, 9) assumes "le caractere quasi-technique" ("Situation," 64; cf. Paulsen,
"Kerygma," 7). The importance of scriptural interpretation for the author(s) of KP is particularly
evident in fragments nine and ten. The former reads:
Now we [apostles], having unrolled the books of the prophets that we possess,
which sometimes in parables, sometimes in riddles, sometimes expressly and
with perfect clarity mention Christ Jesus, we find also his coming and death
and the cross and all the remaining punishments which the Jews did to him,
and the resurrection and ascension to heaven before Jerusalem is founded,
just as all things have been written which it was necessary for him to suffer
and which will occur after this. Knowing these things then we believed in the
God through the things which have been written about this.
Fragment 10 reads: "For we [apostles] have known that God truly arranged these things
[presumably scriptural prophecies], and we say nothing without the scripture.
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apostolic tradition and the proclamations of Jesus as the only appropriate mediators
for the dissemination of revealed knowledge of the supremely transcendent God.
Inasmuch as Christians alone appropriate apostolic teaching for themselves (fr. 5a),
they alone engage in true BeooePeux and knowledge of God. And their "new way"
of worshipping the unique God is thereby legitimated and assumes a universally
obligatory character, as we will now see.
1.2 Monotheism "Through Christ" andApostolic Mission
(Cragments h-S)5<
In addition to Exhortation we possess three logia of Jesus original to KP
which further engage the subject of monotheism "through Christ," fragments six
through eight. We do not know how these logia relate to the discussion of
Exhortation within the larger context of KP, since they are, strictly speaking,
contextually detached fragments with no securely recoverable framework.52 Yet the
picture of monotheism "through Christ" they offer finds a certain resonance with the
schema of Exhortation. Fragment six reads:
On account of this Peter says that the Lord declared to the apostles:
"Therefore, if anyone of Israel wishes to be converted through my name
to believe in the God, his sins will be forgiven him. After twelve years go
out into the world lest anyone say, 'We did not hear.'"53
Fragment seven runs:
So in the Preaching ofPeter the Lord says to the disciples after the
resurrection: "I have chosen you twelve, having judged (you) to be
disciples worthy ofme [—(you) whom the Lord desired—] and having
regarded (you) to be faithful apostles; I send (you) into the world to
preach the gospel to all persons in the inhabited world, that they might
know that there is one God (ei<; 6eo<; eotiv) through faith in me, [the
Christ,] (and) to reveal things to come, so that those who hear and believe
might be saved while those who hear and do not believe might bear
witness that they do not have excuse to say 'We did not hear.'"
51 We mimic KP's rhetoric of monotheism "through Christ" and avoid the more ambiguous
"christological monotheism," which often evokes various ontologic patterns. We resist a
christological reading of fragment 2a (cf. Excursus supra), and the remaining fragments do not
substantially clarify the ontologic relationship of "the Lord" to the unique God.
52 Were the logia independent (and precursive) of Exhortation (Paulsen, "Kerygma," 5-11)?
Or, were they integrated (interspersed?) into the broader apostolic discourse (Cambe, Kerygma,
135-36)?




But to every soul endowed with reason it is said from above: Whatever
anyone [among you]54 committed in ignorance because he did not know
the God clearly, if he converts to knowledge all sins will be forgiven
him."55
Fragments six and seven recall declarations of the resurrected Christ to his
disciples.56 From the outset it is clear these statements strongly emphasize
proclamation of belief in one God through Christ as the centerpiece ofa global
apostolic mission. In both cases the risen Jesus himself by verbal fiat ordains and
legitimates apostolic mission and designs its message—"there is one God through
faith in me." The mission is universal in scope and presupposes that "all persons in
the inhabited world" (i.e., Greeks and Jews) lie outside authentic knowledge of the
unique God revealed in Christ and thereby require conversion. Apostolic missionary
preaching is directed to all denizens of the inhabited world so that they might
"know" (yivcooKerv) that there is a single God through faith in Christ and by
embracing worship of this God "might be saved," receive forgiveness of sins, and
escape eschatological judgment ("things to come;" fr. 7). Parallels between the
fragments suggest a parity between the concepts of "knowing" (ytvcooKeiv) God
through Christ (fr. 7) and "being converted" (pexavoijoav) to God through Christ (fr.
6). Conversion to the Christian way of worship is framed as movement from a
position of "ignorance" to a state of "knowledge." This analysis comports well with
fragment eight, which ostensibly reports a declaration of universal appeal by the
risen savior (avco0ev...eipiycai) to the world of "ignorant" unbelievers. If this
reading is correct, the conversion process envisioned in fragments six and seven is
explicitly formulated in fragment eight in terms of a turning from pre-conversion
54 Possible Clementine addition harmonizing fragment eight with the following two scriptural
citations in Strom. 6.6.48.7-49.1 (Paulsen, "Kerygma," 6). However, it may also be understood as a
global pronouncement of the risen Lord to "anyone among you (unconverted)" who hears the gospel
(Cambe, ibid., 331; cf. 120-21). Our reading assumes the latter view.
55 The unique citational formula of fragment eight (dvo>0ev...Eipr|Tai) demarcates a saying of
the resurrected (and ascended?) savior and signals that this fragment probably represents a Clementine
summary of KP's doctrine. The inclusion of fragment eight in KP is conjectural and based on internal
similarities with fragments six and seven. See Cambe, Kerygma, 118-21, 329-34.
56 Actually, the monotheistic message of the primitive church (e.g., 1 Thess 1:9-10; cf. Acts
19:26) was transcribed into logia of the resurrected savior. "La nouveaute du KP," Cambe opines, "est
d'integrer au mandat du Ressuscite le message du Dieu unique et de lui donner une position tout a fait
centrale...En faisant de ce message un mandat du Ressuscite, le Kerygme lui donnait une autorite
inegalable" (Kerygma, 385; cf. esp. 335-36).
165
"ignorance" to a state of post-conversion "knowledge," in which the convert comes
to know the unique God "clearly."
The text does not envision epistemically-oriented conversion in terms of
entire groupings but of individuals who repent to believe in the unique God through
Christ. Whatever corporate responsibility the Jews had for the crucifixion and
sufferings of Christ Jesus (cf. fr. 9)57 individual Jews are not precluded from crossing
the boundary from "ignorance" to "knowledge" through faith in Christ and thereby
receiving forgiveness of sins (fr. 6). Nor does the initial twelve year apostolic
mission to Jews (fr. 6) preclude Greeks from sharing in missionary preaching. The
call to convert to "knowledge" of God is global and obligatory for all individual Jews
and Greeks. Yet to participate in "knowledge" one must have opportunity to hear
about it.58 In the logic of KP "knowledge" of the unique God must be made
universally accessible, "lest anyone say 'We did not hear'" (fr. 6; cf. 7). Global
mission is incumbent on the apostles and also the recipient community which
participates in the revelation of apostolic "knowledge." And there is both urgency
and a sense of achievability to the church's mission. These fragments present a
dialectic of obligation surrounding the message of belief in (sc. knowledge of) the
unique God in Christ. Greeks and Jews must convert from "ignorance" to
"knowledge," and Christians are obligated to universally disseminate "knowledge"
of the unique God through Christ. If the latter is not fulfilled, some now "in
ignorance" will have excuse before the coming judgment of God.
In sum, the fragmentary logia of the risen Jesus offer a unified message that
fits comfortably alongside that of Peter's Exhortation. In the latter, Peter had
confined Jews and Greeks in "ignorance" of the unique God and ipso facto in need of
a call for conversion from "ignorance" unto "knowledge" and "a new way" of
worship, revealed as the Christian way. In his logia, the resurrected Jesus authorized
conversion to faith in the unique God through Christ as the proper content of
Christian Missionsrede. Only through acceptance of this boundary criterion
separating "ignorance" from revealed "gnosis" can the individual Jew or Greek move
from their "ignorance" to Christian GeooePeia.
57 Translated in n. 50. In KP Jewish involvement in Jesus' death is a scriptural necessity.
"[D]ans la premiere moitie du IIC siecle," the ascription of Jesus' passion to the Jews "se manifeste en
particulier dans les ecrits petriniens" (Norelli, "Situation," 67-69, citing p. 69).
58 This differs from Paul's picture of the accessibility of knowledge of the divine nature
through natural revelation; cf. Malherbe, "Apologetic Theology."
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1.3 Evaluation: "Gnosis" and "Newness"
We have seen how monotheism functions in the internal logic and discursive
monotheistic strategy of the fragments of KP. The text employs the symbol of the
unique God within a framework of "cultic reasoning."59 Yet to describe KP's
approach as a monotheistic "strategy" further implies analysis of why such cultic
reasoning was socially useful. Can we infer from the literary shaping of the extant
fragments anything about the social goals that lie behind the text? We believe two
broad social functions for appealing to the unique God "through Christ" are
perceptible in KP. Both work in synergy towards a similar end.
First, behind the fragments may be sensed a community which places high
value on "gnosis."60 The author(s) and (quite probably) the community for which he
writes appear fixated on understanding and articulating the nature and accessibility
of authentic "knowledge" of God. This concern is evident in the epistemically-based
schematization of Exhortation and the epistemically-oriented missionary appeal of
the logia. What (or who) is the proper subject matter of knowledge? Is gnosis
revealed or discovered? Are there different gradations of knowledge—some more
authentic than others—or a simple bifurcation of gnosis and ignorance? Where does
authentic knowledge reside and how is it socially transmitted? Which religious
groups participate in it and on what basis? Do mechanisms exist by which one who is
ignorant may become knowledgeable? These types of questions lie subtly perceptible
behind the fragments, and it is these concerns about "gnosis," we cautiously suggest,
that KP itself addresses. Exhortation and the logia represent an attempt by some
Alexandrian Christian(s) to articulate for some Christian community/ies a theology
and christology rooted in a general theory of knowledge.
The answers to the above questions are framed in terms of monotheism, the
resurrected savior, and apostolic traditions of the Christian religion. "Knowledge"
always means "knowledge of the divine nature," specifically of the unique
transcendent creator God. All general religious activity, whether Greek, Jewish, or
Christian, formulates itself in terms of "knowledgeable" cultic worship of the one
transcendent creator God, yet only Christians actually participate in true "gnosis."
There is no division between pneumatic and psychic Christian "gnostics," only
59 That is, the delineation of social groupings by valuation of their cultic practice.
60 This does not, however, mean it is "gnostic" in the traditional sense of the term. See
Michael Allen Williams, Rethinking 'Gnosticism': An Argumentfor Dismantling a Dubious Category
(Princeton: University Press, 1996).
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between Christian "gnostics" and Jews and Greeks (i.e., agnostics). Christians alone
share in this "knowledge" of the unique God because they have received it from an
authoritative source. For KP authentic "knowledge" of God is revealed only through
Christ who himself commissioned the apostles in turn to "reveal" (fr. 7) it to others.
The risen Jesus was and is the revealer of "knowledge" of the unique God and of the
need to worship him "in a new way!" He disseminated this "knowledge" to the
apostles and sent them out on a mission to declare it to all humanity. Because
authentic knowledge of God is revealed and transmitted by tradition, it is not
universally accessible through natural revelation but must be further transmitted by
missionary activity. Christians, having received the apostolic message of the one
God, are thus in turn obligated to reveal the knowledge of God to the world of
Jewish and Greek religion in universal mission. Inasmuch as the one God created and
bounds "all things" (fr. 2a), "knowledge" of him must be made universally
accessible. Thus KP classifies and evaluates the world of religious groupings on the
basis of their participation in "knowledge" of God (as manifest in cultic practice),
and legitimates and authorizes a universal mission for disseminating that
"knowledge."
In its concern to articulate "knowledge" in terms of cultic worship of the
unique God, to classify religious groupings on the basis of participation in that
"knowledge," to authenticate the proper basis for "knowledge" in the revelation of
the risen Jesus, to fix the proper channel for its transmission in apostolic teaching, to
substantiate the need for universal accessibility to "knowledge," and thereby to
authorize a universal mission for its dissemination, we are in the presence of more
than an incoherent series of haphazard fragments. We are witnessing firsthand an
intellectualist attempt to encode a universal "theory of knowledge" that legitimates
specifically Christian worship, traditions, and mission in the revelation of God
through the risen Jesus.01 We do not wish to overstate the matter. One should not
envision a scribal collective pontificating in a scriptorium where literary production
of epistemic theories is churned out. The interests of KP reflect those of an outward-
looking community which greatly emphasizes the revelation of knowledge of the
61 The following demonstrate an educated writership and justify the label "intellectualist:" (1)
the literary texturing of fragments two to five; (2) the author's ability to articulate theology in
philosophical terms and hymnic form; (3) the polemic establishment of the "material" nature of
Jewish and Greek religion vis-a-vis the immaterial transcendence of the divine nature; (4)
programmatic appeal to scriptures (frs. 5, 9-10); and (5) stark contrast throughout between
"knowledge" and "ignorance."
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unique God through Christ in lively cultic life and manifests a missionary zeal,
wishing to see "others" (Jews and Greeks) share in that knowledge. This is no group
concerned with retaining secret gnosis. Knowledge of the God who contains "all
things" cannot be hidden and must be proclaimed.
A second function for appealing to the one God "through Christ" emerges.
The literary texturing of Exhortation evidences great rhetorical skill and manifests an
intentionality (§1.1). This must be taken seriously as a window to the concerns of the
author(s). When, in fragment five, the concept of the "newness" of Christian worship
emerges strongly (Kaivcoq [bis], Koavqv, veav) and directly in opposition to Jewish
and Greek cultic activity characterized as "obsolete" (ita^cad), we must ask what
social concerns this evokes. Behind the juxtapositioning of "newness" and
"obsolescence" operates a fundamental revaluation of the nature of tradition
respecting knowledge of the unique God. The rootedness of Greek and Jewish cult in
antiquity—a traditionally honorable association—is recast in KP's monotheistic
classification strategy as antiquated. Revaluation takes place because of the new
revelation of the Christian revealer figure. Jesus prophesied the nascence of "a new
manner" of worshipping the one God (fr. 5a), proclaimed a monotheism "through
himself," and commanded his apostles to transmit this message to the inhabited
world (frs. 6-8). Because of the revelation of God in Jesus, traditional valuations of
"newness" and "oldness" are now renegotiated. There is powerful interplay here
between the themes of "newness" and the "theory of knowledge" in Exhortation.
Revealed gnosis of the unique God through Christ now trumps all ancestral claims to
inherited knowledge! The argument on "newness" is deeply integrated rhetorically
and thematically with the entire "theory of knowledge."
We may safely assert that the synergy of these motifs in the monotheistic
classification strategy of KP acts to socially legitimate the newness of Christian
religion and its claims to "know" the true God vis-a-vis pagan and Jewish claims to
ancestral tradition as the base of their "knowledge" of the divine nature. That the text
characterizes the universe of religious groupings oppositionally—two "ignorant,"
"obsolete" religions alongside a "knowledgeable," "new" religion—plausibly
mimics accusations encountered by the textual community in its monotheistic
mission to Jews and Greeks: How do you Christians "know" that you alone "know"
God? How can your way of worshipping God be trustworthy since it is "new" and
169
not grounded in ancestral traditions?62 KP provides answers by discursively
reassigning the value of revelatory knowledge in the quest for God, in light of the
historical event of the resurrected Jesus: We Christians "know" the unique God and
worship him in "a new way" because he has been revealed to us through Jesus whose
message we received from the apostles. The monotheistic classification strategy of
KP provides an answer to a series of internal questions confronting this missions-
minded community, which may have arisen directly from interaction with pagans and
Jews, and certainly was envisioned within the context ofmonotheistic mission. This
reading suggests the important semiotic role which a monotheistic classification
schema provided for an early second-century (Egyptian?) Christian community in
claiming and proclaiming its own peculiar identity as a religious community vis-a¬
vis Jewish and pagan recipients of their mission.
2. The Apoloey ofAristides: Pour "Races" ofWorshippers
The Apology of Aristides provides a second example of a monotheistic
classification strategy used in shaping Christian identity vis-a-vis Judaism.63
62 Accusations of "newness" were frequently leveled against second-century Christians. See
esp. Adolf Harnack {The Mission and Expansion ofChristianity in the First Three Centuries [2 vols.;
London: Williams and Norgate; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1908] 1.266-78) and Kinzig
(Novitas Christiana, 186-98).
63 We are fortunate to possess Apology in four textual traditions—papyrological, Greek,
Syriac, and Armenian—representing three distinct recensions—Egyptian (FI1, If2), Oriental (Sy[riac],
ArfmenianJ), and Greek (preserved in two metaphrases in the medieval Life ofBarlaam and Joasaph
[.Ba{rlaam)]—the discourses of Barlaam [DiscBa = §§45-56 Ba] and of Nachor [DiscNa = §§239-55
Ba]). The Armenian is extant for the dedication and 1.1-2.5; IT preserves portions of 4.3-6.1; and FT
records the end of 15.4 through most of 16.1. DiscBa and DiscNa are available in J.F. Boissonade
{Anecdota graeca. Vol. IV [Paris, 1832] 45-56; 239-55) or in G.R. Woodward and Harold Mattingly
(John Damascene: Barlaam and Ioasaph [LCL 34; London: Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1967, repr. 2006] §§45-56; §§239-55.
This relative wealth of evidence comes at a price, for the representations of the Jews in
Barlaam and the Syriac (chapters two and fourteen) could hardly be wider apart, and the differences
depend on the shape of the text itself as preserved in the extant manuscript testimony. The relation of
these witnesses has been debated from the earliest manuscript discoveries (cf. Robinson in Harris,
Apology, 67-80; Raabe, Apologie, 56-57; and J. Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten [Leipzig und
Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1907] XXXIV-XXXVIII). For bibliography of the important literature
immediately following the publication of the editio princeps see Edgar Hennecke ("Zur Frage nach
der urspriinglichen Textgestalt der Aristides-Apologie," ZWTh 36/2 [1893]: 42-43). In an article as
yet unpublished the author argues that the Syriac translation of Apology 2, 14, and 15.1-3 best
preserves the earliest recoverable form of the work (Will Rutherford, "Judaism as Friend or Foe? An
Attempt to Reconstruct Aristides' Portrayal of Judaism"). The textual issues are too burdensome for
the present thesis, and the following discussion assumes the priority of the Syriac in chapters 2,
14, and 15, as well as chapter 1 (see n. 73).
Translations from Greek and Syriac are ours and were made in consultation of D.M. Kay
("The Apology of Aristides the Philosopher," in ANCL add. vol. [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897]),
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According to Eusebius, Apology was composed by "our philosopher" Aristides and
delivered to emperor Hadrian on the occasion of his first stay at Athens where he
was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries (124-125 CE).64 The claim that Aristides
was a philosopher from Athens is repeated across historiographic and textual
traditions.65 Yet it is difficult to know how much stock to place in this observation
and how it should be interpreted. Is the author a native Athenian philosopher still
resident in Athens or expatriated elsewhere (perhaps Asia Minor)?66 Do traditional
reference to Athens and designation as "philosopher" reflect literary fabrication in
Apology, providing no substantive historical value for determining provenance?
Association with the epicenter of Greek thought would prove quite a useful polemic
device for an author wishing to inscribe a philosophically-oriented defense of
Christian faith! These ambiguities urge caution. Athenian provenance should be
regarded only as probable given the independent witness of historiographic and
textual traditions. A date of 124-125 CE may be fixed with slightly more certainty,
placing Apology within a decade or so of KP,67
Harris {Apology), and Bernard Pouderon with Marie-Joseph Pierre {Aristide: Apologie [SC 470; Paris:
Editions du Cerf, 2003] 107—41, 143-72, 401-13). We follow Pouderon's enumeration.
64 Chron. ccxxvi. There is a discrepancy between the Latin (125-126 CE) and Armenian
versions (124-125 CE; cod. N places the event a year later) of Chronicon, yet Eusebius' clearly
intends to locate production of Apology during Hadrian's first stay at Athens. It is, however, Jerome's
reading of Eusebius that explicitly links (in cause-and-effect) production of Quadratus' and Aristides'
apologies with the emperor's visit {Epist. 70.4; cf. Vir. ill. 20).
65 The author self-styles himself "philosopher of Athens" (ded. Sy, Ar). The historiographic
and textual claims ostensibly possess independent value, for Eusebius does not have a copy of
Aristides' Apology to hand. References to Aristides in the remaining historiographic tradition (Jerome
and martyrologies) simply repeat and expand on Eusebius.
66 Harris argued Apology was delivered to Antoninus Pius at Smyrna (Apology, 16-17), and
Lieu cautiously suggests Asia Minor {Image, 164-65).
67 The dedicatory address in the Armenian version ("To the autocratic Caesar Hadrian, from
Aristides, Athenian philosopher") is consistent with historiographic tradition, as is the Syriac title
("The Apology of Aristides the philosopher to king Hadrian concerning the fear of God"). Confusion
arises, however, because the dedicatory address of the Syriac (following the title) directs Apology to
Antoninus Pius ("To the all-powerful Caesar Titus Hadrian Antoninus"). The subsequent plural
descriptors ("august" [rG< \ cV? = Augustus] and "merciful" [r< i = Pius?) represent not two
recipients (Hadrian, Antoninus) but the plural of majesty (cf. 2.2 Sy: rCaA_3b cvr< y^o n \). In its
present form the Syriac (tit. + ded.) envisions both Hadrian (117-138 CE) and Antoninus Pius
(138-161 CE). However, Eusebius' testimony, the Armenian title, and papyrological witness (note
singular ® Pacttkeu; Apology n2 fol. lv I. 44) argue very strongly against reference to plural
recipients, thereby excluding the brief coregency of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius (February to July,
138 CE). In this light the Syriac title appears to be a later addition to harmonize the earlier dedicatory
address (Antoninus Pius) with historiographic tradition (Hadrian). The witness of historiographic
tradition and the Armenian version (Hadrian) compete with the Syriac address (Antoninus Pius). The
burden of proof lies slightly with the Syriac (cf. Robinson in Harris, Apology, 75 n. 2). Regarding the
date ofApology, there is little reason to reject Eusebian tradition a priori since it also carries the
support of the Armenian version. Cf. Pouderon, Aristide, 32-37, 317; Les apologistes grecs du if
siecle (IPE; Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2005) 121-23.
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Should we regard with equal skepticism Eusebius' claim that Apology was
presented (dedere) to emperor Hadrian? Despite being addressed to Hadrian,
Apology presents not a single request to the emperor on behalf of the Christians save
calling for his repentance (17.3 Ba\ or, for that of all pagans: 17.3 Sy). Apology
differs considerably from the genre of formal request present in Justin's First (1; 68)
and Second Apology (14) as well as the embassy genre (jipeoPenxiKoq \oyoq) of
Athenagoras' Legatio offered in response to specific accusations leveled against
Christians (1-3; 32). It should then be regarded as improbable that Apology ever
received an audience with Hadrian. Bernard Pouderon's suggestion that Apology is
an epideictic discourse (£7uSeikti,k6<; Xoyoq) has strong appeal. According to
Pouderon, Apology is a "lettre ouverte"—"an apologetic work of oratory form or,
more strictly speaking, epistolary, occasioned by the visit of Hadrian to Athens,
intended for the widest diffusion possible (just as much within the Christian
community as before the pagan public), from which one would also hope it would be
read by the king to whom it was supposed to be addressed and to whom one
doubtless tried hard to hand it over."68 In this sense Apology differs from KP and
should be regarded as directed both ad intra and to a wider public.
2.1 The One Godand the Tour "Races" (Apology 1-2)
Like KP, Apology begins with a depiction of the unique God. Aristides
frames the discussion of God in terms of his own personal search for truth, which he
paints in philosophic fashion as a rational process of observing and scrutinizing
(Gecopijoaq; I8cbv; ouvfjKa) the natural universe and its orderly arrangement (1.1).
Our philosopher describes how his observation of the structured motion of all things
led him to conclude that this natural arrangement could only have resulted from an
orderly mover, namely, God, and that this God is necessarily supremely transcendent
and superior to the world, for "that which causes movement is stronger than that
which is moved" (1.1).69 This God has established and arranged the universe of
68 On genre and occasion see Pouderon (Aristide, 39-43; quote from pp. 42-43).
69 This concept of God is similar to that of Aristotle's Prime Mover, "an actualization rather
than a potentiality, a mind thinking itself." It had been adopted as the dominant theology (physics) in
Middle Platonism and in the period of history in general with which we are dealing (cf. John Dillon,
The Middle Platonists: A Study ofPlatonism. 80 b.c. to a.d. 220 [London: Duckworth, 1977] 13). It is
echoed in Christian theologians as well (cf. Spanneut, Le stoi'cisme desperes de I'Eglise: de Clement
de Rome a Clement d'Alexandrie [Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1957] 307ff.). Minucius Oct. 19.2;
Tertullian Prax. 5; Hippolytus Ref. 10.33.2; Origen Cels. 7.38)
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things for human benefit (1.2).70 From this naturally-accessible knowledge of God,
Aristides concludes, is enjoined a certain religious and ethical response. "It seems
certain to me," he says, "that it is necessary that each person fear God and in
consequence thereof it is reasonable that he not harm anyone" (1.2 Sy; cf. Ar).71 Yet
knowledge that arises from this cosmological argument is partial and incomplete, for
the divine nature is essentially hidden (cf. 1.1 Sy, Ar)72 as the via negationis teaches
us. God is without beginning, without end, immortal, perfect, incomprehensible,
without limit, etc., descriptors which the texts of the Oriental recension clarify at
some length (1.2).73 Conspicuously, the prologue provides no explicit reference to the
absolute uniqueness of God! Nevertheless, his uniqueness is implicit,74 since he is
envisioned sui generis as creator of "all things." Consequently, humans need worship
and obey this God, whose nature is such that customary cultic dictates of sacrifice
and libation, or, indeed, any of the sensibles are hardly appropriate (1.2).
Three motifs interlock in the prologue of Apology, (1) a naturally-revealed
and incomplete rationally-accessible knowledge of a single, transcendent, personal
first principle to whom humans must (2) offer cultic worship and (3) obey in
manners of ethical practice. The confluence of these elements anticipates the logic
in the remainder of Apology, where the Athenian philosopher offers his version of a
monotheistic classification strategy. "Let us proceed to the human race," he urges,
7(1 This last qualification is absent from Barlaam. Its authenticity is assured from the
discussion on the elements (5.1-3), where both the Syriac and Barlaam envision water, fire, and
winds as created "for the sake of humans."
71
Though absent from Barlaam, this deduction is authentic. It is present in both independent
Oriental witnesses and comports well with the significance of ethic throughout Apology.
11 This assessment on the limits of human knowledge is absent from the epitome of Apology
1 in Barlaam (cf. the following footnote). In accordance with typical Middle Platonic doctrine, no
human obtains fully to the truth of the divine (1.1; 2.1 Sy; cf. 2.1 Ba which can be read this way). Cf.
Plato Tim. 28c; Alcinous (=Albinus) Did. 10.1. References to the former are abundant among early
Christian and Middle Platonic writings; see A. D. Nock, "The Exegesis of Timaeus 28 C," VC 16
(1926) 79-86. Note further Festugiere's helpful comments ("La doctrine Platonicienne," 92-140).
73 There are discrepancies in the length of the prologue between Greek and Oriental
recensions. Though the Oriental witnesses evince some embellishment, the bulk of material missing
from 1.1-2 Ba was secondarily expunged from a fuller Vorlage (by the editor of the Barlaam
romance?). This includes the qualification on the limits of human knowledge attested in the
independent Oriental witnesses (1.1 Sy, Ar). Chapter one of Apology shares a common (Jewish?)
source with two "gnostic" works (Eugnostos; Tripartite Tractate), which also contain the expanded
explanations found in Apol. 1.2 Sy, Ar (Roelof van den Broek, "Eugnostos and Aristides on the
Ineffable God," in idem, T. Baarda, and J. Mansfeld, eds., Knowledge ofGod in the Graeco-Roman
World [Leiden; New York: Brill, 1988] 202-11; cf. Pouderon, Aristide, 93-97. W.C. van Unnik's
attempt to locate a source for Apology 1 is disappointing ["Die Gotteslehre bei Aristides und in
gnostischen Schriften," TZ 17 (1961): 166-74]).
74 Explicit in 13.3-4; 14.3a; 15.3b.
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"so that we might perceive which among them participates in truth and which in
error" (2.1 Ba, Sy, Ar; cf. 3.1). On this fundamental procedural point both
Oriental and Greek recensions agree. Apology engages in a program of
schematizing sameness and difference among various human collectivities based on
their participation or lack of participation in cultic and moral knowledge of the
unique God.
To begin, the Syriac subdivides "the race of humans" into four "races of
humans"—barbarians, Greeks, Jews, and Christians (2.2).75 Despite formulaic
particularities, each ethnicity is introduced by a brief genealogy tracing "the origin of
their race/religion from" a particular progenitor(s) (2.2-4). Each ethnic group is
constituted by shared participation in a peculiar genealogical stemma replete with its
own racial head(s) from whom derives their particular form of cult (and to which
corresponds a peculiar ethic; see below).76 In the discursive pattern of Apology the
symbols of race and religion are integrated and mutually constitutive.77 To each
ethnicity corresponds a religion and vice versa. To participate in Greekness is to
practice Greek religion, and to observe Greek forms of worship is to claim Greek
75 Barlaam parcels the "human race" into a tripartite division—"they who worship those
called 'gods' among you [sc. pagans]," Jews, and Christians. Pagans are further subdivided into
Chaldaeans, Greeks, and Egyptians. Alpigiano labels this "[l]e principali differenze" between the
versions (Aristide di Atene. Apologia [BPatr; Firenze: Centra Internazionale del Libra, 1988] 29).
Comparable three- and fourfold divisions are attested elsewhere: Rom 1:14; 1 Cor 1:22-24; 12:13;
Gal 3:28; Ps-Hipp. Elench. 10.30.6.8; 31.4.6; CIJ 62-63 no. 680a. On the superiority of the fourfold
structure in the Oriental witnesses see n. 91; Pouderon, Aristide, 150-56, 322-27.
76 In each case, the origin of a form of religion is linked to a pattern of ethnic descent from a
progenitor. Barbarians trace "the origin of their sort (or, race) of religion from Kronos and from Rhea
and the rest of their gods" (rCal^a v<r<5 coc\_iip \ r<o7i.\*-i.3
.^otnllmAvkn; Armenian reads "the origin of their race"). Though no reference to "their religion" is
present for Greeks, the continuation of the idea of ethnoreligious source (as in the barbarians) is clear
from the repetition of the ablative preposition (^-so) before the names of Greek ethnic heads beginning
with Hellen, who is purportedly born of Zeus (2.2; cf. 9.1), and from the patrilineal connections (cf.
nk_Ai_r< and rCsC*; 2.2). Christians trace "the beginning of their religion from Jesus
the Messiah" (,r< imn ^3) ^cvtrAi \ n=i Armenian reads "the origin of their race").
Only the Jewish genealogy seems at first not to follow this formal ethnoreligious pattern, since it is
expressed in terms only of ethnicity (■jDOTi_nr< ,_3o ,\ "the origin of their race from
Abraham;" 2.3). However, a religious logic underlines this overt ethnic claim by means of a clear
linking of Jewish and Christian ethnoreligions through the figure of the Hebrew Messiah, Jesus (on
this see below §2.3). The considerably extended treatment of Christian genealogy (2.4) is harnessed to
inform the presentation of the Jewish race and religion rather than vice versa. The Armenian version
consistently classifies the four as "races," and this may better reflect the original Greek of Apology.
11 This observation has long been undervalued by scholars of Apology. Raabe, for example,
relates the Jewish genealogy entirely to the Volksabstammung (Apologie, 30-31). Alpigiano, on the
other hand, overstates the opposite claim, believing the groups are categorized "secondo un criterio
esclusivamente religioso" (emphasis added; Aristide 18, 137). Such either/or simplifications fail to
grapple with the mutually constitutive character of race/ethnicity and religious practice in Graeco-
Roman discourse. Recently this has received attention in the works of Denise Kimber Buell,
particularly in "Rethinking."
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peoplehood. In the logic of Apology interrelation between ethnic and cultic ascriptive
identities is necessary, since the pattern itself is embedded already in popular
ethnographies, which links a people's ethnogenesis to some divine mythic
progenitor(s) or revelatory figure. For a group to constitute a legitimately
recognizable ethnicity with an established religion they must have an account of their
origins and be able to trace their shared ethnoreligious heritage to a genealogical
head. The barbarians derive their form of religion (and thus their ethnicity) from
Kronos and Rhea and other gods. Greeks appeal to Hellen offspring of Zeus, scion of
Kronos.78 And there were still other Hellenic offspring by way of Inachos and
Phoroneus from the Egyptian Danaos.79 In the logic of this slightly confused
ethnography Greeks-cum-Egyptians are distinguishedfrom barbarians by their
collective derivation from Hellen,80 yet both barbarians and Greeks-cum-Egyptians
are inscribed by Aristides into a single genealogical stemma (as distant cousins)
beginning with Kronos and Rhea. Their shared family tree is populated from the very
beginning by more than one god! Jews and Christians, on the other hand, participate
in a separate stemma. Jews trace their origins to the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob, as well as Moses, their lawgiver (2.3). Christians trace their beginning through
Jesus the Christ, "named the Son of God Most High" and "born of the race of the
Hebrews" (2.4). These two groups are ascribed to a collective genealogy going back
to the Most High God (of Apology 1) through various revealer figures (see §2.3). The
separation of genealogical stemmata along polytheistic and monotheistic trajectories
has profound consequence in the argument of Apology, as we will now see.
78
Q2cv__t^ (Dios = genitive for Zeus in Greek) is interpreted in the Syriac as another name for
Zeus; cf. 9.1 Sy. Mythic connection between Zeus and Kronos was so well-known as to require no
explicit statement in the ethnography. Zeus is directly identified as Kronos' son in 9.1-2.
79 Egyptian ethnicity constitutes a subcategory of Greek ethnicity in the structure of the
Syriac (,-cxicv atiiK ^xi ,-1=1 ,aA. o?pc\ azcvAR =A_Air< cbccjAR
c\rC_in Vv)ni_uX .car<_ic\i_^). They too have origins, according to Apology 2,
through Hellen.
80 Cf. Jonathan M. Hall, Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity (Cambridge: University Press,
1997), 45: "While the ancestry of barbarians might be traced back to figures of Greek myth such as
Deukalion or Inakhos, it could not be derived from Hellen and so, technically speaking, no barbarians
could share in Hellenic blood."
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2.2 Polytheistic Ethnicities: Barbarians andGreeks
(Apology 3~B)
Apology 3-13 reviews the polytheistic ethnicities. Aristides begins his
program of monotheistic classification with the barbarians, who, "since they did not
understand God, went astray after the elements (oxoixela) and began to worship
created things instead of their creator" (3.1). He preemptively concludes that
barbarian veneration of material elements could only have resulted from ignorance of
the true God (3.1; cf. 7.2), and as proof he lambastes (1) the irrationality of barbarian
idolatry (ch. 3) and (2) the inherent incompatibility of the natural elements with the
divine nature (chs. 4-7).
First, in order to worship deified elements barbarians fashioned images.
Herein, Aristides claims, is the great irony of their popular cult, for they
subsequently take these images, place them in shrines, and set guards over them lest
they be stolen! The barbarians, he clarifies, "did not perceive that whoever guards is
greater than that which is guarded and that anyone who creates is greater than that
which is created" (3.1).81 Nor are the errors of popular barbarian religion resolved by
their philosophers, who attempts to ground popular idolatry in rational investigation
of the elements. The sages fail to understand the fundamentally reducible nature of
the elements and thereby err in ascribing deity to images made in honor of the
elements (3.2). At the root of this critique lies a categorical confusion in barbarian
religion between created and creator, between that which is inferior and the one who
is supremely superior, between unstable and reducible elements and the one who is
stable and irreducible.
Chapters four through seven are occupied with demonstrating this category
confusion. Aristides turns to a discussion of the elements proper "in order that we
may demonstrate regarding them that they are not gods, but corruptible and
changeable, produced from that which does not exist by the command of the true
God, who is incorruptible and unchangeable and invisible. Yet he sees all things and
as he wills they change and turn" (4.1 Ba). The nature of each element—earth (4.3),
water (5.1), fire (5.2), and wind (5.3)—along with that of the planetary objects (sun,
moon, stars; 6.1-2; cf. 4.2 Ba) and of human beings (7.1) are sequentially articulated
as incompatible with the nature of true deity. Some, like earth, water, and fire, are
81 The logic echoes that of 1.1, where knowledge of a prime Mover was posited because "that
which causes movement is stronger than that which is moved."
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subject to the control of man. Others, like wind and the astral objects, are subject
most clearly to the command of God. Yet they are all subject to the dictates ofsome
external agency. The true God is not! The elements are ipso facto disqualified from
participating in the divine nature, a point repeated again and again at the end of each
paragraph (4.2 Ba\ 4.3-5.1; 5.2 Ba\ 5.3-7.1).82 The singular barbarian error is the
deification and concomitant idolatrous worship of dead elements as though these
were gods (cf. 7.2). Both popular and philosophic strands of barbarian religion
participate in "great error" (3.1-2).
In chapters eight through twelve Aristides investigates the Greeks "so that we
might see what they think concerning God" (8.1). The polemic strategy, spelled out
in the opening argument of chapter eight, is more complex than it was for barbarians.
Though they regard themselves as wise Greeks have erred more than their barbarian
contemporaries because they have (1) "introduced the birth of many gods" and (2)
portrayed them in their myths as subject to all manner of passions and transitory
conditions such as death, suffering, and debilitating illness (8.1),83 thereby (3)
legitimating and perpetuating human immorality and social discord (8.2).
The first two accusations involve the production of mythic ethnographies, to
which Aristides appeals in chapters nine to twelve to demonstrate multiplicity of
error in Greek religion. Following a terse account of Kronos and Zeus (9.1-2) a
series of Greek gods are introduced in turn (10.1-11.6). In nearly every case the text
reveals a stereotyped argument corresponding, respectively, to the first two points of
his argument set out in chapter eight. After Kronos, the Greeks "introduced"84 Zeus
"in second place"85 and then they "introduced" yet "another god"86 and "another god"
and "another god" alongside the ones already mentioned (point 1). Each newly
introduced god possesses some moral or physical defect or performs some action or
profession regarded as immoral or inadequate (point 2). The first and second points
are then discursively linked and each god is declared to be incompatible with the
82 This pattern of reasoning is further substantiated for Apol. 5.3 and 6.1 in IT'.
83 8.1b Ba is restored from DiscBa §49b, which parallels 8.1 Sy.
84
riapEicdyeiv in 9.1-11.4 and 11.7 Ba is a deliberate echo of 8.1-2 Ba where Greeks are
chided for introducing (7tapetoceyeiv) the birth of many gods in their myth-making.
85 Asikepo^. Kronos is god ttpo Jtctvtwv, understood temporally (first) and positionally
(primary), though his positional authority was later assumed by Zeus.
86 r<_ii_ur< r<ooAr<. The Syriac alone phrases the addition of a new god with "another god"
(9.2; 10.1-4; 11.1). Barlaam harnesses simple additive phrases (Seikepot;, ccuv Tovtcp, erea; the
majority are linked by 8e) for a similar non-exclusivity function.
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divine nature ofApology 1. The connection is made via a question—How is it
possible that a "god" be characterized by the aforementioned condition, quality, or
behavior?—or statement—It is not possible, etc.87 Add to this the absurdity that a
"god" should ever have been "introduced" as having an origin, and it is clear the
"gods" of Greek historiography are no "gods" at all.
In a second integrated movement, our philosopher points to the power of
mythic production (points 1 and 2) for informing human ethic (point 3). For
Aristides, myths are productive sources of human ethic and Greek mythologies are
particularly insidious, "for if their gods did such things," he asks, "how will they not
also do such things" (8.2)? Stories of the gods legitimate the perpetuation of human
immorality. Yet the issue is further complicated, for mythic accounts are not only
productive of human behavior but are themselves the product of human ingenuity.
Like the gods they purport to narrate, Greek tales "have been introduced.. .in accord
with the Greeks' evil lusts, so that having them [sc. gods] as advocates of vice they
may commit adultery, robbery, murder and do terrible things" (8.2). Greek myths
and the gods they portray are fabrications, products of human imagination
constructed with sinister intent to legitimate immoral behavior.
This intricate dialectic begins at the fount of Greek mythopoeic activity, with
the epic shortcomings and struggles of their first gods, Kronos and Zeus. The
narratives recount the production of children from Kronos (by Rhea), the tale of his
consumption of them, and the account of his emasculation, immurement, and
overthrow by his son Zeus, so that the latter assumed primacy as king of their gods
(9.1-2).88 Greek ingenuity does not cease with the brutality "they advance against
their god" Kronos (9.1). Zeus' improprieties extend even further, for the myths
recount how he metamorphosed into animal form and sexually exploited women for
the production of offspring (9.2). "If he who is said to be the chief and king of their
gods does these things," Aristides asks, "how much more should his worshippers
imitate him" (9.3 Sy; sim. Ba)l The same obtains in the rest of their mythic accounts,
so that Aristides concludes his entire critique as follows: "All these things, King, the
Greeks have introduced about their gods, and many similar, even much more
obscene and degenerate, things of which it is not right to speak or call to memory at
87
n6><; evSexetcxi 0£ov Eivai toiovtov; K(aq &v e'lr| 0eoi;; ovk evSexerai 0eov Eivai
xoioOxov; ktX. At the end of every paragraph from 9.3-11.6!
88 There is no discrepancy with Greek genealogy (2.2); cf. nn. 78, 85.
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all. Whence humans, taking impulse from their gods, practiced all lawlessness and
licentiousness and impiety, defiling earth and air with their brutal acts" (11.7 Ba\
sim. Sy). The miasma engendered by these myths has spawned all manner of wars,
slaughters, and captivities (8.2). According to Aristides the socially-ascribed
introduction of multiple gods and goddesses, each with his or her own shortcomings,
reflects and legitimates human immorality and social discord. And mythopoesy itself
is suspect, for with introduction of many "gods" inexorably comes increased
occasion for immorality!
Aristides saves his harshest calumny for Egyptians, who beyond the insanity
and impiety of Greek and barbarian religions and their gods, "have even introduced"
still others. Because they are "more stupid and foolish" than Greeks and barbarians
(toutcov),89 they did not content themselves with "the deities of barbarians and
Greeks" but felt it necessary to deify and worship animals and plants (12.1). Hence,
in Aristides' analysis, Egyptians are "more base" (sc. less moral) and "more stupid"
(sc. possessing less knowledge of God) than every nation on earth (12.1; cf. 13.1
Sy).90 The following critique (12.2-5) augments this analysis and harnesses the same
formal structure used against Greek religion. Egyptian gods Isis and Osiris were
unable to prevent Tryphon's fratricide of Osiris, and Tryphon was unable to defend
himself against his nephew Horos. Being unable to save themselves, they are unable
to save others and cannot be "gods" (12.2-3). Egyptians further "introduced"
irrational beasts as gods, animals which daily are unable to prevent their slaughter
upon Egyptian cultic altars and are impotent to avoid decay and death (12.4)! They
too cannot be gods. A subtle logic underlies the singling out of Egyptians in the
broader critique against Greek ethnoreligion (Apol. 8-13). Chapter twelve
demonstrates the moral and cultic extremes to which Greek mythopoeic activity can
lead. Greek ingenuity in myth-making spawned continued myth-creation and the
"introduction" of even more gods among their consanguine hellenic cousins. And the
more "gods" multiply, the more a people's moral and religious fabric is characterized
by error. Egyptians offer the most acute version of Hellenic ethnoreligion91 and
manifest the gravest type of ignorance and immorality (13.1 Sy).
89 Kataphoric pronoun, pointing to ttrivxcDV twv eSvcov immediately following.
90 The evaluation against knowledge (pavia; ■ ' v) and morality (daekyeia;
r<>n<\ t i appears in Barlaam and the Syriac and comports well with the argument against Greeks.
91 In the argument of Apology 12 Egyptians are treated as a third entity alongside barbarians
and Greeks. Some claim the threefold subdivision of pagan religion in 2.2 Ba (Chaldaeans
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Yet what is truly surprising is not the stupidity of the base Egyptians but that
Greeks, who surpass all other people in manner of life and reason, have failed to
understand the incompatibility of idolatry with true worship (13.1), for the unique
God does not require sacrifice or libation as if he had deficiency (cf. 1.2; 13.2).
Despite seeing their idols constructed and destroyed the rationally and morally
superior Greeks do not recognize the fundamental incompatibility of dead idols with
the living deity. Greek poets and philosophers,92 too, err in claiming that those idols
fabricated in honor of the Most High God (k_a ^v< v<crAv<) are gods. Their
ignorance is apparent when they attempt to represent their idols in the form of the
unseen God and present him as though he had deficiency and was in need of ritual
structures like offerings and temples (13.2). Also, their erudite claims that "the
nature of all their gods is one" is also in error (13.3-4). Though the text of Apology
13.3-4, "sans doute mal conserve, est assez obscur,"93 the force of the argument
remains clear. "For if the human body," Aristides asks, "while consisting of many
parts, does not reject any of its own members but, possessing a seamless unity among
all its parts, is harmonious with itself, how will there be such strife and discord in the
divine nature" (13.3 Ba\ sim. Sy)? Like the human body, the divine nature represents
a harmonious unity that cannot accommodate internal strife. And the divine unity
offered by Greek intellectuals can hardly be designated "harmonious." "For if the
[=barbarians], Greeks, and Egyptians) better suits the pattern of Apology 3-13 than the Syriac division
of barbarians and Greeks (2.2). This is not the case. First, Apology permits multiple ascriptive
identities, and utilizes a particular ascription in a given context for a variety of reasons. One can be a
member of "the race of mankind" ( *' ■ V -ia r< au \) for contrast with the divine nature (2.1 vs.
ch. 1) while simultaneously belonging to one of the four "races of mankind" (rf v r; i -in xi cn\.\)
for the purpose of human differentiation. As regards Egyptians and Greeks, we have seen that one
may be both Egyptian and Greek, since a consanguinity through Hellen is presupposed by Apology
2.2 Sy (cf. supra n. 79). Second, the same logic employed against Greeks is used against Egyptians:
they (1) add more gods (Isis, Osiris, animals), (2) each with its own defects, (3) leading to more base
defilements. Third, no comparable introductory section heading (e.g., "let us proceed to the
Egyptians...") prefaces the discussion as it does for all other extra-Christian races (3.1; 8.1; 14.1). In
the logic of chapter twelve, Egyptians remain a subset of Greek ethnoreligion. Why then is
Egyptian identity specifically harnessed alongside Greek identity for the argument? The text identifies
Egyptian religion as the most extreme example ofpolytheism and presents it as the most ignorant and
most unethical of systems. Egyptian identity enhances the larger argument that multiplication of gods
accompanies more extreme levels of foolishness and ignorance. Egyptians are separated as an
extreme example, not a separate ethnic entity.
92 Does the summation in chapter 13 envision barbarians, Greeks, and Egyptians (13.1 Ba) or
only Greeks (13.1 Sy)? It is difficult to see how the phrase "who surpass all other peoples in their
manner of life and reasoning" attributed to Greeks alone in the Syriac, ifauthentic, could be
reconciled with Barlaam's approach. Barlaam may represent an epitome of chapter thirteen (cf.
Pouderon, Aristide, 281 n. 1).
93 Ibid., 366.
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nature of their god was one, one god would not want to pursue or kill or mistreat
[another] god. If then gods are pursued, eaten, and kidnapped, and struck down with
lightning by [other] gods, there is no longer a single nature but divided wills, all
ready to mistreat, so that not one among them is god" (13.3-4 Ba; sim. Sy)! This
argument harnesses the social disjunction among gods of Greek myth (point 2)
against the quality of their "godness" (point 1). Mythic genealogies introduce no real
"gods!"
One final point of disparity emerges between Greek mythic production
(points 1 and 2) and the content of the laws ordering Greek society. "For if their
laws are righteous their gods are wholly unrighteous since they have contravened the
law..., but if they (gods) were right in doing these things, then their (Greek) laws are
unrighteous, since they are framed contrary to their gods" (15.5). By positioning the
body of Greek jurisprudence against the social morality engendered by their mythic
ethnographies Aristides can argue for disparity at the very heart of two defining
structures of Greek ethnicity, their ancestral ethnography and their legal corpus!
Greek myths can be of no value, however one chooses to interpret them (13.6). The
ethic which their myths produce is fundamentally at odds with the social harmony
Greeks seek to create through production of laws.
Apology excludes barbarian and Greek races from knowledge of the unique
God. Greeks are particularly singled out in the discursive logic because of the
formative and universal influence of their myth-making activity. Through human
ingenuity Greek poets "introduced" mythic tales and developed an entire polytheistic
historiographic stemma beginning with Kronos, their god jcpo 7ccwcov (9.1),94 and
Rhea. Barbarians inscribed their collective identity into the myths of this stemma
through Kronos, Rhea, and other gods (2.2), though they developed their religion in
the direction of deifying the elements. Into this stemma Greeks and Egyptians also
inscribed their ethnoreligious identity from Hellen through Zeus. Aristides harnesses
a discursive approach to critique the entire polytheistic stemma by attacking the very
ethnicity of those who framed the stemma. At the base of Greek ethnicity, he claims,
lies a fundamental incoherence in the constitutive social structures that define their
peoplehood—ancestral ethnography, cultic system, and body of law. Surely an
alternative stemmatic structure exists on which the ideal race, its cult, and morality
may be constructed!
94 See n. 85.
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I.7) Monotheistic Ethnicities: Jews and Christians (Apology
M-16)
Apology 14-16 reviews the monotheistic ethnicities, though discussion of
Jews and Christians begins with the genealogies of chapter two. After initially
producing a polytheistic ethnography, the Syriac sets forth the ethnographic
foundations for the monotheistic races (2.3-4). Jews stem from the patriarchs
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, their twelve sons, and their lawgiver from whom they
received the title "the race of the Hebrews" (.rCci -i \ rCca.u\) and were eventually
called Jews (2.3). The overview of (Hebrew-)Jewish origins is strikingly odd in the
context. There is no mention of "their religion" as we have for barbarians, Greeks,95
and Christians, and even more striking, no reference to their God! No religious
framework is established on which recipients of Apology could be, even briefly,
introduced to Jewish religious claims (ancient or contemporary). Granted, chapter
two is preparatory to the lengthier discussion on the respective theologies of the
races later in Apology, yet absence of even cursory mention of these elements for the
Jews is surprising though simply enough explained. The considerably extended
treatment of Christian genealogy (2.4) is harnessed to inform the presentation of the
Jewish race rather than vice versa.
The Syriac attests explicit connections between (Hebrew-)Jews and
Christians through the figure of "Jesus the Christ,"96 the eponymous head of the
Christian race and Son of the Most High God. These are subtly present already in
2.4, where the elements "taught in the gospel" are set out. The gospel comprises a
collection of motifs common to early Christian kerygma and creedal
expressions—the title "the Messiah" ( r< » .v-n; cf. 17.3 Sy) applied to Jesus, his
birth "from a Hebrew virgin" (,_jo rtJruAci-s. v<JtAqJ>i_3; Isa 7:14; cf. Matt 1:23),
his origin "of the tribe of the Hebrews" (rCA_3A.n ,_^o; Gen 49:10; Mic
5:2), his being pierced by the Jews (Zech 12:10; 13:3),97 as well as his death, burial,
resurrection, and ascension (themes related to OT prophecy/events in primitive
95 Cf. n. 76.
96 Lit. "Jesus the Messiah" ( ». v-n uua), a translation which retains the primitive nature
of the reference (cf. 15.7-8: "their Messiah"). The Syriac represents a translation from Greek (o)
XpioToq (cf. 15.7 n2; 15.1, 7 Ba); see further Harris (Apology, 54-55 n. -\20) and Pouderon
(Aristide, 328).
97 Cf. John 19:37; Acts 2:36; Rev 1:7; Justin Dial. 16.4; Harris, ibid. 13-15, 55-56 n. =i 6.
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Christian kerygma).98 Here we see a mixture of bioethnic and religious elements,
which serve to establish an early distance from the Jewish race, while simultaneously
providing subtle elements of religious proximity between Jews and Christians.
Proximity first becomes apparent in the application to Jesus of the
specifically Jewish religio-political titulary "the Messiah." The term is not simply
absorbed into the name of Jesus but focuses overtly on his messianic role and
fulfillment of explicitly Jewish messianic expectation. It is further reported that
Jesus' nativity was "from a Hebrew virgin" and again that he was "born of the tribe
of the Hebrews."99 Claims to Jesus' Hebrew lineage are intentional and overt,
coming as they do immediately on the heels of the (Hebrew-)Jewish ethnography.
They highlight the connection of the Christian ethnic head to the Jewish race.
Another link comes in reference to Jesus' death. Though himself a Hebrew, Jesus
was "pierced" by the Jews (see below). Further conceptual contact may be drawn
between the twelve sons of Jacob and the twelve disciples of Jesus. Like the Jewish
patriarchs, Jesus too "sired" his own twelve sons who became the basis for the
Christian race.100 There is then no simple biogenetic description of Jesus' pedigree
(as we have for the Jewish race). His birth, ministry, and death are connected to the
(Hebrew-)Jewish race and are quite clearly interpreted theologically in terms of
messianism ("the Messiah") and christology ("assumed and clothed himself with
flesh," "the Son of God," etc.). Not all of these genetic and theological links are
positive with respect to the Jews, yet their combined value is to establish the ethnic
identity and consequently the ethnoreligious heritage of Jesus as Hebrew (sc. of the
same patrilineage as those called Jews). Ipso facto Christians are located as offspring
of Jewish ethnoreligion. This historiography portrays both Christians and Jews as
adherents to the same God, "the Most High God" (cf. 2.4), joining them in a
monotheistic genealogical stemma (see further below).
Regardless of these proximate connections, chapter two still establishes an
early distance between Jews and Christians. The text ascribes Jews and Christians as
98 Luke 24:25-27; 1 Cor 15:3^J; ascension: Acts 2:34; cf. John 6:62; 20:17. Harris, ibid.
24-25; Pouderon, Aristide, 66-68, 382-85.
99 The phrases occur in the Armenian too and are likely original (cf. Robinson in Harris,
Apology, 78-79). Pouderon's suggestion that "Hebrew" bears ethnic value while "Jew(s)" connotes
religious affiliation (ibid., 327-28; cf. 58) is unconvincing. The distinction fits 2.4 Sy yet is unclear in
2.3 Sy, where "Hebrew race" assumes religious significance since it is so named by its "lawgiver" (a
religio-political term in antiquity).
100 "Hebrews," "Jews," and "twelve" provide the only explicit lexical connections between
2.3 and 2.4.
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different "races." The application of the boundary term "race" to both groups
demarcates Jews and Christians as distinct, yet, as we observed, importantly related
to the same God. It is Jesus who stands at the center of all Christian-Jewish
disjunction. Indeed the seemingly harshest evaluation of Judaism in the Syriac is the
almost fleeting comment that the head of the Christian religion was "pierced" by his
own people—without reference to the Romans.101 Attribution of Jesus' death to the
Jews occurs in Oriental (2.4 Sy, Ar) and Greek recensions (14.2b; 15.1 Ba) and must
have been present in Apology. There is no question that the "piercing" of Jesus
cannot be a simple, disinterested recapitulation of historical events, since the whole
of 2.4 constitutes a theological interpretation of the life of Jesus and his disciples. In
the context of chapter two it serves as the clearest boundary sign demarcating the two
ethnoreligions, and this delineation centers specifically on their respective response
to the person of Jesus. Viewed in light of the entirety of the work, however, any
inherently anti-Jewish force to the Jewish homicide of the Syriac is mollified by the
prior admission of Jesus' own Jewishness (2.4) and by a rather favorable portrait of
Jewish monotheism and ethic which we will see in chapter fourteen.102 The motif
does not represent a necessarily hostile evaluation of the Jewish race but is best
understood as a primitive interpretation of Jesus' death at the hands of Jews couched
in terms of accommodation to the prophetic and messianic language of Zech 12:10
and 13:3.103
The ethnographies of Apology 2.3-4 inscribe Christians and Jews into a
single monotheistic family tree, while carefully distinguishing them as regards their
relation to the person of Jesus. After description of barbarians and Greeks (chs.
3-13) Apology turns again to Jews and Christians in chapters fourteen through
sixteen. The text is surprising in its approbation of much contemporary Jewish
religion. In 14.3a Jewish monotheistic ideology and confession is lauded—belief in
101 Was Aristides remiss to have Jesus condemned by a civil tribunal? Cf. Pouderon, Aristide,
190 n. 1.
102 Particularly, ethical similarity between Jews and Christians (14.3b; 15.4-9) renders it
more plausible to understand the attribution of Messiah's "piercing" to the Jews (2.4g Sy) not as a
necessarily negative moral valuation of the Jews in terms of a single corporate entity but as
implicating a particular group of Jewish homicides acting unknowingly in accordance with prophetic
fulfillment.
103 Cf. MT Zech 12:10; 13:3) and Apology Syriac (.'Cpn&iR). The Syriac probably
reflects Greek ekkcvteo), common in Christian tradition (cf. John 19:37; Rev 1:7; Justin Dial. 14.8;
32.2; 64.7; 118.1) and attested in LXX "revisions" building on earlier traditions (a', 6', a'
[e7Cekk£vt£co]; Joseph Ziegler, ed., Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum, vol. 13: Duodecim
Prophetae [3rd ed.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984] 319, apparatus).
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the one Almighty God who created all things and the call to exclusive devotion to
that one God rather than to his works. The presentation demonstrates awareness of
two key Jewish religious markers—the confessions (...no...n .,_vi_33r<) of the Shema
(Kmirt .c\m Deut 6:4) and of exclusivist monotheistic worship (cf. Exod 20:3;
Deut 5:7). "In this," he opines, the Jews "are much nearer to the truth than all the
peoples, in that they worship God more exceedingly and not his works."104 This
sympathetic admission is startling in light of Aristides' stated goal of evaluating the
human race "in order to know which of them participate in the truth" (2.1)! Jewish
religious confession and obligations of exclusivist monotheism contrast directly with
pagan religions whose materialistic worship precludes them from worshipping the
unique creator! Jewish participation in truth also extends to their ethic. The Syriac
provides a favorable commentary on Jewish morality (14.3b).105 Jews "imitate God"
by their beneficence and compassion towards humanity, things which are
"acceptable to God" (!) and "well-pleasing also to men." They provide for the poor,
ransom the captive, bury the dead, and other like acts. This superior morality they
received from their ancestors (cf. 2.3). Jewish morality contrasts directly with that
legitimated in the mythic structures of the pagan religions!
In the Syriac, Jewish monotheistic belief and ethical practice prove powerful
elements of discontinuity with pagan religions. In this regard contemporary Jews are
adopted as monotheistic coreligionists and coparticipants in truth with Christians.
Jews and Christians share the ideal of exclusivist monotheistic devotion, for
Christians too believe in one creator God "to whom there is no other god as
companion" (15.3b). The element of ethical continuity between Christians and Jews
is unmistakable, as the particularities of Christian ethic presented in 15.4—9 are
strikingly parallel to and modeled upon the lineaments of Jewish ethic in 14.3b.106
Scholars have described the attitude towards Judaism in the Syriac text as
"surprising," "Jewish-friendly," "very favorable," bearing "no trace of ill-feeling to
the Jews," "rather mild," and lacking "every severity of tone, every anti-Jewish
polemic."107 This favorable valuation is evident in 14.3 where Apology presents a
l(H This concept is altogether absent from Barlaam, in which the Jewish people have excised
themselves entirely from the truth (14.4a).
105
Unparalleled in Barlaam.
106 G.C. O'Ceallaigh, "'Marcianus' Aristides, On the Worship of God," HTR 51 (1958):
249-50; Geffcken, Apologeten, XXXIX-XL; Harris, Apology, 13.
107 Respectively, Harris, ibid.; Raabe, Apologie, 57; Hennecke, "Zur Frage," 94; Kay,
"Apology," 261; Geffcken, ibid., 82; and Heinz Schreckenberg, Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos-
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fundamental coherence between the ideals of Jewish exclusivist monotheism and
Jewish moral law.108 The Jewish race shares with the Christian race the coherence of
these motifs. Jewish and Christian ethical worship is regulated by moral precepts
which they received, respectively, "from their fathers of old" (14.3 Sy) and from
Jesus the Messiah (15.8 Sy). The ultimate origin of these precepts is the one God,
who requires "neither sacrifice nor libation" nor any cultic dictate involving sensible
elements (1.2) but rather spiritual service and concern for fellow persons (1.2 Sy,
Ar).109 Charity and philanthropy towards others is the form of worship most
consistent with the transcendent, self-sufficient nature of the unique God. Shared
Judeo-Christian ethic is necessarily a monotheistic ethic. In following the moral law
of "their fathers" Jews "imitate" the unique God through their philanthropy and
thereby participate with Christians in true knowledge of him (14.3; cf. 15.3-9).110
Even within an aggregative ethnic strategy, however, some difference
between aggregated groupings must be maintained. According to the Syriac what
differentiates Jews from Christians is the incoherence of the ideals of Jewish
exclusivist monotheism and Jewish ritual law. Jewish participation in truth is only
partial. In actual ritual worship Jews have "gone astray from accurate knowledge"
(14.4a). When they practice their ritual laws, the text claims Jewish service is
directed towards angels (14.4b). We are not informed as to how observance of time-
honored Jewish religious institutions such as sabbaths, feasts, festivals, fasts,
circumcision, and dietary laws is related to heavenly mediator figures.1" Apology
simply assumes the two motifs interface and further states that Jews do not observe
ritual obligations perfectly (14.4b). These qualifications place a check on the
approbation of Jewish ethical worship in 14.3,"2and there is an underlying logic to
Texte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umfeld (l.-ll. Jh.) (2 vols.; EuH: Reihe 23, Theologie;
Band 172; 4th rev. ed.; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999) 1.179.
108
Apology itself partitions Jewish worship into "imitation of God" (morality; 14.3b Sy) and
"the methods of their practices" (cultic ritual; 14.4b Sy). Only the former is "acceptable to God and
well-pleasing to men."
109 The nature of true worship must agree with the creative munificence of God who made all
material things "for the sake of humanity" (n. 70). Material culture serves humans, not God, who has
no need of oblations and temples (13.2 Sy).
110 For Aristides ethics occupies a more significant portion of his description of Christians
than does theology. Pouderon speaks of a "primaute des actes" and notes, "ce qui forme la caractere
propre de la religion d'Aristide, c'est son fondement moral" (Aristide, 71, 69).
111 This probably refers to the continued observance of Mosaic (ritual) law and Jewish cult
understood as mediated by angels; cf. Acts 7:53; Gal 3:19; Heb 2:2.
112 Pouderon's comment is apropos: 14.4 "permet de relativiser la portee d'Apol. 14,3a
Sy+Ba, qui attribue aux Juifs la connaissance et le culte du Dieu unique, en insistant sur le fait que
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them. Jewish cultic regulations impose the restrictions and trappings of material
culture (i.e., temporal regulations, bodily restrictions) on the worship of God and are
fundamentally incompatible with the self-sufficient divine nature which requires
service of a more spiritual and ethical quality. A ritual system so materialistically
encumbered simply cannot be directed towards the one true God, who has no need of
created things, but must be addressed to another figure(s). Along these discursive
lines Aristides had already excluded the objects of pagan ritual from participating in
the divine nature. The same applies here. The object(s) of the Jewish style of ritual
worship cannot be the unique God. Yet Jews participate in the monotheistic stemma
and cannot worship the "many gods" of pagan ethnographies. The claim that they
worship angels is then a necessary one in the logic of Apology. Aristides admits as
much, for even Jews themselves are unaware they direct their worship to angels!
They confess "that God is one" (14.3a Sy) and "suppose in their minds that they are
serving God, but in the methods of their [cultic] practices," in the observance of
materially-bound ritual imposed by their legal code, Aristides himself knows that
"their service is to angels and not to God" (14.4a Sy). Jews are not chided for
knowingly venerating angels but for misrepresenting the nature of the unique God
through the material apparatus of their ritual law and thereby unknowingly
misdirecting their worship of the unique God to angels."3 At the interface of these
constitutive elements of Jewish ethnicity, ritual law and monotheistic ideals, Jews
"have gone astray from accurate knowledge" (14.4a Sy).
Not so Christians, who "have found the truth," or rather, "have come nearer
to truth and genuine knowledge than the rest of the nations" (15.3). In his messianic
role"4 the Christian lawgiver, Jesus, revealed from God a new system of precepts
regulating Christian monotheistic worship (15.3). Messianic law harmonizes ritual
worship and ethical worship in a manner consistent with the self-sufficient nature
of the unique God. Material objects exist "for human benefit" and are incompatible
certaines de leurs pratiques sont erronees, temoignant ainsi de 1'imperfection de la connaissance qu'ils
ont de Dieu" ("Aristide et les Juifs. A propos d'Apol. 14,2 Ba.," StPatr 36 [Leuven: Peeters, 2001]
83).
113 Reference to "their (ritual) service" directed to angels in contrast to God (vCdvCXtqA
koAKi KAc\) indicates angel veneration. Yet far from providing evidence of actual angel-
veneration, the logic of Apology infers the opposite. Jews themselves seem quite content in their
monotheistic confessions and their intent to worship the unique God, blissfully ignorant of the fact
they actually worship angels in their ritual practice! Apology's acknowledgement that Jews worship
(^-in \ n?) God "and not his works" (14.3a) refers to their monotheistic confession and intent but also
to their ethical worship, which is consciously in "imitation" of God.
114 Note repetition of "the Messiah" in 15.4-16.3 Sy.
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with the self-sufficiency of the creator who has no need of being worshipped by
means of calendrical, food, and bodily regulations.115 The "law of the Christians"
(16.1 Sy) contains no ritual strictures regulating such material worship of God. The
text makes no mention of Christian ritual practices which might be comparable to
those of the Jews (15.3-9).116 Rather, Christians daily offer service to God by
meeting the needs of others. They reapproriate material objects to their rightful place
within the scope of monotheistic worship, for meeting human insufficiency.
Philanthropy (love of neighbor) alone becomes the new law which fuses ritual and
ethic in pure, undifferentiated worship of the unique God, proceeding from the heart
in eschatological hope (15.3). Christians are then the only ones to truly worship the
one God alone with a worship that rightly harmonizes morality and ritual (cf.
17.3)!117
Z.-f Evaluation
In his Apology Aristides engages in a strategy of monotheistic classification.
He investigates four "races" of people "to perceive which among them participates in
truth and which in error" regarding the unique God (2.1). This is no simple empirical
exercise. Aristides recognizes the power of literary ethnographic production in
constructing a people's collective identity (cf. esp. Apol. 8-13), and he inscribes his
own polemically-useful ethnographies. Harnessing a mode of "ethnic reasoning," he
ascribes three different symbol systems with constitutive power in the production of
a people's collective identity qua ethnos: myth of shared descent, cultic worship, and
115 See nn. 70 and 109.
116 Christian fasting is no exception, for it is repatriated from the mandates of Jewish ritual
law to messianic ritual-moral code! Christians fast only "two or three days" at a time, as need
requires, "to supply to the needy their lack of food" (15.7 Sy)! Christian food restrictions (15.4: "they
do not eat food sacrificed to idols") is repositioned away from the rigors of Jewish "purification" laws
(ostensively in service of God) and joined with the prohibition against idol worship, as an explicit
statement of the unique God's self-sufficiency vis-a-vis the insufficiency of pagan "gods" (chs. 3-13).
117 In the Syriac Jesus is nowhere explicitly stated as object of Christian cultic devotion as he
is in Baiiaam (15.3b). His heavenly origin is affirmed (2.4 Sy; 15.1 Ba). He is once declared to be
God (2.4b Sy), yet the absence of this latter qualification in the Armenian and the parallel passage in
Barlaam (15.1) make it likely the attribution represents a later expansion. Lack of emphasis on Jesus
in cultic connection is consistent with the monotheistic program of Christian apologists (Joseph Lortz,
"Das Christentum als Monotheismus in den Apologien des zweiten Jahrhunderts," in A.M. Koeniger,
ed., Beitrdge zur Geschichte des christlichen Altertums [Bonn and Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder, 1922]
301-27). Christian worship is directed exclusively to the one God (in accord with messianic law). The
Syriac makes no attempt to reconcile the second figure, Son of the Most High God, with confession of
God's uniqueness (15.3b). Mentioning devotion to Jesus might have been, after all, too similar to the
rebuke against Jewish angel devotion (14.4b)!
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legal code. He then indexes sameness and difference between Christians and other
races on the basis of these mutually constitutive ethnic criteria as they interface with
the criteria of knowledge of the unique God (Apol. 1). The more these interlocking
ethnic systems tangibly cohere within a society's social structures, the closer that
group (qua ethnos) participates in "knowledge" of God. Conversely, the greater their
incoherence, the greater a people's "ignorance" of God. Monotheism (divine unity
and uniqueness) proves an important criterion for ethnic comparison because a
people's belief about the divine nature is intertwined (reflectively and productively)
with ethnographic accounts of their shared origin as an ethnos, from which their laws
and cult are established.
The Syriac text of Apology separates barbarians and Greeks, on one side,
from Jews and Christians, on the other. The former participate in devotion to many
"gods," whether elements, idols, or animals. They ascribe their ethnoreligious
heritage from Kronos and Rhea in a genealogical stemma produced through human
mythopoeic activity. Their myths have "introduced" many gods each with his or her
own moral or qualitative failings, excluding them from the divine nature."8 Further,
strife among the gods is incompatible with divine unity. These "gods" are no "gods"
at all, and cult to them is illegitimate. Pagan theogonies legitimate human
immorality, which in turn contradicts the people's own civic laws. Pagan ethnicities
are then constructed on polytheistic mythic systems incompatible with true
"knowledge" of the divine nature. Pagans and Greeks are "ignorant" and "in error."
By demonstrating the incoherence between their ethnic foundation myths and their
cultic practices and legal codes, the Athenian philosopher offers a comprehensive
ethnic argument against polytheistic races. Their status as harmonious and coherent
peoples is compromised by the very myths that shape and reflect their ethnic identity.
Jews and Christians participate in shared descent from Abraham, confess a
single creator God, and practice a common philanthropy based on essentially
identical systems of moral law revealed through their respective lawgivers and
consistent with the self-sufficient divine nature. Both participate (to differing
degrees) in true knowledge of God. Yet what distinguishes Christians and Jews is the
character of their ritual worship as it interfaces with their juridical code.
Unbeknownst to themselves Jews worship angels because their ritual regulations,
118 Against barbarians Apology harnesses only this aspect of the larger argument, yet
barbarians are inscribed into the theogonies fabricated by erudite Greeks and are subject to similar
indictments.
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performed ostensively in service to (i.e., on behalf of) God, cannot actually be
directed to the self-sufficient God who requires no such materially-based worship.
Only Christians possess a harmonious fusion of cult and law consistent with the
character of the unique God revealed by the eponymous head of their race.
Christians "have come nearer to truth and genuine knowledge than the rest of the
nations" (15.3).
Apology invokes a twofold strategy vis-a-vis the Jewish race. First, Aristides
aligns or aggregates Christian and Jewish peoples in an ethnographic account of
shared kinship. The lawgiver and founder of the Christian race was himself a
Hebrew, and his birth, ministry, and death are interwoven with the story of the
Jewish people (2.4 Sy, Ar). Writing to as large an audience as possible, the Athenian
philosopher situates the emergence of Christianness within a long-standing,
explicitly monotheistic historiography. The "new" Christian people (16.3 Sy:
rCzaj*.... v<5nn_x>) are not so new after all, for they share with Jews a wider kinship.
Identification with a well-known ethnic community with respectable ancestral
traditions represents a bid to enhance Christian social respectability as a recognized
ethnicity among the world's races. The creation of an ethnographic history
enfranchises Christians within a recognizable monotheistic historical tradition,
entirely separate from that of the polytheistic races. An aggregative ethnic strategy
allows Aristides to construct Christian peoplehood in terms of the specifically
superior elements of the Jewish ancestral tradition, their moral law and their
monotheistic cult, as these were grounded in a shared account of consanguinity. In
qualifying only the moral aspect of Jewish monotheistic worship as ancestral (14.3b
Sy: "from their fathers of old"), Aristides can identify Christians with the best of
Jewish heritage (monotheism and moral law).
The point at which ethnic difference most clearly emerges between the
monotheistic races is the intersection of their monotheistic ideals (embedded in their
ethnography) and ritual code. By inscribing Christian identity under a new lawgiver
whose messianic role involved the perfect fusion of moral and ritual worship of the
unique God in eschatological hope, Aristides can repudiate that aspect of Jewish
ethnicity which he regards as jeopardizing divine uniqueness and self-sufficiency
(Jewish ritual law). Precisely at this point Aristides harnesses a universalizing
strategy. He distinguishes the Christian ethnos as the race par excellence, the ideal
ethnos, to which all other peoples should aspire to participate (17.3 Sy; sim. Ba).
Only Christian society governed by messianic law perfectly fuses worship of the
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unique God in service of humanity under a harmonious account of shared descent.
Hence, only through the prayers of the Christian race does human society not
descend into chaotic disarray (16.6 Sy). He dissociates Christians from well-known
Jewish practices with little appeal to outsiders (e.g., circumcision!) and highlights the
most appealing aspect of Christian ethnicity, monotheistically-oriented philanthropy
and social harmony. By harnessing a category crucial for Jewish and pagan identity
(ancestral law)119 and invoking important Graeco-Roman aspirations for social
harmony, Aristides constructs Christian identity in immanently attractive terms.
Apology appeals to as large an audience as possible, exhorting outsiders to adopt a
new peoplehood, to forsake the polytheistic family or Jewish monotheism in favor of
Christian ethnicity by adopting Christ as one's lawgiver and ethnic head.120
5- Classification Strategies and Repositioning Jewishness
KP and Apology employ monotheistic classification strategies to schematize
human groups. Both explicit categorization schemas begin by describing the nature
of the one God (Exhortation fr. 2; Apology 1). Only then are human collectivities
indexed against the same fundamental criterion—"knowledge" of that God. Yet in
both cases this important criterion interacts in differing permutations with other
constitutive criterion/a. For KP, knowledge of God is measured in relation to a
group's manner of cultic worship. The two criteria are mutually constitutive of a
group's Geooefteia, their cultic participation in knowledge of the unique creator
God.121 In Apology, knowledge of God is interlinked with ethnoracial criteria—a
group's myth of shared descent, cultic worship, and legal code. The more
harmonious these interlocking ethnic symbols cohere as integrated social structures
119 Cf. Shayc J.D. Cohen, The Beginnings ofJewishness: Boundaries, Varieties,
Uncertainties (HCS 31; Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1999) 91-92.
120
Description of Christianness along ethnoracial lines is a rhetorical strategy attested
elsewhere in second-century Christian sources (Diogn. 1.1; Barn. 13.1-3; Melito Apol. [Eusebius
Hist. eccl. 4.26.5]; Mart. Pol. 3.2; 14.1; 17.1; 1 Clem. 29.1-30.1; Herm. Sim. 9.17), likely developed
in conversation with pagan (pejorative) depictions of Christians as a new or third "race" (Suetonius
Nero 16.2; Origen Cels. 5.35; Tertullian Nat. 1.8; Harnack, Mission, 1.240-78). Religious practice
constituted a marker inter alia for articulating ethnoracial (and civic) affiliation in the Graeco-Roman
world. For many "race" was considered fixed (given, stable) yet potentially fluid (mutable) and not
inherently tied to biology. Consequently, alternative ethnic identity could be acquired (or constructed)
by adopting new religious beliefs and practices, a point on which Aristides capitalized. Buell has
highlighted the importance of reclaiming "ethnic reasoning" for reimagining early Christian identity
construction ("Rethinking;" "Race and Universalism;" Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in
Early Christianity [New York: Columbia University Press, 2005]).
121 See nn. 26-27.
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in a society, the closer a group (qua ethnos) can be said to participate in knowledge
of the unique God. In both texts, the multivalent term yevoc, holds a specific
taxonomizing import, yet couched within distinctive modes of discursive reasoning.
KP manifests a specifically "cultic reasoning" with Christians presented as a "third
way" of worshipping (xpuco yever) the unique God.122 Apology, on the other hand,
invokes a mode of "ethnic reasoning" with Christians presented as one of "four
races" (r< s -nr< VQoo_i.Ju_iv<...v<m.u\ [=yevr|]).
These discursive strategies each masks its own distinct social concerns for
using the symbol of the unique God in construction of Christian identity vis-a-vis
Judaism.123 KP employs "cultic reasoning" in an oppositional, universalizing
strategy with respect to Jewish religion. It encodes for an Egyptian (?) Christian
audience a distinct cultic identity as the ideal religion most consistent with the nature
of the unique God vis-a-vis the universe of Jewish angelo-lunar religious practices
and the idolatry and zoolatry of Greek religion. The text roots Christian identity in a
comprehensive epistemology which reassigns the relative values of revelatory
knowledge versus ancestral tradition in the quest for authentic understanding of God.
This theory of knowledge legitimates the "newness" of Christian faith so that the
recipient community is emboldened in its monotheistic mission to Jews and pagans,
and can counter Jewish and pagan claims to "know" the unique God through
established ancestral traditions. Christian faith is the ideal cult to which all others
should aspire, since it is based on revealed religious practices from the distinctly
authoritative revealer figure, Jesus. Jews and Greeks may escape "ignorance" and
embrace "knowledge" of God through the revelation of Christ Jesus mediated
through apostolic tradition.
Apology harnesses "ethnic reasoning" in an aggregative, universalizing
strategy with respect to the Jewish race. By aligning Christian and Jewish races in a
myth of shared descent from the one God, Apology can separate revealed
monotheistic traditions from the common mythic origins of the polytheistic races and
can identify the best of Jewish monotheistic tradition (specifically its theology and
122 As Harnack (Mission, 1.247), Kinzig (Novitas Christiana, 146-47), and Cambe
(.Kerygma, 266-69) correctly observed. The groupings are described as modes of worship: "(tePecSe
kara -tout; "ETArjvaq," "oePeo6e Kara TouSaiotx;," and "o'l Kaivrix; ccutov xpltm yevet aepdpevoi
Xpicmavoi."
123 Collective identity is necessarily constituted in reference to "other" identities. See
Jonathan Z. Smith, "What a Difference a Difference Makes," in Jacob Neusner and Ernest S. Frerichs,
eds., "To See Ourselves as Others See Us": Christians, Jews, "Others" in Late Antiquity (Chico, CA:
Scholars Press, 1985) 3-48.
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moral law) with Christian tradition. Alternatively, by distinguishing Christian
descent from that of the Jews through a new messianic lawgiver-revealer figure,
Jesus, who brings about a convergence of ritual and ethical worship, Aristides is able
to present Christians not only as the best of the monotheistic tradition but as the
ethnos par excellence. Apology offers appeal to a wide Jewish and pagan audience to
forsake Jewish monotheism and pagan polytheism, respectively, in favor of a new
myth of shared descent from the Most High God through Jesus, the one who
accurately revealed him.
These strategies reveal some of the schematic variety employed by early
Christian communities vis-a-vis Jewish groups in ordinating Christians within their
social world, and they share one important similarity. Whether negotiating the
meaning of Christianness oppositionally (KP) or aggregatively (Apology) with
respect to Jews, Christian literary production of monotheistic classification strategies
situates Christian collective identity within the global framework of cults and
ethnicities in a way that necessarily repositions the meaning of Jewishness along
specifically monotheistic lines.
In the Second Temple era and beyond some Jewish communities were
engaged in their own programs of literary production to construct their corporate
identity (qua ethno-religion) vis-a-vis "hellenism." In this process they too used
discursive processes of cultic and ethnic reasoning.124 And claims to exclusivist
monotheism played an important role in the bid to assert Jewishness in terms of both
cult and ethnicity.125 By insinuating Christianity alongside already-extant Jewish
strategies of identity production by means of ethnic and religious discursive
reasoning, these Christian texts reposition Jewish identity and its monotheism within
these broader patterns of discourse.126 In the case of KP, Jewish cultic identity is
realigned away from their own public and apologetic claims of exclusivist
monotheistic worship to a Christianly constructed schema in which they are
regarded as worshippers of a comprehensive religion joining angels, moon, and
month. No longer encoded as consistent with true monotheistic worship, materially-
based Jewish religion is repositioned as incompatible with true "knowledge" of the
124 Lieu, "Race ofGod-fearers;" Cohen, "Beginnings," 109-39.
125 Infra ch. 2 §§2-3.
126 Production of ethnic and religious identity in terms of mythologic ethnographies was an
important discursive technique in second-century Greek milieux and polemic (Hall, Ethnic Identity,
65-66).
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unique creator God, whose authentic nature was revealed by Jesus Christ. In
Apology, Jewish public and apologetic claims of exclusivist monotheism and
harmonious peoplehood are upheld as ideals shared by Christians. Yet at the same
time the Jewish race is repositioned away from their own monotheistic cultic ideals
to a Christianly constructed schema in which their ritual practice is revalued as
inconsistent with the true self-sufficient nature of the unique creator God, who was
revealed by the messianic lawgiver. Apology repositions the only monotheistic race
which existed prior to Christians into second place among monotheistic ethnicities.
Christian monotheistic classification strategies are bids to develop collective
Christian identity by repositioning Jewishness along the lines of one of its most
treasured symbol systems, confession and cult of the unique creator God! These
strategies realign Jews away from their own ascriptive identity as participants in true
"knowledge" of God to a Christianly-constructed schema which images Jews as
"ignorant" of the unique God (KP) or as less-knowledgeable of his nature than
Christians (Apology). In both KP and Apology, Jesus played an important role in this
repositioning of Judaism as the revealer of the unique God. Jesus was constitutive in
both strategies for separating Christian "knowledge" from Jewish lack of knowledge.
In the next chapter we will see how the person of Jesus was even further an





The Emergence of "Two Powers" Hermeneutic Strategies
In the previous two chapters we examined two distinctive strategies in which
the symbols and rhetoric of monotheism are harnessed as powerful tools in the
construction of distinctively Christian identity vis-a-vis Judaism. For Ignatius (ch. 3),
divine unity is a weapon for resisting "Judaism." Frequent participation in the
eucharist under divinely-authorized episcopal authority regularly reconstitutes the
harmonious fabric of "Christian" life, lived as reflection and imitation of the unity
shared by God and Jesus in the gospel. Participation in unity with God and one
another through the sacramental meal is socially effective for producing specifically
"Christian" identity vis-a-vis the anti-gospel influences of those who preach or
practice "Judaism" in the church. Monotheistic classification strategies (ch. 4) invoke
monotheistic ideology and rhetoric in a literary process which lays claim to Christian
identity by repositioning Judaism within the global ethnoreligious framework. KP
and Apology use strategic discursive strategies to ordinate Christians in the religious
and ethnic universe alongside Jews and others. By distinguishing human groupings
on the basis of their "knowledge" of the one God, these texts secure the place of
monotheism as a constitutive element in the production and perpetuation of Christian
identity vis-a-vis Judaism.
This chapter examines a third strategy of monotheistic identity construction.
We investigate two texts that invoke creative, hermeneutic approaches to reread
Jewish scriptural traditions of exclusivist monotheism in new, specifically Christian
ways. Aristo of Pella's Disputation ofJason and Papiscus (hereafter JP\ §1) and
Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho (§2) maintain confessions of exclusivist
monotheism, yet they also evince a (pre-interpretive) worldview in which a second
heavenly figure, Jesus, stands in some cooperative relationship to the almighty
creator God of OT scripture. Through creative hermeneutical efforts, Aristo and
Justin shape and integrate their "two powers"1 worldview into the text of OT
1 The phrase does not imply that all such "two powers" readings designated Christ or God as
"power" (though, see Mark 14:62; 1 Cor 1:24; Herm. Vis. 1.3.4; cf. Herm. Sim. 5.6.1, 4; Justin Dial.
61.1-3; Clement Strom. 1.2.1A). The phrase mimics rabbinic usage. The rabbis polemicized against
certain minim who posited "two powers in heaven," whether those powers were conceived
cooperatively or oppositionally. By using a rabbinic phrase we are not implying that "two powers"
designates only Christians. It was "a catch-all term for many different groups—including Christians,
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scripture, specifically by insinuating Jesus into OT narrative texts alongside the
creator God.
These efforts, however, are much more than mere readings. They represent
conscious strategies to create a specifically Christian interpretive identity by
rereading traditionally Jewish texts (§3). Both JP and Dialogue demonstrate
awareness that the Hebrew scriptures (qua Jewish scriptures) are the only proper
locus for Christian-Jewish dispute. Their "two powers" readings are positioned
within a dialogic framework of polemic disputation with Jews. There is a clear sense
in both cases that what the text presents as "traditional" Jewish readings are being
supplanted (i.e., reread) by more authoritative readings. Additionally, JP and
Dialogue occupy pivotal moments in the story of second-century Christian literary
production. Though some "two powers" texts had already entered the tradition as
inherited testimonia, the shape of "two powers" textual encoding in these two works
is anything but standard. In their own unique ways, JP and Dialogue evince a certain
literary creativity in using "two powers" texts. This suggests their strategies were
creatively developed at important historical moments for the establishment of
Christian identity vis-a-vis Judaism. In the following discussion, we show how each
text represents a creative moment of "two powers" rereading of Jewish scriptural
traditions for the purpose of producing a Christian interpretive identity.
1. "Two Powers" Wisdom christoloey: Disputation ofJason and
Papiscus
JP represents the earliest example of a Christian literary genre newly
emerging in the second century, the Christian-Jewish dialogue.2 In this section we
examine extant evidence for this early source and suggest that it was dedicated in
part to scriptural proofs of a christological nature (§1.1). Constitutive to this proof-
gnostics and Jews" (Alan Segal, "Judaism, Christianity, and Gnosticism," in Stephen G. Wilson, ed.,
Anti-Judaism in Early Christianity. Volume 2: Separation and Polemic [SCJ 2; Waterloo, Ontario:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986] 141). Our use of "two powers" explicitly foregrounds the
polemic character of these types of arguments that occurred between Jews and Christians in the
second century (Alan Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and
Gnosticism [Leiden: Brill, 1977]).
2 A portion of another early Jewish-Christian work, the Anabathmoi Jakobou, contains
dialogic material and may be contemporary with JP (= Ps.-Clementine Rec. 1.44, 55-71; cf. Robert E.
van Voorst, The Ascents ofJames: History and Theology ofa Jewish-Christian Community [Atlanta:
Scholars Press, 1989] 80: "While any time between 135 and 260 is therefore possible as the date of
the A/, its similarities with the thought of Aristo indicate that the AJ could fit very well into the
middle of the second century").
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from-prophecy, JP harnessed a series of interrelated "two powers" texts—Gen 1:1
(§1.2) in combination with Gen 1:26 and Prov 8:27, 30 (§1.3)—to demonstrate the
preexistence and divinity of Jesus. This convergence of "two powers" proof-texts
employed at a pivotal, creative moment in Christian literary production renders JP
particularly interesting as a specimen of monotheistic "two powers" strategies of
rereading Jewish scriptural traditions (§ 1.4).
1.1 Narrative Framework andChristoloey
JP is reportedly the work of a Jewish Christian, Aristo of Pella,3 and was
composed in Greek4 between 135-160 CE, quite plausibly in the earlier half of that
range since it was very likely used by Justin in the composition of his Dialogue with
Trypho.5 The text of JP no longer survives and what little we know of it comes from
a few brief citations and descriptions.6 Among these, we learn something of JP's
basic genre and framework from a brief assessment in Origen's Contra Celsum and
from the epitome of Celsus Africanus in the letter prefacing his Latin translation of
3 So John of Scythopolis (Sc. my. th. 1.3 [PG 4 col. 422c]; misascribed to Maximus the
Confessor; cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Das Scholienwerk des Johannes von Scythopolis," Scholastik
15 [1940]: esp. 27-28). According to John, Clement, in book six of his Hypotyposes, attributed JP's
composition to Aristo (ev xx\ ouYYeypapnevri 'Ap'icrraivi to IleXWicp biaXe^et nccTUoicov ra'i
'Iaaovoq), while claiming further that saint Luke described the work (pv KAiiim? °
'AkeEavSpeh^.. .tov ayiov Aoukcxv (pr|aiv avaypd\|/ai). The latter represents perhaps a confused
reference to the Jewish Christian Jason of Acts 17:1-9. Aristo evinces knowledge of Hebrew (Jerome
Qu. hebr. Gen. 1.1 [PL 23 col. 937] and infra n. 12), is identified with a Palestinian milieu, cis-
Jordanian Pella (Hist. eccl. 4.6.3), and his own ethnoreligious identity may be reflected in that of JP's
protagonist, whom Celsus Africanus labels Hebraeus Christianus (Ps.-Cyprian Ad Vig. 8 [PL 6 coll.
54-55]).
4 Jerome Comm. Gal. 3.13 [PL 26 col. 361],
5 The terminus a quo is emperor Hadrian's proscription of Jews from Jerusalem (135 CE), an
event explicitly referenced by Aristo in JP (f/Eusebius' citation of Aristo comes from JP). The
terminus ad quem is 178 CE, since Celsus mentions JP (Cels. 4.52). A number of scholars propose that
Justin was in some measure dependent on JP when he inscribed his Dialogue (155-160 CE); so F.C.
Conybeare (The Dialogues ofAthanasius and Zacchaeus and Timothy and Aquila edited with
Prolegomena and Facsimiles [AOCS 8; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898] xxxv-xxxvii, xlvii-l; cf.
li-lvii), and Pierre Nautin ("Histoire des dogmes et des sacrements Chretiens" in Annuaire de
I'EPHESR 75 [Paris: Sorbonne, 1967/68] 162-67), followed by Pierre Monat (Lactance et la Bible:
Une propedeutique latine a la lecture de la Bible dans I'Occident constantinien [2 vols.; Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1982] 1.272-73). Oskar Skarsaune argued the point most forcefully and skillfully in
his masterful study of Dialogue. He suggested the "recapitulation" source behind Dialogue "might be
identical with" the lost JP (The Prooffrom Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr's Proof-Text Tradition
[NovTSup 56; Leiden: Brill, 1987] 234-42; cf. 380-91). If true, this situates JP before Dialogue.
6 Collected in C.T. Otto (ed., "Aristo," in Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum Saeculi
Secundi: Volume IX [Jena: Libraria Maukii (Herm. Duft), 1872] 349-63); cf. also PG 5.1277-1286.
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JP. Origen labels the work a "little text"7 and recounts that "in it a Christian has been
described conversing with a Jew from the Jewish scriptures and demonstrating that
the prophecies concerning the Christ (to\) Xproxon) fit Jesus."8 According to Celsus
Africanus, the Christian protagonist (Jason) is himself a Hebrew, and the Jewish
disputant (Papiscus) an Alexandrian.9 The African Celsus offers still further insight
into the narrative framework. He relates that Jason's teaching "prevailed in Papiscus'
heart," so that the latter came to believe that "Jesus Christ is the Son of God" and
promptly requested "the seal" (signaculum\ sc. of baptism) from Jason.
These terse yet informative descriptions reveal JP's dialogic character and
the significant place which the figure of Jesus assumes in the Christian-Jewish
discussion and eventual conversion of the Jewish disputant. The composition
invoked claims and counterclaims pursued within the locus of "Jewish scriptures."10
If we may place stock in the literalness of Celsus' assertion that Papiscus came to
believe "Jesus Christ is the Son of God," then the nature of the disputation may be
somewhat clarified. The dispute regarded at least two rubrics: proof of (1) Jesus'
messianic status (sc. Jesus, the Christ) and (2) his divinity (sc. Jesus, Son ofGod).11
Arguments of the former type are attested in a reference from book three of
Jerome's Commentarium in Epistulam ad Galatas. Jerome "recalls" (memini me)
that JP involved a discussion of the disputed phrase from Deut 21:23—^.otSopia
beon o Kpepapevoq ("a reproach against God is the one who is hung"). Given the
peculiar phrasing of the passage, Deut 21:23 was probably quoted by Papiscus rather
than the Christian Jason.12 In this case, Papiscus would have claimed from Deut
7 Cels. 4.52: To avYYpappdTiov; cf. to (3i.pA.iov (bis), which retains diminutive force. Hence,
the irony in Celsus' statement: "and especially if anyone should be patient enough to endure listening
to the treatises themselves!"
8 The copy of JP with which Origen is familiar was apparently inscribed 'Iricovo<; Kai
naTuaKoo avTiXoyia Tuspi XpiaToai.
9 Ad Vig. 8.
10 Twv iouSa'tKcov Ypcupwv. Origen's phrasing is not at all haphazard. Aristo situates the
debate of JP in the confines of Hebrew scriptures, which he regards as traditionally Jewish texts yet as
shared sacred tradition (§1.4).
" "Son of God" is a royal messianic title (2 Sam 7:14; Ps 2:7, 12), apart from implications
about messiah's divinity. If only this royal element were in view in JP, however, the confession
"Jesus the Messiah is the divine son" is redundant. This suggests claims to Jesus' deity were at stake.
12 The objective genitival reading of 0,ri7X tvbp agrees with that of the rabbis and Aquila
and differs from the subjective genitival reading of LXX Deut 21:23 (KEKocTtipapivoc; bizo eeou na<;
Kpepapevoi; etc! J^iAou) which Paul also employs (Gal 3:13: E7tiKaTdpatoi; [sc. by God] 7ca<; o
KpEpapEvoq etui Syukou); cf. Skarsaune, Proof, 238.
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21:23 that the messianic role is strictly incompatible with the status conferred on a
crucified person as a "reproach against God." Alternatively, if spoken by Jason, then
Aristo must have resisted applying the passage to Jesus.13 This brings us to proofs of
the second type.
1.2 Genesis hi—"In the Beginning"
The surest evidence that JP made an argument on behalf of Jesus' divinity,
and more specifically a "two powers" argument, also comes from a recollection of
Jerome. In Quaestionum hebraicarum liber in Genesim, Jerome observes:
In the beginning (in principio) God made heaven and earth. Many
reckon—just as has been written (scriptum est) in the Disputation of
Jason and Papiscus and [as] Tertullian in the book against Praxeas
discusses (disputat), and [as] even Hilary in the explanation of a certain
Psalm asserts (ajfirmat)—that in Hebrew is contained (haberi): In the
Son (in jilio), God made heaven and earth. But the reality of the actual
matter (res ipsius) proves [this] to be false.14
Jerome notes some measure of popular support for the opinion that the
Hebrew text of Gen 1:1 explicitly reads "In the Son, God made heaven and earth,"
though he himself rejects the textual reading. As evidence he cites Aristo, Tertullian,
and Hilary. How should we understand Jerome's assertion? Does he intend simply
that Aristo, Tertullian, and Hilary mimick his own assertion, namely, that many think
the Hebrew contains a reading "in the Son" for Gen 1:1? Or, does Jerome mean that
these witnesses themselves actually lay claim to such a reading? Do they invoke a
In Hodegos 14, Anastasius the Sinaite recalls an earlier second-century dialogue between
Mnason ("the disciple of the apostles") and the Jew Philo (undoubtedly identified with "the
philosopher" from Alexandria) "over the divinity of Christ." He attributes to the Jew an allusion to
Deut 21:23: "What kind of God becomes a curse (Kaxtipa), as Paul says about Jesus?" This is all the
more intriguing because J. Edgar Bruns suggests the dialogic excerpt of Hodegos draws on JP ("The
Altercatio Jasonis et Papisci, Philo, and Anastasius the Sinaite," TS 34 [1973]: 290-94; on the
ascription Philo for Papiscus and Mnason for Jason, see Lawrence Lahey ["The Christian-Jewish
Dialogues through the Sixth Century (excluding Justin)," in Oskar Skarsaune and Reider Hvalvik,
eds., Jewish Believers in Jesus: A History from Antiquity to the Present. Volume 1 (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson, 2007; forthcoming) 8-9 nn. 34, 36]. Our thanks to the author for a pre-publication copy,
to which the page numbers correspond). Bruns opines, "[I]t would be reasonable to suppose that the
passage Anastasius is attempting to recall read 'What sort of God becomes a curse, which is what Paul
says of Jesus? Does not the Scripture say that he who is hanged is the reproach of God?" (i.e.,
koiSopia Geou).
13 Jesus can be vicariously cursed by God (so Paul) but cannot be a reproach against God.
14 Qu. hebr. Gen. 1.1.
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Hebrew text (or midrash)15 of Gen 1:1 which reads or interprets p2 in place of
rp^N~D? Alternatively, does he simply report that these three authors offer a Greek
or Latin translation of ITEiX"!? as ev apxfi or in principio and that they subsequently
interpreted this translation as "in the Son" via the formula 'Apxq Qeov/Principium
Dei = Christ, the Son of God?
When Jerome claims that Tertullian "discusses" a textual reading of Gen 1:1
which purports that the Hebrew explicitly reads In filio fecit Deus caelum et terram
(= pNH nNl CTQtiin nN crr6$ N"12 ]23), he is partly correct. Tertullian does
"discuss" a christological reading of Gen 1:1, yet the phrasing of the text he offers is
different than that recalled by Jerome. "Some even allege," Tertullian claims, "that
Genesis begins in Hebrew: In the beginning God made the Son."15 Though
dismissing this textual reading out of hand, Tertullian gives credence to the claim
that some regarded the Hebrew of Gen 1:1 to include explicit reference to "the Son."
It is interesting to note that in the form of Gen 1:1 which Tertullian recalls, an
interpretation in which "the Son" equates with Principium (Dei) is precluded, for
"the Son" appears alongside, not in place of the phrase "in the beginning." As for
Hilary, Jerome is again slightly mistaken. Hilary does indeed register the claim that
the Hebrew makes (implicit) reference to "the Son." "Bresith," he says, "contains
three significations: in principio, in capite, and in filio."]1 However, this is a much
more interpretive approach to Gen 1:1 than Jerome's claim would lead us to believe.
It hardly substantiates his assertion that "the Son" existed in the Hebrew text. Hilary
does demonstrate how christological "in the Son" readings of Gen 1:1 could be
exploited by Christians from what they regarded as the polysemy of the opening
word of Gen: rPttfN~)2. Neither Tertullian nor Hilary give evidence of a Hebrew
reading of Gen 1:1 corresponding precisely to Jerome's suggestion.
15 A christological midrashic reading of Gen 1:1, for example, seems to be presupposed in
Irenaeus Epid. 43, preserved only in Armenian. J. Payne Smith believes Irenaeus' Greek translation of
the Hebrew can be reconstructed from Armenian as "uiov ev dpxfj ektioev o 0eo<;, eteeito, tov
obpavov Ka'i xf]v yf|v." From Irenaeus' corresponding Hebrew transliteration (Baresith Bara Eloim
Basan Benuam Samenthares), Smith reconstructs the Hebrew as follows: "P"13) DTPK N73 rTBN73
fHNn PNl DTiD r,N "inxi p (iHttf ("Hebrew Christian Midrash in Irenaeus Epid. 43," Biblica 38
[1957]: 24-34). Pierre Nautin argues for a slightly different order in Irenaeus' Greek text (ev dpxfi
eKxtoev o 6eo<; uiov, 'iiteixa xov oupccvov icai xryv ynv), which he claims the bishop owed to direct
dependence on the reading of Gen 1:1 in JP ("Genese 1,1-2, de Justin a Origene," in In Principio.
Interpretations des premiers versets de la Genese [EPHESR 152; Paris: fitudes Augustiniennes, 1973]
84-86).
16 Prax. 5.1.
17 Comm. Ps. 2.
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In light of these notes, we may with confidence project from Jerome's claims
only that in JP "has been written" some christological reading of Gen 1:1 that
insinuates "the Son" into the verse. The precise discursive mechanism invoked in the
argument of JP's dialogue and whether the phrase "the Son" was present textually
(as in Tertullian) or only potentially (as in Hilary) cannot be recovered with any
certainty.18 Yet we may safely conclude that Aristo did use a "two powers"
argument from Gen 1:1. We cannot confidently assert whether JP contained a
Hebrew or Greek text of Gen 1:1 corresponding to the Hebrew counterpart of
Jerome's textual claim (In filio fecit Deus caelum et terram). Nor are we able to
assess whether JP replaced JTON~I2 with ev dpxfj and midrashically transformed the
resultant translation via ev apxfl = in Filio. We are secure only in claiming that JP
utilized Gen 1:1 in a christological manner, in a way which insinuated Jesus as a
second authority alongside the one God in the very act of creation. Both Tertullian
and Hilary are aware that the christological invocation of Gen 1:1 is a Christian
argument designed to locate Jesus "the Son" as necessarily prior to the creation of
the world (i.e., preexistent) and as unique agent in the creative act (i.e., divine). We
should assume no less for the reading present in JP. Aristo's dialogue harnessed a
quintessential passage from Jewish creation myth in a manner which insinuates
Jesus, the Son of God, alongside the one God of the OT in the act of creation and
thereby demonstrated that the Son of God (1) was present with God at the act of
creation and (2) was necessarily preexistent and divine.
The importance of the mediation of a second figure in the act of creation for
the argument of JP may also be hinted at from the critique which the pagan Celsus
levels against the writing in his 'A^r|0Tiq Xoyoq. He comments:
I know a work of this type, a Disputation (dvtiXoyiav) of a certain
Papiscus and Jason, deserving not of laughter but rather of pity and
hatred. Therefore, it is not my concern to refute these things (raut );
for it is evident to everyone, and especially if anyone should be patient
enough to endure listening to the treatises themselves. But (dAX') I
prefer to teach this (ekeivo) in conformity with nature (tt]v <pucnv):19
God makes (e7touioev) nothing mortal; but whatever beings are immortal
are works of God (eeo-D.. .Epya), and mortal beings are their works. And
the soul is the work of God (9eou epyov), but the nature of the body is
18 Adolf Harnack, Die Uberlieferung der griechischen Apologeten des zweiten Jahrhunderts
(TU 1/1-2; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1882) 119: "Moglich ist es freilich, dass in der Altercatio von
Jason gesagt worden ist, die hebraischen LA [=Lesart] sei: „In filio fecit etc.",...aber ebenso moglich
ist, dass Jason den Anfang der Genesis lediglich so interpretirt hat."
19 On the accusative of reference, see BDF §160.
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different. In this respect, nothing will differ between the body of a bat, a
worm, a frog, or a human. For [their] material is the same, and their
corruptibility is similar.20
Rather than refute "these things" Celsus prefers to teach "this" in accordance
with nature. What are "these things" and "this" to which he refers? "These things"
clearly bears some relation to the text of JP, which Celsus has just reviled as
"deserving not of laughter but rather of pity and hatred." Does the pronoun refer to
writings of the same type as JP or perhaps to arguments of the type contained in JP?
The latter solution is preferable.21 "These things" is closely contrasted (aAA') with
"this," which Celsus prefers to teach. The proximity suggests that "these things" and
"this" are both doctrinal in nature. By identifying the content of "this," we can
perhaps unlock the content of JP's teaching to which Celsus refers.
In his subsequent argumentation, Celsus makes claims about the creation of
the world, the nature of God and humans, and the involvement of secondary agency
in the creative act. The divine nature is "immortal." God, he therefore claims,
fabricates only "immortal beings" (sc. heavenly agencies) in accordance with natural
law. By extension God also forms that immortal part of the human, the soul. The
world of mortal things and earthly bodies is, in turn, manufactured through the
mediation of secondary created agencies. All "mortal" bodies are composed of
common material and bear a similar nature, subject to corruptibility, unlike the
"immortal" God. Celsus advocates a certain devolution of agency in the creative act,
in accordance with natural law. It is now clear that "this" to which he refers is a
doctrine of creation, creative agency, and the natural law according to which all
things are organized.
We may presume that "these things" of JP, with which Celsus closely linked
"this" of his teaching, include inter alia reference to arguments in JP about the
divine nature, secondary mediation in the act of creation, and the ordered structure of
the natural universe. Further, rather than refute "these things" as JP teaches them,
Celsus pursues "this" argument from a different tack, according to natural law (tt]v
cpuCTiv). This suggests that JP makes its demonstrations from scriptural proofs rather
than natural law. We do know that JP mentions the traditional Jewish teaching of
20 Cels. 4.52.
21 This much is later confirmed by Origen. Speaking directly of JP, he comments, "Therefore
Celsus says that it is not his 'concern to refute these things (rama; i.e., the arguments of JP),'
because he thinks these things (aira) 'are evident to everyone,' even before the production of a
reasoned refutation, that they are ordinary and 'deserving of pity and hatred'" {Cels. 4.53).
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"seven heavens" (enta obpavobq), and thus contains some discussion of the cosmic
structure.22 This is very much in keeping with what Celsus seems to claim about JP.
We have also seen that themes of creation and secondary agency were involved in
JP's "two powers" argument from Gen 1:1. The overlap with Celsus is surprising!
He provides additional confirmation that the idea of God's creative activity through
external agency (i.e., Jesus) and the structure of the cosmos constituted important
aspects of Jason's proof to Papiscus. Indeed, Celsus' rebuttal on this topic and the
prominence of similar issues in the extant fragments of JP indicate that the themes of
creation, secondary agency in creation, and cosmic structure and order held a highly
important place in the overall argument of the "little book." JP must have harnessed
an even lengthier discussion of secondary agency in creation than the christological
reading of Gen 1:1 alone would suggest. In the next section, we offer evidence that
the "two powers" argument of JP was closely aligned with additonal "two powers"
proof-texts, Gen 1:26 and Prov 8:27, 30.
1.3 Remnants ofjP's "Two Powers" in LaterDialogues
We may yet be able to recover remnants of JP's structure and argument from
several later Christian-Jewish dialogues,23 the Greek Dialogues of Athanasius and
Zacchaeus (AZ; late fourth-early fifth c.) and of Timothy and Aquila (TA\ fifth-sixth
c.; extant in a long [LR] and short recension [SR]), as well as the Latin Simon and
Theophilus (STh\ early fifth c.).24 Fred Conybeare speaks of these three as
"independent recensions" of some older dialogue, which he supposes to be JP.15 He
22 Sc. my. th. 1.3 (cf. supra n. 3). On the Jewish nature of this motif, see Otto ("Aristo," 363).
23 More than two centuries separate Justin's Dialogue and the next intact dialogue, AZ. We
possess fragments of a third-century dialogue (POxy 2070); other (possibly dialogic works) are lost
entirely (Pros Joudaious ofMiltiades and of Apollinaris [cf. Eccl. hist. 5.17.5; 4.27]).
24
Conybeare, Dialogues', "A New Second-Century Christian Dialogue" (Expositor 5, 5th
series [1897]): 300-20, 443-63 [trans, of AZ from Armenian]. Lawrence Lahey, "The Dialogue of
Timothy and Aquila: Critical Greek Text and English Translation of the Short Recension with an
Introduction including a Source-critical Study" (unpublished PhD thesis; Cambridge, 2000); Adolf
Harnack, Die Altercatio Simonis ludaei et Theophili Christiani (TU 1/3; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1883).
William Varner, Ancient Jewish-Christian Dialogues: Athanasius and Zacchaeus, Simon and
Theophilus, Timothy and Aquila. Introductions, Texts, and Translations (SBEC 58; Lewiston;
Queenston; Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004).
25 Anticipated in "Second-Century Dialogue," 300-01, but developed at greater length in
Dialogues (xxxiv, li-lvii).
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is followed by others26 amid some dissenting voices.27 The question of dependency
on JP remains debated, and William Varner rightly warns against "dogmatism about
the conclusions of source-critical study."28 Nevertheless, we find the initial
arguments of Lawrence Lahey presented in his Cambridge doctoral thesis intriguing
and in part convincing. Lahey takes up Conybeare's proposal and prepares a series of
three tables comparing shared material within these later dialogues. He obviates any
suggestion that this shared material was derived from Tertullian's Adversus Judaeos
or Cyprian's Testimonia by omitting elements which might have come from these
two stores. Lahey comments:
This material extends beyond shared Bible testimonies; it includes
incidents, arguments, order, and small remarks. AZ and STh share some
different and some of the same material as TA and AZ, showing that AZ
and STh share the same contra Iudaeos dialogue source. Because of the
great amount of material shared between TA and AZ, perhaps it could be
argued that TA is dependent upon AZ. But TA has strong resemblances
with STh, which show that they shared a dialogue source independently
of AZ. This probably indicates that TA independently obtained the
material shared with AZ from the same source AZ and STh share.29
Lahey believes these "close resemblances" offer sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the shared source behind these dialogues "almost certainly is Jason
and Papiscus since the source is a contra Iudaeos dialogue, probably quite early, and
Jason and Papiscus existed in a Latin translation."30 It does not appear to have been
26
Lahey, "Short Recension," 74-89. The suggestion of dependence has received greatest
attention in regards to STh: Vacher Burch ("The Altercation Between Simon the Jew and Theophilus
the Christian," in J. Rendel Harris, Testimonies [2 vols.; Cambridge: University Press, 1916] 1.94-96)
and Harnack (Altercatio, 115-30), who later (in his review of Corssen's Altercatio [TLZ 15 (1890)
coll. 624-25]) sympathized somewhat with Peter Corssen's conclusion that STh depends on
Tertullian's Adversus Judaeos, Cyprian's Ad Quirinum, and JP (Die Altercatio Simonis Iudaei et
Theophili Christiani aufihre Quellen gepriift [Jever: C. L. Mettcker u. Sohne, 1890]). More
cautiously, Bernd Reiner Voss {Der Dialog in der friihchristlichen Literatur [STA 9; Miinchen: W.
Fink, 1970] 24 et esp. n. 10).
27 A. Lukyn Williams, Adversus Judaeos: A Bird's-Eye View ofChristian Apologiae until the
Renaissance (Cambridge: University Press, 1935) 30, 117 n. 2. Eduard Bratke, "Epilegomena zur
Wiener Ausgabe der Altercatio legis inter Simonem Judaeum et Theophilum Christianum"
(SPHKAW 148; Wien: Carl Gerold's Sohn, 1904) 131-33, 158-78. Patrick Andrist (Le Dialogue
d'Athanase et Zachee: Etude des sources et du contexte litteraire [PhD thesis; Universite de Geneve,
2001] 289-91).
28 Ancient Jewish-Christian Dialogues, 11-12.
29 "Short Recension," 74.
30 Ibid.
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Justin's Dialogued The presence of the Jewish disputant requesting baptism at the
end of all three post-Constantinian dialogues is particularly conspicuous32 and
indicates that they derive from a precursor within the dialogic tradition. It further
suggests JP as that source since this comports closely with Celsus Africanus'
description of the baptism of Papiscus.33
If Lahey's identification of the "shared source" of these dialogues as JP is
correct—we grant it here—then we have some substantive basis on which to make
additional claims regarding lost material in JP. Specifically, material contained in all
three later dialogues stands a chance of being original to the source behind them,
presumably JP. Fortunately, Lahey catalogued eleven examples of triple tradition
material, the first five of which are particularly interesting. We quote him here:
1. Quite near its beginning, Jason and Papiscus prominently featured the Jewish objection
that Christians violate the unity of God by worshipping Christ, and thus two Gods. Isa
44:6 and some other scriptures treating the unity of God are given as proof. Minor
Christian denials. (LR 1.5-6 [SR II.4-6], 1.8; AZ 1, 2b; STh 2a-4a, 6a-b.)
2. The Jewish objection is countered with Christian proofs from Genesis ch. 1, especially
1:1, showing the Son is the Beginning by whom God created heaven and earth, and 1:26
where 'Let us make' shows God addressing the Son...(LR 4.10-14 [SR VII. 1-3]; AZ3c,
4d-5b; STh 8b.)
3. Jewish objection that Gen 1:26 was spoken to the angels, and sarcasm noting that the Son
is not mentioned alongside the Father in Genesis. (LR 4.19-20 [SR VII.8-9]; AZ 6a, 12c;
STh 8a, 9a.)
4. Further Christian proof of the Son with the Father during creation based on Prov ch. 8.
(LR 5.5 [SR VIII.3; X.4-5]; AZ 13a; STh 1 lb.)
5. Jewish objection that Prov 8 speaks of God's Wisdom. (LR 5.21; AZ 13b, d; STh 12a.)34
The standardized form in all three independent dialogues renders it
likely that JP comprised something approximating this basic pattern.35 Table 1
31 AZ does not depend directly on Dialogue (Andrist, Le Dialogue, 199-201, 274). STh is
more directly related to Tertullian's Adversus Judaeos, Cyprian's Ad Quirinum, and a collection of
allegorical interpretations of scripture (possibly Origen's Tractatus de libris Scripturarum\ Pierre
Battifol, "Une source nouvelle de l'Altercatio Simonis Judaei et Theophili Christiani," RB 8 [1899]
337-45; cf. Bratke, "Epilegomena," 109-58; Harnack, Altercatio, 110-15) than to Dialogue. The
later dialogues conclude with a baptismal scene and begin with a discussion on divine unity
containing common order and elements (vide infra) not shared by Dialogue, suggesting a source other
than Dialogue for their framework.
32 AZ 130a-b [Armenian]; STh 29-30; LR 57.5-6 [SR XXVI. 1-2], 16-17 [XXVII.2, 4],
33 Ad Vig. 8.
34 "Short Recension," 87-89.
35 The argument for a "two powers" reading from Gen 1:1, 1:26, and Prov 8:27, 30 in JP is
perhaps further substantiated from Maximus of Turin's Contra Judaeos, which Conybeare suggests
depends on JP (Dialogues, xliv). Maximus' work links Gen 1:1 with Prov 8:22 (and additional
verses? Three illegible lines follow in the MS) and Gen 1:16-17, 26.
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compares the placement of the relevant "two powers" texts (Gen 1:1, 1:26, and Prov
8) within these later dialogues.
Table 1. Dialogic Proof-texts
"Two Powers"
Proof Text
AZ STh TA LR [SR]
Gen 1:1 8b
4.6,10; 6.5a
[\TI.l; IX.42; cf. VIII.9]
Gen 1:26 3, 5, 7-9,11-12 8c
4.12,14, 20; 6.4, 7;
cf. 19.14
[VII.2-3; IX.40-41]
Prov 8:22-31 13: Prov 8:27, 30 11: Prov 8:22-31
5.5: Prov 8:27-30
[VIII.3: Prov 8:25, 30]
[X.4-5: Prov 8:27, 30]
Despite minor variations in order, the bolded passages are closely clustered
within their respective arguments. In the argument of STh36 and both long and short
recensions of 77137 a christological interpretation (not textual attestation) of "in the
beginning" (Gen 1:1) is closely integrated with a reading of Gen 1:26 in which the
Christian interlocutor capitalizes on syntactic plurality within the majesterial
fiat—"Let us make man in our image"—to demonstrate that there preexisted
alongside the one God a second personal, divine agent at creation. Though AZ makes
36 8b: Nam si velles credere, poteris et in principio eius invenire, quis est Christus, dei
filius. Sic enim in principio, ait, fecit deus caelum et terram, hoc est in Christi arbitrio et ad eius
voluntatem et ad cuius imaginem hominem facere dignatus est; dicit enim: Faciamus hominem, et
rursus infra dicit: Fecit deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem dei; masculum et feminamfecit
eos.
37 LR 4.10, 14: eutovxoi; xox> Xpiaxiavoir 'Ev apxfi ettolr|aev o Seoi; xov oupavov Kai xt)v
yfjv Kai 7cdvxa tov Koapov auxa>v...Ka0©<; 7tpoei7tapev, ttepi xob dvOpcorcou oiIk ei7cev yevr|0T]xw,
aXXa- jroif|a©p,ev av0pw7tov kccx' e'tKova Tpiexepav Kai Ka0' opoiraciv. xivi eXeyev; 6.5a: e'u; 8e
xov dv0po)7tov Ttoifjocopev e'uuev. eXeyev 8e xw Gaupactxro aupjkroXcp x© ev apxfj ovxi, ou ai
ei;o8oi dip' fipEpwv a'uovoi;, ou xqv yeveav ovSeii; Stivaxai 8ir|ypaao0ai.
SR VII. 1: o 8e Tipo0eo<;...ei7xev'Ev apxfi Ercolr|OEV o 0eo<; xov obpavov Kai xqv yf|v, Kai
xa E^rp;. Kai ettayei p ypaipq Xeyouaa- IIoif|a©p,ev av0pco7tov Kax' e'lKova rpiexepav Kai Ka0'
opoi©aiv. xivi eXeyev...; IX.41-42: Et7tev o 0eo<;- IIoif|a©p.ev av0p©7tov teax' e'lKova ppexepav
Kai Ka0' opoimaiv. eav xoi<; ayyeXou; cruxon eircev 7t©<; ovk eutev lloipaaxe av0pwjrov Kax'
e'lKova epov; aXXa xivi eXeyev; x© 'Aya0© Kai XupfkruX© x© ev dpxTj ovxi, on ai e^oSot dip'
fipepmv a'uov©v, Kai xqv yeveav anxob ouSeic; Sdvaxai SiTiyrjoaaGai.
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no reference to Gen 1:1, Gen 1:26 is heavily invoked to the same end. Proverbs 8
follows on the heels of this closely integrated argument from Genesis 1 as further
proof of this second figure. The texts manifest variation in the extent of the textual
citation from Prov 8. At a minimum they share verses 27 and 30. Here, too, the
Christian disputant harnesses some inherent grammatical plurality in the text to
insinuate a second figure into the act of creation. "When he [sc. God] prepared the
heavens, I was with him (oup,7tapripriv afreed)... / was beside him (r]pr|v reap'
an-tcp)." Each text pursues its argument somewhat differently, though in every case,
the second agent is demonstrated to be a personal counselor to God (hypostatized
Wisdom, Logos, Advisor) at creation who is to be identified with Jesus. And in every
dialogue the Christian interlocutor appropriates a certain nuance in the syntax of the
scriptural text which is then read quite literally in a christological fashion. These are
"two powers" texts from Jewish Wisdom traditions.
The mounting congruence of evidence from these later dialogues suggests
that near the beginning of JP was developed an argument for the preexistence of
Jesus alongside the one God as his counselor and assistant in creation. This argument
appealed to certain "two powers" texts from Jewish Wisdom traditions, including
Gen 1:1, 1:26, and Prov 8:27, 30, probably in that order.38 The "two powers"
demonstration was probably constructed in response to a preemptive Jewish
objection from Isa 44:6.39
I. J- Observations
Precise details of JP's argument are no longer recoverable, yet, we believe,
the broad framework of JP and the general discursive flow of its "two powers"
polemic are. If our previous observations are correct, then this "two powers"
argument was embedded within a narrative frame in which Jason and Papiscus
dispute inter alia the precise nature of biblical monotheism, the presence of
secondary mediation in creation, and the order of the natural world. Papiscus claims
38 The discursive order from Gen 1 to Prov 8 may be due to rhetorical constraints in each
dialogue. AZ and the long recension of TA begin their scriptural demonstration from Genesis
expressly as a matter of principle (cf. AZ 3; LR 4.7), and though no explicit parallel program is found
in STh or the short recension of TA (cf. SR VI.6-7) the practice of beginning from "in the beginning"
remains.
39 Alongside this verse is sometimes included Deut 6:4 (AZ 1; LR 1.5-6; cf. the complex
conflation of elements from Deut 6:4, LXX Ps 81:10, and Isa 44:6 in SR II.6 ["Hear, Israel, I am the
Lord your God, and besides me there is no God"]) and Deut 32:39 (STh 4).
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that the divine self-proclamation of Isa 44:6—"besides me there is no God"—
evidences a biblical doctrine of God's unity as numerical singularity (i.e.,
uniqueness), which precludes any complex unity of persons in the godhead. All
textual plurality must submit to this overarching truth. When God says therefore,
"Let us make" (Gen 1:26), the plural is, for sure, to be respected, yet it is also to be
read in a manner consistent with the grand self-predication claim of Isa 44:6. The
one God created, with the angels present and involved! This is for the Jew the
biblical doctrine of creation and mediation in Genesis 1. And Christian worship of a
second figure, Christ, in addition to the one God violates the simple unity of God,
which scripture teaches, because it implies that a second figure participates in the
divine nature.40 Jason, on the other hand, argues that the confession of God's unity
(Isa 44:6) must be regarded in terms of a complex of two divine entities operating as
one, and this is nowhere clearer than in the act of creation. For him, belief in "two
powers" in heaven is demanded by a series of scriptural texts that acknowledge the
preexistence and divinity of Jesus, precisely at the point of his involvement with the
one God in creation. Gen 1:1 and 1:26 demonstrate a plurality of two and only two
divine persons at creation. God enlisted not the assistance of angels but of a personal
aide-de-camp. The "us" of Gen 1:26 cannot be the multitude of heavenly angels,
because we learn from Prov 8:27, 30 that it is God's Wisdom, a single heavenly
counterpart, that cooperatively aids the one God at creation! The monotheistic
demands of Isa 44:6 must therefore be subjected to the clear reality of divine duality
in the chief creation passages. God's unity and uniqueness are understood in terms of
a complex unity of two persons who operate in unison of will. After all, how can
God's Wisdom do anything other than God himself? Papiscus' "traditional" Jewish
reading of Isa 44:6 and Gen 1 has been overturned, reread, in a way that Aristo
classifies as particularly compelling. For in the structure of the dialogue, Papiscus
finally concedes to the logic of Jason's scriptural polemic. He consents to the will of
scripture to believe that "Jesus Christ is the Son of God," and he is subsequently
baptized. The following observations help us assess the social function of JP's "two
powers" approach in shaping Christian interpretive identity.
First, the types of claim and counterclaim very likely used in JP bear
semblance to the realities of second-century Jewish-Christian debate. JP's probable
40 This is consistent with our observations on Jewish angel devotion and exclusivist
monotheism in ch. 2 §2.2.1.
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mention of Jewish appeal to Isa 44:6 has an air of authenticity. In section three of
Chapter Two, we witnessed the important role which Deutero-Isaianic passages (Isa
44:6, a favorite among them) assumed in rabbinic Jewish arguments to resist "two
powers" claims that threatened the rabbinic understanding of God's unity.41 In the
argument of JP, it was very likely invoked by the Jew to demonstrate that scripture
precludes the Christian understanding that a personal, divine advisor preexisted
alongside the one God at creation. Origen also attests the verisimilitude of Papiscus'
assertions. Commenting on JP, he observes, "and indeed as for the reply which the
other [sc. Papiscus] raises, it is neither vulgar nor inconsistent with the character of a
Jew."42 Having participated in several (third-century) debates with Jews himself,
Origen was intimately familiar with Jewish scriptural arguments, and his testimony
to Papiscus' approach is therefore all the more important. With the inclusion of Isa
44:6 in JP as a quintessential Jewish argument, we are in the presence of an authentic
second-century strategy used by Jews to counter Christian appeals to plurality in the
divine nature. Christian appeals to scripture to demonstrate "two powers" also have
verisimilitude, for by the end of the first century Christians were already using
certain "two powers" proof-texts in debates with Jews (see below). Christian use of
"two powers" texts against Jews thus adds to JP's authenticity as witness to the types
of second-century claims and counterclaims that Jews and Christians employed
against one another specifically respecting the nature of the one God.
Second, though use of "two powers" proof-texts is hardly novel in its own
right, with Aristo's production of JP we witness a doubly innovative moment of early
Christian literary production. In the first instance, his combination of Gen 1:1, 26 and
Prov 8:27, 30 into a coherent argument for "two powers" in heaven is distinctive.
Many "two powers" passages had already entered into Christian tradition as
testimonia (see further §2.2 below). As early as the mid-first century, the apostle
Paul had designated Christ "God's Wisdom" (1 Cor 1:24: 0eob oocpiav), linking him
ideologically to Jewish Wisdom traditions, such as Prov 8. Several later works
demonstrate the early Christian discovery of an auspicious phraseology in Prov
8:22—K-uproq EKTiaev pe apyj|v oScov aikob eiq epya avnov—that permitted
Christians to designate Christ (sc. God's Wisdom) as the "Beginning/Principle"
41 See Segal (Two Powers, esp. ch. 2, and "Judaism, Christianity, and Gnosticism").
42 Cels. 4.52.
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('Apxp) of all things.43 This further allowed christological appeal to Gen 1:1, as most
clearly epitomized in John 1:1-3. Early on then, Prov 8:22 and Gen 1:1 were
productive in christologically creative rereadings as a way to insinuate Christ into the
quintessential moment of creation.44 In his positioning of Christ in the creative act of
Gen 1:1, Aristo, it seems, stands on some traditional ground, yet he appeals to an
altogether different portion of Prov 8 (vv. 27, 30) than is traditional. Other "two
powers" texts were also employed by early Christians to support the motif of Christ's
preexistence and involvement in creation, including Gen 1:26. Barn. 5.5, for
example, invokes the latter in demonstration of Christ's copresence with God at the
founding of the world. Yet proving Christ's preexistence is not the focus of his
argument but is made to subserve a much larger polemical purpose. Barnabas wishes
to highlight the depth of Christ's condescension (i.e., submission to God) in
becoming incarnate and suffering and, thereby, to heighten the extent of his
obedience to God in saving Christians and in bringing to completion the totality of
Jewish sins (5.10-11). Aristo, however, in appealing to Gen 1:26, makes
demonstrating a plurality of "two powers" operative in the creative act the very point
at stake. He singles it out as an explicit proof-text. In this he is distinctive.
Thus we see that Aristo involves himself in a highly creative moment of "two
powers" discursive production. In JP, we witness the blooming of three traditional
precursors from Gen 1 and Prov 8 into a confluence designed to make a coherent
demonstration of the preexistence and creative power of Christ at God's side. JP is
the first time these proof-texts are explicitly referenced together as textual stores to
demonstrate the existence of "two powers" in heaven. Among earlier works that use
traditional precursors from Prov 8 and Gen 1, the gospel of John offers the most
conspicuous counterpart to JP and is its nearest ideological forerunner. From the
opening verses, the gospel explicitly insinuates the preexistent Word of God into the
act of creation in a "two powers" claim from Gen 1. "In the beginning was the Word,
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. This one was in the beginning
43 Cf. Col 1:15-18; Rev 3:14; 21:6; 22:13; Theophilus Autol. 2.10; Justin Dial 61.1, 3; and
possibly KP fr. 2 (cf. supra ch. 4 Excursus).
44 On "les relectures protochretiennes de Prov 8,22 et de Gen 1,1" see Michel Cambe
(Kerygma Petri. Textus et commentarius [CCSA 15; Turnhout: Brepols, 2003] 209-16), who
mentions Col 1:12-14 [sic; 1:15-18]; Rev 3:14; 21:6; 22:13, C.F. Burney ("Christ as the ARXH of
Creation. (Prov. viii 22, Col. i 15-18, Rev. iii 14.)," JTS 27 [1926]: 160-77), A. Feuillet (Le Christ
Sagesse de Dieu d'apres les Epitres pauliniennes [EBib\ Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1966] 188-91,
195-96, 198-99), and Pierre Prigent («In Principio. A propos d'un livre recent» RHPR 54 [1974]:
391 -97). John 1:1-3 should also be mentioned.
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with God. All things were created through him, and apart from him nothing was
created that has been created." Christ preexisted and was personally active in
creation as God's Logos. And John's gospel plays out this claim specifically in the
context of a dispute between the Christian community and Jewish leaders over the
social and cosmic significance of this divine Word. Even here, however, Aristo
remains distinctive. The gospel of John does not invoke the three texts together, nor
does it do so explicitly, nor as part of a demonstration, as does JP. Rather, God's
Word is projected into the act of creation as part of the gospel's a priori claim.
The comparison with John allows us to see yet another instance of Aristo's
creativity. When Aristo encodes his debate vis-a-vis Jews, he does so in a way that
does not pit the Christian community against the Jewish leadership (as the gospel of
John), but he envisions an individual Jew and Christian in theological debate, at the
end of which the Jew converts. Aristo is the first to inscribe these "two powers" texts
into a literary genre known as the Christian-Jewish dialogue.45 By developing this
genre, he directly juxtaposes the Jew and Christian in specifically polemic dialogue,
and engages them in a discussion that lies at the very core of Jewish and Christian
religion, on the meaning of exclusivist monotheism. The dialogue genre directly
positions Christian "two powers" readings of scripture vis-a-vis Jewish monotheistic
readings! This ties closely with our next observation.
Third, in JP both Jason and Papiscus recognize that the proper locus for
debating the nature of monotheism is the Hebrew scriptures. If the surviving reports
are reliable, both interlocutors are descendants of the Jewish race. Jason was a
Hebrew Christian and Papiscus, an Alexandrian Jew. This is certainly plausible, for
though JP is written in Greek, it evidences knowledge of readings derived
specifically from Hebrew textual traditions.46 In none of the extant testimony to JP
does a NT verse surface, and the polemic context over the divine nature, secondary
personal agency, and the nature of the created order lends itself particularly well to
those portions of Hebrew scripture that discuss these topics, namely, Genesis 1,
Proverbs 8, and Deutero-Isaiah. The value of the Hebrew text itself for establishing
monotheistic doctrine is not at stake.47 For both parties, it is sacred scripture. Only
the interpretation of the shared tradition is disputed. This is further intimated from
45 See supra nn. 2 et 5.
46 See supra nn. 3 et 12.
47 Contrast this with Celsus, who appealed to the natural order for his cosmologic arguments
(§1.2).
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the order of the later dialogues (AZ, TA, and STh). If these later dialogues retain (as
respects the argument over monotheism) the original order of JP's structure, as
Lahey suggests, then Jason's appeal to Gen 1:1, 26 follows an initial Jewish
objection from Isa 44:6. In this case, it is the Jew who initially positions the debate in
terms of his (sc. Jewish) scripture. The debate takes place then on grounds of
shared sacred tradition, which are acknowledged as traditionally Jewish texts.
Fourth, these observations have direct implications on JP's involvement in
constructing a specifically Christian interpretive identity vis-a-vis a Jewish one. In
his novel use of somewhat traditional "two powers" texts and in his positioning these
proof-texts within a newly created genre that explicitly juxtaposes Jew and Christian
in debate on the grounds of shared scriptural traditions, Aristo engages in a highly
creative moment of early Christian exegetical and literary production. This creativity
implies a highly conscious and intentional effort and thus a peculiar strategy with
respect to Judaism. For Aristo to construct arguments from Jewish scripture was to
explicitly establish Christian identity vis-a-vis Jewishness. There is a conscious
strategy to oppose Jewish accusations with traditional Jewish texts, precisely by
rereading those texts in a creative Christian way. JP demonstrates at this mid second-
century stage of Christian-Jewish debate the importance of appeal to Jewish
(Hebrew) scriptures (rather than LXX) as a way of convincing Jews of the existence
of a second power alongside God and of legitimating this belief for Christians!
And Aristo's act of literary production did not fall on deaf ears. In contrast to
the pagan Celsus' scathing remarks, when he lambastes JP as "deserving not of
laughter but rather of pity and hatred,"48 we may compare the more sensible and less
ad hominem response of Origen. The latter questions why, "from all the writings
which contain allegories and interpretations in a respectable49 style," Celsus would
ever have singled out JP for ridicule. Indeed, JP, he describes, is "worthless" (to
euTeXeoxepov) for convincing more erudite readers such as Celsus, and it should
never have found place in his respectable argument from philosophy. Yet Origen
does not disassociate himself entirely from the work but describes it as "able to
contribute grace of faith (Tcioxecot; xocpiv) to the simple-minded masses."50 In this
48 Cels. 4.52.
49 EvKaTaippoviixov; lit. not contemptible.
50 Lahey, "Christian-Jewish Dialogues," 7: "These descriptions seem to point to a function JP
had as missionary literature. Neither writer says to whom JP might be directed beyond 'the more
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respect, he requests a more sympathetic attitude from his audience, encouraging
them "to be patient and to listen to our books and to make every effort towards
[understanding] the purpose, the conscientiousness, and the disposition of the
authors."51 It is perhaps the book's simple utility that resulted in JP's continued
durability and popularity in the coming centuries.52 Written in Greek, translated into
Latin, it was available to East and West, and became a model for many later
Christian-Jewish dialogues.53 JP's production of a distinctly "two powers" Christian
interpretive identity by rereading Jewish textual traditions was sustained long after
the book was written.
2. "Two Powers" in Scriptural Theophanies: Justin Martyr's
Dialogue'4
In his description of OT theophanies as narratives portraying pre-incarnate
appearances of a "second God" (exepoq 0Eoq)55who exists alongside the Maker of the
Universe and is named Jesus, Justin Martyr formulates a second innovative moment
in the story of emergent Christian "two powers" strategies (§2.1).56 To make the
case, Justin invokes in his Dialogue with Trypho (155-160 CE) several traditional
"two powers" proof-texts, yet his attention to textual detail in treating extended
theophanic passages reveals a highly creative hermeneutic strategy, free from
stringent dependence on any traditional interpretive precursor, Jewish or Christian
(§2.2). It has been suggested that the initial creative impulse for the development of
his "second God" argument from theophany may well have been conflict with
simple', but JP's audience seems likely to have included Jews, either directly, or indirectly by
preparing Christians for discussion with them."
51 Cels. 4.53.
52
Especially relative to the meager reception history of Justin's Dialogue.
53 As we have seen with AZ, TA, and STh. The reception of JP in later dialogues has been
best noted by Lahey ("Christian-Jewish Dialogues").
54 Sections 2.1 and 2.2 adapt and expand a portion of our contribution to the International
Conference on Justin Marty and His Worlds, held in July, 2006, at the Centre for the Study of
Christian Origins, New College, University of Edinburgh (seeWill Rutherford, "Altercatio Jasonis et
Papisci as Testimony Source for Justin's 'Second God' Argument?" in Paul Foster and Sara Parvis,
eds., Justin Martyr and His Worlds [Fortress Press, 2007, forthcoming]).
55 Or "another God." Justin also prefers d/.Xoq Geoc,. As a matter of course he interprets all
OT theophanies christologically (cf. Dial. 127.1-3).
56 Justin references theophanies in the following passages: Dial. 56-60; 62.5; 125.3-128.2; I
Apol. 63; cf. Dial. 37.4-38.1; 75; 86.2-5; 113.4, 7; 114.3.
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Marcion.57 Nevertheless, from the distinctive literary context and framework in
Dialogue, Justin clearly positions his "second God" argument within a discursive
strategy directed against Jewish accusations and queries in scriptural debate (§2.3).
His argument instantiates a truly original reading of OT theophany which legitimates
specifically Christian "two powers" interpretations as rereadings of traditional
Jewish texts, thereby producing a distinctively Christian interpretive identity.
2.1 The "SecondGod"Argument andJustin's Proof-Texts
Justin develops his most extended and involved treatment on the "second
God" in Dialogue 56-62, which is structurally divisible into two segments, chapters
56-60 (cf. 126-128.2) and 61-62 (cf. 128.2-129).58 The first segment invokes
theophanies; the latter augments the theophanic proofs with arguments from Wisdom
traditions (particularly Prov 8:21-36), and will not be discussed here.59 In the
theophanic portion Justin expounds on the appearances of God to Abraham at Mamre
and again at Sodom (56-57; cf. Gen 18-19), to Jacob at Bethel, Peniel, Luz, and
Haran (58; cf. Gen 31-32; 35; 28), and to Moses at the burning bush (59-60; cf.
Exod 3). The desideratum of the extended argument from theophany is clear—to
prove that "another God" existed alongside the supreme Maker of the Universe and
manifested himself in human form to the patriarchs. In this section, we briefly
examine the logic of Justin's "second God" theophanic argument and isolate the key
"two powers" proof-texts.60 For reasons which will become evident shortly the
discussion focuses only on the theophanies to Abraham at Mamre and Sodom
(56-57), which advances in three stages.
57 The argument may already have appeared in Justin's lost Syntagma, as Pierre Prigent
(Justin et I'Ancien Testament [EBib\ Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1964] 11-13, 117-33) and Oskar
Skarsaune {Proof, 210-12) propose.
58 Cf. Dial. 61.1: paprhpiov aXXo. Form and source-critical readings confirm distinguishable
types of material in these passages (Prigent, ibid., 121; Skarsaune, ibid., 388), yet the inclusion of the
Joshua theophany in 62.4 and Trypho's response to the entire "second God" proof (63.1) indicate
these units constitute a cohesive demonstration.
59 Dial. 61.1-62.4 is concerned with demonstrating the emission, preexistence, and creative
activity of the second God, whose existence was demonstrated from theophanies. Justin does not
evince the breadth of interpretive creativity in the second segment that he does in the first (see infra n.
83).
60 Benedict Kominiak treats the material extensively (The Theophanies of the Old Testament
in the Writings ofSt. Justin [SSTh 14; 2nd ser.; Ph.D. Diss.; Washington D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1948]).
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The argument begins quite boldly. "Now Moses, the blessed and faithful
servant ofGod," Justin asserts, "reveals that the one who appeared to Abraham at the
oak in Mamre is God, sent along with two accompanying angels for the judgment of
Sodom by Another, who ever remains in the supercelestial sphere, is seen by no one,
and never personally converses with anyone, whom we regard as Maker and Father
of the Universe" (56.1). As proof he offers a lengthy citation of Gen 18:1—19:28.61
The Jews with whom Justin converses fail to see how the passage demonstrates that
"a certain other is or is called by the holy spirit 'God' or 'Lord' besides (rcapa) the
Maker of the Universe" (56.3). Speaking on their behalf, Trypho claims, rather, that
God appeared to Abraham under the oak tree and was later followed by three
anthropomorphic angels, two of whom were sent to judge Sodom and another
commissioned to tell Sarah of her impending pregnancy (56.4b-10). The text
presents this reading of the theophany at Mamre as traditionally Jewish,62 and so it is
Justin's first task to refute it. He counters from a larger scriptural context. The text of
Genesis, he observes, records that one of the three who appeared to Abraham (and
who proclaimed Sarah's imminent pregnancy) promised to return at a later date (Gen
18:10), and when that one eventually did return, scripture explicitly designates him
"God" (Gen 21:12). Trypho concedes (albeit too quickly) the impossibility of the
"traditional" Jewish interpretation of the Mamre theophany and admits that it must,
rather, have been the creator God who appeared to Abraham along with two angels
(i.e., sent to judge Sodom; cf. 56.5). This concludes the first stage of the
demonstration, and Trypho delights in reminding Justin that he has yet to actually
show "there is another God besides (rcapa) this one who appeared to Abraham, who
also appeared to the other patriarchs and prophets" (56.9).
Dial. 56.11-14 advances the argument and represents the central passage of
the entire "second God" theophanic polemic. Justin now proposes to prove there
exists "another God" numerically distinct from the God who made all things yet who
is united with him in will,63 for, Justin claims, "he has never done or spoken anything
61 There is a gap in the text of 56.2 where Justin cites Gen 18:3-19:26. The interveningmi
id Xoxnd pixpi lot) is evidently a scribal addition (see Miroslav Marcovich, lustini Martyris.
Dialogus cum Tryphone [PTS; Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997] 161 app.) added
subsequent to the extraction of Gen 18:3-19:26 to shorten the lengthy citation. A similar addition
occurs at 59.2. Apparently Justin offered the extended citation (cf. Dial. 56.4 [dviaxopmv rcakiv id
jcpoXexSevia]; 56.12 [p ypaipq q rcpokekeypEvri: Gen 19:23-25]; 126.5).
62 The traditional nature of this reading is acknowledged by Justin (onep io rcav e0vo<; upwv
voei) and Trypho (ovxaiq yap mi pixpi t°v Se-Dpo Eixopev; 56.10).
63"EiEpo<; eoii iob id ndvxa 7toif]aavio<; 0eou- api0pq> <8e> Xeya. dXXa ov yvcopT].
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other than what the one who made the world—above (weep) whom there is no other
God—desired that he do or say" (56.11).64 Trypho is intrigued by Justin's claim and
shows fresh willingness to engage him in this next stage of the demonstration.65 At
this point Justin adduces his first foundational proof-text, Gen 19:24: "And the Lord
caused to rain down on Sodom fiery sulphur from the Lord out of heaven." The
passage is conspicuous for the double occurrence of the word "Lord," as even one of
Trypho's Jewish companions acknowledges. The textual anomaly, this Jew opines,
"necessarily" indicates that there exists besides (trapa) the creator "God" who
appeared to Abraham another "Lord" who judged Sodom and who must therefore be
one of the two angels (56.13). Granted Trypho's earlier deduction from the first stage
of Justin's demonstration, the deduction of his Jewish companion is entirely
consequent.66 From Justin's first proof, the Jews had deduced that the creator God
appeared to Abraham. Only a single position among the three visitors to Abraham
therefore remains viable for the second "Lord" introduced by Gen 19:24, namely,
that of one of the two angels sent to judge Sodom.
For now, Justin does not directly address the Jew's particular interpretive
turn, but simply ackowledges the appropriateness of his deduction from Gen 19:24
that scripture demands the existence of "two powers." One "must" (e8et) indeed
confess that "a certain other is also called 'Lord' alongside the one who is considered
the Maker of the Universe" (56.14). This is not only demanded by Moses from Gen
19:24. Other texts, too, from David show the existence of two "Gods" or "Lords."
Justin cites LXX Pss 109:1 and 44:7-8, which read, respectively: "The Lord says to
my Lord: Sit at my right hand until I set your enemies as a footstool for your feet,"
and, "Your throne, God, is forever and ever. The scepter of your kingdom is the
scepter of uprightness. You love righteousness and hate lawlessness. Therefore, God,
64 The "second God" exists alongside (7tapa) the Creator, does nothing contrary to (teapot)
the Creator's will, is not above (iittEp) him and yet is more exalted than a mere angel (see infra n. 69).
65 56.12: 'iva Ka'i -roikw 0DV0c6(iE0a!
66 This Jew does not offer "a veiled objection" {pace Kominiak, Theophanies, 36) but a
logical deduction. We cannot follow Kominiak when he suggests that the Jew's proposal, "if
inadvertently admitted by the apologist, would destroy his entire demonstration. For in that case, the
Lord on earth, who is distinguished from God the Father in heaven, would no longer be the one whom
Scripture explicitly calls God, as Justin wants to prove" (ibid.). Rather, the Jew graciously anticipates
Justin's logic from the double "Lord" of Gen 19:24, yet simply draws a faulty interpretive conclusion
because he is working from a position developed only after Justin's first argument. Further, the Jew
has not yet granted Justin's distinction between God in heaven and God on earth (a conclusion that
does not develop until the third of Justin's arguments), and he actually argues that both Gods appeared
on earth simultaneously. Nor does he distinguish between "God" and "Lord."
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your God, anointed you with the oil of gladness above your companions." Like Gen
19:24, both Davidic psalms contain double reference to "God" or "Lord," and Justin
capitalizes specifically on this grammatical nuance. These supplementary texts help
seal the conclusion to the second argument.67
These Davidic psalms further intimate a third and final stage in the argument
(56.15-23), for they fortuitously aid Justin in countering the Jew's prior proposal.
Justin offers a challenge, "If then you say that the holy spirit designates a certain
other as 'God' or 'Lord' besides (mpa) the Father of the Universe and his Christ [as
you do, it seems, when you refer Gen 19:24 to one of the two angels],68 defend
yourself to me" when we make our next (third) argument from Genesis (56.15).
Appealing to the royal, messianic genre of these psalms, Justin deduces that the only
correct attribution of the terms "God" and "Lord" in them can be to the Father of the
Universe and his Christ, not to a mere angel.69 The Jew who suggested one of the two
angels was "Lord" must answer for his proposal,70 for Justin now demonstrates in a
final stage of proof how the text of Genesis demands that the "Lord" who judged
Sodom and the "God" who appeared to Abraham be identified as the same individual
(56.15b). To do this he cites extended portions of Genesis 18 and 19, yet the
67 The messianic connection in 56.15 linking LXX Pss 109 and 44 to "Christ" is also
anticipatory of the extended argument in 63.5, 68.3, and 75.
68 First class conditional sentence, with the protasis granted for argument's sake.
69 The question of Justin's christology is too complex to engage here. Clearly, he capitalizes
at times on the fact that scripture designates the "second God" as "Angel" (56.4, 10; 58.3, 10; 59.1, 3,
etc.), yet by this "not nature but office is signified" (Kominiak, Theophanies, 29). Thus in several
cases where he refers to the "second God" as ayyeAo<;, Justin takes pains to offer immediate
qualification to his pre-incarnate role as messenger to men (dyyeXXeToa) and minister of the
supercelestial God (cf. 56.4, 10; 58.3; 128.2). His capacity as Angel appears to have been an assumed
pre-incarnate function of the "second God," while he was operative as God's Power (cf. 128.1). Yet
he is also "Lord" of the angels (56.22) who participates in the Father's divine substance (61; 128.4; cf.
58.9: 0eoc; kaxeitai koci 0eo<; eoti kou eotou), a point which the argument from Wisdom christology
demonstrates. Though scripture designates him "Angel" in function, he is not simply an angel in
nature (as are the two who went to judge Sodom). For Justin, Christ occupies a liminal position
between the supreme creator God and all other created beings (angels and humans). The title of
"Angel" for Justin best encapsulates that mediatory function (75.3). Justin is quite comfortable
juxtaposing multiple ascriptions of the "second God" (i.e., God, Lord, Angel, Man, Minister, etc.; cf.
esp. 126.1-2), without clarifying the diverse functional and ontological capacities of these terms for
his theology. By so doing, he develops a christology that preserves the transcendence of the creator
God while reserving for God's Angel-Power a revelatory function to men. Finally, to argue that Justin
manifests a highly subordinationist angel christology contravenes the very logic of his "second God"
argument (see §2.3).
70
Trypho's companion is a literary foil safeguarding Trypho's own respectability. This is
evident from 56.16 where Trypho, in light of his companion's foolhardy suggestion, replies:
"Continue your proof. For as you see...we are not prepared [sc. with our own answer] for such
dangerous answers [sc. like yours], since we have never heard of anyone who examines, investigates,
or proves these things."
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underlying logic of this third argument depends on a prior interpretive reading of
Gen 19:24. Justin draws a distinction from the passage between a God "in heaven"
who commissions fiery judgment and a God who carries out that commission on
earth.71 This distinction logically requires the existence of only a single, distinct
divine figure who appeared in both theophanies at Mamre and Sodom. He
summarizes his final conclusion:
So now, have you not understood that one of the three, who is called
God and Lord and who ministers to him who is in heaven, is Lord of the
two angels? For when they proceeded to Sodom he remained behind and
spoke with Abraham the things recorded by Moses. And when he
himself had departed after the conversation, Abraham went back to his
place. And when he had come to Sodom the two angels no longer spoke
with Lot but he himself, as the scripture makes clear. And he is Lord
who received these pronouncements from the Lord who is in heaven
(i.e., the Maker of the Universe) to inflict on Sodom and Gomorrah. The
scripture describes these things, speaking thus: 'And the Lord caused
fiery sulphur to rain down on Sodom from the Lord out of heaven.'72
Trypho concedes, "The scripture, it seems, compels (dvayKcc^er) us to
confess this" conclusion (57.1; cf. 60.3). He raises one further question regarding
how the "Lord" could consume a meal (57.1; cf. Gen 18:8),73 which Justin handles
by appealing to a different (i.e., less literal) "mode of expression" (57.2). At this
point, Trypho is evidently convinced by Justin's "second God" argument74 and asks
him to move on to demonstrate that "this God who appeared to Abraham" was born
as a man from a virgin (57.3). Justin, however, wishes to offer further proofs on the
"second God" rubric, "so that you [Jews; pi.] might also be persuaded about this [i.e.,
forthcoming argument in Dial. 58-60]." Trypho acknowledges that further
71 The phrase "out of (ek) heaven" in Gen 19:24 grammatically modifies the fiery rain (which
came from the sky), yet Justin takes advantage of its syntactic position alongside "the Lord" to infer
that one "Lord" remained "in (ev) heaven" (56.22-23; 60.5; 129.1; cf. 56.1) while another "Lord"
carried out his orders on earth. This reading also corresponds happily with Justin's theology of divine
transcendence (cf. 60.2).
72 56.22-23.
73 This is no objection. Given his prior Jewish reading (sc. that God appeared to Abraham
followed by three angels), Trypho formerly did not encounter this issue, for it was the three angels
who consumed food, and not God. Having abandoned his former Jewish reading (based on Justin's
first discursive stage) to follow Justin's new Christian reading of the Mamre event, Trypho now
encounters this new difficulty: How is it that "God" (ontologic claim!) could physically eat a meal
(Gen 18:8)?
74 58.3 (dx; f]5ri ouveBeoSe, kai 8ia 7c^.et6vcov 7re7reiopevoi pepcdco^ (ievt]te) and 60.3
(E7CEi5f| fj5r) jcpoajtoSeSeiKiai). Cf. Skarsaune, Proof, 210: "There is, in fact, no other topic in the
Dialogue concerning which Trypho declares himself so fully convinced by Justin's argument."
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demonstration on this topic would be agreeable, so Justin discusses the appearances
of God to Jacob (58) and Moses (59-60).
The argument from Genesis 18-19 pivots around a very literal reading of the
double occurrence of the word "Lord" in Gen 19:24. This programmatic passage is
cited initially in Dial. 56.2,75 positioned in verse 12 as the key "two powers" text
demonstrating the existence of "another" God alongside the Maker of the Universe,
and emphatically repeated at verses 21 and 23 in conclusion of the third argument.
Gen 19:24 is constitutive in both second and third stages of Justin's "second God"
argument! And it reappears in a later demonstration (129.1; cf. 60.2-3).76 The
psalmic proof-texts are somewhat abstracted from the overall argument from
theophany,77 being primarily adduced to demonstrate a point previously confirmed
by the directly theophanic text of Gen 19:24 (i.e., existence of "two powers") and to
confirm an assumption made already on the basis of Gen 19:24 (i.e., God in
heaven/on earth). The one substantive element they add is the presence of not only a
"two Lords" passage but also a "two Gods" passage (Ps 44:7-8). They strengthen the
scriptural claim to "two powers" by reference to that teaching "not only by Moses
but also by David" (56.14). The logic of the entire discourse on the theophanies at
Mamre and Sodom is constructed then around Gen 19:24, which harmonizes well
with and is supplemented by the messianic "two powers" proof-texts of LXX Pss
109:1 and 44:7-8. The "second God" argument is secured for Justin and Trypho (!)
in the treatment of the incidents at Mamre and Sodom.78
Further demonstration from theophanies to Jacob and Moses (chs. 58-60)
presupposes the presence of the "second God" already proven from the Mamre-
Sodom events. Justin uses similar arguments and "two powers" strategies to show
that the "second God" who appeared to Abraham also appeared to the patriarchs
Jacob and Moses, yet a reading of the theophanies to Jacob and Moses and of the
relevant parallels in Dial. 126-128.1 establishes no new proof-texts in the
theophanic argument.79 Rather the conclusions already secured from the discussion
of the Abraham episode recur repeatedly in the following sections, where the
75 Now missing in Dialogue (cf. supra n. 61).
76 Gen 19:24 appears no less than six times in Dialogue\
11 "[Dial. 56.14] semble bien etre une petite parenthese" (Prigent, Justin, 123).
78 Supra n. 74.
79 Later theophanies are simply "some other proofs on this rubric" (Dial. 57.4; cf. 58.2).
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argument is designed to demonstrate that the "same" figure80 who appeared to
Abraham and was called "God" also appeared to other patriarchs and was called by
various names, "Angel," "Lord," "God," and "Man."81
A final supplement to the entire "second God" argument from theophany
appears in chapter 75.82 In Dial. 56.15a, Justin had intimated from "two powers"
psalmic texts that the two ascriptions "God" and "Lord" only properly apply to the
Father and his Christ. In the discursive strategy of chapter 56 these texts had
provided a segue to the third stage of Justin's "second God" argument and were not
primarily constitutive in the proof from theophany. In chapter 75, however, Justin
builds on this earlier intimation from the psalms that the designations "God" and
"Lord" apply to the Christ. He reveals from the book of Exodus that "the name of
[the "second"] God himself was also Jesus," that is, the Christ. This name was not
revealed to Abraham or Jacob (cf. Exod 6:3), but only to Moses, as Exod 23:20-21
makes known! Thus Justin supplements the argument that there exists "another God"
alongside the Maker of the Universe by adding that this "God" who appeared to the
patriarchs is named Jesus.
2.2 TraditionalTesti'monia andCreative Rereading
Justin's proof-texts bear the imprint of traditional, forensic testimonia
collected around the theme of demonstrating the existence of "two powers" in
heaven, whether designated "God" or "Lord."83 As early as the final decades of the
mDial. 58.3; 59.1, 3; 60.2, 4-5.
81 On these terms, see n. 69.
82 The supplementary proof occurs on the subsequent day of dispute (cf. Marcovich, Iustini,
62-63), as a summarization of the previous day's conclusions. It is not technically part of the "second
God" proof, but is the coup de grace linking the "second God" argument (56-62; note reference of
appearances to Abraham, Jacob, and Moses in 75.1, 4) with that on virgin birth (63-74; cf. 75.4).
Nevertheless, the argument of 75 is invoked specifically within the context of theophanies in Justin's
summary at 128.1, indicating a close thematic linkage between those two (Skarsaune, Proof, 206-09).
83 Wilhelm Bousset, Jiidisch-Christlicher Schulbelrieb in Alexandria und Rom: literarische
Untersuchungen zu Philo und Clemens von Alexandria, Justin und Irenaus (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 1915) 304-08. In his landmark study of Justin's exegesis Skarsaune demonstrated that in
addition to biblical manuscripts Justin relied upon two written testimonia anthologies which carried
great authority for him—a "kerygma" and a "recapitulation" source. He regarded Dial. 61.1-62.4 as
"obviously traditional" and linked it to the "recapitulation" source. Skarsaune tantalizingly proposed
that the "recapitulation" source behind Dial. 61-62 "might be identical with" the lost JP (ibid.
234-42; cf. 380-91; see supra n. 5 for others who suggest dependence. We are not entirely convinced
by this proposal [see Rutherford, "Altercatio"]). The argument on the theophanies of chapters 56-60,
however, he claimed "was not met with prior to Justin" and is "quite singular in the whole Dialogue"
(Proof 206-13).
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first century Christians were aware of such "two powers" proof-texts and utilized
them in debates with Jews.84The most common among these was LXX Ps 109:1.85 It
is present in parallel in all three Synoptic gospels (Matt 22:43-44// Mark 12:35-37//
Luke 20:42-43) as demonstration of Christ's post-resurrection installment alongside
God. These preserve the memory of some early Christian communities' debates with
Jewish leaders towards the last decades of the first century. It reappears as a key
messianic testimony in Peter's speech on Pentecost (Acts 2:32-36) and in the epistle
to the Hebrews (1:13), where it follows additional "two powers" texts, LXX Ps
44:7-8 and an ingenious reading of LXX Ps 101:26-28,86 alongside other royal,
messianic psalms (Ps 2:7) to combat an angel christology.87 It further receives the
force of a christological proof-text in an anti-Jewish setting somewhere on the border
of the first and second centuries in the Epistle ofBarnabas (12:10-11) where it is
joined to a christianized form of Isa 45:1,88 apparently from a tradition independent
of the Synoptics.89 None of these sources demonstrates direct literary dependence
upon another, helping substantiate the claim that already in the first century
Christians gathered certain "two powers" texts into various testimonia
collections—whether written or oral—for the purpose of messianic debate with Jews
and fellow Jewish-Christians. Connections between these traditional "two powers"
texts and Justin's use of Pss 109:1 and 44:7-8 within his extensive exegesis of
christophany are too weak to posit direct literary dependence upon any one of them
(though contact with Hebrews 1 arouses interest). Yet without doubt, the two psalmic
proof-texts are traditional.
84 J. Rendel Harris (Testimonies [2 vols.; Cambridge; University Press, 1916] 1.1-4), B.P.W.
StatherHunt (Primitive Gospel Sources [London: James Clarke, 1951] vii-viii, 3-13), and Barnabas
Lindars (New Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of the Old Testament [London: SCM
Press, 1961] 13, 23-24) noted the apologetic context with Judaism as key impetus for early Christian
collections of Schriftbeweis.
85 Martin C. Albl, "And Scripture Cannot be Broken": The Form and Function of the Early
Christian Testimonia Collections (NovTSup 96; Leiden: Brill, 1999) 216-36, esp. 232-33.
86 T.F. Glasson, '"Plurality of Divine Persons' and the Quotations in Hebrews I.6FF.," NTS
12 (1965-66), 271-72.
87 Albl, Scripture, 190-207.
88 Reading "Lord" Ocupup) for "Cyrus" (Kupco: LXX Isa 45:1).
89 Albl, Scripture, 232 n. 98. In Barn. 12.10-11, LXX Ps 109:1 counters specifically Jewish
claims that Messiah is merely scion of David (cf. 12:10b: 'Etce'v ofiv peXAoucnv Xeyeiv oxi o Xpioxoi;
mo<; AauiS eoxiv) and not Son of God.
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Gen 19:24 is, however, more enigmatic. It is the primary text for Justin's
"second God" argument, inasmuch as it represents the single "two powers" proof-
text native to the theophanic material of Genesis and Exodus. Skarsaune posited the
possible existence of an earlier Christian testimony-tradition for Gen 19:24 rooted in
Judaeo-Christianity,90 yet to our knowledge no such reference to this passage exists
in any extant "two powers" text before Justin. The passage is so smoothly integrated
into Justin's argument as to demonstrate his full command of it within the larger
scriptural context. This suggests it may not have been part of his received testimonia
tradition but was "discovered" by Justin himself. In this case he supplemented his
thorough reading of the Genesis-Exodus theophanies with two already traditional
"two powers" testimonia, Pss 44:7-8 and 109:1. On the other hand, its proximity to
the "two powers" texts ascribed to David might indicate it was part of an inherited
tradition that already catalogued these three texts under nominal rubrics ("Moses
says," "David says"). One cannot be dogmatic from an analysis of Dialogue as to
whether Justin received Gen 19:24 from a traditional store.
At any rate, with respect to his use ofproof-texts Justin stands on traditional
footing,91 yet with respect to his christological exegesis of theophany Justin is at his
most creative. The early Christian witnesses for a christological interpretation of OT
theophany are few and far between and certainly not of the character of Justin's
treatment of this material. Seeming parallels between Justin's account of theophanies
and that offered by the Alexandrian Jew, Philo, have suggested to some a strong
dependence of Justin upon this key representative of Hellenistic Judaism.92 Philonic
influence on Justin's exegetical development of a "second God" cannot be altogether
excluded given the similarities. Yet in light of recent rebuttals to this thesis it now
seems doubtful at best to suppose Philo as key conceptual source for Justin's "second
90 Proof 412-13; cf. 209 n. 62.
91 Even if Justin already developed his christophany theory in Syntagma (cf. n. 57), this only
transposes the problem of sources (so Demetrius Trakatellis, The Pre-existence ofChrist in the
Writings ofJustin Martyr: An Exegetical Study with Reference to the Humiliation and Exaltation
Christology [HDR 6; Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976] 59), and there is no reason to suspect
the "two powers" proof-texts there were different from those in Dialogue.
92 Philo Mut. 15; Ahr. 107-66 (Abraham); Somn. 1.120-32 (Jacob); and Mos. 1.65-84; Agr.
51; Migr. 174 (Moses). Philo does not mention the theophany to Joshua. Paul Heinisch, Der Einfluss
Philos aufdie alteste christliche Exegese (ATA 1/2; Miinster: Aschendorff, 1908) 195-211; Erwin R.
Goodenough, The Theology ofJustin Martyr (Jena: Verlag Frommannsche Buchhandlung, 1923)
141-47; Trakatellis, ibid., 53-92.
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God" proof,93 and there has been a general move away from this position.94 Justin is
thus no slave to prior interpretive traditions but is involved in his own creative
moment ofscriptural reading.95 Indeed, at least two textual indicators confirm
Justin's own sense of creativity in this literary endeavor.96 And, like Aristo, this
creativity suggests that he has a specific literary strategy in view when producing
Dialogue.
Z.f Literary rramework andStrategy
The literary shaping of Justin's "second God" argument suggests that a much
broader social strategy is at work for Justin when he encodes his creative "two
powers" theophanic reading. We argue that Justin appeals to categories of the one
God and his "second God" in order to constitute a specifically "Christian"
interpretive identity by rereading what he claims are "traditional" Jewish
monotheistic interpretations of scripture. The following observations substantiate this
claim.
First, Justin has the Jew, Trypho, frame the entire "second God" discussion.
Trypho asserts:
So even now resume your discourse and demonstrate to us that
another God besides the Maker of the Universe is acknowledged to
exist by the prophetic spirit. Take care not to mention the sun and
moon, which, it is written, God has granted to the nations to worship as
93 Justin never explicitly cites or references Philo, draws entirely different conclusions,
utilizes theophanic passages in an altogether different manner, has a much more literal approach to
theophanic material, and has an unabashedly personal Logos. The Jewish interpretations of theophany
of which Justin is aware know only the appearance of God the Father and/or his angels, never the
Logos (1 Apol. 63.1; Jules Lebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinite [2 vols.; Paris: Gabriel
Beauchesne, 1928] 2.672-73).
94 Skarsaune, Proof, 409-24; Lebreton, ibid., 2.667-72; R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event:
A Study ofthe Sources and Significance ofOrigen's Interpretation ofScripture (Louisville; London:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2002) 107-08; L.W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought
(Cambridge: University Press, 1967) 92-96; Willis A. Shotwell, The Biblical Exegesis ofJustin
Martyr (London: SPCK, 1965) 45-47, 96-100.
95 Skarsaune believes Justin makes "an original contribution to OT exegesis." "He may have
started," Skarsaune claims, "from traditional testimony nucleusus, but he has developed an impressive
exegetical argument transcending the simple »testimony« approach" (ibid., 211).
96 Justin shows awareness that he is fabricating new, creative proofs in his "second God"
argument from theophany. His claim that these "two powers" proofs "will seem foreign to you
[Jews], even though they are read by you everyday" (55.3) is matched in a subsequent admission by
Trypho. The latter expresses the ill-conceived response of his Jewish companion (cf. supra n. 70) in
the following way, "We are not prepared [sc. with our own answer] for such dangerous answers [sc.
like yours], since we have never heard of anyone who examines, investigates, or proves these things"
(56.16). Cf. Trakatellis, Pre-existence, 53-60; Kominiak, Theophanies, 4.
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gods, even as prophets who employ this concept often say: 'Your God is
God of gods and Lord of lords,' often adding, 'the great and powerful
and terrible.' For they do not say these things as though these were
really gods, but because the scripture teaches us that the true God, who
made all things, is alone Lord of those commonly regarded as gods and
lords. Now, so that the holy spirit might expose this, he said through
holy David: 'The gods of the nations—those regarded as gods—are
idols of demons, and not gods.' He also places a curse on those who
make and worship them.97
Justin has the Jew establishes the ground rules for the "second God"
demonstration. Justin, Trypho requests, should show that the prophetic spirit
acknowledges (sc. in scripture) the existence of "another" who is really (sc.
ontologically) God and not simply one of the so-called "gods" frequently mentioned
elsewhere in scripture and which are not actually divine but "idols of demons." And
Justin must carry out his demonstration (1) by reasoning from scripture (2) in a way
that preserves the uniqueness of the creator God as "alone (povoq) Lord of those
commonly regarded as gods and lords." By having his interlocutor strategically voice
these points, Justin frames them literarily as discursively-significant Jewish
parameters. For Christian claims to Jesus' divinity as "another God" to carry any
validity with Jews, Justin supposes, he recognizes that those claims must be
demonstrable from Jewish scripture in a manner consistent with the uniqueness of
the creator God, which he regards (and presents) as an unmistakable sine qua non of
Jewish tradition.
In response, Justin claims that he will reason in a manner he regards as
foolproof, while taking great pains to safeguard Trypho's suggested constraints. He
replies:
I am not, I said, about to adduce proofs of this type, Trypho, on
account of which I know that those who worship these and similar
things are condemned, but [I will adduce] those which no one will be
able to counter. They will seem foreign to you, even though they are
read by you everyday, so that even from this you understand that
because of your wickedness God has hidden from you the ability to
discern the Wisdom which is in his scriptures, except for some, to whom
according to the grace of his great mercy, as Isaiah said, 'he has left a
seed' for salvation, lest your 'race be destroyed' completely 'like [that]
of the Sodomites and Gomorraites.' So then, pay attention to the
things I am about to recall from the holy scriptures, which do not
need to be exposited, but only heard.98
97 55.1-2; cf. Deut 4:19; Ps 95:5 (LXX).
98 55.3.
224
He adopts Trypho's polemic controls and vows to adduce proofs (1) from
scripture (2) not about "gods" but about "God," that is, in a way that preserves divine
uniqueness. With this response, Justin fully consents to make his demonstration
within the criteriological confines specifically established by his Jewish counterpart.
Both disputants begin on the same methodological page.
Second, though he himself regards the existence of a "second God" as self-
evidently demonstrable from a mere reading of the theophanic texts themselves," for
the sake of convincing his Jewish disputants, Justin offers carefully articulated
arguments which (to him) make the demonstration foolproof from even a Jewish
perspective! He begins with what he portrays as "traditional" Jewish readings of
OT theophanies, and at every stage he appeals to some scriptural nuance to carefully
draw his counterparts from their own "traditional" reading of the Mamre-Sodom
event to alternative conclusions and ultimately to a new Christian rereading ofGen
18-19.
We have noted earlier the tripartite sequence of Justin's "second God"
argument (§2.1). Justin opens the proof with what he presents as the traditional
Jewish interpretation of the Mamre-Sodom theophany—the creator God manifest
himself to Abraham prior to the appearance of three angels, two to judge Sodom and
another who appeared to Abraham to announce Sarah's pregnancy. Justin offers his
first proof. It was "God" who appeared to Abraham as one of the three. This forces
an altered Jewish interpretation—the creator God appeared with two angels who
judged Sodom. Justin offers his second proof, namely, that there exist two distinct
Gods. This leads to another logical alteration in the Jewish reading—the creator God
appeared to Abraham and one of the two angels who judged Sodom was another
"Lord." Justin now provides his third proof, by identifying the "Lord" who appeared
to Abraham with the "Lord" who judged Sodom. The Jews finally conclude with
Justin that the creator God did not appear at all, but another "Lord" did! Only in the
third discursive stage is there complete resolution of the textual phenomena and an
overall coherence in the logic which moved from an initial Jewish theophanic
reading to a Christian christophanic reading of the Mamre-Sodom event.
Strategically, each sequential stage of argumentation moves logically from a prior
Jewish reading or altered conclusion about theophany by way of Jewish criteria to a
99 Justin cites and recites scriptural texts quite frequently in his "second God" proof, as
though these themselves are sufficient for the argument. According to him, the scriptures in this
regard "do not need to be exposited, but only heard" (55.3).
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distinctively Christian solution. Justin's disputants are gradually transposed from
"traditional" Jewish monotheistic readings of theophany to Christian christophanic
rereadings of theophany.
Third, this interpretive transposition does not occur unwillingly. One of the
striking elements of the argument from the Mamre-Sodom theophany is the fact that
Justin has his Jewish interlocutors punctuate his own scriptural and logical
fastidiousness and his safeguarding of the specifically Jewish polemical controls
established for the proof. Throughout his "second God" argument Justin
meticulously scrutinizes the text of scripture and subjects it to a reasoned approach,
paying careful attention to textual details at times chapters apart. Further, he offers a
surprisingly literal interpretation throughout the argument from the theophany of
Mamre-Sodom. His supererogatory concern for textual detail is epitomized in his
very literal use of the nuanced two "Lords" language of Gen 19:24, the coup de grace
of his argument from theophany. Yet it is his peculiar practice of invoking the
responses of his Jewish disputants in order to highlight (1) the logic of his scriptural
reasoning and (2) his own attention to preserving the uniqueness of the supreme,
creator God that particularly stands out. At every step of his argument, a Jew
acknowledges Justin's faithfulness to the two previously agreed upon polemical
parameters.
After his first proof, Justin asks whether he has sufficiently demonstrated the
first point by a juxtapositioning of Gen 18:10 and 21:12. Trypho responds, "That's
correct. But you have not proven from this that another is God alongside (rtccpd) this
one who appeared to Abraham.. .You have proven, however, that we were wrong
in thinking that the three who were in the tent with Abraham were all angels" (56.9).
The first point has been proven from scripture to Trypho's satisfaction, so that he
alters his traditional reading. Indeed, if the point had not been satisfactorily proven
from scripture, then Trypho should carry on believing in Jewish interpretive
traditions. "If then I could not prove from the scriptures [this first demonstration],"
Justin concedes, "it is reasonable for you to think the very thing which your entire
race thinks" (56.10). It is Justin's specifically scriptural reasoning that leads Trypho
from proof one to two. Further, this initial proof in no way threatens the doctrine of
divine uniqueness, the second polemical parameter. In his previous, traditionally
Jewish interpretation, Trypho is content to have the creator God appear to Abraham
alongside three angels. Having now altered that belief, his reformed interpretation
still has the creator God appearing to Abraham, this time alongside only two angels.
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It is unnecesarry then for Trypho to affirm or highlight Justin's careful preservation
of the creator's uniqueness at this point. The first discursive argument has been
adequately demonstrated (1) from scripture (2) in a way that does not endanger the
uniqueness of God the creator.
At this point Justin introduces the second demonstration. He will prove that
the "second God" is distinct in number, though not in will, from the creator God.
And then, something quite interesting occurs. Rather anxious to have Justin
demonstrate the point, Trypho encourages him, "Prove now that this is [the case], so
that we may agree with this. For we acknowledge that you do not say that he affirms
or has done or spoken anything contrary to (7capa) the will of the Creator of the
Universe" (56.12). The Jew effectively concedes that Justin's forthcoming proof,
provided it advances logically from scripture, may not actually endager the creator's
uniqueness. This is an astonishing admission, to be sure, for it indicates a willingness
in Trypho to grant the possibility that the creator's uniqueness might not be
compromised by the numerical presence of a "second God," as long as this "second
God" (obediently) unites his will with that of the supreme creator God. If
demonstrable, the presence of a "second God" would require a subtle nuanced shift
in the meaning of the creator's uniqueness. No longer indicative of numerical
singularity, divine uniqueness would essentially indicate the supreme transcendent
incomparability of the creator God above the "second God," who, in turn, obeys and
is subject to the will of the supreme creator God. The complex unity of divinity
would be preserved through a complex uniting of wills. Trypho seems entirely
prepared to make this theological adjustment in his own understanding of divine
uniqueness, provided that Justin successfully demonstrates that scripture necessitates
the existence of "two Gods!" And Justin does just this to Jewish satisfaction, for after
he cites Gen 19:24, one of Trypho's Jewish companions asserts, "Therefore it is
necessary (dvdyKT|) to affirm that he whom the scripture through Moses designates
as Lord and as one of the two angels who went down to Sodom, this very one is
alongside the God himself who appeared to Abraham" (56.13). It is Justin's use of
scripture that mandates for this Jew the compulsory distinction of "one Lord" and
"one God." In this second stage, Justin has again adequately confirmed another step
of his demonstration by proceeding (1) from scripture (2) in a way that, though it
altars the meaning of divine uniqueness, does not endanger the creator's uniqueness.
It is so crucial for Justin to properly navigate these two polemic controls at
this pivotal second stage of the argument that he has Trypho further confirm his own
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fastidiousnesss in this step. After the second proof is established, Trypho urges Justin
on to his third demonstration by observing, "And we would not have put up with
your discourse if you had not referred everything to the scriptures. For you are
anxious to adduce proofs from them, and you declare that there is no God above
(weep) the Maker of the Universe" (56.16). The ground rules for debate are secured
to this point even to the satisfaction of his primary Jewish dialogue partner. Trypho
is willing to follow Justin into the third stage of proof precisely because at the key
point where Justin demonstrates the existence of a distinct "second God," (1) he has
constantly refered to scripture and (2) has acknowledged the central confession of the
creator God's uniqueness (now, incomparable transcendence), the very points
Trypho had demanded from the outset.
At this point, all that remains for Justin to demonstrate in the third stage is
how the text of Genesis demands that the "Lord" who judged Sodom and the "God"
who appeared to Abraham be identified as the same individual (56.15b). Following
his third point, Justin asks whether he has convincingly demonstrated the final proof.
Trypho responds, "That scripture compels us to confess this is evident. Yet even
you would confess that there is something worthy which remains in doubt,
concerning what is said: He ate what was prepared and was placed before him by
Abraham" (57.1). To this point, Justin has made convincing arguments from
scripture, as even his Jewish counterparts affirm, and he has safeguarded the
uniqueness of the creator God, when, that is, the nature of the creator's uniqueness is
somewhat altered. Yet one thing remains for Trypho precarious and disturbing. If
Justin's "second God" argument is correct, and scripture seems to demand it, then
does not this jeopardize the divine transcendent nature of the "second God," for how
can that which is divine be said to eat, as scripture claims? The "traditional" Jewish
reading of the Mamre-Sodom theophany circumvents this problem, for the creator
God is never said to have eaten, only the three angels who appeared to Abraham.1®
Justin easily surmounts the difficulty by allegorical reference to manna as the
heavenly food. At any rate, this last stage does not threaten the uniqueness (sc.
supreme incomparability) of the creator God, since the question concerns the
"second God."
100 On divine eating in Jewish and hellenistic texts, see Christoph Markschies, Valentinus
Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten
Valentins (WUNT 65; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1992) 99-105.
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At this point, all polemic controls have been met to Jewish satisfaction in
every stage of the debate, and Trypho declares that Justin is engaged in a discussion
"that is entirely pleasing to me" (57.4). The Jew will not only tolerate Justin's
continued proof on this topic, but gladly welcomes it. It is rather humorous to
witness Justin's demure response in 58.1 to all this Jewish confirmation: "I propose
to investigate scriptures with you. I am not eager to show off with peculiar skill my
own rhetorical prowess. For I do not possess any such faculty, but God's grace alone
has been given me for understanding his scriptures" (58.1). Yet even here his
exegetical skill is reaffirmed once again by Trypho. "And in this you act101 in a
manner worthy of piety," Trypho responds, "but you seem to me to be pretending
when you say you do not possess facility in the rhetorical arts" (58.2). Such is the
solidity of Justin's "second God" argument from the Mamre-Sodom theophany. It
surpasses all Jewish scrutiny and meets Jewish satisfaction!102
Justin's approach, as witnessed in the above observations, cannot be merely
incidental. Surely it is not insignificant that he has a Jew establish the terms of
debate; he begins with what he regards as the traditional Jewish interpretation of the
Mamre-Sodom theophany and alters that Jewish conviction; and finally he has Jews
substantiate his own polemical rigor in respect of following the Jewish controls for
the debate. These important observations harken back to the literary creativity that
we briefly witnessed in section 2.2 above, as Skarsaune describes:
In no other part of the Dialogue is the exegetical debate so much a real
dialogue as in the main section on the theophanies. Trypho is very co¬
operative, poses only relevant questions, makes valuable summaries of
previous argument, and declares himself satisfied with Justin's
exposition. One gets the impression that Justin here has gained more
freedom and independence in the handling of his exegetical argument
than elsewhere in the Dialogue. This corresponds to the fact that he is
obviously working directly with the Genesis and Exodus LXX, as his
long LXX excerpts demonstrate.103
Without doubt, Justin's "second God" argument from theophany represents a
highly conscious literary strategy, an attempt at rereading specifically Jewish
monotheistic textual traditions in a distinctly Christian way! Justin's "second God"
argument from theophany moves the Jews from their initial theophanic reading of the
text to a christophanic rereading. By establishing the parameters for the argument
101 Lit. "and you do this"
102 Cf. 60.3; 63.1.
103 Proof, 208.
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along specifically Jewish lines, beginning with Jewish traditional readings, and
having the Jews recognize that he reasons within the confines of established Jewish
parameters, Justin has effected a rereading of Jewish traditions along Jewish
discursive lines! And he fundamentally positions the argument within a category
socially significant for both Jews and Christians, Hebrew scripture as authoritative
tradition. Both disputants agree that knowledge of God must be derived from
scripture. The very structure of the "second God" argument pits Jewish monotheistic
reading of scripture against Christian "two powers" rereadings.
Justin indicates this "second God" reading has been granted him by God's
grace, and he informs his Jewish interlocutors that it is "because of your (pi.)
wickedness God has hidden from you the ability to discern the Wisdom (i;f|v
oocpiav) which is in his scriptures, except for some, to whom, according to the grace
of his great mercy, as Isaiah said, 'he has left a seed for salvation, lest your race be
destroyed' completely Tike [that] of the Sodomites and Gomorraites'" (55.3).
"Wisdom" doubtless anticipates the "second God," Christ, whom Justin will soon
align with God's Wisdom in Dialogue 61-62.104 Justin claims that, as a race, the
Jews have missed the authentic "two powers" meaning of God's scriptures because
of their wickedness. God alone reveals this authentic meaning in a gracious act, and
that reading has been revealed to Christians! To accept the christophanic "second
God" reading of theophany (and Wisdom traditions) is to align oneself with God's
grace and to participate in a distinctly Christian way of reading. Indeed, some ethnic
Jews (i.e., Jewish-Christians) have even been granted the grace of God's mercy to
participate in "second God" readings of scripture as Christians. These ethnic Jews, as
Christians, reread their ancient textual traditions in a new, divinely-authenticated
way. This claim legitimates and authenticates in God's grace the creativity of
Christian "two powers" rereadings of Jewish traditions!
Yet in this strategy, Justin actually engages himself in an even more
ambitious project. This textual "two powers" rereading of theophany and the
Christian interpretive identity it engenders reinforce a totalizing monotheistic
Christian identity. By his rereading of theophany, Justin restructures the entire
cosmic order away from traditional Jewish monotheistic cosmology to a new
104 Cf. 61.1: Mapvupiov 8e Kai aXKo vpiv, to cptXoi, £<priv, anb xwv ypacpcov 8c6aw, oxi
dpzhv rcpo Tttivxwv xwv Kxiapaxcov o 0eoi; yeyevvtike Svvaplv xiva eI; eocoxov Xoyikt]v, -pxii; kcci
So^a Kvplov xoto xov TcvEvpaxoi; xov cr/lov Ka^Eixai, tuoxe 8e mot;, tcoxe 8e aoqua, 7toxE 8e
ayye^°?. 7coxe 8e 0eo<;, 7coxe 8e kvpioq xai Xoyoq, 7uoxe 8e apxiaxpaxriyov savxov Xeyti.
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Christian cosmology that involves "two powers" in heaven. By fortifying this
totalizing Christian worldview, he inevitably reinforces every area of Christian life
and identity. In the flow of Dialogue, the theophanic rereading specifically fortifies
Christian (1) monotheistic belief and (2) cultic practice.
In this regard, it is interesting first to observe the subtle shifts in Trypho's
own thinking respecting the uniqueness of the creator God. Prior to the argument,
Trypho presents the uniqueness of the creator in terms of numerical singularity. The
creator is "alone (povoq) Lord of those commonly regarded as gods and lords." He
exists as the true God (o xqj ovxt, Qeoc) in an entirely separate category of being
from all other existants, "for [the prophets] do not say these things as though [those
commonly regarded as 'gods and lords'] were really (ovxeov) gods" (55.2). Through
Trypho, Justin presents the traditional Jewish conception of divine unity as simple
and equivalent to numerical singularity (sc. uniqueness).105 By the beginning of the
second discursive step, however, Trypho expresses a willingness to shift his
traditional understanding of divine uniqueness to allow for a complex unity of wills
between "two Gods," in a way that does not jeopardize the supreme incomparable
transcendence of the creator God, if Justin can convince him that scripture demands
the existence of two distinct Gods. At the beginning of the third stage, we see that
Trypho, though he declares Justin's conclusion "dangerous," has actually made the
theological alteration to divine uniqueness, precisely because he does not know how
to refute Justin's second argument about the existence of "two Gods," which Justin
established in line with Trypho's polemical parameters.106 According to this new
frame of reference, the creator God is unique for Trypho because he remains
incomparably transcendent. He is the one "above" (brcep) which no other God rules,
but "alongside of' (jcapa) which scripture demonstrates there exists a "second God,"
who does nothing "contrary to" (jrapd) the supreme creator's will, since he is
functionally united with him in purpose. As part of this unity of wills, it is this
"second God" who manifests himself to the patriarchs on earth in theophany. Trypho
has gradually adopted Justin's Christian view ofmonotheism] Justin involves
himself in nothing short of a program to alter the most cherished of Jewish beliefs,
105 This coincides with Aristo's presentation of traditional Jewish understandings of divine
unity as simple and corresponding to numerical uniqueness (see supra §1.4). Together these witnesses
further confirm that Jewish monotheism was understood by those outside that tradition in terms of
"exclusivist monotheism" (supra ch. 2 n. 52).
106 56.16: Kcci Tipeli; npbt; i&q ouxtoq ettikivSuvoui; dTtoKploeu; ouk eapev etoipot, etceiSti
ouSevoi; oi)8E7toTE -rccDta EpEuvaivroq i) ^titouvtoi; q drtoSeiKvuvroi; dKriKoapev.
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the unique existence of a single creator God, by insinuating a "second God"
alongside the creator God and demonstrating this from OT theophanic texts!
In the second instance, Justin's argument powerfully reconstitutes Christian
monotheistic "cultic practice of devotion to 'two Gods'" which regularly recurs
among Christian communities. This is a very central practice that distinguishes
Christianness from Jewishness. It is not insignificant that the Jew Trypho explicitly
formulates the problem which the existence of "another God" poses in terms
specifically of the threat that cultic worship of a "second God" poses to the exclusive
worship rightly belonging to the creator God alone (55.1).107 Dialogue 56-60
attempts a scripturally-based, theological solution to the difficulties which Christian
devotion to Jesus posed for the category of divine unity.
It is this confluence of monotheistic belief and cultic practice which lies at
the heart of Justin's rereading. His creative approach to OT theophanies permits the
development of a distinctively Christian interpretive identity that reestablishes a
Christian monotheistic theological and cultic identity on the basis of authoritative
scriptural texts. In Dial. 56-60 is concealed a deeper social strategy involving the
production of distinctly Christian interpretive identity, which reinforces a new
cosmic structure. Justin's response to the "Jesus problem" provides an effective
means of hermeneutically reconstituting Jewish traditions in a new, Christian way,
thereby shaping specifically Christian ways of "two powers" reading, monotheistic
belief, and cultic worship vis-a-vis Jewish practices. Justin has moved his Jewish
counterpartfrom a traditional Jewish reading of theophany to a Christian rereading,
while simultaneously transmuting the traditional Jewish cosmos (sc. understanding
ofGod's uniqueness) into a Christian understanding! In so doing, his theophanic
literary strategy legitimates specifically Christian identity vis-a-vis Jewishness.
Reasoning from pentateuchal traditions which his Jewish dialogue partner, Trypho,
also grants as authoritative, Justin's formulation of the "second God" represents one
of the more inventive, early Christian theological and exegetical rereadings of Jewish
textual traditions.
107
npoaieuveiv appears twice in 55.1 (cf. also 55.2-3), both times in reference to the worship
of "those commonly regarded as gods and lords" vis-h-vis that due to the "true God." Cf. supra ch. 2
§§1,2.2.1.
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5- Rereading Jewish Traditions: ProducingChristian Interpretive
identity
Both JP and Dialogue reread Jewish textual traditions by capitalizing on
some inherent plurality within the text of Jewish scriptures to prove the existence of
a personal agent alongside the one God. In JP, when the Son of God is closely
related to (or, perhaps, identified with) the 'Apxp of creation and Zoqna 0eon, a
duality of persons emerges in Gen 1:1, 26 and Prov 8:27, 30. For Aristo, the Son of
God is present with God at the very act of creation. Yet, for Justin, he is also the
"other God" that presented himself in OT theophanies to the Hebrew patriarchs. The
presence of two "Gods" or "Lords" in the single, programmatic passage of Gen
19:24 confirms this. Justin found supplemental support for the distinct existence of
this "second God" alongside the supreme creator God from a similar "two powers"
textual phenomenon in LXX Pss 44:7-8 and 109:1. By creatively injecting into
Jewish scriptures a second figure, Jesus, alongside the creator God, Aristo and Justin
effectively reread Jewish textual traditions in a distinctively Christian way. Their
"two powers" rereadings are then sophisticated, strategic moments of early Christian
monotheistic identity construction. There are, of course, other creative ways in which
Christians envisioned a second figure alongside the supreme God,108 yet JP and
Dialogue share much in common and enlighten particularly well the value of "two
powers" readings as monotheistic identity strategies. Consider the following brief
points which highlight their comparative value in this regard.
Both JP and Dialogue embed their "two powers" readings within a literary
genre (the Christian-Jewish dialogue) that explicitly pits Christian readings against
Jewish readings in a polemical context of Christian-Jewish debate that plays out on a
108 For example, the post-resurrection exaltation of Christ to God's right hand in the Synoptic
gospels (Matt 22:43-44// Mark 12:35-37// Luke 20:42-43) and Acts (2:34-35) represents a "two
powers" enthronement rereading of a traditionally-messianic Jewish text LXX Ps 109:1. Heb 1:5 has a
similar exaltation pattern in view and uses, in addition, other messianic passages, Ps 2:7 and 2 Sam
7:14. Along with Justin, these rereadings presuppose the cooperation of the creator God and the
second figure, Jesus.
The "two powers" theologies of Marcion and of Valentinian myth, however, envision a
strong separation between the one supreme Christian God (i.e., Father) and the creator (i.e., demiurge)
God of Jewish tradition. Marcion viewed the relationship between these "two powers" entirely
oppositionally, while Valentinian myth portrayed the second demiurge as ignorant (for a season) of
the supreme Father. Marcion and Valentinian myth thus provide very different modes of adopting the
"two powers" motif, in ways which have profound importance for understanding Christian
monotheistic identity construction vis-a-vis Jews.
For reasons of space, we have been unable to analyze these additional types of "two powers"
strategies in this thesis. We plan to evaluate these elsewhere at a future date.
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battleground of commonly shared tradition, the Jewish scriptures. In these dialogues,
both Jew and Christian grant that these (traditionally-Jewish) scriptural texts are
authoritative sources upon which any dispute over the nature of the one God must be
resolved. In the course of that debate, it is the Jew (Papiscus and Trypho,
respectively) who first objects that Christian worship of a "second God" threatens the
unity of God and the exclusivist dictates of monotheistic worship. JP and Dialogue
answer this concern by rereading traditional Jewish interpretations of creation and
theophanic texts, respectively, to introduce a second, divine personal agent alongside
the one creator God of Jewish tradition. In the process of proof, the traditional Jewish
understanding of divine unity as numerical uniqueness is redefined.
Ultimately, these "two powers" rereading strategies are attempts to
legitimate, authorize, and perpetuate a particularly Christian cosmology within the
scope of authoritative texts. There is no sense in the "two powers" interpretive
strategies of JP or Dialogue that the Jewish God ofOT scriptures is anything other
than the same God which Christians worship. JP and Dialogue acknowledge that
Jews and Christians worship the "same God," the unique creator revealed in the OT
scriptural traditions. Yet by introducing a second divine, personal agent into the
cosmic order of things, an entire reconstruction of the traditional symbolic universe
of monotheism can take place and be substantiated in explicitly Christian terms! No
longer does divine unity simply mean numerical uniqueness, as Jews have long
claimed. "Two powers" scriptural texts demand that the concept of God's uniqueness
be redefined to enfold a complex unity of two agencies, operating harmoniously with
each other. The simple Jewish cosmology of a single creator God is shifted to a more
complex Christian cosmology of "two powers" in heaven. And this seismic shift
corresponds to a shift in collective identity. These strategies of rereading Jewish
traditions are socially effective in the continual process of negotiating and indexing
Christian monotheistic identity vis-a-vis Jewishness. Both JP and Dialogue are





The eventual cultural disentanglement in the fourth century of (rabbinic)
Judaism and (orthodox) Christianity depended in large part on the ability of Christian
leaders of earlier generations to craft for themselves cultural (and textual) discourses
that engaged shared Judeo-Christian symbols in distinctive "Christian" ways. Our
self-proclaimed Christian texts are complicit in that process. We have seen how
Christians of the second century actively engaged the symbol of "one God" in
diverse literary strategies as a powerful ideological tool for resisting, repositioning,
and rereading "Judaism" and "Jewish" traditions in order to shape and articulate their
own peculiar "Christian" identities. By harnessing the symbol of "one God" from the
broader Judeo-Christian discursive culture and using this in various combinations
with constructed images of Judaism, our texts could create new worlds of meaning
and identity, identities that were at once marked by belief in "one God" and were
"Christian" in a way that was distinctively not "Jewish."
1. Textual Constructions and Existing identities
Each of our texts acts as a vehicle for voicing a particular construction of
"Christian," "Jewish," and "one God" identities in ways that either contest or
reinforce existing senses of communal identity. In the case of the Ignatian epistles of
Philadelphians and Magnesians, one senses that the textually constructed identities
of opposition—Judaism and Christianism—actually run in the face of the blurred
categories of overlap which characterized Jewish and Christian interactions in the
communal life of these two cities. Behind the rhetoric of the text lies a hidden reality.
Philadelphians and Magnesians contest the fuzziness of negotiated Christian-Jewish
identities in Philadelphia and Magnesia, respectively, by positing a sharp contrast
between "Judaism" and "Christianism." Jews are not Christians, Christians are not
Jews, and never the twain shall meet. In this case, the text of these epistles presents
the world not as it is, but as it could (or rather, should) be. And the way to make
reality conform to textually-constructed identity, the text proclaims, is through
regular participation in the unity of God through the eucharist. By reaffirming again
and again the unity of God and Jesus Christ through collective participation in the
eucharist under the authority of a single bishop, a new less-fuzzy, distinctively
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"Christian" identity can emerge that will more clearly articulate the difference (as the
text constructs it) between Jews, as those who reject Jesus, and Christians, as those
who accept him.
For KP and Aristides' Apology, the idea of "one God" is constructed in a very
different way than with Ignatius. The sacramental monotheism of Ignatius that
closely united God, Jesus, and "Christians" in the eucharist now gives way to the
idea of "one God," conceived along (Middle Platonic) philosophical lines as the
supremely transcendent creator, without reference to Jesus (KP fr. 2; Apol. I)!1
"Jews" and "Judaism" are not primarily those who reject Jesus (as for Ignatius), but
those who do not have "knowledge" of the one creator God (as the text portrays his
nature). For KP, Jews worship angels and participate in a lunar cult and are thereby
excluded from knowledge of the "one God," even though they desire to do so and
claim to do so (fr. 4ap). Similarly, for Aristides, Jews confess "that God is one"
(14.3a Sy) and "suppose in their minds that they are serving God, but in the methods
of their [cultic] practices" Aristides himself knows that "their service is to angels and
not to God" (14.4a Sy). In both cases, "Jewish" identities (as "Christian" ones) are
constructed and indexed against an equally constructed idea of "one God." In this
way, Jews are artificially excluded (KP) or distanced (Apology) from the very
indicator that the text itself presents as fundamental, namely, accurate knowledge of
the one God. Jewish cult cannot therefore represent the highest, most enlightened
form of worship (KP) or the most harmonious form of ethnic society (Apology).
We may sense something disingenuous behind the textual rhetoric and
constructions in these monotheistic classification systems. If we listen closely, we
hear the silenced voices of those Jews and their multiple monotheisms that we
discovered in Chapter Two. We sense the moves of power being made by these texts
to wrest away from the Jews their public claims to know the "one God" and to place
it in the hands of Christians. There is a displacement of Jewish identities. With these
classification strategies we are involved then in a larger internecine dispute over the
nature of true monotheism taking place among the discourses of Jews and Christians.
Yet there is also a sense that already extant Christian communal identities are being
confirmed or perhaps more firmly established. In the one case, the Christian sense of
being "true worshippers" of the "one God" is bolstered through the development of
1 We have argued that the ambiguous fr. 2 of KP should not be understood christologically
(see ch. 4 Excursus).
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an explicitly "Christian" epistemology (KP). In the other case, Christian sense of
being a different "race" of people is confirmed by an ethnoracial classification
schema {Apology). In both cases, the figure of Jesus (so removed from the
presentation of the "one God") becomes the bearer of revelatory tradition. In this
way, only Christians are privy to "accurate knowledge" of the "one God."
In Aristo's JP and Justin's Dialogue, once again, an altogether different
picture of the "one God" appears, now surprisingly constructed as "two." Through
repetition of proof-texts from Hebrew scripture, both texts claim that the Jewish
scriptures themselves teach the existence of a "second God," which they identify
with Jesus. The texts have the Jews begin the argument by invoking such passages as
Isa 44:6 {JP) and Deut 4:19 and Ps 95:5 (LXX) {Dialogue). In so doing, they present
as "traditional" to Judaism a belief in the absolute uniqueness of God that would
exclude any possibility of the existence of "two powers" in heaven. Our texts claim
the belief in a second divine figure exclusively for Christians. Jews, who are
presented in both texts as not believing in the existence of this deuteros theos, have
thereby jettisoned the proper interpretation of their scriptural heritage.
There is an air of authenticity to these "two powers" arguments from
scriptures, for we have seen how the rabbis inveighed against certain minim who
believed in "two powers in heaven."2 JP and Dialogue thus collude (from the very
opposite direction) with rabbinic arguments that those who believe in "two powers in
heaven" are not Jewish. For the former, they are Christian; for the latter, minim. Yet
there is also a sense in which the plurality of Jewish monotheisms on the ground is
not being accurately represented by these texts and indeed has been altogether lost in
this dialectic of mutual exclusion.3 In particular, the voices of certain para-rabbinic
Jewish groups that did believe in the existence of "two powers in heaven" are
discursively squelched in these textual strategies.4 If the arguments of JP and
Dialogue are read in the context of this historical plurality, their claims to a
specifically "Christian" monotheism can be seen really as discursive strategies within
2 Ch. 2 §3.
3 In Chapter Two we argued that there is a sense in which we can speak of Jewish
"monotheism" as the predominant form of early and second-century Jewish religion. We do not imply
by this that Jewish monotheism was either (1) a monolithic entity, (2) always had the same
expressions, or (3) that it could not include diverse representations of the one true God, including the
addition of a secondary personal agent alongside that God (see Ch. 2 §3). Jewish religious belief and
practice and Jewish conceptions of God were diverse, yet the overwhelming evidence is that they
directed their worship to one God alone as a peculiarly Jewish religious standard.
4 Justin hints at this diversity [Dial. 48.4).
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ongoing debates over the nature of the one God in relation to secondary heavenly
figures that was taking place in the broader Judeo-Christian culture. Behind these
textual voices that so clearly distinguish Christian from Jewish monotheism may be
perceived a certain interpenetration and sharing of Christian and Jewish ideas about
the one God. These are voices somewhat lost to history but which may perhaps be
reconstructed in part by reading our monotheistic texts "against the grain."
Through our six texts we have grasped a sense of how second-century textual
productions of monotheistic strategies represent bids at staking claim to communal
identities by contesting and/or confirming existing senses of identity. Our
monotheistic identity strategies all too often create false senses of unity, as though
there were a single, reified version of Christianity, Judaism, or the idea of "one
God." We have seen how behind these texts, however, may be perceived a more
complex discursive settings of disentangling Judeo-Christian sub-cultures.
2. The "Jesus Problem" Revisited
If, as we have shown, these textual strategies are constructions of power, then
we may ask finally about them, "Why did many Christians use monotheistic
ideologies as a tool for identity construction?" What underlying social concerns
seemed so pressing that Christians felt the most appropriate response was to reclaim
a sense of who they were as monotheists by means of highly-conscious literary
strategies that resisted, repositioned, and reread Judaism and Jewish traditions?
Alternatively, we may intonate the question slightly differently and ask, "Why did
many Christians use monotheistic ideologies as a tool for identity construction?"
Why articulate Christian identity vis-a-vis Judaism through a series of literary
exercises expressed in specifically monotheistic ways, that is, in terms of a
quintessential Jewish identity marker (as demonstrated in Chapter Two)? Why not
select some other constitutive Jewish symbol(s) to delineate Jewish and Christian
identities, perhaps a symbol some Christians could more easily repudiate?5
Quite serendipitously, the answer to these queries was already incipient in the
initial framing of our investigation. Early on, we observed that Christian devotion to
5 The brief answer to this question is, of course, that Christians often did select other symbols
as areas of self-definition vis-a-vis Judaism; the Mosaic Law and its observance are particularly
prominent in this regard. Yet, for many communities no symbol was more important for shaping
Christian identity than the idea and confession of one God and the concomitant cult of exclusivist
monotheism that ties in with that belief.
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Jesus alongside the one God seemed to present a social and rational incongruity with
more traditional presentations and practices of Jewish monotheism and pagan
polytheism. We labeled this incongruity the "Jesus problem" (ch. 1 §1). Two issues
inhere to this problematic, namely, the worship ofa second—no more, no
less—heavenly figure,6 Jesus, and the significance of the newness of that cultic
practice vis-a-vis more well-established cultic modes in the Empire. These motifs
recur throughout our literature as interlocking themes, suggesting that the "Jesus
problem" itself constitutes the broader social (and not merely theological)7 context
against which the crafting of Christian literary strategies of monotheistic identity was
deemed necessary. The best way to demonstrate the social significance of the "Jesus
problem" is to rehash the logic of our texts with a view to highlighting the elements
of Christian "newness" and the importance of Jesus in this regard.
Ignatius explicitly frames "Judaism" and "Christianism" in terms,
respectively, of something "old/antiquated" versus something "new" in Christ.8 For
him, Jesus Christ reveals the one God in a new way. His faithful obedience to God in
the gospel instantiates his unity with God and becomes paradigmatic for the
"Christian" community founded by him. The gospel itself renders "Judaism"
antiquated and useless (Magn. 8.1; 9.1) and ushers in something profoundly
"distinctive" (e^aipexov) in "Christianism" (Phld. 9.2) through the creation of a
cosmic ecclesia consisting of believers of all ages—prophets, patriarchs, apostles,
and church—harmoniously united with God and with one another. To participate in
the gospel is to participate in unity with God and Jesus. The gospel thereby becomes
the dividing line between antiquated "Judaism" and authoritative "Christianism." At
the same time, it becomes the quintessential paradigmatic expression of Jesus' unity
with God. This is why "Judaism" is to be avoided, especially when its influence
extends into the practice of the "Christian" churches. If the gospel effects social
harmony, it is equally true, for Ignatius, that "Judaism" (sc. the anti-gospel) leads to
social differentiation. By turning towards certain interpretive (Philadelphians) and
cultic (Magnesians) patterns associated with "Judaism," some so-called "Christians"
6 Jews question why a second figure was worshipped at all (cf. above n. 3); pagans, why only
a second figure was worshipped.
7 Eric Osborn clearly demonstrates the important theological and philosophical concerns that
Christian devotion to Jesus raised amidst confessions of one God. Though he does not label this the
"Jesus problem," it is evident that similar phenomena are involved in his description of second-
century Christian theological development (cf. our discussion of his work in ch. 1 §2.1.1).
*Magn. 8.1; 9.1; 10.2; Phld. 9.2; cf. ch. 3 §1.1-3.
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in Philadelphia and Magnesia effectively abandon the new revelatory, unifying,
cosmic value of Jesus in the gospel in favor of what is now outmoded, obsolescent,
and alienating.
For bishop Ignatius, there can be but one response. "Christians" must
perpetually reclaim their distinctive "Christian" identity9 vis-a-vis "Judaism" through
a series of cultic practices designed to actualize afresh the unity of God worked out
in social harmony with the designated leadership. The communities of Magnesia and
Philadelphia must resist "Judaism," the antiquated anti-gospel system, in their midst
by repeatedly actualizing through the eucharist, the reflection of Jesus' unity with
God in the gospel and of the church's ongoing unity with God through Jesus. In sum,
Ignatius constructs a response to those so-called "Christians" who would backtrack
into an antiquated system of practices associated with "Judaism," from which the
"Christian" church had decisively emerged through the gospel, the expression of
Christ's unity with God. "Christians" must regularly embrace and reenact afresh
the "newness" of their identity in Christ, an identity that came about
specifically through the revelation of the one God in Jesus Christ which
rendered "Judaism" obsolete. To resist the antiquated, anti-gospel influence of
"Judaism" in the church, Christians at Philadelphia and Magnesia must regularly
reactualize the unity of God in their midst by maintaining social harmony and
frequently participating in eucharist on the Lord's Day under the appropriate
leadership. Christian "newness" of Jesus-devotion is not herewith only legitimated in
a theology of divine unity based in the revelation of God in Jesus! It is embraced as
part of "Christian" identity established through Jesus' unity with the one God
through the gospel, an event which has rendered "Judaism" outmoded. In his own
way, Ignatius offers a response to the "Jesus problem" through the construction of a
monotheistic identity grounded in the worship of the one God in a new way through
Jesus.
The repositioning strategies of KP and Apology broker solutions to the "Jesus
problem" from a very different angle of attack than witnessed with the bishop of
Antioch, yet in a way that constructs and legitimates a new "Christian" community in
an identity grounded in authentic "knowledge" of the one God because of the recent
revelation of that God in Jesus. KP specifically legitimates the "newness" of
Christian faith by reassigning the relative value of revelatory knowledge versus
9 Magn. 4.1: "It is right not only to be called 'Christians' but to actually be [Christians]."
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ancestral tradition for transmitting authentic understanding of the true God (ch. 4 §3).
To do this, KP articulates a comprehensive epistemology based on the supreme value
of Jesus for revealing "knowledge" of the one true God. The recent revelation of the
one God in Jesus trumps all appeals to the value of ancestral traditions in revealing
the one God. In this way, Christian faith becomes the ideal cult to which all others
should aspire, since it is based on religious practices revealed from the distinctly
authoritative revealer figure, Jesus. Through this newly-established framework of
"knowledge" grounded in the revelation of God in Jesus, a distinctly Christian
identity emerges and the "newness" of Christian faith is socially legitimated. The
recipient community is emboldened in its monotheistic mission to Jews and pagans,
and can counter Jewish and pagan claims to "know" the unique God through
established ancestral traditions. Jews and Greeks may escape "ignorance" and
embrace "knowledge" of God by submitting to the novel revelation of God in Christ
Jesus mediated through apostolic tradition. In so doing, they assume a Christian
identity.
Apology aggregates Christian and Jewish races in a myth of shared descent
from the one God, and distinguishes them as revealed monotheistic traditions
fundamentally different from the common mythic origins of the polytheistic races. In
this way, Aristides legitimates montheistic races vis-a-vis polytheistic ones. By
further identifying the best of Jewish monotheistic tradition (specifically its theology
and moral law) with Christian tradition he is able to legitimate the latter with
reference to a community with respectable ancestral traditions. Yet Aristides is also
aware that he is involved in mapping a new community which derives its claims to
authority from Jesus, the progenitor of a "new people" (16.3 Sy: By
presenting Jesus as a superior lawgiver-revealer figure who harmonizes the dictates
of Christian ritual and ethical worship with the transcendent, self-sufficient nature of
the one true God, Aristides encodes Christianity not only as the best of the
monotheistic tradition but as the ethnos par excellence, which all should aspire to
join. Apology offers appeal to a wide Jewish and pagan audience to forsake Jewish
monotheism and pagan polytheism, respectively, in favor of a new myth of shared
descent from the Most High God through Jesus, who alone accurately revealed him
and harmonized authentic "knowledge" of the one God in the cultic worship and
ethical practice of a new race.
The rereading strategies of JP and Dialogue likewise share a concern to
frame Christian monotheistic interpretive identity in terms of something "new" in
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Jesus vis-a-vis traditional interpretive stances of Judaism. Both JP and Dialogue
situate their Jewish interlocutor as the one who first raises the problem which Jesus-
devotion presents vis-a-vis traditional biblical monotheism as understood by the
Jewish community.10 The dialogues respond to the accusation by challenging what
they present as the "traditional" Jewish understanding of divine unity (i.e., unity is
equivalent to numerical uniqueness). They point to Jewish scriptures of creation and
theophany, respectively, and reread them, in order to demonstrate that these actually
demand the existence of a second power in heaven, a personal divine agent figure
who acts on behalf of the one God by mediating in the act of creation or by revealing
the will of God to OT saints in theophanic appearance. More universally, these "two
powers" rereading strategies legitimate, authorize, and perpetuate a particularly
Christian "two powers" cosmology and worship practice within the scope of
authoritative texts. By introducing a second divine, personal agent into the cosmic
order of things, an entire reconstruction of the "traditionally"-Jewish symbolic
universe of monotheism can take place and the worship of a second figure can be
substantiated in explicitly Christian terms! This "two powers" cosmology is "new,"
yet only in the sense that it had been veiled prior to the coming of Jesus. Though
latent in the texts of the Hebrew scriptures, the Jews missed these "two powers" texts
{Dial. 55.3), and thus the traditional ideas of one creator God must now be modified
in light of the Jesus-event. The polemic of JP and Dialogue is shaped in terms of
traditional readings versus newer rereadings. Christian rereadings are productive of a
distinctly Christian interpretive identity, and they unveil the previously hidden "two
powers" nature of the cosmos. They substantiate and authenticate the novelty of
Christian scriptural readings and its monotheism through this very interpretive
identity.
Our texts agree then. With Jesus, a fundamentally new way of relating to the
one God of Jewish monotheistic tradition has come. And a new community has
entered the human drama, which, though it bears some historic relation to Jewish
monotheism and faith, perceives itself as mediator of a "new" way of worshipping
God through Jesus." In every strategy the relation of Jesus to this "newness" is
10 Cf. ch. 5 §§1.3-4 (JPy, Dial. 55.1.
" In our examples, Christian "newness" is always indexed against traditional Jewish
monotheism. Jonathan Z. Smith brilliantly demonstrates how questions of identity are always worked
out vis-a-vis an "other" ("What a Difference a Difference Makes," in Jacob Neusner and Ernest S.
Frerichs, eds., "To See Ourselves as Others See Us": Christians, Jews, "Others" in Late Antiquity
[Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985] 3-48).
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conceived differently and expressed in varying permutations, yet it is always
fundamentally constitutive to the entire endeavor of constructing "new" monotheistic
identities. In crafting and exercising these strategies, Christians engage in nothing
shy of reenvisioning in a fresh way the entire traditional cosmic order in heaven and
on earth!
Those whose voices are preserved in the works we studied show no sense of
shame or embarassment about the historical novelty of their community vis-a-vis the
licit and even esteemed quality of ancient Jewish traditions. They evince no desire to
capitulate to the accusations of pagans or Jews who would mock the nascence of
their communal identity. Rather, the Christians who gave shape to these monotheistic
strategies embrace the innovate character of their movement and of their version of
monotheism. They harness the newness of the revelation of God in Jesus to their
social advantage, giving voice to an alternate reality. Hand-in-hand with embracing
their "newness," these Christians innovate. They craft new modes of discoursing,
reasoning, and interpreting in respect to the one God of Jewish tradition, as a way of
establishing Christian identity as worshippers of the one God in a "new" way
through Jesus. And they innovate strategies to legitimate their novel belief in the one
God by means of a more comprehensive, authoritative framework. For Ignatius, that
frame of reference was the unity of Jesus with God in the gospel regularly
reactualized in the new community through the eucharist. For KP, it was a new
epistemology grounded in the revelation of God in Jesus. For Apology, it was Jesus,
perceived, like a Solon of old, as the founder of a new society, who harmonizes the
Christian people's "knowledge" of the one God with their ritual and ethic and
thereby creates an ethnos par excellence. For JP, Jesus is God's personal assistant
who mediates in creation, while in Dialogue he is the manifestation of the one God
to the Jewish patriarchs, thus requiring "new" ways of envisioning the one God and
the cosmic order. In every case, these texts articulate in different permutations the
motif of the "newness" of Christian worship in Jesus. They are all actively involved
in giving voice to a "new" myth in which the one God is revealed in some novel,
authoritative way in Jesus. In so doing, these authors and their monotheistic
strategies give to ordinary Christians a voice by which to embrace the novelty of
their peculiar monotheistic identity in a culture that esteems traditional structures like
Judaism. These monotheistic strategies articulate answers to the "Jesus problem!" It
is against this larger social issue that these Christian texts reconstitute and actualize a





Reading and Reconstructing the Ignatian Opponents
This Appendix suggests a distinctive approach to understanding the nature
and teaching of the opponents resisted by Ignatius in his epistles (§1). The nuanced
method proposed here regards each Ignatian epistle as a carefully articulated literary
work consciously tailored to address the peculiar historical circumstance of the
community to which Ignatius sends that missive (§2). Applying a "thick(er)
description" to each of the epistles allows a window into recovering a somewhat
distorted yet not altogether inaccurate historical context for the churches of Anatolia
and Rome to which Ignatius wrote his missives (§3).
1. Interpretive Questions
Along his journey to Rome, where Ignatius (quite eagerly!) anticipated
becoming "food for beasts" {Rom. 4.1), the bishop of Syrian Antioch probably
around 113 CE passed through a series of communities in western Asia Minor. While
there, he had occasion to stop for some duration in Philadelphia and later Smyrna,
where he received delegates from churches at Ephesus {Eph. 1.3-2.1), Magnesia
{Magn. 2), and Tralles {Trail. 1.1). Prompted by firsthand experience with certain
"false teachings"1 at Smyrna and Philadelphia and presumably by circumstantial
reports to a similar tune from the emissaries from Ephesus, Magnesia, and Trades,
coupled with his concern for peaceful resolution to some conflict that had engulfed
his community at Syrian Antioch, Ignatius undertook a program of correspondence
with these churches of western Anatolia. Why not capitalize on the honor accorded
an impending martyrdom?2 From Smyrna he dictated letters to the churches in
Ephesus, Magnesia, Trades, and Rome, and upon arriving at Troas he had three
additional letters inscribed to Smyrna and Philadelphia and to Polycarp bishop of
Smyrna. If there is a leitmotif to the collective group of Asian letters, it is the
concern for social harmony established through common cultic participation in the
1 'EtepoSo!;*: Cf. Smyrn. 6.2; Magn. 8.1; ETspoSiSaaKCxXeco: Pol. 3.1; KEVoSo^ia: Magn.
11.1; Phld. 1.1.
2 Rom. 9.3. Honor was granted him even by his "opponents" {Smyrn. 5.2).
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one eucharist. This appeal for communal harmony is expressed against the backdrop
of "false teachings" which Ignatius perceived as threatening the social fabric of the
Asian Christian communities, and in two of the letters, Magnesians and
Philadelphians, these threats are categorized in terms of "Judaism" and once in terms
of "judaizing."3
This summary conceals a complex web of seemingly intractable problems.4 It
is widely debated, for example, whether Ignatius has in mind in the Asian letters two
deviant "groups" ("trajectories," "tendencies") of opponents, one which propounded
a docetic christology and another which "judaized," or does he have in his field of
view some single complex, syncretistic heresy which combined both docetic and
"judaizing" tendencies?5 Furthermore, what is the precise nature of the opponents
3 The single reference elsewhere to "the Jews" (Smyrn. 1.2) is of little significance for our
analysis. It is situated in a passage which "is semi-credal" and Ignatius "significantly fails to develop
[the formula] in his understanding of the church" (Judith M. Lieu, Image and Reality: The Jews in the
World of the Christians in the Second Century [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996] 27).
4 Paul J. Donahue comments, "The nature of the evidence makes conclusive proof impossible
at almost every point" ("Jewish Christianity in the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch," VC 32 [1978]: 81).
5 This does not include Christine Trevett's proposal. She envisions a tertium quid, an anti-
episcopal "phenomenon different from the erroneous practices associated with Docetists and
Judaisers" ("Prophecy and Anti-Episcopal Activity: a Third Error Combatted by Ignatius?" JEH 34
[1983]: 13). James Moffatt also speaks of "anti-episcopalians" ("An Approach to Ignatius," HTR 29
[1936]: 11-15), though he does not distinguish them as sharply as Trevett. For an overview of the
proposals see C.K. Barrett ("Jews and Judaizers in the Epistles of Ignatius," in Robert Hamerton-
Kelly and Robin Scroggs, eds., Jews, Greeks and Christians: Religious Cultures in Late Antiquity.
Essays in Honor ofWilliam David Davies [Leiden: Brill, 1976] 220-32).
Among those distinguishing two groups are Cyril Charles Richardson (The Christianity of
Ignatius ofAntioch [New York: Columbia University Press, 1935] 51-54), Virginia Corwin (St.
Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960] 52-87), Hans-Werner
Bartsch (Gnostisches Gut und Gemeindetradition bei Ignatius von Antiochien [BFCT 2/44; Giitersloh:
C. Bertelsmann, 1940] 34-39: two "Stromungen"), Donahue ("Jewish Christianity," 81-93), Robert
M. Grant (The Apostolic Fathers: A New Translation and Commentary. Volume 4: Ignatius ofAntioch
[Camden, N.J.; Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1966] 22), and C.P. Hammond Bammel ("Ignatian
Problems," JTS 33 [1982]: 81-83, 88-89: two "tendencies" [Judaizing, docetic] "not entirely
separate"). William Schoedel is carefully nuanced and recognizes distinctions between "the Judaizers"
at Philadelphia and at Magnesia ("Ignatius and the Archives," HTR 71 [1978]: 101-06).
Among those envisioning a single group (or trajectory) are Theodor Zahn (Ignatius von
Antiochien [Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1873] 356-99: "eine einzige haretische Richtung") and
J.B. Lightfoot (The Apostolic Fathers, Part II: S. Ignatius, S. Polycarp [2 vols.; 2nd ed.; London:
MacMillan, 1889] 1.373-88: "the heresy is one"), Walter Bauer (Die Briefe des Ignatius von
Antiochia und der Polykarpbrief [HNT Erganzungsband, Die apostolischen Vater 2; Tubingen: J.C.B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1920]; Rechtglaubigkeit und Ketzerei im altesten Christentum [BHT 10;
Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1934] 92), L.W. Barnard ("The Background of St. Ignatius of
Antioch," VC 17 [1963]: 198-203), Pierre Prigent ("L'Heresie Asiate et 1'Eglise confessante: De
1'Apocalypse a Ignace," VC 31 [1977]: 7), and Barrett (ibid., 241; well-nuanced). Einar Molland
regards this view as "the communis opinio since Theodor Zahn's and Lightfoof s masterly
contributions" ("The Heretics Combatted by Ignatius of Antioch" JEH 5 (1954): 1-6; cf. Donahue,
ibid., 82: the "common opinion").
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involved and the content of their teaching? And does Ignatius' portrayal of his
opponents predominantly reflect the situation familiar to him from Antioch and/or
western Asia Minor?6
2. Contextual Observations
We offer a few methodological observations. First, there are elements in the
Ignatian letters reflective of the bishop's Syrian background and which
demonstrate his ongoing profound concern for the church at Antioch. The
circumstances surrounding his arrest had left a void in leadership at Antioch, and the
community was evidently embroiled in some type of social strain. This much is
certain. But was this tension foisted upon it from without (persecution) or from
within (internecine strife)? The former is usually presupposed,7 yet the latter is not
without its advocates.8 Ignatius' leadership status in Antioch may not have been
without question, and it may well have been his failure to maintain unity in the
congregation that precipitated the situation that ultimately led to his arrest. This
reconstruction, if correct, goes a long way in explaining Ignatius' frequent self-
effacement (and his uncertainty of "attaining God")9 characteristic of the early
missives from Smyrna. Whether this interpretation is accurate or not, the bishop does
continue to express deep concern over the ongoing situation of instability at Antioch
(Rom. 9.1). He had sent messengers from Syria to Rome as vanguard to announce his
imminent arrival (Rom. 10.2) and had commissioned liaisons from Antioch—Philo
and Reus Agathopous—to update him on the situation back home (Phld. 11.1;
6 Antioch: Corwin (St. Ignatius), Donahue ("Jewish Christianity"), Trevett ("Prophecy"), and
Robert R. Hann ("Judaism and Jewish Christianity in Antioch: Charisma and Conflict in the First
Century," JRH 14 [1986/87]: 341-360). Asia Minor: Zahn {Ignatius), Lightfoot {S. Ignatius), Jakob
Speigl ("Ignatius in Philadelphia: Ereignisse und Anliegen in den Ignatiusbriefen," PC 41 [1987]:
360-376), and Peter Meinhold (Studien zu Ignatius von Antiochien [Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag,
1979]). Henning Paulsen is nicely nuanced, allowing for aspects of both contexts (Die Briefe des
Ignatius von Antiochia und der Briefdes Polykarp von Smyrna. Zweite neubearbeitete Auflage der
Auslegung von Walter Bauer [HNT 18, Die apostolischen Vater 2; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul
Siebeck), 1985] 29-31).
7 Already defended at some length by Zahn (Ignatius, 242-50).
8 P.N. Harrison (Polycarp's Two Epistles to the Philippians [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1936]), followed by William R. Schoedel ("Theological Norms and Social
Perspectives in Ignatius of Antioch," in E.P. Sanders, ed., Jewish and Christian Self-Definition.
Volume I: The Shaping ofChristianity in the Second and Third Centuries [London: SCM Press, 1980]
36-44; also, Ignatius ofAntioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius ofAntioch [Hermeneia;
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985] 13-14) and approached from a somewhat different direction by
Willard M. Swartley ("The Imitatio Christi in the Ignatian Letters," VC 27 [1973]: 90-103).
9 Cf. Rom. 9.2.
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Smyrn. 10.1-2). He further urges in his earlier letters from Smyrna that prayers be
directed on behalf of the restoration of the Syrian community (Eph. 21.2; Magn.
14.1; Trail. 13.1; Rom. 9.1). When Philo and Reus Agathopous finally caught up
with him at Troas, the news from Antioch was favorable. The formerly tense
situation had been diffused and order restored (Phld. 10.1-2; Smyrn. 11.1-2; Pol.
7.1), and a growing confidence in the tone of our bishop is tangible in the letters
from Troas. Upon hearing this good news Ignatius requests that embassies be sent to
Antioch from those churches he had personally visited, Philadelphia and Smyrna
(Phld. 10.1-2; Smyrn. 11.1-2; Poly. 7.1; cf. Pol. Phil. 13.1). All this activity points to
an intentional, well-coordinated diplomatic program ofsending and receiving
emissaries from Antioch (doubtless at great expense to the churches!)10 and
demonstrates his profound ongoing concern for the tense situation there. The bishop,
it seems, milked his "mission" to Rome for all it was worth!
To his concern for the Syrian context we may also note the web of symbols
that pervades his epistles and reflects consistent patterns of thought shaped by his
experiences in the hellenistic city (quite probably Antioch).11 Othmar Perler has
demonstrated that Ignatius' compositional style bears the imprint of "Asianic"
rhetoric and shows strong points of contact with the thought of the very Jewish 4
Maccabees.12 The bishop's indebtedness to Antioch extended (perhaps
unconsciously) to his own contacts with Jewish influence there!13 William Schoedel
has noted the influence on Ignatius of civic and political ideologies from the
hellenistic city.14 Hermann Josef Sieben has firmly situated the Ignatian letters within
the literary form of hellenistic letter-writing.15 The cumulative evidence points to a
rootedness within the hellenistic world, and to the extent that we may combine this
10 On the "staged" nature of Ignatius' mission see Schoedel ("Are the Letters of Ignatius of
Antioch Authentic?" RelSRev 6 [1980]: 200; Ignatius, 12).
11 Trevett observes the conditioning of Ignatius' Antiochene experiences and demonstrates
conceptual connections with other Syrian literature ("Prophecy," 4 n. 10 et passim). Cf. Barnard
("Background," 196-97) and Robert M. Grant ("Scripture and Tradition in St. Ignatius of Antioch,"
CBg 25 [1963]: 333).
12 "Das vierte Makkabaerbuch, Ignatius von Antiochien und die altesten Martyrerberichte,"
Rivista di archeologia cristiana 25 (1949): 47-65; cf. H. Riesenfeld, "Reflections on the Style and the
Theology of St. Ignatius of Antioch," StPatr IV (TU 79; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961): 315-18.
13 Grant nevertheless appears hasty when he concludes, "The principal features of his thought
come to him from the apostolic faith as interpreted in the Jewish Christian circles of Antioch"
("Scripture," 334).
14 "Theological Norms," 47-49; Ignatius, 7-10; cf. Riesenfeld, "Reflections," 316-17.
15 "Die Ignatianen als Briefe: Einige formkritische Bemerkungen," VC 32 (1978): 1-18.
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with Ignatius' care for the Syrian church we may speak of a "mode of thought"
reflective of and shaped by that context. The application ofsimilar linguistic patterns
and shared imagery to his opponents across the Asian letters16 may point then not to
the singular nature ofan Anatolian "heresy"11 as much as to Ignatius' own
rootedness in urban Syrian Antioch and the singular mode of thought and symbolic
apparatus he had developed through his circumstances and life there. This is
certainly the case with the emphasis on social harmony and divine unity, which
represents a semiotic pattern embedded in Ignatius' mode of hellenistic thought and
theology developed already in Syria (see Appendix B).
Second, particularities from the Anatolian context emerge in the letters.
This is not surprising given the fact that Ignatius writes to no community there with
which he does not have some personal contact, whether through visit (Philadelphia,
Smyrna) or reception of emissaries (Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles).18 Sensitivity to the
historical situation is particularly apparent from the resume of Ignatius' encounter
with opponents during his stay in Philadelphia19 as well as from the mention of his
run-in with unnamed opponents at Smyrna.20 He appears, for example, genuinely
nonplused by the presence of conflict in Philadelphia, and his inability to persuade
his opponents from OT scripture evinces a certain polemic spontaneity for which he
was unprepared and seemingly had to improvise.21 This is all the more surprising
considering that he hails from an urban area in Syria with a significant and well-
16 Cf., e.g., "weeds" or "evil plants" (Eph. 10.3; Trail. 6.1; Phld. 3.1), "false
teachings/worthless opinions" {Phld. 2.1; Magn. 11.1), "division" {Phld. 2.1; 3.1; 7.2; 8.1; Smyrn.
8.1), etc. It is preferable to regard this language as a patterned response modeled on Ignatius'
preexisting thought process and pre-formed vocabulary.
17 Pace Prigent ("L'Heresie," 1-7), many of whose observations are misguided on this very
point.
18 Schoedel refers to Ignatius' "special sensitivity to the needs of the churches" ("Theological
Norms," 37).
19 Phld. 6.3-8.2. Note also 3.1 (ox>x on reap' vptv peptcpov evpov); 6.3 (tcai n&ai 8e ev ol<;
EXaXrioa); 7.1 (peTa^h [you] div); 7.2 (coq irpoeiSora xov pepiopov nvcov); 8.2 (etce'i qicovaa nvwv
Aeyovnov).
20 Smyrn. 5.3. Note also evorioa at Smyrn. 1.1 and the final greetings by name (13.2).
21 Pace Schoedel, Ignatius, 11 n. 62. Ignatius' ability to engage OT scripture polemically
seems very limited. He introduces only two OT passages both from Proverbs with the formula "it is
written" {Eph. 5.3; Magn. 12), possibly quotes a third text (cf. Trail. 8.2), and makes few additional
allusions from OT (cf. Swartley, "Imitatio," 88 n. 31). Cf. the comments of Theo Preiss ("La mystique
de Limitation du Christ et de l'unite chez Ignace d'Antioche" RHPR 18 [1938]: 222-23), Paulsen
{Briefe, 65: "die Art und Weise des ign[atius] Umgangs mit dem AT bleibt erstaunlich schmal [nur
zwei Zitate sind aufweisbar!]"), and Grant ("Scripture," 323: "[T]hese allusions suggest that Ignatius
knew something of the OT though it cannot be said that his mind was steeped in it.").
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respected Jewish colony.22 Due diligence should be given this observation. Any
simple literary transference by Ignatius from some hypothetical situation in Antioch
onto Anatolia should not be assumed a priori, certainly not with respect to
Smyrnaeans and Philadelphians. He does not dictate these missives without some
regard to the actual context of his recipients. Any false reference to the actual
situations he experienced in Philadelphia and Smyrna would discredit his authority to
be heard by those very communities.
The remaining letters, too, evince a certain contextual-distinctiveness which
urges caution against too readily importing a Syrian context onto the situations
reflected in the letters inscribed in Anatolia. The letter of Romans, for example,
written from Smyrna has a very different, contextually-distinct interest from the
missives directed to the Asian churches. Ignatius' desire to stave off any lobbying
efforts by the Roman Christians which might have prevented his martyrdom
pervades almost every paragraph of Romans and offers a striking contrast with the
letters to Asia Minor with their concern for "heresy" and "false teaching."23 In
Ephesians, Ignatius notes his awareness of a group of itinerants whose "false/evil
teaching" (Kaicf|v 8t8axfiv), apparently involving a "gnosis" related to heavenly
mysteries,24 had been previously rebuffed by the church at Ephesus (9.1). The
wandering nature of this group suggests missionary activity, which would have
fostered the spread of their teachings in different urban settings of Anatolia, and it is
possible that Ignatius encountered the same (or similar) "heretical" group in
Smyrna.25 At any rate, whether or not Ignatius personally encountered this
"heretical" group from Ephesus while he stayed at Smyrna, he is indebted to the
direct, firsthand report by the Ephesian delegation, and we must take seriously his
claim to have heard directly from their bishop Onesimus that "no heresy was found
22 Carl H. Kraeling, "The Jewish Community at Antioch," JBL 33 (1932): 130-60; cf. Lieu,
Image, 23-24.
23 Zahn correctly concluded, "Die Gefahr...muss eine ortlich begrenzte sein, und Rom liegt
weit ab von dem bedrohten Gebiet" (Ignatius, 356).
24 The emphasis on special knowledge is also evident from 17.lb-2a where the "teaching of
the ruler of this age" is contrasted (cf. 8e) with a wisdom available to every Christian "kapovrei; 0eo-G
yvwciv." Cf. Eph. 19, perhaps countering similar claims to "gnosis" by his opponents.
25 As Zahn proposed (Ignatius, 356-60). How should we interpret eyvcov Se Jtapo8e6aavxd<;
tivac; 8KEi0ev (Eph. 9.1): "But I came to know certain people who had passed by [Smyrna] on their
way from there [=Ephesus]," or "I have learned that certain people from there [=Ephesus] had passed
by [you at Ephesus]?" These itinerants had likely not arisen within the context of the Ephesian church,
since they were given no hearing (cf. 6.2; 9.1) and bishop Onesimus reported that "no heresy has
found a home" among the church (6.2). This favors the former reading.
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among" them (6.2). His address to the Ephesians is further marked by locale-specific
imagery attested in his reference to the miniature temples carried about in the
religious processions in honor of the Ephesian Diana (9.2).26 Similar context-specific
particularities are manifest in the letter to Tralles, which was also written while their
bishop, Polybius, accompanied Ignatius (1.1; 3.2), and anything the latter
communicated by letter would likewise have been subject to the scrutiny of the head
of the Trallian community. We will not belabor the point, except to say that we must
take seriously these literary references to direct reports by the delegations from
Ephesus and Trades and, as we will see, Magnesia. Our bishop, it seems, knew how
to tailor-make his missives.
5- aThiclc(er) Description:8 A Nuanced Approach
The Ignatian letters evince a profound concern for the situation in
Antioch and reflect a mode of thought deeply-rooted in the hellenistic city and even
in its Judaism (probably Antioch), yet their subject matter is in many ways
context-specific to the Asia Minor communities.27 This suggests that a letter-
specific nuanced approach is the most appropriate method for uncovering the nature
of "heresy" and "false teaching" in Asia Minor. In this endeavor to reconstruct the
identity of Ignatius' opposition, the letters written to Philadelphia (Philadelphians)
and Smyrna (Smyrnaeans, Polycarp) should be prioritized, since Ignatius had
personal, firsthand experience with these two communities.28 Jakob Speigl has
argued for the programmatic importance of the events and experiences which
Ignatius encountered at Philadelphia for the remainder of his epistolary program to
the Asian churches.29 We suggest the same may be said of his time at Smyrna.
26 Schoedel, Ignatius, 67.
27
Any debate couched in terms of Ignatius' epistles reflecting the historical situation of
Antioch or western Asia Minor is therefore a red-herring. A better way to frame the problem is to
inquire into the extent to which Ignatian concepts, literary patterns, depictions of opponents, polemic
responses, etc. are reflective of the Sitz im Leben at Antioch and to what extent that in Anatolia.
28 They have the added advantage of being the last of the letters Ignatius composed.
29 The importance of Philadelphians as a heuristic starting point was recognized by Zahn
(Ignatius, 261-72; 373-78), Barrett ("Jews and Judaizers," 232-38, 240), and Speigl ("Ignatius,"
360). Speigl places fundamental weight on the events (Ereignisse) and experiences (Erfahrungen)
Ignatius had with a single docetic-Judaizing group at Philadelphia for the remaining letters in Asia
Minor: "Die warnenden AuBerungen in den Briefen an die Epheser und ausdriicklicher in denen an
die Magnesier und Trallianer konnen als Anliegen aufgefaBt werden, die sich ihm seit den dortigen
[i.e., in Philadelphia] Erfahrungen (erstmals oder erneut) aufgedrangt hatten;" this includes Smyrn. as
well (ibid., 372; cf. 368-69). He speaks of a request, "das unterschiedslos alle Briefe durchzieht und
ebenso in den Briefen an die Konfliktgemeinde Philadelphia begegnet wie in den Schreiben nach
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Only by first mapping the contextual-directedness of the individual letters
and the differences in the letter-specific literary portraits of Ignatius' opponents can
we reasonably come to conclusion about the number and nature of opposition
groups/trajectories that Ignatius may have encountered (firsthand or by word of
mouth) in Asia Minor.30 Such letter-specific "thick(er) description"31 might also help
resolve the individual literary portraits of the Ignatian letters into some broader
framework. We might, for example, descry a holistic pattern of response or
description that may well point back to Ignatius' Antiochene context. And then the
hermeneutical cycle reiterates. Such a dialectic approach allows for both the
intentionality of a programmatic epistle-writing mission (with Antioch partly in
view) and the spontaneity of the Anatolian Sitze im Leben. This approach takes the
diversity of the epistle-specific literary shaping of the "opponents" seriously as a
window into historical context.
Smyrna, Ephesus, Magnesia und Tralles. Das ist das Anliegen, das am konkretesten im Wunsch sich
ausspricht, dafi die richtigen Eucharistieversammlungen gehalten werden" (ibid., 372-73).
30 A similar approach has been pursued by Moffatt ("Approach") for Trallians (though too
methodologically restrictive) and by Jerry L. Sumney ("Those Who 'Ignorantly Deny Him': The
Opponents of Ignatius of Antioch," JECS 1 [1993]: 345-65) for Smyrnaeans, Magnesians, and
Philadelphians.
31 "Thick(er) description" plays upon the well-known phrase coined by the American
anthropologist Clifford Geertz ("Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture" in The
Interpretation ofCultures: Selected Essays [New York: Basic Books, 1973, 2000 repr.] 3-30; cf. E.
Silverman, "Clifford Geertz: Towards a More 'Thick' Understanding?" in C. Tilley, ed., Reading
Material Culture [Oxford, 1990] 121-59). We have argued elsewhere for "thick(er) description" of
early Christianity in an unpublished paper (Will Rutherford, "'Thick(er) Description' of the Shaping
of Early Christian Identities: Case Studies in Judaizing at Philadelphia and Magnesia") presented at a




Divine Unity in Ignatius:
Provenance, History of Research, and a Proposal
This Appendix locates the provenance of Ignatius' peculiar belief about
divine unity (§1) and overviews the history of research into the theme with particular
reference to proposed religio-historical backgrounds (§2). We conclude by
suggesting a more nuanced approach to the motif of God's unity in the Ignatian
epistles (§3).
J. Antiochene Provenance of Ignatius' Unity-Motif
The Antiochene development of the all-important Ignatian unity-motif is
quite easily observed from the personal resume of the bishop's experience at
Philadelphia (his first official stop in Asia Minor), particularly the parenetic section
of Phld. 7.1-2. Ignatius had offered a charismatic utterance, which he claimed
reflected the divine spirit speaking through him: "Do nothing apart from the bishop.
Guard your flesh as the temple of God. Love unity; flee divisions. Become imitators
of Jesus Christ even as he is of his father" (7.2). All contextual indications argue that
these exhortations occurred prior to Ignatius having learned of the situation of
"division" that had earlier occurred in Philadelphia. "To be sure," he writes, "there
were those who suspected me of saying these things as having known beforehand
about the division caused by some, but the one in whom I am bound as prisoner is
my witness that I did not come to know [this] from any human being. Rather, it was
the spirit who proclaimed."
There are in these exhortations several characteristically-Ignatian leitmotifs:
the call to social harmony under proper episcopal authority (cf. the infamous yoopiq
xou eTcioKOTiou-motif), emphasis on flesh (oap^-motif), on embracing communal
solidarity (evcooiq-motif) and resisting divisive influences (pepiopoq-motif), and
especially the appeal to imitate Christ (imitatio Christi)—to ground Christian
behavior (Abbild) on analogy between the unity of the divine father and son
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(Vorbild)} In this brief snippet of historical event the fundamental christocentric
nature of Ignatius' theology surfaces and with it the equally-emphatic notion of
social harmony and participation in the church's communal life. The theological-
grounding of Ignatius' doctrine of unity was already deeply ingrained in his
thought patterns from the Syrian context well before his trip through Anatolia.2
These elements of his theology were not developed ad hoc from Anatolian
circumstances. Nevertheless we believe they were applied to the Anatolian context in
a contextually-sensitive manner.
The shared nature of imagery and rhetoric across the Anatolian epistles does
not indicate the singular nature of the opposition in Asia Minor but rather the
singular mode of Ignatius' thought which developed through his circumstances and
life at Antioch.3 Particularly, the circumstances surrounding his arrest in Antioch
were perceived by him to threaten the unity, solidarity, and stability of the
community there, and it is likely this situation that was so fresh on his mind when he
encouraged unity at at his first stop in Anatolia (sc. Philadelphia) without any prior
knowledge of "division" there. And it must have been in light of the ongoing
situation at Antioch which when combined with the perception of threats native to
Asia Minor, led the bishop to dictate his letters." Harrison's suggestion that Ignatius'
arrest was the result of some inner-Christian discord seems plausible and goes a long
1 Cf. Henning Paulsen, Die Briefe des Ignatius von Antiochia und der Briefdes Polykarp von
Smyrna. Zweite neubearbeitete Auflage der Auslegung von Walter Bauer (HNT 18, Die apostolischen
Vater 2; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1985) 85.
2 Similarly, Hans Freiherr von Campenhausen (Kirchliches Amt und geistliche Vollmacht in
den ersten drei Jahrhunderten [BHT 14; Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1953] 105-16),
William R. Schoedel ("Theological Norms and Social Perspectives in Ignatius of Antioch," in E.P.
Sanders, ed., Jewish and Christian Self-Definition. Volume I: The Shaping ofChristianity in the
Second and Third Centuries [London: SCM Press, 1980] 36-44; Ignatius ofAntioch: A Commentary
on the Letters ofIgnatius ofAntioch [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985] 13-14), and
L.W. Barnard ("The Background of St. Ignatius of Antioch." VC 17 [1963]: 195: "The essence of his
thought springs out of his experience as Bishop of Antioch in spite of his concern for the Churches of
Asia Minor").
3 Failure to give this due weight is often the fundamental error of those who see a single
docetic-Judaizing heresy in Asia Minor (e.g., Pierre Prigent, "L'Heresie Asiate et l'Eglise
confessante: de l'Apocalypse a Ignace," VC 31 [1977]: 1-22). By focusing on common rhetorical
elements in the letters (which, we argue, point to the bishop's singular mode of thought established in
Syria) and then projecting this common rhetoric too hastily onto the diversity of religious expression
in Asia Minor, scholars too often reduce the manifold Anatolian religious tendencies actually reflected
in the Asia Minor letters.
4 Schoedel, "Theological Norms," 30-56.
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way in explaining why the unity-motif assumes such preeminent importance in
Ignatius' encounters with "heresy" and "false teaching" in Asia Minor.5
Whether the development of this uniquely Ignatian motif was the result of
some discord at Antioch, and whether that discord involved an anti-episcopalian
group, the substantial Antiochene Jewish community, "judaizers," and/or docetists, is
certainly possible but simply cannot be proven. All scholarly attempts to reconstruct
a particular Antiochene Sitz im Leben which ostensibly gave rise to this unity-motif
are (indeed, must be) highly speculative.
2. Religi'o-HistoricaI Sources and Their Significance
Scholars posit a number of conceptual frameworks with which Ignatius may
have dialogued to construct his peculiar understanding of divine unity. The various
frames of reference they propose often have direct bearing on how they interpret the
social significance of Ignatius' unity-motif. We review key proposals here.
Heinrich Schlier was the first scholar to systematically locate Ignatius'
thought on unity within a "gnostic" milieu. He advocated that Ignatius developed his
thought on unity in conversation with a specifically pre-Valentinian, "gnostic"
Mandaean myth of the ascending-descending redeemer.6 Schlier appealed to
seemingly "gnostic" language ("unity," "silence," etc.) and imagery (particularly in
Ephesians 19) of Christ's descent and ascent, of Christians as pneumatikoi united to
the savior, and of martyrdom as "participation in God" (0eob eTrvcuxoo) to assert that
Ignatius held to an Iranian myth of the redeemer-redeemed. In essence Schlier
proposed that the point of contact between Ignatius and "gnosis" was a shared
mythology of redemption grounded in the myth of the savior-saved and the
reassimilation of the fallen souls. In this mythic context, Ignatius' unity-motif
represented the reassimilation of fallen souls to the savior in a cosmic redemptive
drama.
5 Cf. Willard M. Swartley, "The Imitatio Christi in the Ignatian Letters," VC 27 (1973):
101-03.
6 Heinrich Schlier, Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatiusbriefen (BZNW
8; Giessen: Topelmann, 1929). Richard Reitzenstein had earlier briefly intimated a Mandaean Vorbild
behind Ephesians 19 (Das iranische Erlosungsmysterium: Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen
[Bonn: A Marcus & E. Weber, 1921] 86 n. 3 et 234, 236). For a brief and helpful summary of Schlier
consult Virginia Corwin (St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch [New Haven: Yale University Press,
1960] 11-12).
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In an extensive article Theo Preiss enthusiastically appropriated Schlier's
proposal nearly a decade later.7 Preiss argued that Ignatius reduced the Christian
message entirely to one of redemption expressed in a personal quest for immortality
by means of the imitation of Christ's death.8 Ignatius, he claims, conceives
immortality in a rather "gnostic" way, in terms of an entire mysticism of ultimate
union with the divine. The quest to rejoin the divine is the goal of the Christian life,
and as Christ represents "the perfect model of the union of the divine and of the
human" the imitation of Christ becomes the means by which to achieve immortality.9
Preiss detects in Ignatius a radical recentering away from Pauline soteriology of
"participation in" Christ's death, the latter being understood as the central
redemptive event in a grand sweeping portrait of salvation history. Rather, the
Ignatian emphasis on a "mysticism of imitation" has its own distinctive
christological and martyrological implications. Jesus' death was not redemptive sui
generis,10 for "the 'passion' of the martyr has its value in itself, parallel to that of
Christ."u Ignatius' understanding of martyrdom and christology are mutually
constitutive.12 At their base lies a mythology of cosmic redemptive unity, "belief in
the similarity, and, in sum, in the identity of the future condition of the savior and of
the believer saved."13
This leads to what is for Preiss the central problem of Ignatius' thought. In
this soteriological recentering humans arrive at the core of the Christian message,
which may then be called "theocentric" only insofar as it has God as the object ofan
individual's redemptive quest, not as the active and all-powerful subject,14 Ignatius
has shifted soteriology in an anthropomorphic direction, such that one would
7 "La mystique de Limitation du Christ et de l'unite chez Ignace d'Antioche," RHPR 18
(1938): esp. 208-17; cf. 238-39.
8 Ibid., 207-10, 218-21; p. 234: "la redemption consiste surtout a delivrer Thomme de la
matiere et de ces puissances adverses, et a l'integrer dans l'unite divine oil il trouvera l'immortalite."
9 Quote from ibid., 214. For Ignatius this involved imitating Christ's passion through
martyrdom. Martyrdom is, however, not required of all: "le simple croyant s'assure par la
participation a l'unite de l'Eglise et a l'eucharistie une immortalite veritable" (p. 215).
10 Ibid., 211: "[I]l n'attribue jamais a la mort de Jesus la valeur d'un sacrifice...[I]l ne
s'interessait guere a la valeur redemptrice que la mort de Jesus pouvait avoir en elle-meme."
11 Ibid., 212, emphasis added.





inevitably anticipate in his theology "a certain attenuation of the sense of the
transcendence and of the sovereignty of God and of Christ."15 Such a reduction of
divine transcendence, Preiss argues, occurs in the Ignatian letters. Unlike Paul,
Ignatius lacks a sense of the grand sweep of salvation history. There is no doctrine of
creation nor eschatology,16 and the bishop preserves of Paul only "what is necessary
to assure to man his full immortality," that is, the mysticism of Christ.17 It is this
collapse of traditional soteriology (i.e., of history expressed redemptively in terms of
creation and eschatology) that leads in Ignatius to an attenuation of God's
sovereignty. In its place the bishop has elevated a redemption of mystical union with
God, who is described in the letters only in terms of redemption and ipso facto in
relation to the church.
The importance of divine unity for Ignatius' ecclesiology is now unlocked.
"Nothing is more characteristic of the theology of Ignatius," Preiss opines, "than the
manner with which he understands the monotheistic affirmation: it appears only
when it is a matter of insisting on the unity of the church (Magn. 7,2; 8).. .Would we
not say that the monotheistic doctrine is above all the superstructure, the replica of
{la replique sur) the divine plan of unity which ought to exist in the entire spiritual
world and in the church in particular?"18 The monotheistic doctrine is that which is
visible (i.e., the superstructure), yet the divine plan of unity Preiss interprets in
strikingly mystical tones in light of Ignatius' "gnostic" view of redemption.
'Evott^/evcoou; 0eob "above all does not mean only the unity commissioned or
given by God, but also 'the unity of divine things.' Perhaps we would sometimes
need to translate 'the unity of God', God designating no longer only a personal
being, but a sort of divine substance, the parts of which it is the goal of redemption to
gather together."19 It is in light of its cosmic significance that Preiss interprets not
only the language ofunity, union, harmony, andparticipation in the Ignatian letters
but also the perceived threats ofdivision. Earthly division threatens the stability of
15 Ibid., 218.
16 Ibid., 221-226. Preiss correctly dismisses Eph. 15.1, though he has not observed Rom.
inscr. (ev eeXqpaxt xoii 0e/.r|aavxoi; xa rtavxa a eaxtv). It is specifically the "positive side of
primitive eschatology"—Christ's return, God's seizing power over the entire world, the resurrection
of the believers—which Ignatius replaces with "une autre eschatologie, etrangere a l'histoire, l'idee
hellenistique de l'ascension de 1'ame vers l'immortalite" (ibid., 226).
17 Ibid., 219.
18 Ibid., 227, emphasis added.
19 Ibid., 228.
257
the cosmic order (perhaps even the divine unity itself!), and Ignatius' developed "a
theory of the unity and authority of the church" (including episcopal monarchy) to
counter this threat to the metaphysical order.20
In sum, Preiss portrays "the mysticism of imitation"—the believer's
redemptive ascension towards God through imitation of Christ—as playing the
central role in Ignatius' thought.21 It is the key organizing principle which galvanizes
the bishop's thinking about martyrdom, Christ, and the church. And there is an
integral dialectic between "la mystique de 1'imitation du Christ" and the unity-motif.
The former is conceived of entirely in terms of the latter, so that Preiss speaks even
of the presence of "toute une mystique de 1'unite" within Ignatius' thought.22 The
interpenetration of the ideas is quite natural, for the bishop's "entire theory of
redemption is centered on the realisation of the union and integrity of the divine
sphere."23 Because of its integral role in the image of "mystic" union with the divine,
we see why for Preiss unity (ev6xr|<;) or union (evcooiq) represents "a fundamental
category of Ignatius' thought."24 The concept of unity is "active on every level of his
mysticism; from his ethic, passing by his ecclesiology and his christology, it leads to
his theology in the strict sense of the word." And, it is so profound in Ignatius'
thought that "the problem of unity places that of the sovereignty of God entirely in
the background."
Not everyone was as anxious as Preiss to so wholeheartedly adopt Schlier's
thesis. Only two years after Preiss, Hans-Werner Bartsch critiqued and modified
Schlier's work in his Gnostisches Gut und Gemeindetradition bei Ignatius von
Antiochien.25 As the title suggests, Bartsch was interested in delineating the material
Ignatius had inherited from the traditions of the Christian community
0Gemeindetradition) from that which was his own peculiar property, which he
20 Ibid., 230.
21 Even despite his best intentions (cf. ibid., 198: "Naturellement nous ne pretendons pas
ramener a ce seul motif toute la pensee d'Ignace.").
22 Ibid., 229.
23 Ibid., 234; cf. 237: "Ignace est certes trop Chretien pour partager cette notion mythique,
impersonnelle et substantialiste du sauveur et de Dieu. Neanmoins le primat de cette evtocu; donne a
toute sa mystique une forte tendance a voir en Dieu, dans le Christ, dans les membres de son corps et
dans tout ce qui concerne l'Eglise und seule et meme substance plus ou moins divine."
24 Ibid., 229, for the following quotes too.
25 (BFCT 2/44; Giitersloh: Verlag C. Bertelsmann, 1940).
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received (our author argues) from "gnosis" (Gnostisches Gut).26 Bartsch identified
three layers of tradition in Ignatian thought—a primitive kerygmatic core
uninfluenced by gnostic ideas and mythologies27—and two strata of gnostic
material—an indirect gnosticism which settled onto traditional material28 and a direct
gnostic influence, which Bartsch specifically saw in Ignatius' concept of God
(Gottesbegriff).29
According to Bartsch, Ignatius was not primarily dependent on the tradition
of biblical monotheism for his idea of God, as von der Goltz had earlier asserted.30
Rather, his was an image of God consistent with the larger cultural atmosphere of
hellenism, particularly the rationalistic philosophic idea of (cosmic/world) unity
popularly mediated through the oriental cults in terms of divine unity—most
appropriately called Henotheismus?] In Ignatius, such common hellenistic ideas
about God are accompanied by certain "gnostic" elements that come quite strongly to
the fore. These can be seen particularly clearly in Ignatius' idea of the unity of God,
to which is bound a "circle of mythological images"—those of the church as the
26 By "gnosis" {die Gnosis) Bartsch indicates a pre-Christian world-view, "die unabhangig
vom Christentum entstanden ist, dieses aber wie jede ihr begegnende Religion erfaBte und nach ihrer
Weltanschauung umbildete. Wir haben die Gnosis also primtir als Weltanschauung zu verstehen. Ihr
Charakteristikum ist der radikale Dualismus, der zum erstenmal nicht innerweltlich ist, sondern die
gesamte Welt, den griechischen Kosmos mit seinen Gottern, wie die orientalische Welt mit ihren
Planeten, auf die Seite des Bosen riickt und von dem einen fernen Gott trennt.. .Der weltanschauliche
Charakter der Gnosis bringt es mit sich, dafi sie nicht als eine Religion, die zu einem Zeitpunkt
entstanden ist, von diesem Zeitpunkt an in der Welt wirksam ist, sondern in alien Religionen dieser
Zeit als umbildende Kraft mit in Rechnung gestellt werden mufi, ohne dafi charakteristische
mythologische Ziige in Erscheinung trdten" (ibid., 6-7, emphases added).
27 Ibid., 167: "Es ist die Tradition vom Leben, Leiden und Auferstehen Christi" and which is
closely linked with Paul.
28 Ibid., 76: "so vor allem der Logosbegriff und die Charakteristik des Erlosers als Gesandter
und Offenbarer," transmitted from Johannine circles. Cf. ibid., 61-71, 167.
29 Ibid., 76-77, 166-68. Cf. Corwin {St. Ignatius, 12-13) and the review of her work by
Herbert Musurillo ("Ignatius of Antioch: Gnostic or Essene? A Note on RecentWork" TS 22 [1961]:
103-10).
30 Particularly in relation to Pauline material and the gospel of John (Eduard Freiherr von der
Goltz, Ignatius von Antiochien als Christ und Theologe: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung
[TU 12/3; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1894]). Bartsch, ibid., 8-11, 17-18, 21, and esp. pp. 34-52.
According to Bartsch, excepting Ephesians, the NT stresses die Einzigkeit Gottes, while Ignatius'
Gottesbegriff stresses die Einheit Gottes.
31 Bartsch, ibid., 17-23. Bartsch did not deny a role for biblical monotheism in Ignatius'
thought, yet he significantly mollified it to the extent that the latter entered Ignatius' thought-world
only through contact with hellenistic-Judaism, particularly the writings of the Jewish philosopher
Philo, who "combined Old Testament monotheism with the ideologically-grounded monotheism of
Hellenism." Thus OT biblical monotheism "nicht das treibende Element in der Diskussion des
Ignatius ist" (ibid., 21). And though Ignatius demonstrates ideological contacts with other
"hellenistic" NT writings—Eph 4:5-6 and 1 Tim 2:5—one should not envision literary dependence,
for they all inhabit the same thought world of hellenistic-Judaism (ibid., 22-23).
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body of Christ (owgLa-Begriff), of believers as plants, and of a cosmic building.32
Interesting for the present thesis is the fact that Bartsch appeals specifically to
Philadelphians and Magnesians to isolate the concept of divine unity as Ignatius'
own intellectual property to be differentiated from the stratum that belongs to
Christian tradition and which includes inter alia the superiority of Christ and the
salvific-historical significance of the prophets.33 In these two missives, Ignatius
reflects a concept of divine unity external to that of OT tradition, one which Bartsch
previously identified with die Gnosis. In addition to divine unity, Bartsch points to
other characteristically "gnostic"-elements in Ignatius' concept of God—the idea of
silence (aiyfj; f)onxia) and of height and grandeur (vyicioq-Begriff) as
characteristics of God.34 For these concepts as well Bartsch attempts to demonstrate
that Ignatius is dependent not on traditional Christian material but on extra-Christian
ideals common especially in die Gnosis.35 Ignatius, he argues, has inherited directly
from "gnosis" a comprehensive world-view of the concept of God and especially of
divine unity, a world-view mediated to him through hellenistic-Judaism (and Philo in
particular).36 In his analysis Bartsch has shifted the question of Ignatius' gnostic
influence from "a fixed point within gnostic speculation" (i.e., Schlier's soteriology)
to "the total context of the gnostic world-view" (i.e., theology)-31 or, to say it another
way, he has relocated the point of Ignatius' contact with "gnostic" thought from
soteriology to t/zeology.38
12 Ibid., 24-34. Yet these three characteristically-gnostic images for Ignatius "ihren
mythologischen Gehalt verloren haben und zu Bildern, zu Allegorien geworden sind" (ibid., 31).
33 Cf. Phld. 9.1-2; 5.2; Magn. 8.2. Ibid., 39-52; cf. p. 34: "Die Fremdheit der Gottesidee des
Ignatius gegeniiber dem Gottesbegriff der Tradition, d.h. dem biblischen Gottesbegriff, wird sich
besonders dort zeigen, wo Ignatius sich mit den judaistischen Lehren auseinandersetzt, die den
Gottesbegriff des Judentums vertreten."
34 Ibid., 53-61, 71-75, respectively.
35 Ibid., 74: "[W]ie wir gesehen haben, sind alle anderen Ausdriicke, wie der eine Gott, der
hochste Gott und die Ruhe Gottes aus der Gnosis und den orientalischen Einfliissen zu erklaren."
36 I.e., a hellenistic-Judaism through which "gnostic" thought has penetrated. In this sense
Bartsch recognizes Philo as "Mittler der gnostischen Gedanken" and comments, "Es ist aber wichtig,
daB wir bei jedem Begriff eine Verbindung zu Philo herstellen konnten; denn einmal sind wir so der
Annahme einer direkten Abhangigkeit vom Griechentum enthoben, und zum anderen wird die
Tatsache damit erklart, daB der Begriff -utjtioto^ sowohl im AT als auch in auBerchristlichen
Zeugnissen seine Parallelen hat" (ibid., 74; cf. 20-23, 72-74).
37 Ibid., 166.
38 Ibid., 33-34, 56, 76-77, 166-67, et esp. 78-132.
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Bartsch and Schlier have been followed by a number of others,39 though not
by all.40 Preiss, in particular, was critiqued by E. J. Tinsley, who argued that Ignatius
"is a good early example of Christian 'incarnational' mysticism in which the
historical life of Jesus has a central place." "He is concerned," Tinsley continues, "to
warn his readers of the dangers of a vague amorphous 'spiritual' mysticism which he
sees is bound to result from devotion to a 'docetic' Christ."41 To repeat Tinsley's
arguments would be burdensome, especially since they are summarized and
addressed elsewhere.42 It is sufficient to note that though Tinsley rightly draws
attention to the incamational nature of Ignatius' thought, he does not sufficiently
undercut Preiss' central contention that Ignatius reduces the gospel to an essentially
ahistorical message of redemption and in so doing deemphasizes the transcendence
and sovereignty of God and Christ.43
More recently a number of counter-voices to the traditional proposals of
Schlier and Bartsch have emerged. Noting the "conundrum in which Tinsley can
pose as a sharp critic of Preiss and yet unwittingly concur with Preiss' portrayal of
the leading motifs of Ignatius' thought," Willard Swartley reexamines the imitatio
Christi in Ignatius. Casting reasonable doubt on elements of Preiss' presentation,
especially that "Ignatius' theology was abortive in historical consciousness,"
Swartley posits a different approach to the problem. "Since it is now apparent," he
notes, "that one can read Ignatius with different kinds of glasses and observe
different emphases, it becomes essential to carefully analyse, not systematize, the
letters, paying special attention to the concepts which dominate Ignatius' thought and
their specific inter-relationship."44 From a reading of the Ignatian epistles Swartley
39 Peter Meinhold ("Die Anschauung des Ignatius von Antiochien von der Kirche" in idem,
Studien zu Ignatius von Antiochien [VIGM 97, Abteilung fur abendlandische Religionsgeschichte;
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979] 57-66) and Campenhausen (Kirchliches Amt, 106-09).
Joachim Rogge (""Evojok; und verwandte Begriffe in den Ignatiusbriefen," In .. .undfragten nach
Jesus: Beitrage aus Theologie, Kirche und Geschichte [Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1964] 48,
esp. 50-51) is somewhat too enthusiastic when he notes, "H. Schlier und H.-W. Bartsch...haben
erstmalig eine so erdruckende Fiille religionsgeschichtlicher Parallelen beigebracht, daB auch dann,
wenn man geneigt ist, das Gewicht dieses Materials nicht so schwer wiegen zu lassen, die teilweise
Verwurzelung des Ignatius in der Gnosis unabweisbar ist" (ibid., 45).
40 Corwin offers a dissenting voice (St. Ignatius, particularly chs. 5 and 9; cf. also pp.
175-88).
41 E.J. Tinsley, "The imitatio Christi in the Mysticism of St. Ignatius of Antioch," in StPatr 2
(TU 64; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957) 554-55.
42 In Swartley's "Imitatio."
43 Cf. ibid., 84-85.
44 Ibid., 90.
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identifies four "clusters of thought" (ethical, christological, unity, and obedience),
each of which depends on a number of consistent lexical terms. He proposes a
statistical analysis: "If one could discover; (sic) first, which cluster is essentially
primary in Ignatius' thought; then secondly, which cluster-member is essentially
primary to the other cluster-members; and third, how each cluster (and the members
thereof) functions in relation to the others, then one should be able to authentically
describe Ignatius' concept of imitatio Christi,"45 Unable to carry out such a complex
analysis at length, Swartley contents himself with uncovering first "the frequency of
these concepts in the letters (without any prima facie critical regard to contexts)" and
then analyzing "certain interrelationships which are crucial to any conclusions even
of a tentative nature."46 Among other conclusions Swartley finds that:
imitation is never directly associated with attaining God or even with
discipleship...Rather imitation and discipleship, although they both
express aspirations of dedication, are oriented to different sets of
terms...
Examination of the imitation-texts clearly shows that imitation is
oriented primarily to suffering, not to the cross specifically but to
suffering as the inevitable consequence of loving like God loves...
From this point of view it is difficult to see why Ignatius' imitation is to
be associated at all with mysticism (whether Preiss' mystical quest for
immortality or Tinsley's mystical meditation on the cross). Further,
since the concept of imitation is used only once (Rom. 6,3) with
reference to Ignatius himself, how can this concept be regarded as the
'key' to understanding Ignatius? This term is used rather to describe a
simple historical reality (fully Pauline and Petrine, esp. I Pet. 2,20-23)
of what it means to be Christian. Associated with the ideas of suffering,
love, and unity, Ignatius' use of the term imitation is radically historical,
not metaphysical or mystical.
For Ignatius then, imitatio Christi means shaping one's historical life,
especially in love's willingness to suffer and in love's quest for unity, by
the paradigm set forth in Jesus Christ.. .Further, his pressing concern
that he be worthy, be found in him, and attain unto God, puts the
distinctive Ignatian emphasis not on the general point of imitatio Christi,
(since the imitation-terms are never associated with these concepts) but
on the specific point of Ignatius' own discipleship.. .For the key to
understanding Ignatius is not his view of imitation per se but his
understanding of his own distinctive role as a disciple who must first be
a bona fide bishop of the church in Syria, then (with no problem) a




Ignatius certain way (attainment) to God as bishop and martyr is the
unity of the church"
Furthermore, Swartley observes:
evcootq is a distinctive Ignatian concept, connected with his relation to
the church in Syria. Further, because the evmciq-concept occurs only
once in Romans (and there refers to the church at Rome, Rom. Ins.) and
is thus never in this letter associated with Ignatius' frequently expressed
concern of being worthy, being a true disciple, attaining God, etc.,
Preiss' thesis that Ignatius refers to the unity of flesh and spirit via the
incarnation as external support for his quest for immortality is
contradicted by the evidence. The phrase, oapKiKdiq and
TtveupomKCOi;, does not occur outside the Inscription, even though
there are appropriate occasions for it (5,3; 7,3; 8,3), especially if this
unity were the background of Ignatius' imitatio Christi. Moreover, the
uses of unity-terminology in Philadelphians shows that the concept is
connected with church unity, not the unity of the flesh with the spirit vis
a vis Ignatius' [sic] attaining immortality.48
Using word-cluster statistics Swartley provides a countervailing voice to
typical "gnostic" readings of Ignatian imitation- and unity-motifs and reemphasizes
the immanent, earthy nature of Ignatius' unity-concept.
What Swartley accomplished through statistical analysis another scholar has
more recently accomplished by identifying an alternative religionsgeschichtliche
schema whereby unity language could have entered Ignatius' thought-world. In an
article on scripture and tradition in Ignatius, Robert Grant steers away from gnostic
ideas and seeks to locate Ignatius more closely with traditional/scriptural Christian
material.49 He suggests that the idea of episcopal unity (i.e., ecclesial unity through
conformity to the authority of the monarchic episcopate) is essentially modeled on
Johannine elements (with a touch of Ephesians) adapted under the influence of
imitation/hierarchy ideas already present in hellenistic-Judaism (Josephus, Paul, and
Didache). Similarly, the concept of sacramental unity (i.e., ecclesial unity through
participation in a shared sacrament) was developed in interaction with Pauline
material again interpreted "in language related to Judaism."50 "The principal features
of his thought," Grant concludes, "come to him from the apostolic faith as
interpreted in the Jewish Christian circles of Antioch."51 Grant's attempt to shift the
47 Ibid., 99-101.
48 Ibid., 101-02.




discussion of religio-historical sources in a more hellenistic-Jewish direction, while
laudable, is not wholly convincing, if only because he did not have the necessary
space to provide a detailed treatment such as Bartsch's. The links to hellenistic-
Judaism which he makes are somewhat haphazard and unclear.
In his impressive commentary on the Ignatian letters, William Schoedel has
assumed the mantel of drastically vitiating gnosticizing claims for Ignatius, arguing
instead for "a minimalist interpretation of the theme" of mystical participation in
God.52 "A major purpose of this commentary" on Ignatius, Schoedel notes, "is to
show the extent to which he had absorbed elements of what may be loosely called
popular Hellenistic culture."53 Schoedel moves away from earlier attempts to situate
Ignatius within a primarily "gnostic" milieu to posit an alternative vision, an Ignatius
affected by a spiritual climate of "a widely diffused otherworldliness that variously
affected forms of mystical and semi-mystical movements of the period," of which
"the Gnostic religion" [sic] is one "distinctive articulation."54 "[W]e are doubtful," he
claims, "that some important themes in Ignatius apparently of mystical
provenance—that of unity, for example, or that of silence—are as deeply rooted in
this soil [sc. "spiritual climate of otherwordliness"] as may at first seem likely. At
any rate, the emphasis in this commentary is on the extent to which potentially
mystical or marginally Gnostic images and ideas have been made to subserve more
concrete religious and social concerns."55 Schoedel's research shows the likelihood
that Ignatius' references to "unity" imitate contemporary hellenistic and hellenistic-
Jewish rhetoric and metaphors of concord and social harmony,56 whether portrayed
variously through musical57 or biological metaphors,58 Stoic imagery of cosmic




56 E.g., Philo Virt. 35; Mut. 200; Migr. 220. Schoedel, ibid., 51-55, 74, 104-05, 116-17, 202,
206.
57 As, e.g., in Eph. 4.1-2; Rom. 2.2; Phld. 1.2. Schoedel, ibid., 51-53: musical imagery is
"close in spirit" to that in "Gnosticism," yet "is more specific and concrete and can be illustrated more
adequately from the central cultural tradition of Hellenism."
58 Eph. 4.2; Trail. 11.2; cf. Philo Her. 242; Fug. 112; 4 Macc. 14:6; Plutarch Frat. amor.
2,478f.
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unity,59 or more predominantly modes of political discourse popular in the hellenistic
city.60 Social concord, Schoedel helpfully reminds us, is "a dominant theme in the
discussion of relations between cities and between citizens in cities of Asia Minor in
this period,"61 and Ignatius demonstrates awareness "that in calling for unity and
harmony he was building on standard rhetorical practice."62 What Schoedel has done
is to shift the purpose and importance of this language within the Ignatian letters by
providing a less-mystical, more concrete religio-historical discursive context. The
result of his approach has been to suggest an immanentization of one's reading of
Ignatius, so that by "unity," specifically concrete social interaction "is what is
primarily involved."63
5- Re1'magrung Ignatius' Unity-Motif
From the above survey we see that to inquire into the religio-historical
sources of Ignatius' unity-motif and the socio-religious function(s) of that concept
has been to ask much the same question. The two are closely linked. Depending on
the conceptual framework one uses different images and social meanings for the
unity-motif in the Ignatian letters emerge. Preiss represents an extreme example of
how "gnostic" readings may influence interpretation. He rigorously applies Schlier's
thesis to Ignatius' ideas about martyrdom, christology, and ecclesiology, noting that
the three find their point of contact in a larger "mysticism of imitation" conceived in
terms of redemptive unification with the divine. His elevation of the individual in
redemptive "union with God" is completely consistent with the "gnosticism"
portrayed in the religionsgeschichtliche Schule with its focus on the salvation of
self.64 Though taking a different point of contact with "gnostic" influence, Bartsch
59 Magn. 7.1-2; cf. Eph 4:5-6; Marcus Aurelius Meditations 7.9; Josephus Ant. 4.200-01; C.
Ap. 2.193; Philo Conf. 170; Opif. 171; Spec. 1.67, 70. Cf. Martin Dibelius, "Die Christianisierung
einer hellenistischen Formel," NJahrb 35/36 (1915): 224-36.
60
Eph. 13.1-2; 4.1-2; Magn. 6.1; 15; Trail. 12.2; Phld. inscr.; 11.2. On the use of opovoia as
a political metaphor see Schoedel (Ignatius, 74).
61 See Schoedel ("Theological Norms," 50-51 and relevant endnotes) for literary and
numismatic evidence. Antioch was a major hellenistic city, and we cannot therefore exclude it as the
place where Ignatius received this rhetoric (see supra §1).
62 Schoedel, Ignatius, 8; cf. 105.
63 Ibid., 21-22.
64
Particularly Rudolf Bultmann's existentialism (Primitive Christianity in Its Contemporary
Setting [trans. R.H. Fuller; New York; London: Thames and Hudson, 1956] 162-71: "redemption, the
ascent of the Self').
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similarly allows the ideological "gnostic" world-view and specifically the concept of
God to inform his reconstruction of the historical situation in Philadelphia and
Magnesia (and elsewhere). He reconstructs the historic conflict in terms of a cultic
division played out in the celebration of private mysteries (Privatenmysterien) in
which union with the divine is reenacted and reconstituted.65 Scholars have now cast
sufficient doubt on the "gnostic" models of Schlier and Bartsch, so that these may no
longer be a priori presumed as the driving thought-world behind the Ignatian unity-
motif. Alternative models and approaches (Swartley, Grant, Schoedel) have been
helpful correctives in this regard. Schoedel, for example, reflects a countervailing
opinion, especially to the individualist reading of Preiss. Developing his
understanding of the motif from hellenistic-rhetoric about social and political
"harmony" he points decidedly to the corporate, collective and earth-bound, social
importance of the Ignatian unity-motif. While not denying the element of communion
with God and of divine unity he tends to minimize them.66 These two ways of
reading represent alternative ideas about the ideological and social function of
Ignatius' unity-motif. The former envisions it as "union with God;" the latter as
"union from God." Ultimately none of these approaches sufficiently accounts for the
diversity of Ignatius' thought on this matter, and it is now doubtful whether any
single religio-historical model can adequately inform our interpretation of Ignatius'
unity-motif.67
There seems little doubt in light of Bartsch's research that Ignatius' divine
unity concept did come from somewhere outside the shared traditions of the
Christian church,68 yet to identify this as "gnosis" is unnecessary. The linguistic and
ideological connections Bartsch has noted with "gnosis" are not convincingly
specific to demonstrate contacts with any specific "gnostic" movement of which we
are aware. Nor is his case furthered by his lack of definitional specificity. Bartsch
65 Gnostisches Gut, 13-17, 78-132.
66 Ignatius, 21-22: "A sense of communion with God is not missing from Ignatius and is no
doubt presupposed whenever he speaks of union or unity. For the latter are conferred by God. But
since Ignatius apparently avoids using the term union when he speaks of communion with God, we
may assume that union has to do with the solidarity of the community in social and cultic terms and
lacks deeper mystical significance." Quite simply, "the bishop builds on ideas of concord and unity
drawn from Greek political thought, but he orients them to a conception of the church as a
transcendent reality" (ibid., 116).
67 We do not wish to apply this analysis too harshly to Schoedel, whom we believe to be
rather balanced in approach.
68 His argument in Gnostisches Gut, 42-52, is convincing, if not in every detail, at least on
the whole.
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can discover "gnosis" in Ignatius precisely because he defines "gnosis" so broadly: it
is not a specific movement but an ideology, inseparable from hellenism, transmitted
to Ignatius by hellenistic-Judaism, and penetrating every religious movement of the
time.69 With a definition so nebulous and plastic how could one not find "gnosis" in
Ignatius?
Some contact with hellenistic-Judaism and ideas of divine unity now seems
certain, though no one source can be definitively proven to be the transmitter. This
was proposed by Bartsch, Grant, and Schoedel, and it has been convincingly
demonstrated in the case of Ignatius' contacts with 4 Maccabees by Perler. If Allen
Cabaniss is correct in his (less well-known) assessment of a relation between
Ephesians 19 and Wisdom of Solomon (18:14-15; cf. 7:29-30),™ then a hellenistic-
Jewish context is evident even in this most "gnostic" of Ignatian passages on which
Schlier based so much of his argument! Nevertheless, whatever contacts and
borrowings the bishop owes to hellenistic-Judaism are certainly unconscious on his
part. He rails so strongly against what he perceives as alien "Jewish" influence in the
churches of Philadelphia and Magnesia that his aversion to things "Jewish" would
certainly have prevented any conscious borrowing from overtly "Jewish" sources.
All-in-all, identifying a specific extra-Christian text, set of texts, or ideology
from which Ignatius gleaned his idea of divine unity, and subsequently reading the
Ignatian letters in light of that reconstructed model, remains highly suspect. It is
preferable to retain the ambiguity of the unknown and to envision Ignatius as
generally influenced by the larger rhetorical and ideological milieux of hellenism and
hellenistic-Judaism.
Another option is available. Rather than allow a reconstructed religio-
historical context to drive our interpretation of Ignatius' theology, we should first
evaluate the form and function of divine-unity within the specific literary shaping of
each individual letter and within the historical context presupposed by that letter.71
This will reveal why Ignatius himself perceives (sc. phenomenologically) the
concept of unity to be socially important across a range of specific historical
69 Supra nn. 26 et 36. Cf. ibid., 23: "Dies ist darin begriindet, daB die
Gnosis.. .Weltanschauung ist und als solche in ihren Einfliissen vom Hellenismus nicht rein zu
trennen ist."
70 "Wisdom 18:14f.: An Early Christmas Text" VC 10 (1956): 97-102.
71 Appendix A proposes a method for recovering historical context from the literary shaping
of the Ignatian letters.
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contexts. Only then, out of the diversity of its context-specific applications, should
we attempt a synthesizing reconstruction of his theology of unity. Whatever
"contextually-independent value" the unity-concept held for Ignatius can only be
articulated through a close "thick(er) description" of the texts themselves. These
texts demonstrate how the concept functions for him in specific historic contexts. A
holistic understanding of divine unity in Ignatius will not emerge through some a
priori presumed ideological context from his religio-historical environment. Only by
evaluating its function in the individual letters (sc. its "contextually-specific value")
can we identify the extent to which the unity-motif bears "independent value."
Several reasons make this letter-specific approach attractive in the case of the
Ignatian epistles.
First, in those areas where Ignatius almost certainly used traditional sources
there is clear evidence that he applied them rather freely.72 We must assume that any
religio-historical ideologies he adopted were likewise adapted relatively freely. How
those ideas functioned in their native extra-Ignatian context must not be permitted to
drive the interpretation of motifs within the Ignatian letters. Interpretation of Ignatian
motifs must arise from Ignatius' own texts, not hypothetically reconstructed
mythological or conceptual backgrounds. Our proposed approach refocuses on the
letters themselves.
Second, by examining the place of Ignatius' unity-motif in each letter
individually, the proposed tack does justice to thematic, rhetorical, and lexical
diversity between the Asian epistles and Romans.17, In Romans neither evcocnc; nor
evoxrn; appears, and exhortations to be united with the bishop are entirely absent.
The idea of unity, however, is not entirely absent. The verb evoco occurs in the
inscription, where Ignatius addresses the missive "to those who are united
(f)vcopevoiq) in flesh and spirit (kara adcpica kcci Ttveupa) to his (sc. Christ's) every
commandment." Yet here it does not break beyond stereotyped epistolary forms.74 In
one other passage Ignatius mentions hellenistic-imagery of social harmony. He asks
the Roman Christians to remain silent (sc. not to intervene on his behalf, but instead
to pray; cf. 1.2; 3.2), so that he may become a divine word and "attain God" (0eo\>
72 Cf. Grant, "Scripture."
73 Swartley, "Imitatio," 91-94, esp. Tables A and B.
74 References to harmony, unity, "common life," "physical and spiritual life," or the like
appear throughout the openings and closings of Ignatius' missives. Cf. esp. Eph. inscr.; 21; Magn. 1.1;
15; Phld. inscr.; 11.2.
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emvuxeiv) through martyrdom. Only through their collective silence and concerted
prayer can the contingency of the event itself (cf. 3.2) be turned to certainty, and only
through his martyrdom may their silence finally be broken with the result that they
"may form a chorus in love and sing to the Father in Jesus Christ" (2.1-2). The
collective, harmonious praise anticipated when the bishop "attains God" through
martyrdom is contingent on the community's present harmonious silence (sc. non-
lobbying efforts on his behalf). An idea of mystical participation may be present (i.e.,
through their collective efforts at silence the community too mystically participates
in God through Ignatius' own "attaining God"), yet such a motif is implicit and
certainly suppressed in the rhetoric. Precisely in Romans then, where the motif of
martyrdom and rhetoric of "attaining God" is most prominent,75 we find only the
slightest of links to unity rhetoric and images, and that expressed in distinctly social
(not mystical) form. Conversely, evcootq, evoco, evoxriq, and opovota (sc. unity-
terms) populate in an otherwise unprecedented way the missives of Philadelphians
(lOx) and Magnesians (7x),76 and these are precisely the works where the rhetoric of
"attainment" (e7ci[x\)yxdvco]) is least frequent.77 This suggests that the link between
the unity- and "attaining God"-motifs often appealed to by advocates of "gnostic"
influence is not as certain as once thought.
Third, the proposed approach does justice to thematic, rhetorical, and lexical
diversity within the Asian letters themselves. For example, the motifs which Bartsch
musters to support a "gnostic" understanding of Ignatius' divine unity-motif (oropcc-
Begriff\ believers as plants, cosmic building) are simply not present in
Philadelphians and Magnesians. Bartsch may successfully demonstrate from
Philadelphians and Magnesians that Ignatius' unity-motif comes from outside the
sphere of biblical traditions, yet when he attempts to define that motif in terms of
"gnostic" divine unity he is forced to appeal to Ephesians, Trallians, and
Smyrnaeans\ls Additionally, the images to which Bartsch appeals to demonstrate the
75 [etu]tdyx(xvco appears 9x in Romans; cf. Swartley, "Imitatio," 92.
76 The word frequency is 8.2 and 5.3 per 1000 words, respectively (obtained from
Accordance). The nearest ratio occurs in Ephesians with a frequency of 3.59, followed by Polycarp
(3.01), Trallians (1.64) and Smyrnaeans (1.36). In Romans the ratio is 0.74/1000 words.
77 The word frequency is 0.82 and 1.51 per 1000 words, respectively (obtained from
Accordance). The nearest ratio occurs in Ephesians with a frequency of 1.79, followed by
Smyrnaeans (2.04), Polycarp (3.01), and Trallians (2.46). In Romans the ratio is 6.69/1000 words.
78 Bartsch, Gnostisches Gut, 24-34; cf. Trail. 11.1-2; Eph. 4.2; 9.1; 10.3; Smyrn. 1.2. His
parenthetical reference to Phld. 3.1 "als eine bewuBte Zitierung des Begriffes von Mt 15,13" only
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concept of the height and grandeur of God (n\|/ioxoq-Begriff) outside the biblical
tradition come from Ephesians (19; 9.1; 2.2).79 The "gnostic" motif of "silence" as a
divine characteristic, in addition to appearing in Ephesians (19.1; 15.1-2), does
occur in Magn. 8.2, yet Bartsch is able to describe the motif almost entirely without
reference to its appearance in Magnesias™ Ignatius may well owe his idea of
silence as a divine characteristic to wider religio-historical ideas purveyed in the
early second century. That, however, is another (less-important) question than asking
what role the motif actually plays in the argument ofMagnesians. In the case of the
latter, it takes a relatively minor rhetorical place in the overall argument.81 All-in-all,
the mythological images which Ignatius supposedly borrowed from "gnosis" are
entirely absent from Philadelphians and with the exception of the "silence" motif are
absent from Magnesians. This raises serious questions about whether there may have
been a phenomenologically-significant reason for Ignatius to employ such
"mythological" language much more frequently when writing to the churches in
Ephesus, Trades, and Smyrna—where docetic influence seems to have been
problematic—while not to those at Philadelphia and Magnesia—where "Jewish"
influence was the problem. Inversely, the language of unity is less frequent in the
former than in the latter.82 Does this indicate a phenomenologically-distinct
significance for Ignatius in using the divine unity-motif when he combats "Jewish"
versus "docetic" influence? The approach proposed here can address this question.
These observations suggest that a detailed, "context-specific" analysis of
unity rhetoric on a letter-by-letter basis as it functioned within the historical context
of each community (reconstructed through "thick[er] description;" Appendix A) will
yield better results for understanding the importance of the unity-motif (inter alia) in
Ignatius' overall "independent" theology. Only by the difficult task of wading
through the individual material can we begin to reconstruct Ignatius' holistic
theology, quite independent of presumed religio-historical influences.
attests similar horticultural imagery and can hardly (by appeal to Trail. 11.1) be seen to support
similar mythological background.
79 Cf. Rom. inscr.
80 Gnostisches Gut, 59-60.
81 See infra ch. 3 § 1.2.
82 See supra n. 76.
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